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Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement 
of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military 
interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for 
prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and 
bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a 
prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials—with the top military brass and war 
veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront—who highlight its potential downsides and 
long-term costs, on the other. 
The military leaders—the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington—are 
generally skeptical of humanitarian and other ―idealist‖ interventions that aim to change the 
domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides 
of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian 
policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming 
that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to 
altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests 




expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over 
prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great 
initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention 
from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from 
relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their 
bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping 
and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning 
bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. 
United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant—
the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining—and it may not actually 










List of Tables and Figures                                                                                                            iv 
 
Acronyms                          v 
 
Introduction                    1 
 
Chapter I: The Value of Multilateral Legitimacy for U.S. Military Interventions        25 
1. Norm internalization and the logic of appropriateness            27 
2. Reducing the risk of ―soft balancing‖ by other states            39 
3. Increasing domestic support among the American public           55 
4. Policy benefits: Burden sharing in combat and post-combat           67 
 
Chapter II: A Bureaucratic Politics Theory of U.S. Multilateralism         85 
1. Foreign-policy decision making as a bureaucratic political game           88 
2. Understanding the U.S. military‘s bureaucratic interests and concerns          91 
3. The military as flag-bearers of limited liability              98 
4. Sources of the military‘s bureaucratic leverage           111 
5. How bureaucratic bargaining steers U.S. policy toward multilateralism        123 





Chapter III: Haiti, 1993-94: Securing a UN handoff before going in       155 
1. Origins and evolution of the Haitian crisis            157 
2. The costs of U.S. multilateralism on Haiti            167 
3. U.S. multilateralism as the result of bureaucratic politics          175 
4. The importance of domestic political factors: public opinion and Congress       195 
5. Alternative explanations of U.S. multilateralism in Haiti          206 
 
Chapter IV: Bosnia, 1992-95: We did not want to ―own‖ it             222 
1. Limiting U.S. liability by staying out of it, 1992-93               224 
2. The costs of U.S. multilateralism on Bosnia           228 
3. The U.S. military insisting on multilateral consensus, 1993-95         237 
4. Endgame: NATO air strikes and a NATO-led stabilization force         251 
5. Understanding the military‘s bureaucratic political influence         267 
6. Testing alternative explanations for U.S. multilateralism on Bosnia        272 
 
Chapter V: Kosovo, 1998-99: Europe‘s buy-in through NATO reassures the JCS      284 
1. Background to the crisis              286 
2. The costs of U.S. multilateralism over Kosovo           289 
3. The military‘s pushback against U.S. unilateral intervention         301 
4. How bureaucratic bargaining drove Washington‘s policy toward NATO       315 
5. June 1999: A U.S.-led ground invasion without NATO endorsement?        330 






Chapter VI: Iraq, 1998-2003: The policy is regime change (on the cheap)       349 
1. Prologue: the 1998 ―Desert Fox‖ airstrikes           352 
2. The Bush administration, 2001-2003: Iraq as a vital threat         366 
3. The hard-liners‘ rosy expectations and aversion to multilateralism        376 
4. Powell‘s push for a UN-based approach and the silence of the JCS        385 
5. The outcome: A half-hearted attempt at the United Nations         404 
6. Could a second UN resolution have been obtained?          412 
 
Conclusion                         426 
 
List of officials interviewed               434 
 












Figure 1: Causal pathway to multilateralism/ non-intervention (a first cut)                     5            
Figure 2: Causal pathways to U.S. unilateralism (a first cut)                  6 
Figure 3. Definition of intervention vs. war                11 
Figure 4:  Existing theories vs. my bureaucratic politics theory              16 
Table 1: Discrete decisions on U.S. intervention analyzed in the dissertation                      22 
Table 2: Post-cold war U.S. military interventions                    34 
Table 3:  The Effect of International Endorsement on U.S. Public Support                                 63 
Figure 5: How the military can influence U.S. policy on armed intervention        123 
Table 4: Post-cold war U.S. interventions: IO endorsement sought/ not sought        124 
Figure 6: Causal pathways to U.S. multilateralism/ nonintervention          144 






List of Acronyms 
 
 
AU   African Union 
CARICOM  Caribbean Community 
CENTCOM  U.S. Central Command 
EUFOR  European Union Force (Bosnia) 
IFOR   NATO Implementation Force (Bosnia) 
INC   Iraqi National Council 
IO   International Organization 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JS   Joint Staff 
KLA   Kosovo Liberation Army 
KFOR   NATO Kosovo Force 
NAC   North Atlantic Council  
NAM   Non-Aligned Movement 
NIE   National Intelligence Estimate 
NSC   National Security Council 
OAS   Organization of American States 
OPLAN  Operation Plan 
OSD   Office of the Secretary of Defense 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SC   Security Council (United Nations) 
SCR   UN Security Council Resolution 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
UNMIH  United Nations Mission in Haiti 
UNMOVIC  United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission  
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia) 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission (Iraq) 
USA   United States Army 
USAF   United States Air Force 
USMC   United States Marine Corps 








American leaders worked hard to obtain the explicit endorsement of relevant 
international organizations (IOs), such as the UN or NATO, for the 1991 Gulf War and 
subsequent military interventions in Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Serbia (1999), 
Liberia (2003), and Libya (2011). At the same time, the United States made no such efforts, or 
only half-hearted efforts, to obtain explicit IO endorsement leading up to similar interventions in 
Panama (1989), Iraq from mid-1991 onward and culminating in the 2003 invasion, and for a 
number of counter-terrorism incursions over the last several years. The first goal of this 
dissertation is to explain this striking variation in post-cold war American efforts to obtain the 
endorsement of relevant IOs for military interventions. Put differently, I seek to answer the 
following question: Under what circumstances is the United States likely to engage in significant 
efforts to obtain an explicit IO endorsement before intervening militarily abroad, and when can 
the U.S. instead be expected to straightforwardly intervene on its own or with only ad-hoc 
coalitions of likeminded allies? 
Obtaining IO approval for armed interventions is typically costly to the United States: it 
requires protracted international negotiations and logrolling and can greatly reduce U.S. freedom 
of action. Therefore, American leaders can be expected to make meaningful efforts to obtain IO 
endorsement only if they anticipate significant positive payoffs. My argument, in a nutshell, is 
that U.S. efforts to obtain IO endorsement for military interventions are not only, and not even 
primarily, the result of norm internalization on the part of American leaders, or of Washington 







 Instead, I hypothesize (Chapter I) that the United States usually seeks IO approval for 
prospective interventions primarily because of the expected benefits in terms of policy 
implementation. The endorsement of relevant IOs, obtained before the launch of offensive 
operations, locks in international support and thereby reduces the costs to Washington of 
successfully implementing complex interventions, especially those that require open-ended troop 
commitments for post-combat peacekeeping and stabilization. Put differently, IO endorsement 
obtained from the outset facilitates burden sharing in the long run and therefore limits American 
liability.
2
 As former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sums it up: 
Particularly when it comes to intervening in either civil wars or failed states, it is much 
more sustainable if you have regional IOs and coalitions that are backed by global 
institutions to carry these things out, rather than having the United States with its much 




I further develop a bureaucratic politics theory (Chapter II) that explains how the 
preferences and concerns of specific U.S. policy leaders and governmental organizations can 
actually steer the Washington policy process toward institutionalized multilateralism. My central 
hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs for 
prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and 
bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a 
                                                 
1 For the hypothesis that U.S. multilateralism on the use of force is primarily the result of a post-cold war normative 
shift, see Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2003); and Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security 
Council (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). For the hypothesis that U.S. multilateralism results from 
concerns about potential soft balancing, see esp. Erik Voeten, ―The Political Origins of the UN Security Council‘s 
Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,‖ International Organization 59 (3), 2005; and Alexander Thompson, 
Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2009). On the hypothesized value of multilateralism to boost U.S. public support for armed intervention, see esp. 
Joseph Grieco et al., ―Let‘s Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War,‖ 
International Studies Quarterly, 55 (2), 2011, pp. 563-583; and Terrence L. Chapman, Securing Approval: Domestic 
Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
2 On the American tradition of limited liability in foreign affairs, see Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, 
Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 





prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials—with the top military brass and war 
veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront—who highlight the potential downsides and 
long-term costs of armed intervention, on the other. 
American military leaders—the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in 
Washington—are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other ―idealist‖ interventions that aim 
to change the domestic politics of foreign countries. The military worry that such interventions 
will result in open-ended troop deployments; and they fear that in the absence of perceived vital 
threats to U.S. national security, Congress and the American public are unlikely to support such 
costly engagements overseas. The military also naturally tend to consider all the potential 
downsides of armed intervention, given their operational focus and the awareness that perceived 
failure on their part might among other things negatively affect the armed services‘ institutional 
health and standing in American society. Hence assuming that the military leaders are not merely 
stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to resist prospective interventions aimed 
at changing the domestic politics of foreign countries, especially when they perceive that no vital 
American interests are at stake.  
Research shows that faced with strong skepticism or outright opposition from the military 
leadership, U.S. presidents are in fact unlikely to order American troops into combat overseas.
4
 I 
hypothesize that under such circumstances, civilian advocates of intervention from other 
government agencies need to reassure the military leaders, or at least be able to show that the 
                                                 
4 David H. Petraeus, ―Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force,‖ Armed Forces and Society 15 (4), 
1989, pp. 489-505. See also Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, second ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 312; Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla Klapp, with Arnold 
Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, second edition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 






military‘s concerns have been adequately addressed, in order to forge a winning bureaucratic 
coalition in favor of intervention. Therefore, when the military brass initially opposes the use of 
force, fearing a protracted troop deployment overseas, the administration‘s civilian activists are 
likely among other things to seek IO approval, so as to lock in international support and thus 
maximize the chances of significant post-combat burden sharing. The endorsement of relevant 
IOs, once obtained, can in turn be expected to reassure the uniformed leaders and their 
bureaucratic allies and persuade the president to move ahead with the use of force. United States 
multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant—the outcome 
of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining—and it may not actually reflect the initial 
preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.
5
 
The argument that U.S. military leaders are the driving force behind Washington‘s efforts 
to seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions is somewhat counter-
intuitive: the conventional wisdom holds that American military planners oppose multilateral 
interventions as exceedingly burdensome and dysfunctional, in view of coordination problems 
magnified by doctrinal differences and the growing capabilities gap between the United States 
and its allies.6 One further implication of my theory is that when the military leaders strongly 
oppose a prospective intervention based on the expectation of high long-term costs, if the civilian 
activists are themselves not sufficiently influential inside government and cannot muster the 
necessary resources to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs, the most likely outcome is U.S. 
procrastination and non-intervention. Sometimes, skeptical military leaders and their 
bureaucratic allies may also explicitly recommend that Washington obtain a mandate from 
                                                 
5 On policy outcome as a resultant of bureaucratic politics, see Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 256, 
294-95. 
6 See e.g. Stanley Hoffmann, Chaos and Violence: What Globalization, Failed States, and Terrorism Mean for U.S. 





relevant IOs, when they know that key international partners are also reluctant to use force, so as 










Finally, my theory predicts that if the military leaders and their bureaucratic allies readily 
support the use of force, the most hawkish policy officials will have few incentives to seek to 
obtain a formal multilateral endorsement, since reassuring the military won‘t be necessary—
hence the most likely outcome under such circumstances is U.S. unilateral intervention.  The 
military leaders can be expected to readily support the use of force when either or both of the 
following conditions apply: first, they perceive that vital U.S. national interests are directly at 
stake; and second, they expect that a prospective intervention is highly unlikely to result in an 
open-ended deployment of ground troops. When the military perceive that vital national interests 
are indeed at stake, their focus is on quick and decisive action, their time horizon is shortened, 
and they are likely to agree with civilian hawks that the short-term costs of multilateralism in 
terms of reduced U.S. freedom of action exceed its longer-term benefits. But even in the absence 
of perceived vital threats to national security, when the military leaders do not anticipate long-
term entanglements and costly troop deployments overseas, they can be expected to put up little 
resistance to armed intervention, in the face of a determined civilian leadership. Hence for quick 
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in-and-out missions, such as missile strikes, air raids, commando operations, and more generally 
for interventions anticipated to be limited in time and scope, the U.S. can be expected to 












Liberal theorists since John-Stuart Mill have argued that multilateralism is normatively 
desirable for the international use of force, because it constrains powerful states and makes 
blatantly self-serving interventions less likely.
7
 In this dissertation I seek to explain the value of 
multilateralism, not so much from the viewpoint of Mill‘s impartial spectator, but rather from the 
perspective of very partial Washington policy officials, who are generally motivated by their 
own patriotism, their personal experiences, and the organizational interests of the bureaucracies 
they serve. By showing that IOs are a key factor in U.S. decision making on military 
intervention, I reject the traditional realist ―null hypothesis,‖ according to which international 
institutions are merely epiphenomenal, i.e. have no independent impact on great-power politics 
in the field of international security.
8
  
                                                 
7 J.S. Mill, ―The Spanish Question,‖ in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XXXI ed. by John Robson 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 374. For a contemporary analysis along similar lines, see Michael 
Doyle, ―The Ethics of Multilateral Intervention,‖ Theoria, 53, 2006, pp. 28-48. 
8 See esp. John Mearsheimer, ―The False Promise of International Institutions,‖ International Security 19 (3), 1995, 
pp. 5-49. 
Figure 2: Causal pathways to U.S. unilateralism (a first cut) 
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This dissertation is part of a growing body of scholarly literature which takes it for 
granted that IOs are consequential, including in the field of international security, and it seeks to 
contribute to our understanding of how precisely they can affect state behavior. I argue that when 
it comes to U.S. military intervention, in particular, IOs matter for reasons that are different from 
those typically theorized by institutionalist scholarship in IR.
9
 I further suggest that U.S. 
decisions to seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions cannot be fully 
accounted for by other existing theories. My research thus contributes to ongoing debates in IR 
about the conditions under which powerful states have incentives to rely on IOs to pursue their 
national security objectives under conditions of international anarchy.  
 
A theory of bureaucratic politics? 
By showing how U.S. efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective 
interventions often result from sustained bureaucratic bargaining and deliberations in 
Washington, I also contribute to our understanding of bureaucratic politics in foreign-policy 
decision making. The central tenets of the bureaucratic politics paradigm, as developed by 
scholars like Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, are that (a) policy decisions are usually the 
outcome of bargaining and coalition building among officials from various agencies and 
departments, and (b) how those officials view the interests at stake in a given situation is 
substantially affected by their specific organizational membership (―where you stand depends on 
where you sit‖).10 Critics have emphasized that this approach may be able to explain individual 
decisions after the fact, but it cannot yield general explanatory theories. Where officials stand on 
                                                 
9 The traditional institutionalist argument is that IOs increase transparency or reciprocity and thereby facilitate 
cooperation under anarchy. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).  
10 Graham Allison, ―Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,‖ American Political Science Review 63 (3), 
1969, pp. 689-718; and Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, ―Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 





any given issue is never completely determined by their organizational membership, and even 
assuming that it was, it would be exceedingly difficult to predict the outcome of bureaucratic 
bargaining.
11
 Proponents of the bureaucratic politics approach concede that it should be seen as a 
―research orientation‖ that serves to sensitize the analyst more than as a full-fledged theory 12  
My research however demonstrates that it is in fact possible to develop explanatory 
theories based on the bureaucratic politics paradigm, when the representatives of specific U.S. 
government organizations (e.g., the military leaders representing the armed services) always 
―stand‖ at roughly the same place on a particular matter, for roughly the same reasons, and have 
the ability to actually steer the Washington policy process in their preferred direction.  
When it comes to debating armed intervention overseas, the U.S. military leaders indeed 
display fairly distinctive and persistent attitudes—i.e., they always stand at roughly the same 
place: they are typically concerned about the need for solid domestic political support in 
Congress and among the American public; they are skeptical of open-ended commitments 
overseas, and when they feel that no vital American interests are at stake, they usually counsel 
against using force altogether; but in the face of growing domestic pressure to intervene, they can 
be expected to insist on the need for clear and limited objectives, international burden sharing, 
and a clear exit strategy, to ensure that the bulk of American troops can be quickly withdrawn. 
The military‘s overarching concern, which clearly reflects their organizational interests, is to 
limit the liability of the armed services and their troops.  
                                                 
11 Stephen D. Krasner, ―Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),‖ Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972), 
p. 165; Robert J. Art, ―Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,‖ Policy Sciences 4 (4) 1973, 
pp. 467-90; and David A. Welch, ―The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and 
Prospect,‖ International Security 17 (2), 1992, pp. 121f., 131. 





Furthermore, the military leaders can exert an extraordinary amount of influence on 
Washington decision making about national security. To this end, they have numerous 
instruments at their disposal, ranging from intramural persuasion based on their professional 
expertise, to more straightforwardly political measures, such as press leaks, public appeals, 
threats of resignation, and alliances with members of Congress. When the Joint Chiefs feel 
strongly about a prospective intervention and explicitly declare that the limited U.S. interests at 
stake do not warrant the potentially high costs involved, it is likely to be politically very costly 
for the president to overrule the military.
13
 Therefore, when the military brass is greatly reluctant 
about or altogether opposed to a prospective intervention, it is in the interest of interventionist 
leaders in Washington to reassure the JCS about the policy‘s long-term costs to the United States 
and its armed services. One way of achieving that is to seek to obtain the endorsement of 
relevant IOs from the outset and thereby lock in the support of international partners.  
 
Defining military intervention 
The English word intervention is derived from the Latin ―intervenire,‖ which literally 
means ―to come between‖ conflicting parties. Hence a military intervention can first of all be 
understood as external interference, involving actual or anticipated combat, between two 
opposing sides in a civil war. That is arguably the most traditional understanding of military 
intervention, and it is how most classical theorists of international law and politics understood 
the term.
14
 A broader definition of intervention might also encompass forcible interference 
between a government (typically an oppressive ruler) and its people, even in the absence of any 
                                                 
13 As Allison and Zelikow have written, ―in the United States, no decision for a substantial use of force… will be 
made against [the military‘s] advice, and without at least a delay during which an extensive record of consultation is 
prepared.‖ Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p. 312. See also Halperin and Klapp, Bureaucratic Politics 
and Foreign Policy, p. 215. 
14 Stefano Recchia and Jennifer Welsh, ―Introduction,‖ in Id., eds., Modern Classics on Military Intervention: From 





violent local conflict. Such interference is usually aimed at influencing the domestic politics of a 
foreign country, including the nature of the domestic political regime. John Vincent adopts this 
broader definition in his classic work, Nonintervention and International Order, where he claims 
that military intervention is to be understood as ―coercive interference aimed at the domestic 
authority structure of a target state,‖ or forcible ―intrusion in domestic affairs.‖15  
For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt the latter, broader definition of intervention, 
which includes any kind of forcible interference in the domestic politics and/or authority 
structure of a foreign country. In other words, I define military intervention as the cross-border 
deployment of military forces, involving actual or anticipated combat, targeted at the domestic 
politics and/or authority structure of a foreign country.  
Military intervention thus typically seeks to change to varying degrees the domestic 
politics and authority structure of a foreign country. The specific goal of intervention might be 
helping an oppressed population, ending a civil war, or neutralizing a specific threat emanating 
from within the target state. However, an intervention cannot seek to altogether eliminate the 
domestic authority structure of the target state; that is, its goal cannot be to permanently erase the 
national sovereignty or political independence of a foreign country. Traditional wars of conquest 
aimed at territorial annexation or colonial submission clearly go beyond any conventional 
understanding of intervention. Hitler‘s occupation of Poland in 1939 was not an ―intervention.‖ 
Likewise, the cross-border use of force aimed at liberating a country from foreign occupation 
and restoring a people‘s national sovereignty exceeds any plausible definition of intervention. 
Thus, American combat operations against German forces in Normandy in 1944, or against Iraqi 
forces in Kuwait in 1991, were not interventions but traditional wars of collective self-defense.     
                                                 
15 John R. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 
13. For a similar definition, see also James N. Rosenau, ―Intervention as a Scientific Concept,‖ Journal of Conflict 





Finally, against one possible understanding of intervention as ―limited war,‖ I argue that 
the scale of military operations should not matter to the definition. An intervention may be 
limited in both time and scope, involving even just a single air strike against a specific target; or 
it may involve a full-scale invasion of a foreign country aimed at changing its political regime 
and subsequently restoring political stability, with hundreds of thousands of outside troops 
deployed for several years. What matters to the definition of intervention espoused in this 
dissertation, once again, is that the use of force be targeted at the domestic politics and/or 
authority structure of a foreign country, but crucially without seeking to permanently eliminate 
that country‘s national sovereignty altogether. Hence the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2003 Iraq 
war count as quintessential cases of military intervention, notwithstanding the fairly large-scale 
military operations involved.  
 
Figure 3. Definition of intervention vs. war 
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 Scholars generally distinguish between two types of multilateralism, ―quantitative‖ and 




coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.‖16 The latter is more demanding 
and involves formal international organizations (IOs) that coordinate state behavior based on 
―certain generalized principles…which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions.‖17  
 According to the quantitative definition, almost all U.S. military interventions beyond 
limited air strikes carried out since the end of WWII have been multilateral. For instance, U.S. 
interventions in Vietnam in the 1960s, or in Lebanon and Grenada in the 1980s, all involved the 
support and participation of ad-hoc coalitions of states.
18
 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, too, 
was perfectly multilateral according to the quantitative definition: the invasion enjoyed the 
political support of a ―coalition of the willing‖ made up of over thirty countries, representing 
every region of the planet, although only three of them (the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
Poland) ended up contributing troops to the actual war effort.
19
 For instance, a former senior U.S. 
national security official insists on the multilateral character of the 2003 invasion, precisely by 
implicitly adopting a quantitative definition: ―There is this fiction that the [George W. Bush] 
administration acted unilaterally on Iraq. But more than thirty countries were with us. The notion 
that it was unilateral comes from the fact that Germany, France, and Russia opposed this. That 
means that it was not unanimous, but that does not make it unilateral.‖20 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, however, I adopt the qualitative definition. Hence for 
U.S. military interventions to qualify as multilateral, they must be explicitly endorsed by relevant 
IOs with a mandate in the field of international security. (I sometimes use the expression ―formal 
                                                 
16 Robert O. Keohane, ―Multilateralism: an agenda for research,‖ International Journal 45, 1990, p. 731. 
17 John Ruggie, ―Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution,‖ IO 46 (3), 1992, p. 571. See also Martha 
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 80-81. 
18 See Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, second revised edition (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 
2004), pp. 118-20, 140-2. 
19 Steve Schifferes, ―U.S. names coalition of the willing,‖ BBC News, March 18, 2003. Available online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm. 




multilateral endorsement,‖ precisely to indicate that the approval is obtained through institutions 
which operate according to generally accepted rules.) Relevant institutions do of course include 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has primary responsibility for international 
peace and security under the UN Charter and is the only body that can legally authorize military 
interventions, apart from operations carried out in self-defense. But regional organizations, such 
as NATO or the OAS, also qualify as multilateral under the qualitative definition, since they 
likewise coordinate state behavior according to generalized principles of conduct. Decisions on 
the use of force, in particular, need to be adopted by the supreme political organs of those 
organizations, NATO‘s North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the OAS Permanent Council, 
according to the principle of unanimity in the first case and by two-thirds majority in the latter.
21
  
  U.S. reliance on quantitative multilateralism, or ad-hoc coalitions of allies, is not 
particularly costly and therefore hardly surprising. The United States can virtually always cobble 
together some ad-hoc coalition of states at little cost, for the purpose of increasing U.S. popular 
support when the use of force is domestically controversial. As former Undersecretary of State 
for Political Affairs Marc Grossman confirms, ―some coalition is always available.‖22 In 
contrast, American efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs, such as the UN or NATO, 
are more time consuming and politically (as well as often economically) costly. They involve 
persuading other powerful member states, who are typically least susceptible to material 
incentives offered by Washington and have global interests of their own that may conflict with 
those of the United States. Therefore, Washington‘s efforts to obtain qualitative, or IO-based, 
                                                 
21 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ―Consensus decision-making at NATO,‖ available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm; and Organization of American States, ―Rules of Procedure of 
the Permanent Council‖ (OEA/Ser.GCP/doc.1112/80 rev. 4 corr. 1), Washington, DC: August 27, 2003, p. 14.  




multilateral endorsement for prospective interventions constitute a puzzle and are worth studying 
in detail.  
 
Why focus on post-cold war interventions? 
 This dissertation focuses specifically on post-cold war U.S. military interventions. There 
are several reasons for this choice. First, the UNSC was deadlocked for most of the cold-war 
period. The SC authorized the U.S. war in Korea in 1950, but subsequently the bipolar standoff 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the resulting mutual vetoes, made the 
Council‘s endorsement for U.S. interventions practically unavailable. By the late 1980s, 
however, the political deadlock at the SC was being gradually overcome, and President 
Gorbachev‘s announcement in 1987 that the Soviet Union was prepared to reengage with the UN 
marked the beginning of a new era. In 1988, Moscow began paying its financial assessments for 
UN peacekeeping, and over the following two years, the SC became actively involved in 
managing political transitions and establishing multilateral peace missions in Angola, Namibia, 
and Nicaragua.
23
 By the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the SC was once again available to 
endorse prospective U.S. military interventions, provided that Washington was willing to engage 
in usually protracted diplomatic deliberations and offer the necessary side-payments to bring the 
Council‘s other members on board.  
Furthermore, a number of scholars have argued that since the early 1990s, and especially 
following the 1991 Gulf War, new international norms have emerged and progressively become 
accepted by most states, which require the endorsement of relevant IOs to legitimize military 
                                                 
23 See Bruce Russett, ―The Gulf War as Empowering the United Nations,‖ in John O‘Loughlin et al, eds., War and 






 It might be that U.S. leaders now genuinely believe in the need to obtain IO 
endorsement before the launch of military operations abroad out of ―an internal sense of moral 
obligation.‖25 Alternatively, Washington leaders might seek IO endorsement for strategic 
reasons, to reassure third-party states who do in fact believe in those norms, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of costly international opposition, or ―soft balancing,‖ against the United States.26  
Finally, those norms of multilateralism might have become internalized by the American 
people, though not necessarily by their leaders. Compared with today, during the cold war it was 
usually easier for Washington leaders to generate U.S. domestic support for military 
interventions. Most American citizens believed that the United States was engaged in an 
existential struggle with the Soviet Union, which in their eyes justified U.S. military 
interventions to prevent Soviet encroachment in foreign countries. Today, the United States no 
longer faces any existential threat, and the demonization of foreign opponents has become more 
difficult, notwithstanding its short-lived revival following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.
27
 Thus, it appears plausible that IO endorsement has become more valuable than ever to 
build up U.S. public support for prospective military interventions.
28
  
In short, by focusing specifically on the last two decades, I am able to test the relative 
explanatory power of prominent theories from the scholarly literature, which explain 
                                                 
24 Voeten, ―The Political Origins of the UN Security Council‘s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,‖ p. 150; 
Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 124; see also Bruce Cronin, ―The Paradox of Hegemony: America‘s Ambiguous 
Relationship with the United Nations,‖ European Journal of International Relations, 7 (1), 2001, pp. 103-130.  
25 Ian Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ International Organization 53 (2), 1999, p. 387; 
see also Thomas Risse-Kappen, ―Between a New World Order and None: Explaining the Reemergence of the 
United Nations in World Politics,‖ in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies 
(Minnesota University Press, 1997), p. 267.  
26 See footnote 1, above. 
27 Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and United States Foreign Policy 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 96-7. See also Christopher Paul, Marines on the Beach: The 
Politics of U.S. Military Intervention Decision Making (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), p. 149. 




Washington‘s efforts to seek IO approval for the use of force as the result of a post-cold war 
normative shift. These theories are for the most part alternative to my own causal argument. 
Without completely rejecting these existing explanations, my dissertation aims to show that they 
are ultimately flawed, incomplete, and therefore by themselves insufficient to explain post-cold 









Methodology and data sources 
Small-N qualitative research in the social sciences generally starts from an outcome of 
interest (a ―dependent variable‖) and seeks to discover its causes.29 The outcome I first set out to 
explain were U.S. government efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs before 
intervening militarily abroad. In the course of my research, however, I increasingly focused on 
U.S. bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining as the main factor driving American efforts to 
obtain IO endorsement for prospective interventions. My focus on bureaucratic politics led me to 
conclude that there are actually three possible outcomes of interest, which my theory logically 
needs to encompass and should be able to explain: first, U.S. unilateral intervention (with no 
                                                 
29 In contrast, the goal of large-N statistical research is typically to explain the mean effect of a given cause; hence 
the focus of such research is on the independent variable and only secondarily on the dependent variable. See Gary 
Goertz and Harvey Starr, ―Necessary Condition Logics, Research Design, and Theory,‖ in Goertz and Starr, eds., 
Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 15.  
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explicit IO endorsement); second, U.S. multilateral intervention (with IO endorsement); and 
third, U.S. nonintervention. Hence I conceptualize my dependent variable as a trichotomous 
variable.  
Seeking to explain the outcome of U.S. bureaucratic bargaining on military intervention, 
with a specific focus on the question of multilateralism, poses the traditional challenges of a 
research puzzle with numerous variables and only a few relevant empirical cases. Therefore, for 
the purpose of theory testing, I rely on the method of structured-focused comparison of a few 
carefully chosen cases: my analysis is structured, in that I ask similar questions of each case 
under study, and it is focused, in that I deal only with specific aspects of the cases examined that 
are relevant for the purpose of theory testing.
30
 In addition, I rely on causal process tracing as a 
form of within-case analysis; that is, I reconstruct the sequence of decisions and the bureaucratic 
political processes leading to the outcome of interest in particular cases. Process tracing increases 
the number of theoretically relevant observations within particular cases, which is very valuable 
for the purpose of theory testing.
31
 Furthermore, process tracing makes it easier to understand 
interactions among different causal variables and to account for potential equifinality— i.e., 
multiple causal pathways to the same outcome.
32
  
I discovered at a fairly early stage in my research that the cases I study are not mutually 
independent: government officials are involved in a process of learning, defined as ―experience-
induced belief change,‖ and they apply the lessons of past experiences to subsequent decision 
                                                 
30 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), p. 68. 
31 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 226-28. 
32 Andrew Bennett, ―Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective,‖ in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and 






 For instance, U.S. military leaders learned from the 1992 Somalia and 1994 Haiti 
interventions that IO endorsement, provided it is properly planned and implemented, can be 
helpful to lock in international support and thus limit the long-term liability of the armed services 
and their troops. If the lessons learned by the individual members of governmental agencies and 
departments are aggregated and become encoded in organizational routines, we can also speak of 
organizational learning.
34
 The qualitative research methodology I employ makes it possible to 
take into account such learning by senior U.S. decision makers and the bureaucratic 
organizations to which they belong. Thus, I am able to incorporate causal feedback from the 
dependent variable in earlier cases to explanatory variables in subsequent cases—all this while 
satisfying the criterion of conditional independence between causal variables and outcome.
35
  
 I gather the information, or data, for my research from numerous sources in several 
languages.
36
 My most important source of information consists of almost one hundred personal 
interviews with current and former senior policy officials, mainly but not exclusively from the 
United States. Beyond that, I rely on memoirs of U.S. and European officials; public reports and 
recently declassified documents from relevant U.S. government agencies (the White House, State 
Department, and Department of Defense); records of congressional hearings; transcripts of 
relevant IO deliberations; and contemporaneous newspaper reports (mainly from the New York 
Times and the Washington Post, as well as from the Los Angles Times, The Guardian, and Le 
                                                 
33 See Jack S. Levy, ―Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,‖ International Organization 
48 (2), 1994, p. 291. 
34 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ―The Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning Under Ambiguity,‖ 
European Journal of Political Research 3 (2), 1975, pp. 147–171. 
35 Tim Büthe, ―Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence,‖ American 
Political Science Review 96 (3), 2002, p. 481-93. On conditional independence, see King, Keohane, and Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 94-5; and Gerardo L. Munck, ―Tools for Qualitative Research,‖ in Henry E. Brady and 
David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 111.  
36 I use memoirs, newspaper articles, and official documents published in English, French, Spanish, German, and 
Italian. Documents in French and Spanish are especially helpful for my Haiti case study. On Bosnia and Kosovo, I 




Monde). For each of my case studies, I have interviewed current and former senior U.S. officials 
from the NSC staff, the State Department, and the Department of Defense (with a particular 
focus on members of the armed services), as well as senior diplomats from important U.S. allies, 
and officials directly employed by relevant IOs. I have interviewed the most senior official 
available from each bureaucratic organization, typically at the level of assistant secretary or 
above. For instance, I have interviewed four former U.S. national security advisers (Colin 
Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Anthony Lake, and Stephen Hadley), one former secretary of state 
(Colin Powell), three former vice-chairmen of the JCS (David Jeremiah, William Owens, and 
Joseph Ralston), three former deputy secretaries of state (Strobe Talbott, Richard Armitage, and 
John Negroponte), and one former NATO Secretary-General (Javier Solana). Each interview 
lasted between twenty minutes and two hours, with an average of about fifty minutes. All the 
interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that they did not consist of free-flowing 
conversations about U.S. multilateralism and the use of force, but instead I asked each 
interviewee a number of specific questions aimed at testing relevant hypotheses. Some questions 
were standard (i.e., I asked some version of the same question to each interviewee), while others 
were targeted to the interviewee‘s particular government background and the role he or she 
played on the policy under consideration.  
Data gathered from interviews is of course frequently unreliable, because memories may 
be clouded by hindsight, interviewees may over-emphasize their own personal importance to 
specific decisions, and few officials are willing to candidly acknowledge that major foreign 
policy decisions were influenced by narrow organizational interests or political motives. 
Moreover, most government officials except those at very senior levels lack a comprehensive 




result in specific national decisions. Nevertheless, students of decision making have long 
emphasized that candid, in-depth interviews with senior officials from various governmental 
agencies are probably the only valid method of reconstructing the particular motives and 
bureaucratic bargains that lie behind the adoption of specific policies.  
Official government documents and memos, even when declassified and thus readily 
available, are inadequate sources of information for students of bureaucratic politics. The 
motivation mentioned in official government memos often just represents the common 
denominator; it is the argument that all senior officials involved can agree on for the written 
record.
37
 Richard Neustadt, having studied American politics for several decades, drew the 
following conclusion: ―If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and 
late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the other, I would be 
forced to discard the documents.‖38 The task of the analyst, then, is to parse together from the 
often partial and incomplete perspective offered by individual interviewees the broader 
bureaucratic political process from which specific decisions emerged. When the perspectives 
offered by different interviewees overlap and the information gathered through interviews is also 
backed up by alternative sources of information, that naturally increases our confidence in the 
data.  
 
Case Selection and Plan of the dissertation 
 
 The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter one, I review and critique 
the principal existing explanations of U.S. multilateralism for the use of force, before suggesting 
that IO approval for military interventions is in fact valuable to the United States primarily 
                                                 
37 Author interview with Morton H. Halperin, head of policy planning at the U.S. State Department, 1998-2001 
(March 10, 2010). 




because of its expected benefits in terms of policy implementation. I discuss in particular how IO 
endorsement obtained from the outset can lock in international support for the long run and 
thereby facilitate the establishment of follow-on UN or NATO peace operations after the end of 
major hostilities. 
 Chapter two builds on the first and lays out my central theoretical argument: American 
efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective military interventions are often the result of 
sustained bureaucratic political deliberations and bargaining in Washington. I discuss in 
particular how the military brass, by at first opposing interventions that do not involve vital 
national interests and are likely to result in open-ended troop deployments, can steer the 
Washington policy process toward multilateralism. I have developed my theory and related 
hypotheses deductively from the literature on U.S. bureaucratic politics, civil-military relations, 
and IOs, as well as inductively from a number of conversations with former senior U.S. 
government officials. Throughout the chapter, I illustrate my theoretical claims by reference to 
anecdotal evidence from relevant post-cold war cases of U.S. military intervention. 
The four subsequent empirical chapters (chapters three to six, on U.S. interventions in 
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, respectively) are primarily devoted to theory testing. I begin 
each empirical chapter by reviewing the diplomatic and financial costs of institutionalized 
multilateralism to the United States in the particular case under examination. The central part of 
each chapter is devoted to testing my bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism, as 
briefly outlined above and as presented in more detail in chapter two. Finally, each empirical 
chapter examines prominent alternative theories from the existing scholarly literature that 
explain American efforts to obtain IO endorsement as the result of norm internalization on the 




I have carefully (i.e., nonrandomly) selected my case studies to ensure meaningful 
variation on my DV and hypothesized explanatory variables. The selected cases are also central 
to the contemporary debate about multilateralism and U.S. military interventions. Specifically, I 
devote individual chapters to U.S. decision making on a particular country: Haiti (chapter 3), 
Bosnia (chapter 4), Serbia/Kosovo (chapter 5), and Iraq (chapter 6). Each empirical chapter 
encompasses a time period of at least two, and often several, years. For instance, chapter four on 
Bosnia discusses U.S. decision making between 1992 and 1995. Chapter six on Iraq, while 
focusing primarily on the 2003 intervention aimed at toppling Saddam Hussein‘s regime, also 
reviews prior U.S. policy during the 1990s and contains a mini-case study of Washington 
decision making on the 1998 ―Desert Fox‖ air strikes. Therefore, each empirical chapter, while 
focused on U.S. policy vis-à-vis one particular country, in fact studies several discrete decisions 
about U.S. intervention (or non-intervention) surrounding the decision of principal interest.  
 
Table 1. Discrete decisions on U.S. intervention analyzed in the dissertation (main ones underlined) 
 
Haiti 
October 1993 Harlan County deployment  
Spring        S  intervention  





Summer 1992 no-fly zone* 
March 1993 lift & strike deliberations  
May 1993 protection of safe areas  
October 1994 response to Serb attack on Bihac* 
May 1995 response to hostage crisis  
July 1995 response to Srebrenica massacre* 
August 1995 NATO air campaign* 
 
Kosovo 
April 1998 coercive diplomacy  
October 1998 backing Holbrooke agreement  
 anuary      air stri es  
March 1999 NATO air campaign* 
June 1999 ground invasion  
 
Iraq 
1991 no-fly zone* 
1993, 1996 air strikes* 
November 1997, January 1998 air strikes  
 ovem er      air stri es  
December 1998 air strikes* 
October 2001 invasion  
March 2003 invasion*






 The dissertation includes three cases where the United States made significant, and 
ultimately successful, efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs: Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, 
and Kosovo 1999. I could have chosen other cases of post-cold war U.S. intervention where 
Washington successfully obtained the endorsement of relevant IOs (e.g. Somalia 1992, Liberia 
2003, or Libya 2011). However, for Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, obtaining an IO endorsement 
was particularly time-consuming and burdensome to the United States, which makes these cases 
especially useful instances in view of analyzing the cost-benefit calculations of Washington 
decision makers and related bureaucratic bargaining. Furthermore, the selected cases allow me to 
study U.S. efforts to obtain the endorsement of different IOs, namely the UN, the OAS, and 
NATO. I find that leading up to U.S. interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the military 
brass was at first either opposed to or greatly skeptical about armed intervention and played a 
central role in steering Washington policy toward relevant IOs.  
 In Chapter six, on Iraq, I first briefly examine U.S. decision making leading up to the 
1998 Desert Fox air strikes. The evidence I gather suggests that in the face of a strong push for 
armed intervention from the civilian leadership, the Joint Chiefs quickly came on board, given 
their understanding that U.S. credibility was on the line and the expectation that no American 
ground troops would be deployed. In view of the anticipated limited benefits of multilateralism, 
Washington made no meaningful effort to obtain the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs.  
The main part of chapter six, however, is devoted to a discussion of U.S. decision making 
leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. I show that in 2002-03, senior members of the armed services 
doubted that vital strategic interests were at stake. Military planners on the Joint Staff and at the 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also recommended that the U.S. seek an explicit UN 




likelihood of post-combat burden sharing with allies and partners. However, the top military 
brass—CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks, as well as the chairman and vice-chairman of 
the JCS, generals Richard Myers and Peter Pace—were for various reasons closely aligned with 
the Bush administration‘s civilian hard-liners. In the absence of strongly voiced skepticism or 
opposition from the military leaders, and given the generally heightened threat perception in the 
country following the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, the United States made only a limited and 
ultimately unsuccessful effort to obtain an explicit IO endorsement before the launch of 
offensive operations. Consequently, as Iraq descended into chaos following the U.S. invasion of 
March 2003, few international partners were willing to step in, and Washington had to bear 
virtually the entire burden of a costly stabilization effort over several years.  
In conclusion, then, my dissertation suggests that a politically independent military 
leadership, which does not shy away from vigorously expressing its professional views about the 
use of force, is key to restraining civilian hard-liners and ensuring the successful implementation 
of armed interventions overseas. A vocal military leadership, as this dissertation shows, can also 
help steer U.S. policy on armed intervention toward relevant IOs, which can in turn facilitate 
post-combat burden sharing and limit American liability. Therefore, while the principle of 
ultimate civilian supremacy should be considered sacrosanct in a democracy, vigorous civil-
military exchanges about the use of force—on matters of both policy and operations— 
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Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 












 Why were U.S. military operations against Iraq in 1991 widely perceived as legitimate 
internationally, while the subsequent U.S. campaign in 2003 was condemned by most other 
major states? One important change, apart from the two wars‘ different objectives (fighting Iraqi 
aggression in ‗91 vs. imposing regime change in ‗03), was the availability of explicit UN 
approval in the former case and its absence in the latter. Scholars and practitioners alike 
commonly acknowledge that multilateral approval, provided by relevant international 
organizations (IOs), is a key factor in legitimizing the international use of force. In the broadest 
sense, this legitimization effect appears to be the principal reason why powerful states frequently 
seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for offensive military operations abroad.
40
 As former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell straightforwardly 
                                                 
40 The scholarly literature on multilateral legitimacy and the use of force has grown considerably in recent years. 
Some of the relevant contributions reviewed for this dissertation are: Evan Luard, ―Collective Intervention,‖ in 
Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1984; Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
―Between a New World Order and None: Explaining the Reemergence of the United Nations in World Politics,‖ in 
Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies (Minnesota University Press,1997); Bruce 
Cronin, ―The Paradox of Hegemony: America‘s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations,‖ European 
Journal of International Relations, 7 (1), 2001, pp. 103-130; Edward C. Luck, ―The United States, International 
Organizations, and the Quest for Legitimacy,‖ in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, Multilateralism and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing 
Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 80-81; Andrea K. Talentino, 
Military Intervention After the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice (Athens, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 2005); Erik Voeten, ―The Political Origins of the UN Security Council‘s Ability to Legitimize the Use of 
Force,‖ International Organization 59 (3) 2005, pp. 527-557; Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the 
United Nations Security Council (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Katharina P. Coleman, 
International Organizations and Peace Enforcement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Alexander 
Thompson, Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2009); Joel Westra, ―Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of 
International Order: A Re-examination of the UN Charter System,‖ International Studies Quarterly 54 (2), 2010, pp. 




explains, ―if you can get multilateral support for a planned intervention, then you should seek it, 
in order to have the greatest possible legitimacy for the action.‖41  
 Scholars frequently distinguish between procedural legitimacy, which results from the 
exercise of power in accordance with generally accepted norms and procedures, and output 
legitimacy, which depends on the achievement of substantive results widely regarded as 
desirable or appropriate.
42
 IO endorsement has the ability to greatly enhance the perceived 
procedural legitimacy of military interventions, by constraining self-serving behavior on the part 
of powerful states and demonstrating that the use of force follows established international 
norms and procedures.
43
 The argument that military interventions which are not obviously in 
self-defense enjoy greater international legitimacy when endorsed by relevant IOs is 
compelling—if somewhat trivial. A more interesting question might be: Why precisely do 
powerful states and their leaders value such legitimacy for prospective military interventions?  
Existing scholarship offers at least three different explanations as to why powerful states 
and the U.S. in particular might seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective military 
interventions. First, political leaders in the western world might inherently desire IO approval out 
of a sense of moral obligation, having internalized relevant international norms of legitimate 
behavior. Second, IO endorsement might be sought primarily as a means to signal benign 
                                                 
41 Author interview with Gen. Colin L. Powell (February 2, 2011). 
42 David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, ―Introduction,‘ in id., eds., Force and Legitimacy in World Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.5; and Robert O.  Keohane, ―The contingent legitimacy of 
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intentions to third-party states, thereby reducing the risk of costly soft balancing (i.e., the 
formation of international counter-coalitions aimed at thwarting the intervener‘s policies in other 
issue-areas). Finally, policy leaders planning a military intervention might seek the endorsement 
of relevant IOs first and foremost to generate increased political support among their own 
domestic publics.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I first review and test each of the aforementioned 
hypotheses. I show that when applied to the United States, they are insufficient to explain 
Washington‘s efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions. 
Thereafter I lay out an alternative theory, which suggests that IO-based multilateralism for 
military interventions is valuable to the United States primarily because of its expected benefits 
in terms of policy implementation. I specifically hypothesize that IO endorsement, obtained 
before the launch of offensive operations, locks in international support, which in turn facilitates 
post-combat burden sharing and limits the liability of American troops.  
 
1. Norm internalization and the logic of appropriateness 
One prominent hypothesis set forth in the existing scholarly literature holds that states 
and their leaders seek IO endorsement for prospective military interventions primarily because 
they have internalized relevant norms and attendant rules of international legitimacy—i.e., they 
abide by those norms out of a genuinely felt sense of moral obligation. The hypothesis has been 
developed in particular by scholars associated with the social constructivist research program. 
Social constructivists and other norm-oriented scholars in IR typically challenge more 




then proceeds to study resulting patterns of international conflict and cooperation.
44
 Instead, the 
argument goes, states‘ interests should always be treated as socially constructed, reflecting their 
particular national identities along with broader international norms and ideas.
45
 It follows from 
this conceptualization that as the international normative structure evolves, state‘s social 
identities, their interests, and ultimately their behavior can also be expected to change in 
significant ways. As one scholar puts it, ―shifts in [international] norms socialize states to want 
different things, and to behave differently in order to attain them.‖46  
 
Compliance as a matter of moral obligation 
Key to the social constructivist research program is the hypothesis of ―norm 
internalization.‖ It holds that over time, through precedent-setting and socialization, certain 
prominent norms and attendant rules become internalized by states. Standing international 
organizations, notably the United Nations, but also the WTO, NATO, and other regional bodies, 
can facilitate processes of norm diffusion and internalization.
47
 Once internalized by states, 
norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.
48
 
Compliance is then perceived as a matter of duty: in the words of Ian Hurd, it is motivated ―by 
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overview, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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46 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 14.  
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Organization 52 (4), 1998, p. 255. On precedent setting, see also Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer, ―Setting 
Precedents in Anarchy: Military Intervention and Weapons of Mass Destruction,‖ International Security 20 (4), 




an internal sense of moral obligation.‖49 Or, as Thomas Franck explains, internalized norms and 
associated rules of behavior exert an inherent ―pull toward compliance on those addressed 
normatively,‖ reflecting a sense of ―obligation [that] is…uniquely rooted in the notion of 
community.‖50 In short, according to the norm internalization hypothesis, norms influence 
behavior at a deep level, by fundamentally shaping actors‘ preferences more than any strategic 
calculus on their part. 
Constructivist scholars typically agree that the modern international sovereignty regime 
and attendant legitimacy norms entail a strong prima facie duty of nonintervention in the 
domestic affairs of foreign countries.
51
 Those legitimacy norms underlying the regime, explains 
Hurd, are taken for granted—i.e., they have been internalized—by all status quo states, including 
the United States and its major allies. Related precepts are ―very rarely challenged in a profound 
way;‖52 and states generally comply out of ―a belief in being bound.‖53 State behavior with 
regard to the norms in question can thus be expected to conform to the ―logic of appropriateness‖ 
more than the ―logic of consequences,‖ which implies that policy leaders no longer constantly 
calculate whether observing the rules on specific occasions will be materially advantageous or 
not.
54
 The latter point is emphasized in the literature: ―legitimacy implies a willingness to 
                                                 
49 Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ p. 387, 388 
50 Thomas Franck, Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 24, 196. 
51 See e.g. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 6; Friedrich Kratochwil, ―Sovereignty as Dominium,‖ in Gene M. Lyons and 
Michael Mastanduno, eds., Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ―The social construction of 
state sovereignty,‖ in id., eds., State sovereignty as a social construct (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
52 Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖ p. 393. In fact, he continues, ―the internalization of the 
norm of nonintervention helps to explain...that, despite the absence of deterrent forces, we generally do not see 
states calculating at every turn the self-interested payoff to invading their neighbors.‖ (ibid., p. 398). 
53 Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, p. 23, emphasis in original; see also Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 7. 
54 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ―The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,‖ International 




comply with rules or to accept a political order even if this goes against specific [material] 
interests.‖55 According to contemporary international legitimacy norms, cross-border 
intervention is admissible only on exceptional grounds, and it needs to be sanctioned by the 
international community of states. This normative structure, constructivists argue, explains why 
states generally comply with the requirement of multilateral (preferably UN) approval for the use 
of force, except when acting in self-defense: ―Increasingly, legitimacy [has come] to be defined 
as institutional sanction, particularly in regard to the use of force.‖56  
Social constructivist arguments about norm internalization are notoriously difficult to test 
empirically. Consider for instance Hurd‘s claim that all ―status quo states‖ have 
―internalize[ed]…the norm of nonintervention‖ and more generally ―accept the legitimacy of the 
overall structure, and…the constraints of existing rules and institutions,‖ while revisionist states 
typically don‘t.57 The argument is extremely malleable and therefore virtually non-falsifiable. 
What counts as a status quo state is defined retrospectively based on observed evidence of norm-
compliant behavior. Hence when a state observes relevant norms and attendant rules for an 
extended period of time, and ―decision makers‘ stated motives‖ emphasize compliance with 
international norms, that presumably validates the hypothesis of norm internalization.
58
 But if the 
state in question then suddenly violates the norm in a blatant fashion, the theory can be saved by 
                                                 
55 Andrew Hurrell, ―Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?‖ in Armstrong and Farrell, eds. 
Force and Legitimacy in World Politics, p. 24, emphasis added. 
56 Talentino, Military Intervention After the Cold War, p. 35; Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 80-1. 
57 Hurd, ―Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,‖  p. 398.  




claiming that the state has either (temporarily) reverted to a revisionist nature or had never 
internalized the norm to begin with.
59
  
Assuming the United States and its major allies are in fact status quo states that accept 
―the legitimacy of the overall structure‖ and have internalized its underlying norms, compliance 
with the principle of multilateral endorsement for military intervention should be habitual and 
reflect a shared sense of duty. Among contemporary IR theorists, Thomas Risse has perhaps 
most explicitly and coherently applied the social constructivist argument about norm 
internalization to the issue of multilateral endorsement for military intervention: ―Military 
interventions and the use of force in general,‖ he argues, ―are no longer considered legitimate 
outside explicit approval by the [United Nations] Security Council… It is more and more 
inconceivable that any of the Western great powers will intervene militarily to pursue 
unilaterally defined strategic interests in any part of the world. Unilateral military interventions 
for whatever purpose appear to belong increasingly to the past.‖60 Risse‘s assertion, by taking the 
social constructivist argument to its logical conclusion, comes closest to expressing a testable 
empirical hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (Norm internalization): U.S. leaders seek the endorsement of relevant IOs 
for prospective military interventions primarily because they have internalized relevant 
legitimacy norms, which make formal multilateral endorsement a matter of moral duty.  
 
Is U.S. behavior compatible with the norm internalization hypothesis? 
The theory outlined above has several implications for U.S. behavior that one should be 
able to observe. Evidence of norm internalization first of all requires a high degree of 
                                                 
59 Following the 2003 Iraq war, for instance, Hurd concluded somewhat ad-hoc that there were ―strong reasons to 
doubt‖ the United States had internalized relevant international legitimacy norms requiring IO approval, though he 
stopped short of explicitly stating that the U.S. had become a revisionist state. Cf. Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 125. 
60 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ―Between a New World Order and None: Explaining the Reemergence of the United 
Nations in World Politics,‖ in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies (Minnesota 




consistency in state behavior across similar cases.
61
 Therefore, the United States should 
practically always seek to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs before intervening militarily 
abroad, except when it is clearly planning to act in self-defense. Second, when a prospective 
intervention is not clearly in self-defense and the United States cannot obtain the endorsement of 
relevant IOs, American policy leaders should opt for non-intervention. That is, U.S. interventions 
in blatant violation of existing legitimacy norms should be virtually nonexistent. In addition, 
looking more specifically at the decision-making process in Washington, one should find that 
prominent U.S. policy leaders, especially liberal activists who are themselves pushing for 
intervention (e.g., on humanitarian grounds), perceive an obligation to comply with international 
norms and thus insist on IO endorsement as an all but necessary condition for military action. 
Finally, the requirement of IO endorsement should have become embedded in U.S. domestic 
institutions and political discourse more generally. As Harald Mueller explains, genuine 
internalization of international norms by individual states requires ―nesting‖ in domestic law.62 
Even a cursory look at the empirical evidence suggests that support for the norm 
internalization hypothesis is scarce. First, as shown in Table Two (below), over the last two 
decades the United States has frequently intervened without explicitly seeking, let alone 
obtaining, the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs.
63
 For several of those cases (such as notably 
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Regimes,‖ in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, eds., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford, Engl.: 
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Norms,‖ p.72. 
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for the repeated air strikes against Iraq from 1991 to early 2003) the claim of self-defense was 
exceedingly tenuous.  
Nevertheless, committed proponents of the norm internalization hypothesis might suggest 
that military action against Iraq from 1991 onward, though not explicitly endorsed by relevant 
IOs, was in fact ―implicitly‖ authorized by UNSC Res. 687, the cease fire resolution adopted at 
the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
64
 In addition, one could argue that for the 2003 Iraq war, U.S. 
policy leaders made a genuine effort to obtain an explicit UN endorsement of military 
intervention, before deciding to move ahead without it once the stakes had simply become too 
high. In short, a flexible reading of the available evidence might lead to the conclusion that U.S. 
behavior since 1990 has, at least on the surface, been quite compatible with the norm 
internalization hypothesis. But it would be too easy and ultimately wrong to conclude that norm 
internalization has occurred merely because state behavior can be interpreted as consistent with 
existing international norms. What one would instead need to be able to observe, as Cortell and 
Davis have cogently argued, is evidence of norm internalization that is ―independent of the 







                                                 
64 This interpretation, emphasized by several U.S. officials in interviews with the author, is problematic, since 
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Table 2. Post-cold war U.S. military interventions        
 
(excluding noncombatant evacuation missions and covert operations) 
 
 
Explicit IO endorsement sought            
(UNSC or NATO) 
 
 
No explicit IO endorsement sought 
 
- Iraq 1991 (Operation Provide Comfort)  
- Somalia 1992 (Restore Hope) 
- Bosnia 1993 (Deny Flight) 
- Haiti 1994 (Uphold Democracy) 
- Bosnia 1995 (Deliberate Force) 
- Kosovo 1999 (Allied Force) 
- Iraq 2003 (Iraqi Freedom) 
- Liberia 2003 (Joint Task Force) 
- Haiti 2004 (Secure Tomorrow) 




- Panama 1991 (Operation Just Cause) 
- Iraq 1991* (Northern Watch) 
- Iraq 1992* (Southern Watch) 
- Iraq 1996 (Desert Strike) 
- Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 (Infinite Reach) 
- Iraq 1998 (Desert Fox) 
- Afghanistan 2001 (Enduring Freedom) 
- Yemen 2002**  (Enduring Freedom) 
- Pakistan 2006** (Enduring Freedom) 
- Somalia 2007** (Enduring Freedom) 
 
 * Numerous air strikes until 2003. 





Examining the policy preferences of (activist) American leaders  
Looking for additional evidence of norm internalization, it might be helpful to investigate 
the preferences and motives of U.S. policy leaders, especially activist ones who are pushing for 
military intervention. If policy leaders known to oppose intervention insist on the need for 
explicit IO approval, that hardly constitutes evidence of norm internalization. Opponents of 
intervention might at first simply expect that proceeding multilaterally will slow down the 
momentum toward military action, making it altogether less likely. If instead policy activists 
who are pushing for military intervention within an administration insist on the need to obtain an 
explicit IO endorsement, that is more likely to express a genuinely held belief. 
In order to infer leaders‘ private policy preferences, it is not sufficient to look at their 
public rhetoric, which may not necessarily reflect sincerely held beliefs. Hence ―discourse 




when it comes to testing normative hypotheses, which makes it methodologically flawed.
66
 Nor 
should we uncritically rely on policy leaders‘ own accounts of their motives after the fact, since 
those can be expected to be biased in the respondent‘s favor. However, by drawing on and cross-
checking with a number of different sources, such as interviews with (former) government 
officials, declassified documents, memoirs, and contemporaneous newspaper reports, we can 
seek to reconstruct the policy preferences privately held by an administration‘s senior activists 
leading up to specific military interventions. For the norm internalization hypothesis to be 
corroborated, prominent U.S. policy activists should habitually want to comply with international 
legitimacy norms and view IO endorsement for military intervention as ―a universal moral 
imperative.‖67  
Arguments about international cooperation, multilateralism, and IOs are generally 
associated with liberal internationalist, or Wilsonian, beliefs.
68
 Therefore, among U.S. policy 
activists, those officials who self-identify as liberal internationalists should be most likely to 
have internalized relevant legitimacy norms requiring multilateral approval for military 
intervention. They should consistently argue during relevant policy debates in Washington that 
the United States needs the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs before intervening militarily 
abroad, unless such action is clearly in self-defense. However, the evidence from my case 
studies, presented in more detail in subsequent chapters, surprisingly points in a different 
direction. Liberal internationalist U.S. policy officials who publicly profess their principled 
                                                 
66 For constructivist scholarship that relies on policy leader‘ public statements about the importance of norms to 
infer that those norms in fact greatly affect decision making on military intervention, see e.g. Nicholas Wheeler, 
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
and Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement. 
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68 See Michael Doyle and Stefano Recchia, ―Liberalism and International Relations,‖ in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-




attachment to multilateralism frequently push for quick, decisive, and (partially as a result) 
unilateral American military action in private, when faced with serious human rights violations 
and perceived humanitarian emergencies abroad. From the point of view of liberal activists, 
obtaining the endorsement of relevant IOs before the launch of offensive operations often 
imposes unacceptably high costs on the United States in terms of bargaining, delayed action, and 
operational constraints that might limit the effectiveness of intervention.  
For instance, I show in chapter three that during the lead-up to the 1994 Haiti 
intervention, the principal policy activists inside the U.S. government (who were all committed 
liberal internationalists), such as National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, and his deputies 
Samuel Berger and Nancy Soderberg, never thought of IO endorsement as a necessary condition 
for the intervention‘s legitimacy. In fact, from late 1993 onward, Lake and his staff repeatedly 
considered and even advocated U.S. unilateral military action, in view of quickly resolving what 
they perceived as a morally hideous and politically embarrassing humanitarian situation. In 
chapter four, I show that similarly, for Bosnia, the leading liberal activists—Madeleine Albright, 
then the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, as well as Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Holbrooke, and Vice-President Albert ―Al‖ Gore—all insisted that in the face of European 
reluctance to intervene, the United States should unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo over 
Bosnia and strike Bosnian Serb military strongholds from the air, so as to strengthen the Bosnian 
Muslim faction on the ground and put an end to the genocidal violence that was being 
perpetrated against its members. Finally, in chapter five, I show that leading up to the 1999 
Kosovo intervention, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her principal collaborators 
at first again pushed for U.S. unilateral military action, fearing that working through the UN or 




In short, the available evidence suggests that liberal internationalist policy officials in the 
United States might well have internalized universal human rights norms and related norms 
calling for humanitarian military intervention in the face of large-scale atrocities committed 
against civilians abroad; yet their attachment to the norm of IO endorsement for military 
interventions not explicitly in self-defense appears to be much weaker. In situations marked by 
an overt conflict of norms, U.S. liberal activists usually prioritize norms of humanitarian 
intervention over norms of multilateral legitimacy. More generally, as I show in subsequent 
chapters, there is no evidence that activist U.S. policy officials of any kind (not just liberal 
internationalists) have deeply internalized the requirement of IO endorsement for military 
intervention. It is usually pragmatic U.S. policy leaders who are skeptical of intervention, such 
the military commanders and other senior defense officials, who insist in the relevant 
bureaucratic debates that Washington seek an IO endorsement before intervening militarily 
abroad. But those pragmatic policy officials view multilateral endorsement as advantageous for 
their own purposes, because it may slow down the momentum towards armed intervention in the 
first place, and then is seen as helping with policy implementation if an intervention actually 
occurs. Put differently, I find that for those U.S. policy officials who actually steer the decision 
making process on military intervention toward multilateralism, the logic of (material) 
consequences typically trumps, or at any rate subsumes, the logic of appropriateness. 
 
Do U.S. domestic institutions embody international norms? 
 Finally, if a state has fully internalized norms of international legitimacy, those norms 
should be ―translated into domestic legislation.‖69 That is, domestic legislation should itself 
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require compliance with the international norms in question. Most liberal democracies, for 
instance, have internalized international human rights norms, by translating them into domestic 
constitutional and legislative principles. However, there is no evidence that the requirement of 
IO endorsement for military intervention has become embedded in U.S. domestic laws and 
institutions.  
The United States constitution and American public laws embody a strong conception of 
national sovereignty, and they do not in any way require that U.S. military interventions be 
sanctioned by relevant IOs. That stands in marked contrast to the constitutional frameworks of 
European states such as Italy or Germany, which explicitly accept multilateral limitations on 
national sovereignty and outlaw any offensive military action not explicitly approved by the UN 
or NATO.
70
 As Edward Luck has persuasively shown, American support for multilateralism is 
qualified and contingent: U.S. leaders and their followers generally value multilateral 
organizations only to the extent that such bodies are viewed as accountable, allow for decisive 
action, and are compatible with American exceptionalism and the unfettered sovereignty of the 
American constitution.
71
 Such low domestic salience of international norms is incompatible with 
the hypothesis of deep norm internalization and decision making motivated by a concomitant 
sense of moral duty.
72
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In conclusion, the social constructivist hypothesis of multilateral norm internalization 
might be accurate for most western European states, and especially for Germany, Italy, and the 
Scandinavian nations, where offensive military action without IO endorsement has in fact 
become all but unthinkable. However, norm internalization can hardly be said to have occurred 
in the United States, where policy elites and the broader public are generally ambivalent toward 
multilateralism and the requirement of IO endorsement for military intervention is nowhere 




2. Reducing the risk of “soft balancing” by other states 
 
 Another influential explanation of American efforts to seek IO endorsement for 
prospective interventions rests on the hypothesis that Washington leaders fear ―soft balancing,‖ 
or costly international opposition to U.S. unilateralism, and thus they seek formal multilateral 
approval to signal benign intentions to other states. The hypothesis is broadly based on Stephen 
Walt‘s balance-of-threat theory, which claims that states do not balance primarily against power 




How U.S. unilateralism might result in costly international opposition 
 In recent years, a number of theorists associated with the realist tradition of IR 
scholarship have warned that unilateral U.S. military interventions might lead other states to 
form ―soft balancing‖ coalitions against the United States.75 As long as American intentions are 
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widely perceived as nonaggressive (i.e., U.S. actions are status-quo oriented, as demonstrated by 
compliance with broadly accepted legitimacy norms), second-tier states face incentives to 
cooperate and bandwagon with the unipolar power. But those incentives to cooperate with the 
United States may quickly dissipate if Washington pursues unilateral military interventions that 
change how most of the rest of the world views its intentions.
76
  
Second-tier powers like China, Russia, or France may lack the economic resources and 
ultimately the motivation to engage in traditional ―hard‖ balancing, involving military alliances 
and arms buildups, against the United States. However, fearing that their own security will suffer 
from aggressive American policies, such second-tier powers might nevertheless engage in 
coordinated opposition to Washington and rely on various ―nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, 
and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies.‖77 Specifically, second-tier powers 
might refuse landing, basing, and overflight rights to the American military; but they might also 
form diplomatic coalitions to more generally oppose American policy at the UN and elsewhere, 
and they might establish regional trading blocs that exclude the United States and impose heavy 
import duties on American products.
78
 Scholars have argued that even in the absence of such 
coordinated international opposition, ―assertive hegemony erodes the willingness of allies to 
cooperate on a wide range of endeavors.‖79 The crucial underlying variable expected to trigger 
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coordinated opposition to U.S. policies and/or reduced overall cooperation with the United States 
is ―how others perceive the unipolar leader‘s motives.‖80  
Several non-realist scholars have come to broadly similar conclusions. Martha Finnemore 
for instance claims that contemporary states wishing to intervene militarily abroad need ―to 
demonstrate that their purpose in intervening is not merely self-serving and particularistic,‖ and 
the failure to do so ―may eventually have material consequences for intervenors.‖81 Other 
theorists agree that widespread perceptions of illegitimacy among third-party states (and not just 
their narrow security concerns), ―might alter regional alliance or trade patterns,‖ and ―can be 
expected to lead regional states to balance‖ against the illegitimate intervener.‖82 Joseph Nye has 
suggested that blatant instances of U.S. unilateralism might lead even close American allies to 
oppose Washington in specific issue-areas: ―allies may follow the American bandwagon on the 
largest security issues but form coalitions to balance American behavior in other areas such as 
trade or the environment.‖83 Finally, unilateral U.S. military interventions, by explicitly 
challenging the modern rule-based international order, might undermine the hegemonic position 
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Signaling benign intentions to foreign leaders and popular audiences 
 A number of scholars have built on the aforementioned body of theory in an effort to 
explain why the United States does in fact frequently seek IO endorsement for its military 
interventions.
85
 Straightforwardly put, the hypothesis is that U.S. leaders want to signal benign 
intentions vis-à-vis third-party states and legitimate American power, in view of preventing 
potentially costly ―soft balancing‖ and reduced overall cooperation with the United States.86  
 According to Alexander Thompson, who has developed the argument in greatest detail, a 
prospective intervener can reduce the risk of international opposition by working through 
relevant IOs, seeking their endorsement, and thereby signaling ―benign intentions to leaders of 
third-party states.‖87 However, Thompson acknowledges that reassuring foreign political leaders 
might not be sufficient. Whether third-party states cooperate with the intervener or broadly 
oppose it through issue-linkage, intentional noncompliance in shared regimes, and generally 
uncooperative behavior is also determined to a significant degree by the attitude of foreign 
publics.
88
 Again, IO endorsement can be helpful, by allowing the intervener to send what 
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Thompson calls ―policy-relevant information‖ to foreign popular audiences and reassuring them 
that ―the policy‘s consequences will be broadly favorable to the international community.‖89 
 Thompson‘s distinction between signaling benign intentions to foreign leaders, on the 
one hand, and informing foreign popular audiences about the policy‘s benevolent consequences, 
on the other, is somewhat arbitrary and not derived from his theory. One could argue that foreign 
leaders, especially those of major allies and partners, are usually quite well informed about a 
prospective intervener‘s intentions by the time offensive military action becomes a concrete 
possibility, regardless of whether the policy is multilaterally sanctioned or not. Furthermore, 
Thompson does not consider the possibility that the process of generating IO approval and 
related deliberations may merely reveal the prospective intervener‘s intentions more clearly; but 
if those intentions are not actually benign and compatible with international norms to begin with, 
IOs can do preciously little to whitewash the intervener‘s intentions, especially in the eyes of 
foreign leaders. If as a result of multilateral deliberations, the leaders of third-party states 
conclude that the prospective intervener‘s intentions are threatening to their own interests, they 
might become less likely to offer their affirmative vote in the decision-making bodies of relevant 
IOs.
90
 In short, the diplomatic and political constraints imposed on the prospective intervener by 
the process of engaging with relevant IOs, far from naturally revealing ―benign intentions‖ to the 
leaders of third-party states, are themselves likely to be endogenous to perceptions of the 
intervener‘s intentions among the leaders of other IO member states.  
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 The second part of Thompson‘s argument, namely that prospective interveners seek IO 
endorsement to legitimize military intervention in the eyes of foreign popular audiences, which 
in turn might reduce the risk of costly international opposition, or soft balancing, appears more 
plausible. Thus, American leaders might seek the endorsement of the UN or NATO for 
prospective interventions to reassure popular audiences abroad and thereby make it possible for 
foreign political leaders to uphold general international cooperation with the United States.  
Hypothesis 2 (Avert soft balancing): Washington policy leaders seek the endorsement of 
relevant IOs primarily because they want to signal benign American intentions to foreign 
audiences and thereby reduce the risk of costly international opposition, or reduced 
overall cooperation with the United States. 
 
The hypothesis again has a number of observable implications that allow for empirical 
testing. First, American leaders should make the greatest effort to seek IO endorsement for 
interventions expected to be particularly controversial internationally, and little or no such effort 
for military action clearly in self-defense or for limited humanitarian interventions that enjoy 
widespread international legitimacy a priori. Second, U.S. interventions that are not a priori 
viewed as legitimate internationally and lack explicit IO endorsement should result in costly 
opposition by third-party states and reduced overall cooperation with the United States, beyond 
the intervention in question. Finally, American policy leaders involved in decision making on 
military intervention should declare that when Washington has actually sought the endorsement 
of relevant IOs over the last two decades, preventing soft balancing and upholding broader 
international cooperation with the United States has indeed been the main reason for 







Does Washington seek IO endorsement for especially controversial interventions? 
 As a first test of whether soft-balancing concerns are in fact the principal determinant of 
U.S. efforts to seek to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions, one 
might look at the types of military action for which Washington generally seeks such external 
approval. Interventions clearly carried out in self-defense or for limited humanitarian purposes 
are usually seen as legitimate by foreign popular audiences, and they are at any rate unlikely to 
generate strong international opposition. Therefore, Washington should generally eschew the 
costly and time-consuming diplomatic efforts needed to gain an explicit IO endorsement for such 
interventions. Thompson himself writes that according to his theory, ―we expect to see 
unilateralism…when the coercive goals are widely viewed a priori as legitimate (as in the cases 
of self-defense or humanitarian intervention).‖91 Conversely, Washington should make the 
greatest efforts to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs for military interventions that are a 
priori considered to be illegitimate internationally, such as interventions for regime change, 
control of natural resources, and retaliatory strikes.  
A quick review of the empirical record of U.S. intervention over the last two decades or 
so suggests that the evidence is mixed, at best. In line with the predictions of Thompson‘s theory, 
the United States did not explicitly seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for its military 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, which was widely regarded as a legitimate act of self-
defense, and it did make some effort to obtain a UN mandate leading up to the 2003 Iraq war, 
which was expected to be internationally controversial. However, a number of other cases shed 
significant doubt on the theory. To begin with, Washington made no effort to seek a formal IO 
endorsement for several military interventions that were expected to be internationally 
                                                 




controversial, such as the intervention aimed at changing Panama‘s political regime in 1989, or 
the retaliatory missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.
92
 At the same time, in 
1990, Washington went to great lengths to obtain a formal UNSC mandate for military 
operations against Iraq, although they were aimed at undoing Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of 
Kuwait and would thus have been clearly legitimate as an act of collective self-defense under 
Art. 51 of the UN Charter, even without explicit multilateral approval.  
Finally, Washington has sought the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs for virtually all 
humanitarian military interventions it has carried out since the early 1990s.That is particularly 
puzzling for Thompson‘s and other similar theories based on the supposed soft-balancing 
concerns of American leaders.  Of all putatively humanitarian U.S.-led military interventions 
over the last two decades, only the 1994 Haiti intervention (which involved restoring an elected 
leader to office), the 1995 air campaign over Bosnia (which involved taking sides in an ethnic 
civil war) and the 1999 Kosovo intervention (which involved military support for a secessionist 
movement), were internationally controversial, with the latter two strongly opposed by another 
great power, namely Russia.
93
 However, Washington also sought an explicit UNSC endorsement 
for more limited humanitarian interventions in Somalia in 1992 (delivery of food aid), Bosnia in 
1993 (enforcing a no-fly zone), Liberia in 2003 (delivering food aid), and Libya in 2011 
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(enforcing a no-fly zone). All those military operations were considered to be a priori legitimate 
by wide portions of the international community, and there was no fundamental opposition by 
any other great power that might have raised concerns about potential soft balancing.
94
 In short, 
the available evidence suggests that Washington does not generally make the greatest efforts to 
obtain the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs for those interventions that can be expected to be 
most controversial internationally and where the risk of soft balancing is presumably most acute.  
 
Have illegitimate U.S. interventions actually resulted in costly opposition? 
The hypothesis that American policy leaders seek the endorsement of relevant IOs to 
prevent soft balancing by third-party states also implies that blatantly illegitimate past U.S. 
interventions, carried out without formal multilateral endorsement, should in fact have produced 
costly international opposition and even some coordinated retaliation against the United States. If 
instead third-party states have generally limited their opposition to verbal protests and refusals to 
actively support the illegitimate intervention in question, while otherwise continuing to cooperate 
with the United States on various issues of common concern, then Washington policy leaders 
should have progressively updated their expectations and eventually ceased to worry about 
broader soft balancing altogether. 
The available evidence suggests that even highly controversial past U.S. military 
interventions that were not endorsed by relevant IOs and blatantly contravened basic rules of 
international legitimacy did not result in costly retaliation, or reduced overall cooperation with 
Washington. Among major post-cold war U.S. military interventions, the most internationally 
controversial were the 1989 Panama intervention, the 1999 Kosovo intervention, and the 2003 
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Iraq War. All aimed at either partially or entirely changing the domestic political structure of the 
target state and were thus a priori illegitimate under existing international rules.  
The unilateral Panama invasion was formally censured by the UN General Assembly and 
the OAS. However, nobody in the western hemisphere or beyond took further retaliatory action 
against the United States, and indeed, Latin American cooperation with Washington increased 
steadily in subsequent years.
95
 The 1999 Kosovo intervention was strongly condemned by major 
global and regional powers, such as Russia, China, India, and South Africa, which disputed that 
NATO endorsement provided sufficient international legitimacy.
96
 Nevertheless, there were no 
instances of costly retaliation against the United States, neither during nor after the 
intervention—not even by Russia, whose interests were most directly affected—and general 
international cooperation with Washington continued unabated.
97
   
Of all post-cold war U.S. military interventions, the 2003 Iraq war most blatantly violated 
existing international legitimacy norms, resulting in particularly harsh and vociferous 
international condemnations.
98
 The widespread perceptions of illegitimacy among foreign 
popular audiences resulted in a near absence of cooperation on the war itself, in spite of 
Washington‘s deployment of significant financial and diplomatic incentives to lure third-party 
states into its ―coalition of the willing.‖99 However, beyond the issue of Iraq, once again overall 
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international cooperation with the United States on matters of international security and 
counterterrorism, trade, the environment, and various technical issues did not noticeably suffer, 
and by some counts it actually increased in subsequent years.
100
  
The reasons for this apparent lack of costly opposition by third-party states beyond 
refusals to cooperate on the illegitimate intervention in question are at least twofold. First, other 
great powers that have the capabilities to impose significant costs on the United States might not 
actually feel threatened by U.S. armed interventions in peripheral regions, regardless of whether 
such military actions are endorsed by relevant IOs and abide by basic norms of international 
legitimacy. American military interventions in recent years have been either humanitarian rescue 
operations, targeted at failing and collapsed states, or they have been aimed at weak states 
suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and harboring global terrorist 
organizations. Such interventions may sometimes have run counter to the strategic interests of 
other great powers, but those probably ―understand that the United States does not have 
offensive designs against them.‖101 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have in fact shown 
that whenever other powerful states have acted contrary to American interests in recent years, 
such as in the field of arms transfers, regional security cooperation, or international policy 
toward Iraq and Iran, that simply reflected those states‘ own contingent economic or strategic 
interests, more than any shared international concern about ―hostile‖ U.S. intentions.102 
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Second, even limited soft balancing efforts and decisions to reduce cooperation with 
Washington can be very costly to third-party states. The U.S. remains the world‘s leading 
military and economic power, and its diplomatic influence probably remains unmatched. 
Furthermore, as theories of hegemonic cooperation have long suggested, smaller states rely on 
the U.S. to improve and sustain generally beneficial global cooperation in less institutionalized 
issue areas.
103
 Therefore, ―other states are generally much more dependent on [America] than it 
is on them.‖104 Put differently, if third-party states reduce their overall cooperation with the 
United States on issues such as international finance, trade, the environment, and international 
security, they might end up hurting themselves much more than their intended target. This 
probably goes a long way in explaining why foreign leaders retain strong incentives to keep 
cooperating with the world‘s only superpower on a plethora of issues, even in the face of 




 There is no particular reason to expect that the aforementioned pattern should change in 
the near future, even assuming further U.S. military interventions in blatant violation of basic 
international legitimacy norms. However, American policy leaders might for various reasons 
misperceive the evidence about past international reactions and still fear that U.S. military 
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Are U.S. policy leaders (nevertheless) motivated by fears of soft balancing? 
Political scientist Erik Voeten suggests that regardless of whether soft balancing against 
illegitimate U.S. interventions actually occurs, American leaders since the end of the cold war 
have often behaved ―as if‖ international opposition were in fact to be expected for interventions 
without explicit IO endorsement and especially without UN approval. According to Voeten, 
American leaders have been motivated to seek such approval by fears that if ―the United States 
exercises force in the absence of SC authorization,‖ third-party states might retaliate, ―for 
instance, by reducing cooperation elsewhere.‖106 Observed outward behavior however is an 
imperfect test of any actor‘s motives. To determine whether concerns about potential soft 
balancing have in fact been the main cause of Washington efforts to obtain the endorsement of 
relevant IOs, a more direct examination of U.S. decision makers‘ motives would be necessary.  
 Among post-cold war U.S. combat operations overseas, those most widely discussed by 
theorists who explain American multilateralism as the result of efforts to avoid soft balancing  
are the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 Kosovo intervention, and the 2003 Iraq war. Thompson for 
instance claims that leading up to the 1991 war, ―U.S. decision makers turned to the UN as an 
intentional strategy to minimize international political fallout‖ and were not primarily 
―motivated by burden sharing‖ or a desire to limit U.S. domestic political opposition.107 
Following Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the G.H.W. Bush administration spent 
several months building up multilateral and domestic support for a major U.S. military effort.
108
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However, senior U.S. officials involved in decision making at the time dispute that concerns 
about soft balancing, or about the future of American hegemony, drove Washington policy vis-à-
vis the Security Council.
109
 The administration was fully aware that a legitimate case could have 
been made under existing international rules for swiftly undoing the Iraqi aggression without any 
explicit IO endorsement, based on the principle of collective self-defense enshrined in Art. 51 of 
the UN Charter, and the expectation was that most other states would have accepted such a 
justification.
110
 The decision to multilateralize the policy and seek an explicit UN endorsement 
for military action appears to have been motivated primarily by a desire to bring major allies on 
board, thereby sharing the burden of an operation expected to be very costly, and reduce U.S. 
domestic opposition from Congress and the reluctant military leadership.
111
 
The 1999 Kosovo intervention is in several regards a ―most likely case‖ for the hypothesis 
that American efforts to gain IO endorsement are determined by concerns about costly 
international opposition, or soft balancing.
112
 The use of force over Kosovo was vociferously 
opposed by Russia, China, and influential members of the non-aligned movement, including 
India and South Africa; and Russian opposition in particular was of some concern to Washington 
during the lead-up to the intervention.
113
 Katharina Coleman specifically argues that Washington 
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sought a NATO endorsement ahead of its intervention in order to maximize perceptions of 
international legitimacy among third-party states and ensure that ―U.S. power [would] be seen as 
non-threatening by other states.‖114 However, senior U.S. policy officials were quite aware 
during the lead-up to the Kosovo intervention that NATO endorsement would not reassure 
Moscow and other non-NATO members about American intentions or legitimize the use of force 
in their eyes; in fact, Russian leaders in particular feared a strong NATO, and the fact that the 
operation was channeled through NATO made them even more worried than they might 
otherwise have been.
115
 Yet the expectation in Washington was that the Kremlin would 
ultimately acquiesce in U.S.-led military action and stop short of reducing cooperation with the 
U.S. in other domains, mainly because of Russia‘s economic dependence on the West.116 
Political opposition from countries besides Russia never amounted to a serious concern in 
Washington, because of the understanding that ―there was nothing they could do to help Serbia 
or harm [the United States].‖117 
Finally, a number of scholars have argued that in 2002-03, U.S. policy leaders sought an 
explicit SC endorsement for military action against Iraq, once again not for the purpose of 
burden sharing or increasing U.S. domestic support, but ―because they worried about the 
international political costs of intervening in Iraq,‖118 and wanted to ―reduce the likelihood of 
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resistance from other states.‖119 President George W. Bush was persuaded to seek a UNSC 
endorsement for military action by Secretary of State Colin Powell, and to a lesser extent by 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in the summer of 2002.
120
 Yet Powell himself insists that he 
personally never thought about negative reactions from third-party states in other issue areas as a 
potential consequence of U.S. unilateral intervention. His primary concern was that if the U.S. 
was ―going to go into Iraq, it would be important to go in with the greatest possible international 
support‖ for the operation in question, to maximize domestic approval, and also in view of 
sharing the burden on postwar stabilization and reconstruction.
121
 Stephen Hadley, deputy 
national security adviser to the president in 2002-03, confirms that leading up to the Iraq war, 
soft balancing was a secondary concern at best among the administration‘s principal national 
security officials: ―I don‘t remember anybody making the argument that we needed international 
sanction on Iraq to keep people cooperating with the U.S. in other areas.‖122  
In conclusion, there are good grounds for rejecting the hypothesis that concerns about 
potential soft balancing against the United States have been driving Washington‘s post-cold war 
efforts to seek IO endorsement for prospective military interventions. First, Washington has not 
consistently sought the endorsement of relevant IOs for those interventions that were a priori 
most controversial internationally, and it has gone to considerable lengths to obtain IO 
endorsement for prospective interventions that enjoyed significant legitimacy to begin with. 
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Second, American interventions carried out without IO endorsement and in blatant violation of 
international norms have not resulted in costly international opposition and reduced cooperation 
by third-party states in other issue areas. Finally, as just discussed, when American leaders have 
actually sought the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions, those leaders insist 
that signaling benign intentions to third-party states in view of preventing potentially costly soft 
balancing has not been among their principal motives. To understand why American leaders do 
in fact frequently seek IO endorsement for prospective military interventions, one needs to look 
elsewhere. It might be useful to move away from an exclusive focus on international systemic 
factors to also consider U.S. domestic political dynamics. 
 
3.  Increasing domestic support among the American public 
A number of scholars have argued that when Washington policy leaders seek to obtain 
the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective military interventions, they do so primarily in 
order to bolster U.S. public support. Legitimizing U.S. military interventions domestically was 
relatively easy during the cold war. Back then, most Americans believed that the United States 
was engaged in an existential struggle against the Soviet Union, and Washington leaders could 
plausibly argue that military interventions were necessary in self-defense, to prevent communist 
takeovers abroad. However, that interpretive frame broke down in the late 1980s, and 
consequently the demonization of foreign opponents, which functioned as ―the engine of [U.S.] 
interventionism…after World War II,‖ has become more difficult, notwithstanding its short-lived 
revival in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.
123
 As a result, today 
American presidents generally find it more challenging to build up and maintain popular support 
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 Given this changed post-cold war political context, it appears 
plausible that the endorsement of relevant IOs has become more valuable than ever to legitimize 
U.S. military interventions domestically among the American public.  
The most common hypotheses are that IO endorsement can help boost U.S. public 
support for the use of force, by validating the claims of Washington leaders about a foreign 
crisis,
125
 and/or by sending relevant information to the American public about the likely policy 
consequences of military intervention.
126
 Terrence Chapman, for instance, argues that IO 
endorsement can boost U.S. popular support for military action by sending relevant information 
to the American public about whether ―good policies‖ are being planned, ―in the sense that they 
conform closely to the public‘s preferences.‖127 The argument that IO endorsement reassures 
U.S. public opinion about the likely consequences of the policies planned by their leaders 
involves a significant leap of faith. What is a ―good‖ policy with desirable consequences from 
the perspective of other influential IO member states may not necessarily be good for the 
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American public. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that Washington policy leaders seek IO 
endorsement for prospective interventions due to the expectation that it will improve U.S. public 
support, possibly by signaling to American citizens that their leaders‘ assessment of a foreign 
crisis is widely shared internationally (and therefore the burdens of military action, too, are likely 
to be shared), enjoys strong intuitive appeal.  
Opinion polls over the last two decades have also regularly confirmed that large segments 
of the U.S. public feel uneasy about unfettered American primacy and in principle prefer 
multilateral over unilateral military interventions. For instance, a 2010 Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs poll found that 61 percent of Americans support contributing military forces to a 
hypothetical defense of South Korea from a North Korean attack together with other countries 
―as part of a UN-sponsored effort‖; but only 40 percent of Americans support contributing U.S. 
forces without any multilateral participation.
128
  
Hypothesis 3 (U.S. public support): Washington leaders seek the endorsement of relevant 
IOs for prospective military interventions primarily to increase U.S. public support. 
 
The hypothesis that U.S. leaders seek the endorsement of relevant IOs such as the UN or 
NATO to improve domestic support among the American public again yields several 
implications that one ought to be able to observe. First, there should be evidence that the 
availability of IO endorsement systematically increases U.S. public support, not just for 
hypothetical military interventions (the ―defense of South Korea from a North Korean attack‖), 
but also for actually executed controversial interventions. Second, polling data should clearly and 
systematically indicate that the American public prefers explicit IO endorsement for military 
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interventions to either straightforward unilateralism or support form ad-hoc coalitions of allies. 
Third, Washington policy leaders should declare that when they have sought IO endorsement for 
prospective interventions, increasing U.S. public support was in fact a primary objective.  
 
Does IO endorsement systematically increase U.S. popular support? 
Research suggests that public opinion poll data about support for hypothetical military 
interventions is not necessarily a reliable predictor of popular attitudes vis-à-vis actual combat 
operations. First of all, polling data on public support for any hypothetical future policy should 
be treated with a dose of skepticism: even small changes in question wording, or in the order in 
which alternative responses are presented, can lead to changes of over fifteen percent in public 
support.
129
 Second, studies more specifically focused on popular attitudes about foreign policy 
have found that U.S. public support for multilateralism is as shallow and ambivalent as it is 
widespread.
130
 Meanwhile opposition to multilateralism and to the UN in particular by relatively 
narrow, vocal segments of the American public is usually intense and resilient, and the ―vocal 
public‖ is known to have a disproportionately large impact on U.S. policy making.131  
Third, there is significant evidence that regardless of whether U.S. citizens favor a 
military intervention in the abstract, once American soldiers are involved in combat abroad, the 
public tends to ―rally around the flag‖ and support the president and the policy—at least, so long 
as the administration can compellingly frame an intervention as being in America‘s national 
interest and U.S. government leaders are broadly supportive.
132
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Finally, in terms of U.S. public support for military interventions, output legitimacy (i.e., 
perceived policy success) appears to matter more than procedural legitimacy (i.e., respect of 
appropriate procedures, such as obtaining IO endorsement). Comparing all major instances of 
U.S. military intervention between 1981 and 2005, Richard Eichenberg finds that regardless of 
multilateral endorsement and of the level of American casualties suffered, high popular support 
generally results from perceived policy success, such as for the 1989 Panama intervention, the 
1991 Gulf War, or the initial combat phase of the 2003 Iraq war.
133
 Therefore, IO endorsement 
does not systematically and reliably increase U.S. public support for actual military 
interventions: public support for blatantly unilateral interventions widely perceived as successful 
(such as Panama) is likely to be significantly higher than public support for a UN-mandated 
intervention that fails to achieve its long-term objectives (such as Somalia).
134
 
In short, polling data about hypothetical interventions that indicates strong popular 
support for multilateralism only partially reflects the actual incentives facing Washington policy 
officials. American leaders are usually aware that perceptions of success matter most in terms of 
generating popular support for the policy and for the administration more generally. As one 
former senior U.S. defense official explains: ―Success determines the politics. If you‘re 
successful in an intervention, then the politics work out, and if you‘re not successful, then the 
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politics turn on you. In the end, no one will really judge you based on their initial attitude; what 
they will judge you on is whether you are successful or not.‖135  
 
Does the American public prefer IO endorsement to ad-hoc coalitions?  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned evidence, U.S. policy leaders might want to hedge 
their bets and seek the endorsement of relevant IOs, anticipating that all else being equal, 
multilateral interventions will enjoy higher support from the American public. Explicit IO 
endorsement might be desirable especially for humanitarian operations and other interventions 
that cannot clearly be framed as being in America‘s vital national interest, given that baseline 
U.S. public support for such interventions is generally low.
136
 Washington policy leaders 
generally understand that ―in terms of public opinion, where there is not a direct threat to 
national security that is either perceived or can be explained, if you can cloak the mission as part 
of a broad international undertaking, you can create a greater political logic on your part.‖137 
However, one important question at this point is: Does the intervention necessarily have to be 
sanctioned by the UN or NATO to generate greater U.S. public support, or is the participation of 
foreign allies and partners in an ad-hoc international coalition sufficient for that purpose? 
Obtaining the participation of likeminded allies in ad-hoc coalitions is typically much less costly 
and time-consuming to Washington than obtaining the endorsement of relevant IOs. 
Terrence Chapman explicitly theorizes that U.S. public support for IO-endorsed 
interventions is generally higher than support for interventions undertaken with ad-hoc coalitions 
                                                 
135 Author interview with John K. Veroneau, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs from 1999 to 
2001 (April 7, 2010). Other former policy officials agree that ―nothing in the end justifies the use of force, if the use 
of force is unsuccessful.‖ Author interview with Leon Fuerth, NS adviser to the Vice-President from 1993 to 2000 
(March 9, 2010). 
136 Jentleson and Britton, ―Still Pretty Prudent,‖ pp. 397, 406; and Eichenberg, ―Victory Has Many Friends,‖ pp. 
157f, and 161-65. 






 In addition, he claims that the UN and NATO differ in their ability to boost U.S. 
public support for military intervention. His underlying hypothesis is that when an IO is a priori 
less likely to endorse Washington policy, because the organization‘s aggregate preferences are 
generally known to be distant from those of the United States (such as in the case of the UNSC), 
then when that body does actually back a U.S. intervention it sends ―a powerful signal…that a 
policy is worth supporting,‖ which in turn boosts American public approval of military action.139 
In short, UNSC endorsement should generate the highest levels of U.S. public support, followed 
by NATO endorsement; and finally endorsement by ad-hoc coalitions should generate the lowest 
levels of U.S. public support for military action, given that it can be most easily obtained. 
According to Chapman, the available evidence supports his theory.
140
 Data from relevant U.S. 
military interventions, he claims, shows among other things that American ―public support is 
consistently higher for working through the UN as opposed to NATO.‖141  
It is in fact the case that when asked about using force in the abstract, without reference 
to specific cases, Americans display a mild preference for UN over NATO endorsement.
142
 
However, the American public‘s preference for UN endorsement over other forms of 
international support (through NATO or ad-hoc coalitions) all but disappears when the focus is 
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on concrete instances of prospective military intervention. For example, a September 2002 CNN-
USA Today-Gallup poll found that 79 percent of Americans approved of invading Iraq, either 
with UN endorsement or with the participation of other countries, while only 38 percent of 
Americans approved of a prospective invasion without any kind of international support.
143
  
A detailed analysis by Richard Eichenberg confirms that Americans do not inherently 
prefer UN endorsement over other forms of international support. Eichenberg reviews hundreds 
of opinion surveys on U.S. public attitudes about past military interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, 
Haiti, Kosovo, Iraq, and Liberia. He finds that on average, American citizens are about equally 
approving of military interventions endorsed by the UN or NATO or supported by ad-hoc 
coalitions of allies. His data even suggests that for some military operations, such as the 1994 
Haiti intervention or the 2003 Iraq war, public support was marginally higher when the question 
only referred to international support in general, as opposed to specifically mentioning UN 
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Table 3.  The Effect of International Endorsement on U.S. Public Support for Intervention 
(source: Eichen erg, “Victory Has Many Friends,” p   60 ) 
 
                                           
























































































Total:  49.6 55.2 53.8 55.4 
 
In short, opinion surveys about U.S. armed intervention show that for military operations 
that cannot clearly be framed as acts of self-defense, the American public generally prefers some 
form of international endorsement and support to straightforward unilateralism. But crucially, the 
public does not consistently prefer UN approval to either NATO endorsement or simple support 




Do Washington leaders misperceive the opinion poll data? 
It might still be the case that Washington policy leaders misperceive the preferences of 
the American public when it comes to prospective military interventions. Specifically, U.S. 
policy officials might seek the endorsement of relevant IOs, and of the UN in particular, in the 
mistaken belief that U.S. public support benefits more from such formal multilateral approval 
than from just the backing of ad-hoc coalitions of states.  
However, most of the Washington leaders I have interviewed do in fact interpret the 
polling data correctly. For instance, former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake explains 
                                                 




that in terms of increasing American public support, ―when considering interventions, allies are 
more important than the UN.‖145 Similarly, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter 
Slocombe affirms that especially for humanitarian interventions, which may be widely perceived 
as marginal to American interests, to build up U.S. public support it is ―important to have, not 
UN support, and not NATO qua NATO, but to have other countries participate in the 
operation.‖146 The underlying reason, other officials speculate, might be that the American public 
ultimately cares most about burden sharing through multi-national coalitions, while ―there is a lot 
of skepticism about the UN as the validator of good and just things in the United States.‖147 
Some even go so far as to speculate that ―the American people have little confidence in the UN 
and essentially…don‘t care whether the UN is involved or not.‖148 With domestic political 
support in mind, Washington policy leaders actually tend to prefer NATO endorsement to a 
UNSC mandate, anticipating that the former will be viewed more favorably by the American 
public and especially on Capitol Hill.
149
  
American policy leaders are generally confident that if necessary, given the very 
significant economic resources available to the United States and its resulting diplomatic clout, 
Washington can always assemble some token international coalition in support of military 
intervention to assuage U.S. public opinion—regardless of whether the operation is also formally 
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endorsed by relevant IOs. The 2003 Iraq war is an eloquent case in point. As Marc Grossman, 
undersecretary of state for policy in 2002-03, candidly explains, ―some coalition is always 
available.‖150  
Undoubtedly, having a formal UN or NATO endorsement can be helpful in terms of 
persuading major democratic allies, such as Britain, Germany, or France, to join a U.S.-led 
coalition, and Washington leaders are clearly aware of that.
151
 However, the formal endorsement 
of relevant IOs is secondary at best in terms of the size of the coalition backing Washington 
policy, which ultimately appears to matter most for building up U.S. public support. For smaller 
countries, especially from the developing world, the lack of overarching international legitimacy 
can easily be offset through material incentives offered by the United States. One former senior 
military official who was involved in international coalition management at the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) during the 2003 Iraq war puts it bluntly:  
If you are one of those tiny little countries, and the United States is going to give you 
armored personnel carriers, or if you are an Eastern European country and the U.S. is 
sponsoring NATO membership for you at some point down the road, then the 
overarching international legitimacy resulting from a UN mandate matters less. But by 
having those countries send their representative to the coalition village at CENTCOM, 
we [the United States] could then say, we now have thirty-odd partners supporting us. 
How much they actually contributed didn‘t matter much.152 
 
In conclusion, there is little evidence that U.S. policy leaders seek IO endorsement for 
prospective interventions primarily to increase American public support. First, for actual military 
interventions, other factors appear to be more important than IO endorsement in terms of 
generating U.S. public approval. In particular, perceived output legitimacy (i.e., policy success) 
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matters more to the American public than procedural legitimacy (which results among other 
things from compliance with international norms). Second, polling data indicates that on 
average, the American public does not clearly prefer UN or NATO endorsement to support form 
ad-hoc international coalitions. Hence if the goal is merely increasing U.S. public approval, 
Washington leaders should generally prefer ad-hoc coalitions, given that their political support is 
typically much easier to obtain than explicit IO endorsement. Finally, my own research suggests 
that American policy leaders do in fact correctly interpret the aforementioned polling data. They 
understand that the American public is generally supportive of acting with partners in 
international coalitions, especially for interventions that are marginal to U.S. national interests. 
But they also understand that IO endorsement, and especially a formal UNSC mandate, are not 
necessarily more valuable than ad-hoc coalitions in terms of building up U.S. public support for 
domestically controversial interventions.  
Summing up, when IO endorsement can be obtained swiftly and at little cost to the 
United States, then Washington policy leaders might view it as an effective means of quickly 
putting together a broad international coalition of states, for the purpose of generating ―the 
appearance of burden sharing among allies‖ and boosting U.S. popular support.153 But when it is 
clear from the outset that a UN or NATO endorsement will be difficult to obtain, then in terms of 
building up American public support for military action, Washington policy leaders should 
generally prefer an ad-hoc multinational coalition without any explicit IO endorsement as a 
much less costly and equally effective alternative.  
* 
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 If norm internalization by American leaders, fears of soft balancing, or concerns about 
U.S. popular support cannot fully explain Washington‘s efforts to seek the endorsement of 
relevant IOs for prospective military interventions, then the question remains: What does? In the 
remaining part of this chapter I outline a theory that explains how IO endorsement, obtained 
before the launch of offensive military operations, can be advantageous to the United States in 
terms of policy implementation. The endorsement of relevant IOs, I argue, can lock in third-party 
state support for long-term peacekeeping and stabilization; and that, in turn, facilitates burden 
sharing and greatly reduces the costs of protracted interventions to the United States and its 
armed services in particular. In short, IO approval limits American liability in the long run.  
  
4. Policy benefits: Burden sharing in combat and post-combat 
I hypothesize that IO endorsement of U.S. military intervention and the resulting 
international legitimacy are valuable from Washington‘s standpoint primarily because they 
reduce the long-term costs of implementing a given policy and achieving set targets. Scholarship 
has long recognized that IOs facilitate burden sharing, or what David Lake calls the creation of 
―joint production economies,‖ in foreign affairs, thereby reducing the cost to individual member 
states of achieving specific objectives.
154
 However, with regard to foreign armed interventions, 
research to-date has done little to clarify through what mechanisms the advance endorsement of 
relevant IOs can facilitate burden sharing in a way that reassures skeptical Washington officials 
about the foreseeable (long-term) costs of military action.  
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Overcoming popular opposition abroad to actively supporting U.S. policy 
The endorsement of relevant IOs—whether the United Nations, NATO, or regional 
organizations from the part of the world targeted by an intervention (such as the OAS, the 
African Union, ECOWAS, or the Arab League)—helps legitimize U.S. military action in the 
eyes of foreign popular audiences. That, in turn, can be expected to make it politically easier for 
the leaders of foreign partner states, and especially for the leaders of fellow democracies, to 
openly back the United States on specific interventions. In the language of two-level games, IO 
endorsement can help the U.S. expand the domestic win-sets of foreign leaders (i.e., the breadth 
of policies those foreign leaders are able to ―sell‖ to their own domestic publics), thereby making 




For instance, public opinion in Europe and Latin America strongly believes in the UN 
Security Council as a legitimizing organ for international military action. Hence political leaders 
from Europe and Latin America, although generally sympathetic to the United States and keenly 
aware of their nation‘s interest in maintaining friendly relations with Washington, find it 
exceedingly difficult to openly support U.S. military interventions, let alone contribute troops 
and resources, in the absence of an authorizing SC resolution.
156
 Thompson sums up the 
argument as follows: ―Even if other state leaders determine that supporting the coercive policy is 
in their national interest, they may face domestic barriers to doing so. They must convince their 
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own publics that supporting another state‘s exercise of power is justified. IO approval helps 
overcome this additional obstacle.‖ 157  
For a variety of reasons, the UN Security Council is best equipped to provide this kind of 
international legitimation.
158
 That may seem puzzling in several regards: SC approval of military 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the result of eminently political decisions, 
produced through the votes of sovereign states, and it frequently reflects significant bargaining 
and ethically questionable side deals.
159
 The Council itself is in many ways a flawed, secretive, 
and arguably unrepresentative body. The special prerogatives of its five veto-wielding permanent 
members (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) clearly reflect the 
global distribution of power at the end of WWII and stand in permanent tension with the 
principle of sovereign equality. That hardly makes the Council legitimate according to abstract 
normative standards of fairness, proportionality, and democratic accountability.
160
  
Nevertheless, the SC is treated by most political leaders in most countries of the world, 
and as a result also by their followers, as an authoritative institution that effectively represents 
the community of nations.
161
 As Inis Claude put it in his seminal analysis of the UN, ―what the 
United Nations actually represents is less important than the fact that statesmen have conferred 
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the function of collective legitimization primarily upon that organization.‖162 Furthermore, the 
Security Council offers at least some (however weak) institutional checks on great-power 
military adventurism, given its reluctance to authorize blatantly self-serving foreign 
interventions; and that arguably further increases the perceived international legitimacy of those 
interventions it does actually endorse.
163
 Finally, the Security Council is the only body that can 
authorize military action not clearly in self-defense under international law, and in many parts of 
the world, conformity with general legal principles is seen as the default test of international 
legitimacy.
164
 Hence the argument made by a number of scholars, according to which the SC, 
because it is itself illegitimate according to abstract normative standards of democratic 
representation and accountability, cannot plausibly legitimize international military action, is 
based on a fundamental confusion between legitimacy as a normative ideal and legitimacy as a 
social construct.
165
 The latter, not the former, is what ultimately matters in view of generating 
political support abroad.
166
   
Beyond the United Nations, regional IOs can also legitimize U.S. military action in the 
eyes of popular audiences abroad, thus facilitating active third-party state support for American 
interventions. Among regional IOs, NATO occupies an especially prominent position, given the 
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unique capabilities and democratic nature of its members. Not surprisingly, NATO contributes 
little to legitimating U.S. intervention in the eyes of non-Western audiences: given widespread 
perceptions of American dominance within the organization, the legitimation effect of NATO 
endorsement is generally limited to the organization‘s area of membership.167 Nevertheless, 
NATO endorsement of prospective U.S. military interventions can be extremely valuable from 
Washington‘s standpoint, because it increases perceptions of legitimacy among the 
organization‘s own members and activates the ―pull‖ of alliance solidarity. Even apart from 
popular perceptions of legitimacy, once NATO has formally endorsed a U.S. intervention, 
America‘s political leverage over its closest allies is greatly increased: Washington can more 
easily persuade the leaders of other member states to rally their domestic publics behind military 
action, as the U.S. insists that the broader transatlantic security tie is potentially at stake.
168
 That, 
in turn, makes it much easier for Washington to generate concrete international support for 
policy implementation.  
 Finally, the endorsement of U.S. military action by a regional IO that has among its 
members a state directly targeted by the intervention (such as the Arab League, the African 
Union, or the OAS, for interventions in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, 
respectively) signals some politically valuable form of local consent. That can contribute to 
legitimizing the use of force beyond the organization‘s area of membership—provided the 
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regional backing is not blatantly seen as the result of U.S. pressure.
169
 While the resulting 
international legitimacy may be insufficient by itself to overcome domestic reluctance in non-
member states to actively support a U.S. military intervention, the endorsement of such regional 
IOs generally undermines arguments about ―American imperialism‖ and greatly facilitates the 
adoption of a UNSC resolution formally approving the use of force.
170
 For instance, in the spring 
of 2011, two regional organizations, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, 
endorsed a U.S.-led military intervention in Libya aimed at protecting the civilian population 





Burden sharing during the active combat phase? 
As argued above, advance endorsement of U.S. military interventions through relevant 
IOs reduces domestic political barriers in third-party states to actively supporting American 
policy. Insofar as scholars have tackled the question of what concrete policy benefits can accrue 
from this to the United States, they have suggested that IO endorsement makes it easier for 
foreign partner states to join U.S.-led combat coalitions or otherwise offer valuable support to 
Washington during the active combat phase.  
The underlying assumption in much extant scholarship is that the operational combat 
support of international allies and partners continues to be valuable from Washington‘s 
standpoint and is generally sought to limit the burden on American troops. Byman and Waxman, 
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for instance, suggest that the key advantage of a coalition-based approach ―with respect to 
coercive operations is the members‘ pooling of military…efforts against a common adversary. 
Coalitions can bring additional assets to the table.‖172 Put differently, the argument is that combat 
coalitions are desirable from a U.S. standpoint because they aggregate the capabilities of 
participating nations and thus allow Washington to share the burdens of combat. Other scholars 
have emphasized that even when international partners do not directly contribute to war fighting 
operations, the legitimation effect of IO endorsement can mobilize their support during the active 
combat phase and allow ―the broad exercise of basing rights, and the employment of diplomatic 
and economic levers to terminate a conflict.‖173  
However, the aforementioned claims are problematic in several regards and lack clear 
empirical support. First, the armed forces of major U.S. allies and partners are typically 
constrained by their own domestic public opinion from meaningfully contributing to high-risk 
combat operations overseas. European public opinion, in particular, is highly risk-averse when it 
comes to foreign military intervention. IO endorsement and the resulting international legitimacy 
might be sufficient to allow the leaders of foreign allies to overcome domestic opposition to 
politically backing the United States in public; yet in the absence of a common threat perception, 
the actual contribution to U.S.-led combat operations is usually limited to logistics, or at best 
high-altitude air strikes, with only a few states, such as Britain or Australia, regularly deploying 
combat troops on the ground.
174
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Second, U.S. armed interventions are increasingly technology intensive. The growing 
―capabilities gap‖ between the United States and even its major partners makes coalition warfare 
increasingly costly and inefficient from an operational standpoint, quite apart from doctrinal 
differences and political constraints that further limit the employability of allied resources.
175
 For 
instance, U.S. weapons and communications systems can often not be readily integrated with 
those of international partners who invest much less in weapons development and procurement, 
resulting in serious problems of interoperability that can undermine military effectiveness. 
Furthermore, most international partners lack the strategic lift capabilities that may be needed to 
quickly transport their combat assets to the theater of operations, thus making them de facto 
dependent on American resources for transportation and logistics.
176
 Finally, for ground combat 
operations, the U.S. increasingly relies on small, highly mobile units made up of special forces, 
which cannot easily be integrated with troops from international partners.  Partially for these 
reasons, in September 2001 the G.W. Bush administration declined NATO‘s offer of active 
military support for combat operations in Afghanistan, instead preferring to carry out the initial 
phase of its ―war against terror‖ unilaterally.177 
Finally, there is little evidence that the advance endorsement of U.S. military interventions 
by relevant IOs and the resulting international legitimacy systematically facilitate the granting of 
overflight rights, American access to foreign military bases and port facilities, and the activation 
of foreign diplomatic levers to facilitate conflict termination on American terms. For instance, 
during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, the German government was among the war‘s most 
strident opponents; yet Germany nevertheless privately offered transit and overflight rights to 
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U.S. forces and even contributed AWACS airplanes to the protection of Turkey. With regard to 
basing rights on the territory of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Saudi Arabia, it was clear from early 2002 onward that they would be granted regardless of UN 
endorsement, provided that the U.S. firmly committed itself to ousting Saddam Hussein from 
power.
178
 Finally, during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, Russia ultimately offered its diplomatic 
support to Washington, crucially helping to terminate the war on terms broadly favorable to the 
United States—yet Moscow‘s assistance was offered in spite of, and not because of, NATO‘s 
endorsement of the war, which Russia had previously denounced in unmistakable terms.
179
 
In sum, even assuming that international allies and partners are willing to actively 
participate in U.S.-led combat operations, from a military operational standpoint, foreign 
participation is at best only marginally helpful to the United States and at worst actively 
counterproductive. Therefore, ensuring the combat support of international allies and partners is 
unlikely to be a major factor driving American efforts to secure the endorsement of relevant IOs 
for prospective military interventions. As to non-combat support on diplomacy and logistics, 
given U.S. leverage over its allies and partners, in most instances such cooperation can be 
obtained regardless of whether the intervention is endorsed by relevant IOs to begin with.  
 
Sharing the burden post-combat 
I hypothesize that the greatest benefit of IO endorsement from Washington‘s standpoint is 
that it ―locks in‖ the support of foreign allies and partners for the long run. G. John Ikenberry has 
developed a theory suggesting that IOs can help states maintain their policy commitments in the 
long run, thereby facilitating sustained international cooperation. By channeling their policies 
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through relevant IOs, he argues, ―states…lock in their commitments and relationships, to the 
extent that this can be done by sovereign states.‖180 Extrapolating from Ikenberry‘s theory, I 
expect that the endorsement of standing IOs, obtained before the initiation of offensive military 
action, is advantageous from Washington‘s standpoint precisely because it locks in the support of 
foreign allies and partners or of the UN as an institution; and that, in turn, allows the U.S. to 
reduce its own troop contribution over time and ensures significant burden sharing on post-
combat peacekeeping and stabilization. In short, IO endorsement has the ability to greatly reduce 
the long-term liability of American troops and of the armed services more generally. Conversely, 
if the United States violates international norms and intervenes militarily without the explicit 
approval of relevant IOs, it is likely to be difficult for Washington to subsequently recruit 
international allies and partners for post-combat stabilization, as suggested for instance by the 
recent U.S. experience in Iraq since 2003. In this latter case, ―the failure to achieve greater 
political consensus within the United Nations or even NATO…resulted in a lack of cooperation 
in efforts to stabilize and rebuild postwar Iraq.‖181  
There are several ways in which advance IO endorsement for U.S. military intervention 
can lock in international support, thereby facilitating post-combat burden sharing and limiting 
the liability of American troops. The promise of long-term burden sharing can be (A) very 
explicit, when the authorizing UN resolution itself expressly foresees the establishment of a 
follow-on UN peace operation. Alternatively, IO endorsement can offer less explicit 
reassurances of limited liability, based on: (B) UN legitimation obtained from the outset, 
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combined with public commitments of support from international partners, or (C) political buy-
in and U.S. leverage achieved through allied state participation in U.S.-led NATO interventions.  
 
A) Explicit guarantees about the establishment of a follow-on UN mission 
The most explicit promise of post-combat burden sharing can be obtained when a U.S. 
intervention is endorsed by the UNSC, and the authorizing resolution itself expressly foresees the 
swift establishment of a follow-on UN peace force after the end of major hostilities. To be sure, a 
reduced contingent of American troops might still be required to participate in the follow-on 
force. Furthermore, troops for the follow-on UN force have to be recruited on an ad-hoc basis; 
and while the UN force will be financed through assessed UN peacekeeping funds, the U.S. 
portion of assessed contributions to the overall UN peacekeeping budget remains significant.
182
 
Nevertheless, when the authorizing SC resolution expressly foresees the establishment of a 
follow-on force, the UN as an institution is locked in and committed to the process, which offers 
the promise of greatly reducing America‘s long-term contribution to peacekeeping and 
stabilization, thereby limiting U.S. liability.
183
 
For instance, SCR 940, which authorized the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti in July 1994, 
included a paragraph explicitly foreseeing that a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission would be 
established and ―assume the full range of its functions‖ in the field of long-term stabilization as 
soon as basic security in the country had been restored.
184
 In recent years, the language of 
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relevant paragraphs included in SC resolutions authorizing U.S. intervention has become 
increasingly detailed, often mentioning specific timelines for the UN transfer. That has offered 
the United States even more explicit guarantees of a rapid hand-off to multilateral stabilization 
missions. For example, SCR 1497, which authorized a U.S.-led intervention in Liberia in the 
summer of 2003, included an explicit commitment on the part of the Council ―to establish…a 
follow-on United Nations stabilization force‖ within a timeframe of no more than two months.185 
Similarly, SCR 1529, authorizing a renewed intervention in Haiti in 2004, explicitly foresaw that 
the deployment of a U.S.-led coalition would be limited to ―a period of not more than three 
months,‖ after which a ―follow-on United Nations stabilization force‖ would take over.186 
 
B) Less explicit reassurances about burden sharing: commitment, legality, and legitimacy 
Even in the absence of explicit guarantees about a UN handoff in the authorizing SC 
resolution, UN approval of the initial military intervention greatly facilitates the smooth 
establishment of multilateral peace operations, as well as more generally post-combat burden 
sharing with allies and partners. To begin with, a SC resolution authorizing Washington‘s use of 
―all necessary means‖ (UN jargon for force) involves a public commitment on the part of all 
those Council members who have offered their affirmative vote to back U.S. policy and support 
its underlying objectives. Therefore, subsequent resistance by those members to further UN 
initiatives required to successfully complete the mission becomes unlikely. In short, even putting 
aside questions of international legitimacy, a SC endorsement for military intervention obtained 
at the outset greatly reduces the costs to the United States in terms of bargaining and potential 
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side-payments of subsequently establishing a follow-on UN force or more generally of involving 
the UN in long-term stabilization efforts.
187
  
Furthermore, an explicit SC mandate authorizing U.S. intervention under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter (on enforcement measures) results in a binding legal obligation on all UN 
member states to help restore international peace and security.
188
 That may create additional 
incentives for third-party states to subsequently cooperate with Washington on postwar 
stabilization. It certainly makes it politically difficult even for those SC members that did not 
actively cooperate and ultimately abstained on the initial use-of-force authorization to stand in 
the way of further UN involvement.  
There is possibly one additional benefit. Explicit SC endorsement of a U.S. intervention, 
as argued above, commits the Council‘s other permanent members who supported the 
authorizing resolution to politically, if not necessarily materially, supporting Washington in its 
subsequent endeavors related to the original endorsement. That, in turn, may create incentives for 
weaker third-party states that are in a dependent relationship with one of those other permanent 
members (though not necessarily with the U.S. itself) to cooperate with Washington or at least to 
not actively oppose American efforts at long-term stabilization. For instance, the U.S.-led 
intervention in Liberia in 2003 was authorized by the SC, with an affirmative vote from France 
as one of the Council‘s five permanent members. France thereby publicly committed itself to 
politically supporting the intervention. Such highly visible French backing presumably made it 
exceedingly difficult for francophone states in West Africa with close political and economic ties 
to Paris to seek to undermine the U.S.-led mission in Liberia; and indeed it might have motivated 
those francophone states to support Washington in various ways. Similarly, had the U.S. 
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invasion of Iraq in 2003 been formally authorized by the SC, third-party states such as Syria and 
especially Iran, which in various ways are dependent on the diplomatic and financial patronage 
of other powerful Council members (notably Russia and China), might have been more 
cooperative with the United States on the issue of reestablishing long-term stability in Iraq. 
Finally, as previously argued, multilateral endorsement of prospective U.S. interventions 
through relevant IOs (not only the UNSC, but also NATO, or organizations from the region of 
the world actually targeted by military action, such as the Arab League, the AU, or the OAS), 
makes it politically easier for the leaders of states already aligned with Washington to openly 
support the United States from the outset. Such widespread perceptions of legitimacy, 
particularly when combined with public expressions of international approval, can help lock in 
the support of allies and partners for the long run. As one former senior U.S. defense official 
explains: ―many countries take the position that, they won‘t participate in a peacekeeping, post-
conflict type operation unless the original intervention has been authorized by the UN.‖189  
 
C) Why a lock-in through NATO may require active allied participation from the outset 
A SC mandate for military intervention typically imposes few operational constraints on 
the United States. It allows Washington to carry out initial combat operations largely on its own, 
which may be especially advantageous for limited interventions, where the U.S. increasingly 
relies on advanced capabilities that no other country possesses. Once international support is 
locked in through the initial UN authorization, foreign allies and partners can then be brought in 
for post-combat peacekeeping and stabilization. As one former senior State Department official 
explains, ―there is a difference between whether you are asking for an endorsement which carries 
no command-and-control burdens, and whether you are trying to multinationalize an operation 
                                                 




[from the outset] to the point where it significantly affects unity of command.‖190 For instance, in 
1994, after the prospective U.S. intervention in Haiti had been authorized by the SC, American 
troops at first intervened without any participation from foreign allies and partners, and only in 
subsequent weeks and months was the operation gradually internationalized. In short, advance 
SC approval allows the United States to combine broad operational flexibility during the initial 
combat phase with maximum burden sharing on postwar stabilization and reconstruction.  
But sometimes an explicit SC mandate is expected to be simply too costly to obtain, due 
to deeply diverging strategic interests among the Council‘s permanent members. Under such 
circumstances, to mobilize and lock in allied support, Washington can instead seek to obtain the 
endorsement of NATO. The U.S., for instance, judged that a UN mandate authorizing military 
intervention over Kosovo would have been exceedingly costly to obtain, due to a threatened 
Russian veto at the Security Council, and thus Washington chose to seek the support of NATO. 
However, just NATO‘s political endorsement might not by itself be sufficient to reassure 
skeptical U.S. leaders about the availability of sizable and reliable support for post-combat 
stabilization. NATO, unlike the UN, has no strong institutional commitment to peacekeeping, 
although it has accumulated significant expertise in this field over the last fifteen years. In 
particular, NATO lacks any system of assessed funding and a permanent institutional structure 
specifically devoted to sustaining post-combat stabilization missions.  
Therefore, when Washington leaders choose to seek a NATO endorsement for U.S. 
military interventions as an alternative to UN approval, they have strong incentives to more 
actively involve allied nations from the outset. Specifically, Washington leaders may find it in 
their interest to have as many NATO members as possible actually participate in the initial 
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combat phase, and cede some degree of control to allied nations, by giving them some voice over 
operational matters, so as to maximize their buy-in and provide them with a stake in the 
outcome. The participation of other NATO allies in combat operations with their own aircraft 
and armed forces appears to be key to maximizing their political buy-in and thus locking in their 
support for the long term, even though the allies‘ concrete military contribution in the short run 
may be negligible and the management of broad combat coalitions might in fact complicate 
matters from a U.S. standpoint. Furthermore, involving NATO institutional structures from the 
outset, as previously argued, activates the ―pull‖ of alliance solidarity and thus greatly increases 
Washington‘s political leverage over its allies 
In short, whenever a military intervention is channeled through NATO, Washington may 
have to sacrifice significant operational independence during the initial combat phase, so as to 
fully lock in its major allies and be able to limit U.S. liability during the subsequent stabilization 
and reconstruction phase. The U.S. followed this model of behavior quite closely for its air 
campaigns over Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. On both occasions, NATO not only 
politically endorsed the use of force, but all the most important military decisions—including 
those to threaten airstrikes, initiate airstrikes, and approve increasingly more controversial 
targets—were taken through a fully integrated NATO command structure.  
As one former senior U.S. defense official involved in Washington policy debates and 
military planning for the Bosnia intervention recalls: ―We wanted to have the European allies as 
part of the air campaign and involve them in planning and operations at all levels, even though 
frankly they were not adding very much, because it was our view that they should be the ones to 
take it forward and take the lead for subsequent peacekeeping activities on the ground.‖191 For 
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both Bosnia and Kosovo, closely involving NATO partners from the outset proved to be 
advantageous to Washington in the long run. The United States began by contributing about one-
third of the initially 60,000 stabilization forces in Bosnia and then gradually reduced its 
contribution, until U.S. troops were entirely withdrawn in 2004.
192
 For Kosovo, the U.S. 
contribution of peacekeeping troops and other post-combat assets never exceeded fifteen percent 





From a policy implementation standpoint, when U.S. leaders decide that multilateralizing 
the policy might be valuable, they typically prefer a SC endorsement, given that it allows 
Washington to lock in international support for the long run while maximizing short-term 
operational flexibility.
194
 Once a UN mandate has been obtained that provides the desired 
international legitimacy, it might then be possible to bring in NATO assets and capabilities at a 
subsequent stage, for post-combat stabilization and reconstruction.
195
 But if a SC mandate 
authorizing military intervention cannot be obtained from the outset at a diplomatic and financial 
cost that the United States is willing to pay, then to lock in third-party state support for the long 
run, Washington leaders can seek an advance endorsement through NATO, preferably to be 
combined with active allied participation in combat and a unified command from the outset. As 
one former senior U.S. defense official sums it up: ―NATO is the minimum level; but a United 
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Nations mandate is always preferred in terms of political authority for military action, and 
NATO can then play an important stabilization role after the end of a military campaign.‖196 
Hypothesis 4 (Multilateral lock-in): U.S. leaders seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for 
military interventions primarily because it locks in international support, thus ensuring 
significant burden sharing for post-combat stabilization and limiting American liability. 
 
The aforementioned hypothesis yields several observable implications that allow for 
empirical testing. First, U.S. policy leaders should make the greatest effort to seek IO 
endorsement for prospective interventions that do not involve important American interests 
(making the United States particularly risk-averse) and that at the same time are expected to 
require open-ended deployments for peacekeeping and stabilization. Second, U.S. leaders should 
acknowledge in interviews that whenever they sought the endorsement of relevant IOs before 
launching an armed intervention abroad, locking in international support, in view of facilitating 
post-combat burden sharing and limiting the liability of American troops, was indeed among 
their principal motivations. Finally, all else being equal, U.S. interventions endorsed by relevant 
IOs from the outset should display higher levels of post-combat burden sharing, when compared 
to similar interventions without IO endorsement.  
In chapters three to six, I test the hypothesis that Washington seeks the endorsement of 
relevant IOs primarily for the expected benefits in terms of multilateral lock-in. Before that, 
however, I want to lay out in more detail my bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism.  
  
                                                 






A Bureaucratic Politics Theory of U.S. Multilateralism                    
for Military Interventions 
 
 
The U.S. military leadership was initially highly reluctant to intervene in Somalia, Haiti, 
or the Balkans in the 1990s and more recently in Liberia (2003) and Libya (2011). In each case, 
the argument was that no vital American interests were at stake and that a costly, open-ended 
U.S. troop deployment would ensue. However, in each case, the top military brass ultimately 
came on board, once the United States had clearly defined its objectives and obtained an explicit 
IO endorsement for the use of force that promised significant burden sharing in the long run. To 
what extent was U.S. multilateralism in those instances a result of the military leaders‘ initial 
reluctance or opposition to intervene?  
This chapter lays out a bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism for armed 
interventions. The essence of my argument is that U.S. government efforts to obtain the 
endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective interventions are typically the result of significant 
bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the 
likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials—with the 
top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront—who highlight its 
potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. In the eyes of the civilian hawks, 
multilateralism is often a costly diversion the United States can ill afford; meanwhile for those 
skeptical of the use of force, efforts to forge multilateral consensus are a welcome means of 
delaying or averting armed intervention and maximizing the chances that if the U.S. ultimately 




 The chapter is structured as follows: I first briefly review the principal insights of the 
scholarly literature on bureaucratic politics, as well as relevant findings from research on civil-
military relations. Since the American failure in Vietnam, the U.S. military leadership has 
become increasingly reluctant to support armed interventions overseas, in the absence of 
perceived vital threats to national security. The armed services are particularly skeptical of 
humanitarian and other ―idealist‖ interventions aimed at promoting domestic political change 
abroad, given that such operations typically result in costly, open-ended troop deployments and 
entail a high risk of failure. The military naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of 
armed intervention; and they usually worry much more than activist civilian leaders about public 
and congressional support for protracted engagements overseas.  
In view of the military‘s professional expertise and their high standing in American 
society, they can exert an extraordinary amount of influence on Washington decision making 
about the use of force. Faced with strong skepticism or outright opposition from the military 
leadership and their bureaucratic allies, U.S. presidents are very unlikely to order American 
troops into combat overseas—hence the military come close to holding a de facto veto over 
prospective interventions they clearly oppose.  
In the second part of the chapter, I build on the aforementioned insights to develop my 
own bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism. I discuss how the military brass—the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but also the combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint 
Staff—can in fact influence Washington to seek the endorsement of relevant IOs, such as the UN 
or NATO, before intervening overseas. Assuming that the Joint Chiefs are not merely stooges of 
the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when 




U.S. troops. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the 
part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies 
need to reassure the military leaders, or at least be able to show that the military‘s concerns have 
been adequately addressed, in order to forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in favor of 
intervention and persuade the president to move ahead with the use of force.  
During the ensuing bureaucratic debates, the military may indicate that they might be 
willing to reduce their opposition, provided the civilian activists can reassure them that force is a 
last resort, its objectives are clear, and the long-term costs to the armed services and their troops 
will be kept to a minimum. Hence activist policy officials can be expected to among other things 
seek to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thus 
maximize the chances of significant post-combat burden sharing. That, in turn, is likely to 
reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies and persuade the president to authorize the use 
of force. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy 
resultant—the outcome of protracted bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining—and it may not 
actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.  
There are two further implications of the theory outlined in this chapter. First, if the 
policy activists themselves are not sufficiently influential and cannot muster the necessary 
resources to obtain the advance endorsement of relevant IOs, when the military staunchly oppose 
a prospective intervention based on the expectation of high long-term costs, the most likely 
outcome is U.S. procrastination and nonintervention. Second, if the military brass readily 
supports the use of force, based on the view that vital national interests are at stake and/or a long-
term entanglement is unlikely, there will be few incentives for policy activists to seek to obtain a 





1. Foreign-policy decision making as a bureaucratic political game 
International relations theorists have traditionally conceived of foreign policy as the 
outcome of rational decision making by a unitary actor (the head of government representing 
―the State‖) in pursuit of the national interest. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, theorized foreign-
policy decision making as follows: the successful statesman first determines national objectives 
in light of the power available; he then assesses the capabilities and intentions of other nations; 
and finally he employs the means best suited to the pursuit of the identified national objectives—
either persuasion, or compromise, or force.
197
 For the most part, the traditional paradigm rests on 
a deliberate simplification of political reality, which has allowed generations of scholars to 
fruitfully theorize international strategic interaction.
198
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
However, the traditional paradigm becomes inadequate as soon as one‘s analysis moves 
down from the level of international systemic interaction to that of foreign-policy decision 
making.
199
 Unless the external environment is extremely compelling, working with the 
assumption of a unitary actor who pursues a given conception of the national interest makes it 
impossible to explain the origin of complex foreign policy decisions. More often than not, 
foreign policy results from the interaction of disparate forces and individuals at the domestic 
political level. What constitutes the national interest is itself frequently contested. Building on 
these fundamental insights, as well as on extant research in public administration, in the early 
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1970s scholars like Graham Allison and Morton Halperin set out to develop a new approach to 
the study of international politics.
200
   
The ―bureaucratic politics‖ paradigm—as the alternative approach has since become 
known—rests on three central propositions. First, there is no central, unitary actor who rationally 
decides what is to be done in pursuit of the national interest. Instead, many agencies and 
individuals participate in government decision making and compete for influence on policy 
outcomes.
201
 The bureaucratic politics paradigm is therefore based on a pluralist view of decision 
making. 
Second, the officials representing different agencies and departments frequently adopt a 
particular outlook on matters of policy reflecting their organization‘s parochial interests. In other 
words, where policy officials stand on any given issue and what they see as being at stake is 
significantly influenced by their organizational membership. This proposition is summarized in 
the aphorism ―where you stand depends on where you sit‖—also known as Miles‘ law.202 
Bureaucratic agencies and departments typically lack a constitutional base and thus have no 
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guaranteed existence. In consequence, they constantly vie for power and resources to ensure their 
own vitality, relevance, and ultimately their survival. This struggle for power produces a 




Career officials become gradually socialized into their organization‘s bureaucratic culture 
and frequently come to believe that ―the health of their organization is vital to the national 
interest.‖204 Besides, bureaucrats also have rational incentives to faithfully ―represent‖ the 
organization of which they are a member in interagency debates, given that their prospects for 
promotion depend in large measure on being seen as advancing their organization‘s parochial 
interests. Accordingly, officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA (as well 
as frequently from particular sub-branches of those organizations), either have particular 
conceptions of the national interest or particular views on how best to translate it into effective 




 Third, the bureaucratic politics paradigm holds that as a result of the competition among 
agencies and departments, with their different interests, values, and perspectives on the national 
interest, decision making is not a matter of maximizing efficiency and solving problems 
logically. Instead, decisions are usually the outcome of bargaining and coalition building among 
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the relevant powers that be – they reflect ―the pulling and hauling that is politics.‖206 Advocates 
of a specific course of action frequently need to modify their original proposal, make 
concessions, and engage in logrolling, to reassure various skeptics and ultimately persuade the 
president to approve the policy. Coalition building is crucial.
207
 With different organizations and 
individuals pulling in different directions, the policy outcome is frequently a genuine resultant—




2. Understanding the U.S. military’s bureaucratic interests and concerns 
 Critics of the bureaucratic politics paradigm have repeatedly challenged the hypothesis 
that ―where you stand depends on where you sit.‖ The policy outlook of top-level government 
officials, notably cabinet members and other political appointees, is frequently affected less by 
their organizational membership than by their previous experiences outside government and their 
party political affiliation (which they usually share with the president).
209
 However, for the most 
part this criticism does not apply to permanent career officials in senior positions, including the 
military. In fact, military officials usually retain their bureaucratic allegiance even when they are 
appointed to top-level positions from which they can exert significant influence on policy.  
American military leaders—members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but also the 
regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff—are thus perhaps the 
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most bureaucratic senior national security officials in the United States government. The military 
officials with the greatest ability to influence Washington policy making are the chairman and 
vice-chairman of the JCS, who since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (the ―Goldwater-
Nichols Act‖) have regularly participated in National Security Council (NSC) debates and 
directly advised the president and his administration on military affairs.
210
 Richard Betts 
concluded in his landmark study of U.S. civil-military relations that although members of the 
JCS are likely to be ―less parochial than colonels or others lower in rank,‖ since they recognize 
that their decisions have political impact, their ―latent political function is still secondary to their 
manifest professional identity.‖211 In other words: the highest-ranking military officials who 




True, the president and to a lesser degree the secretary of defense can seek to ensure the 
support of the Chiefs by appointing individuals anticipated to be loyal and known to share the 
administration‘s political orientation. However, while the president can certainly influence the 
selection process and veto candidates he outright opposes, it is difficult for him to 
straightforwardly select a close political follower to the JCS. The services would be embittered, 
opposing such perceived corruption of their professional autonomy, and the U.S. Senate, which 
has an institutional interest in preserving professional military independence, might be unlikely 
                                                 
210 Before Goldwater-Nichols, the JCS advised the president jointly, but ever since the role of the service chiefs has 
been limited to that of force providers. Furthermore, since 1986, the commanders of the unified commands (the 
combatant commanders, until recently also known as ―CINCs‖) have enjoyed growing influence thanks to their 
direct access to the secretary of defense and the JCS chairman, as well as the significant financial and personnel 
resources available to them. See Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, ―The Military 
Establishment, the President, and Congress,‖ in Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford, Jr, 
American Defense Policy, eight edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 140; see also 
Halperin and Klapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 107. 
211 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, p. 40. 




to confirm such blatantly political appointments.
213
 In recent years, Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld challenged this practice by personally vetting candidates for senior military posts, 
managing promotions, and frequently appointing close personal aides to strategically important 
positions.
214
 That resulted in high tensions with the services and made for an overall ineffective 
Department of Defense. When Rumsfeld was asked to resign in November 2006, the ostensible 
reason was his failure to successfully manage the ongoing wars in Afghanistan in Iraq—yet the 
fact that a number of retired military leaders had publicly denounced the Secretary‘s modus 
operandi in previous months may have contributed to the president‘s decision to fire him.215   
 
The Powell Doctrine and the lessons of Vietnam 
The military leaders‘ organizational membership and related bureaucratic interests also 
affect where they ―stand‖ on matters pertaining to the international use of force. The traditional 
view on the radical left, which was very influential during the Vietnam War has recently gained 
a new lease on life, is that American military leaders, in an unholy alliance with the U.S. arms 
industry, put strong and persistent pressure on the nation‘s political leadership to undertake 
adventurous and protracted military interventions abroad.
216
 However, the evidence does in fact 
overwhelmingly point in the opposite direction: U.S. military leaders are exceedingly reluctant to 
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commit American combat troops abroad, especially when they anticipate that victory is uncertain 
and believe no vital U.S. national interests are at stake.  
Samuel Huntington was the first modern political scientist to theorize that most military 
leaders are in fact reluctant warriors: the typical ―military man,‖ Huntington wrote in the 1950s, 
believes that ―war should not be resorted to except as a final recourse, and only when the 
outcome is a virtual certainty;‖ but since the latter condition is met only when a powerful state 
fights a much weaker opponent in traditional warfare, ―the military man rarely favors war.‖217 
During the decades immediately following WWII, the evidence initially seemed somewhat 
mixed, suggesting that U.S. military leaders were not exceedingly risk averse and on average 
neither more nor less bellicose than their civilian counterparts.
218
 Subsequently however the 
pattern changed quite dramatically, vindicating Huntington‘s original intuition. Following the 
chastening experience of America‘s war in Vietnam, as well as subsequent botched interventions 
in Lebanon in the 1980s and Somalia in the early 1990s, U.S. commanders in the armed forces 
have in general become clearly less willing to intervene militarily abroad than civilian 
authorities.
219
    
With regard to Vietnam, the military leaders concluded, several fundamental mistakes 
were made: first, the president‘s decision to intervene in a domestic political conflict on the side 
of a losing faction that lacked meaningful support among the local population; second, the 
civilian authorities‘ insistence on fighting a limited war that responded to enemy provocations in 
a tit-for-tat manner, without a clear strategic vision, instead of approving the decisive escalation 
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of U.S. combat operations that alone could have led to victory; and finally, and most difficult for 
the military leaders to come to terms with, the Joint Chiefs‘ own acquiescence with this ill-fated 
policy.
220
 The antiwar movement resulting from the failure in Vietnam gave birth to broader U.S. 
anti-militarism. That, in turn, harmed the armed services and their institutional standing in 
American society—at least until the perceived stunning U.S. military success in the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War. But the reputational damage suffered in the aftermath of Vietnam has had a lasting 
impact on the armed services, making their leaders extremely skeptical about direct intervention 
in foreign political conflicts, particularly when no vital American interests are perceived to be at 
stake. The military‘s greatest fear has been a progressive escalation of U.S. involvement in the 
absence of clear strategic objectives and without solid domestic political support, resulting in 
high long-term costs for the services and their troops.
221
  
In October 1983, following the death of 241 American soldiers during a stabilization 
mission in Beirut, Lebanon, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger publicly outlined a set of 
rules that ought to govern U.S. military interventions to avoid similar quagmires in the future.
222
 
According to what came to be known as the ―Weinberger Doctrine,‖ the United States should 
commit forces to combat overseas only if the following conditions are fulfilled: military 
intervention is a last resort; vital U.S. national interests are involved; the intervention is intended 
to pursue ―clearly defined political and military objectives;‖ and there is a ―reasonable 
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assurance‖ that the troops will enjoy the support of the American public and of Congress.223 
Weinberger, while expressing his own views, also lent the legitimacy of official policy to the 
military establishment‘s principal conclusions from the failures in Vietnam and Lebanon.224 
Among those who influenced Weinberger‘s thinking in the 1980s was (then) Major-
General Colin L. Powell, a U.S. Army Vietnam veteran who then served a stint as senior military 
assistant to the secretary of defense.
225
 In his subsequent capacity as JCS chairman from 1989 to 
1993, General Powell added two principles to Weinberger‘s list. First, when the United States 
intervenes militarily abroad, ―decisive means‖ are to be preferred, so as to quickly overwhelm 
and defeat the enemy.
226
 Second, before U.S. troops are committed to combat, policy officials 
must ―think through how it will end and what happens at the end.‖227 In other words, the United 
States should have a clear exit strategy—there ought to be plans to complete the mission and 
withdraw American troops within a reasonable timeframe.
228
 The key tenets of the ―Powell 
Doctrine‖ are still widely shared at the top of the U.S. military hierarchy today.229 That remains 
true in spite of occasional challenges by interventionist regional combatant commanders, such as 
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Generals Wesley K. Clark or Tommy L. Franks, who strongly supported the use of force against 
Serbia and Iraq, respectively.
230
 
The administration of President G.H.W. Bush, during which Powell served as chairman 
of the JCS, closely followed the Powell Doctrine for its intervention in Panama in 1989 and the 
1991 Gulf War. With regard to Panama, Powell insisted that an overwhelming contingent of 
24,000 American troops be deployed to remove local strongman Manuel Noriega from power, 
after U.S. soldiers deployed in the Canal region had come under fire.
231
 Similarly in 1991, before 
going to war against Iraq, President Bush built up solid domestic political support for military 
action, and then he committed overwhelming force—about half a million troops—to achieve a 
clear and limited strategic objective, the liberation of Kuwait.
232
  
The military‘s preference for clear and achievable objectives, to be pursued with 
overwhelming force, is a manifestation of their patriotic pride and natural wish to succeed at 
what they do. But it also reflects the services‘ general risk aversion and deep-rooted desire for 
institutional self-preservation. As typical bureaucratic actors, the military want to preserve the 
health, vitality, and social prestige of their organization, which might get undermined by 
protracted engagements abroad with unclear objectives, lukewarm domestic political support, 
and (partially as a result) a high risk of failure. As Huntington put it several decades ago, 
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―whether victorious or not, war is more unsettling to military institutions than to others.‖233 More 
recently, David Petraeus has forcefully restated this viewpoint: ―It is, after all, the senior 
military’s institutions—the services to which the officers have devoted their lives—that have the 
most to risk in foreign intervention.‖234  
 
3. The military as flag-bearers of limited liability  
With the end of the cold war, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the risk 
that limited U.S. intervention overseas might escalate into global confrontation quickly faded. 
That emboldened activist policy officials in Washington to recommend military intervention in 
pursuit of various political and strategic objectives. Beginning with the humanitarian operation in 
Somalia in late 1992, U.S. interventions overseas have frequently aimed less at defending vital 
national interests than at defending and promoting American values, such as human rights, 
democracy, and freedom from genocidal violence.  
U.S. humanitarian and idealist interventions typically reflect classical liberal 
internationalist, or Wilsonian, beliefs. These beliefs, which permeate U.S. political culture, 
encourage ambitious foreign-policy goals, notably concerning the promotion of human rights, 
open markets, and liberal-democratic institutions abroad.
235
 But as Colin Dueck has argued, 
America‘s political culture produces two contradictory impulses in foreign policy: namely, the 
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aforementioned tendency toward assertive (liberal) internationalism, on one side, and a 
countervailing tendency toward risk-aversion, or limited liability, on the other.
236
  
 I argue that within the U.S. executive branch, different agencies and individuals typically 
embody these countervailing tendencies toward assertive internationalism and limited liability. 
Humanitarian activists, liberal internationalists, and so-called neoconservatives—such as 
Madeleine Albright, Anthony Lake, or Paul Wolfowitz—are usually the ones who push for U.S. 
military interventions to uphold American values and promote domestic political change abroad. 
In contrast, the military leaders, as well as civilian policy officials with significant prior 
experience in the armed services (i.e., war veterans), such as Brent Scowcroft or Colin Powell, 
are usually pragmatic realists. They seek to limit American liability and remain highly skeptical 
of putting the lives of American soldiers at risk in the pursuit of humanitarian or other idealist 
objectives.
237
 Armed interventions driven by idealist motives usually take place in fragile or war-
torn societies and involve significant interference in the domestic politics of the target country. 
As a consequence, the exit strategy for U.S. troops frequently looks unclear, evoking the specter 
of Vietnam and subsequent failed interventions in the minds of military leaders.  
That does not mean that U.S. generals and admirals are always fundamentally opposed to 
intervening overseas to stop mass atrocities and stabilize war-torn societies. Most military 
commanders and war veterans, though reluctant in principle about intervening abroad in the 
absence of vital threats to American security, recognize that those ―humanitarian, duty-to-protect 
type operations are legitimate, up to a point.‖238 The military leaders however have been adamant 
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that political authorities provide them with clear guidelines, a narrowly defined mandate, and 
some reassurance that longer-term peacekeeping and stabilization tasks will be shared with 
international allies and partners.  
 
Longer time horizons result in high risk aversion 
Research has found that policy activists pushing for military intervention typically focus 
on short-term challenges, without giving much consideration to questions of longer-term 
feasibility.
239
 That may explain frequent instances of wishful thinking on their part, as well as the 
tendency to disregard the lessons of past failures.
240
 William Owens, who served as vice-
chairman of the JCS in the mid-1990s, sums it up as follows: ―There is a tendency among 
civilian leaders to try to use the military lightheartedly and assume that everything is going to be 
rosy. It is the Paul Wolfowitz phenomenon on Iraq; but this thinking also marked the initially 
somewhat ideological Clinton administration.‖241   
Perhaps the best known example of a civilian leader in the Clinton administration who 
had no military experience and displayed a tendency to want to use armed force lightheartedly in 
the pursuit of humanitarian objectives was Madeleine Albright. In the course of debates over 
intervention in Bosnia at the National Security Council, Albright famously became irritated at 
Colin Powell‘s repeated insistence that intervention in the Balkans would be extremely costly 
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and might result in an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, and she eventually asked him: 
―What are we saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can‘t use it?‖242 (Confronted with such 
strategic naiveté, Powell thought he was ―going to have an aneurysm‖).243 
Commanders in the armed forces, as the natural planners and executors of military action, 
are much less prone to the aforementioned tendency to discount the future and underestimate the 
longer-term implications of armed intervention.
244
 This is in line with research in clinical 
psychology, which has found that individuals who focus on how an action should be 
implemented tend to closely consider questions of feasibility and examine the action‘s 
implications at a concrete operational level. Meanwhile individuals focusing on why a specific 
course of action should be taken (such as pro-intervention civilian officials), typically consider 
the implications of that action from a more abstract viewpoint and think primarily about the 
desirability of the expected payoffs.
245
  
The armed services, like most specialized bureaucracies, approach planning for their 
activities according to standard operating procedures, which involve the elaboration of detailed 
operational maps that are reviewed at different levels in the organization‘s hierarchy.246 
Furthermore, as career officials, the military are not tied to political timelines and can thus 
                                                 
242 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 182. 
243 Powell, My American Journey, p. 576 
244 One notable exception was CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks, who neglected to adequately plan 
for stability operations in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war. For a discussion, see chap. 6 of this dissertation. 
245 Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman, ―Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance,‖ Psychological Review 
117 (2), 2010, pp. 440-463. 
246 Typically, planning cells at one of the U.S. unified combatant commands initiate contingency planning under the 
overall guidance of the combatant commander, a four-star general or admiral. Additional planning may be done by 
the Joint Staff in Washington, as well as by the individual services (Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy). 
Operational plans are then reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and senior officials at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD). Finally, the president of the United States, after consultations with his closest advisers, 
decides whether and when to implement specific plans for military action. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for 




naturally take a longer-term perspective. As Betts has written, the military‘s ―natural professional 
impulse is towards worst-case contingency planning for every possible disaster.‖247 This makes 
them extremely risk-averse, as opposed to political leaders who think about intervention in more 
abstract terms and have to be sensitive to competing nonmilitary needs. The desire of senior 
military officials to limit their service‘s liability for cross-border interventions is hardly exclusive 
to United States generals and admirals. For instance, the British chiefs of staff in the 1930s 
opposed a potentially costly entanglement in continental European affairs, insisting that when a 
nation intervenes overseas, it is virtually ―impossible to limit the liability once [it is] committed 
to any theatre of operations.‖248 Contemporary U.S. military leaders are probably even more risk-
averse than their British colleagues were during the interwar period, given that the sense of 
national urgency in the United States today is incomparably lower.  
Among U.S. military leaders, the most consistently cautious concerning cross-border 
intervention have been Army generals and commanders of the Marine Corps.
249
 Army generals 
are usually the most skeptical, given that their service bears the greatest burden in terms of 
ground combat, logistics, and postwar stabilization. The Army‘s greatest fear is ―getting stuck‖ 
in open-ended stabilization and counterinsurgency missions overseas—with dwindling domestic 
political support.
250
 Air force leaders, on the other hand, are more likely to support foreign 
interventions, given that air war is typically less burdensome and debilitating than the kind of 
war fought by the Army and the Marine Corps.
251
 Air force generals also tend to be confident 
                                                 
247 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, p. 160. 
248 Quoted in Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p. 104, emph. added. 
249 Army generals are usually the most skeptical, given that their service bears the greatest burden in terms of ground 
combat, logistics, and postwar stabilization. 
250 Author interview with LTG David S. Weisman (February 16, 2011). 
251 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, pp. 116ff. See also Halperin and Klapp, Bureaucratic Politics 




that strategic bombing can quickly cripple an enemy and achieve victory from the air—they did 
so for Korea, Vietnam, and most recently during the lead-up to the 1999 Kosovo intervention. In 
contrast, members of the Army and the Marines usually emphasize the need for ground combat, 
frequently to be followed by lengthy deployments for peacekeeping and stabilization, to achieve 
strategic victory.
252
 Scholarly research tends to confirm the Army‘s view: most recent studies 




The military’s distinctive concern about congressional support 
Given the military leaders‘ specific focus on the challenges of implementing complex 
operations and their concern for the health and vitality of the services, they are also typically 
quite anxious about congressional support for armed intervention—or rather about the 
dissolution of such support in the face of protracted deployments overseas without clear evidence 
of success. Extrapolating from experience of Vietnam and Lebanon thereafter, U.S. generals and 
admirals fear that ―things won‘t go well for the military once political support is lost for the 
mission,‖ meaning that unless Congress and the public perceive vital interests to be are at stake, 
even a few casualties may be sufficient for U.S. troops to be withdrawn in dishonor, with 
attendant long-term costs for the services‘ financial well-being and institutional prestige.254 
Congress rarely has much direct impact on U.S. decision making concerning the 
international use of force. The American president, as commander in chief, enjoys significant 
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freedom of maneuver in the field of international security; and although the U.S. constitution 
technically reserves for Congress the ―power to… declare War‖ (Article 1, section 8), presidents 
since the early years of the republic have repeatedly deployed U.S. troops in combat abroad 
without congressional authorization.
255
 Even the 1973 War Powers resolution, intended to 
reassert congressional authority on these matters, has changed remarkably little.
256
  
As long as the president of the United States is committed to an intervention, Congress is 
extremely unlikely to constrain an administration through binding legislation. Legislators 
generally aim at ―blame avoidance‖ when it comes to the international use of force: they prefer 
to neither explicitly vote for a military intervention, ceding control entirely to the executive 
branch, with the additional risk of sharing the blame in case of failure, nor to explicitly vote 
against an intervention and risk being blamed for the failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy (which, 
in turn, might make actual military intervention more likely).
257
 Therefore, Congress largely 
limits itself to adopting ―Sense of the Senate‖ and ―Sense of the House‖ resolutions, which allow 
it to voice its concerns without formally constraining the president. Congress adopted binding 
legislation requiring a withdrawal of U.S. troops within a specified time frame only once, during 
the 1983 Lebanon intervention. On two other occasions, for Vietnam in 1973 and Somalia in 
1993, Congress cut off funding for ongoing foreign military operations; yet in both cases it did 
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so only after significant divisions had emerged within the executive branch.
258
 
Nevertheless, since the end of the cold war, Congress has become more assertive overall 
on national security affairs and individual members have become more willing to challenge 
presidential decisions to intervene militarily abroad. Congress has continued to largely defer to 
the president on matters pertaining to the use of force when important U.S. national interests are 
widely perceived to be at stake. But presidents have become more ―likely to confront concerted 
congressional opposition when they contemplate using force to promote U.S. values (e.g. 
democracy, rule of law, a halt to genocide).‖259 Congress can also frame how the American 
public perceives an issue and thereby affect broader popular support for an intervention. This 
largely appears to be due to the fact that the U.S. news media, and especially the local media, 
which have fewer resources for independent analyses of foreign policy, generally ―index‖ the 
slant of their coverage of international crises involving the United States to reflect the range of 
opinion that exists within Congress.
260
  
Political scientists William Howell and Jon Pevehouse argue that through its impact on 
public opinion, Congress in fact affects U.S. presidential decision making on military 
intervention.
261
 They find that over the past several decades, presidents have used force more 
often when they enjoyed strong political support in Congress.
262
 In their view, this statistical 
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finding suggests that ―early congressional discussions about impending military action sen[d] 
valuable signals to the president‖ about the likelihood of domestic political support for 
―protracted or costly‖ interventions.263  
However, Howell and Pevehouse provide no direct evidence from interviews with former 
U.S. policy officials or archival records, and they engage in little causal process tracing to assess 
whether, and if so, how, the president‘s own concerns about congressional opposition have in 
fact directly affected his decisions on the use of force. My own research suggests that U.S. 
civilian leaders favorably inclined toward the use of force are in fact rarely constrained in their 
decision making on military intervention by expectations of long-term congressional or broader 
public opposition. Activist U.S. policy officials—including activist presidents—generally have 
great confidence in the ability of decisive leadership and bold initiatives to generate their own 
domestic political support. Former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, who in the 1980s was 
a strong supporter of American interventions overseas, eloquently expressed the activists‘ belief 
as follows: ―Use of force need not enjoy public support when first announced; it will acquire that 
support if the action is consonant with America‘s interests and moral values.‖264  
To the extent that congressional sentiment actually affects an administration‘s policy on 
armed intervention, it is likely that the U.S. military leaders and their bureaucratic allies 
constitute a crucial transmission belt. First, as previously argued, the military leaders are 
themselves highly skeptical of open-ended troop deployments to uphold American values and 
change the domestic politics of foreign countries, and they share this concern with a majority of 
congressional leaders from both political parties. Second, the military have a longer time horizon 
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than their activist civilian peers; hence they are more likely than the latter to clearly perceive the 
long-term costs of armed intervention, which in turn makes them more concerned about 
maintaining congressional support.
265
 Army generals and joint forces commanders are especially 
aware of the need to secure and maintain congressional support for open-ended deployments.
266
 
Particularly in situations where no vital U.S. national interests are at stake, the military 
have a habit of assertively communicating their concerns to the president and his civilian 
advisors. Other senior administration officials, including the president, frequently become aware 
of the likelihood of a protracted troop deployment overseas, with implications for congressional 
support, only after the military leaders have made it clear that a surgical intervention or quick in-
and-out mission is in fact impossible, given the administration‘s goals and the domestic structure 
of the target country. For instance, this pattern clearly occurred leading up to U.S. interventions 
in Haiti and Bosnia in the 1990s: on both occasions, the military made it clear—challenging the 
rosy assumptions of civilian activists— that open-ended troop deployments would be necessary 




As General Joseph Ralston, formerly vice chairman of the JCS, explains: ―The military 
don‘t want to get started with an intervention and then suddenly have the Congress say, ‗well 
wait a minute, we‘re not going to support that!‘—because then you don‘t have a way to 
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succeed.‖268 The military leaders understand that in the short run, when U.S. forces are deployed 
in risky combat missions abroad, the American public may ―rally behind the flag‖ and support 
the president and the troops.
269
 But U.S. military commanders worry that in the long run, unless 
important national interests are widely perceived to be at stake or other nations are seen to be 
shouldering a significant portion of the burden, Congress and the American public might not 
support the protracted stabilization effort that may be necessary to accomplish the mission.  
 
The military’s growing insistence on post-combat burden sharing 
Deploying highly skilled American combat troops in protracted peacekeeping and 
stabilization missions overseas has significant opportunity costs, given that those troops will not 
be available for potentially more serious contingencies. Furthermore, deploying just 50,000 U.S. 
troops on long-term missions around the world, out of a total of almost 1.5 million on active 
duty, taxes the armed services because of the so-called tooth-to-tail ratio: in the Army, for 
instance, it takes up to 5 additional military personnel (―tail‖) to support the deployment of one 
combat soldier (―tooth‖) overseas.270 Finally, as argued above, the military leaders are typically 
more concerned than activist civilian policy officials about congressional support for open-ended 
troop deployments overseas. 
Hence the U.S. military are ―anxious not to have the main burden‖ for protracted 
stabilization missions overseas, and ―in fact they want to have as little of the burden as 
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possible.‖271 International burden sharing on post-combat stabilization is not only highly 
desirable from the military‘s standpoint; it also appears eminently feasible. Although only a few 
major American allies, such as Britain, France, or Canada, have much to contribute to U.S.-led 
combat operations in terms of advanced war fighting capabilities, many more foreign partner 
countries have the required capabilities to contribute to lower-stakes peacekeeping and 
stabilization missions.  
Ideally, once basic security has been restored, U.S. military leaders will want to hand off 
longer-term stabilization tasks to a follow-on multilateral mission, so that American troops can 
be gradually withdrawn, as peacekeepers from other countries deploy.
272
 American military 
leaders have traditionally been reluctant to deploy U.S. troops as part of blue-helmeted UN peace 
operations, unless American officers have commanded the mission; yet increasingly in recent 
years, creative arrangements have been devised whereby United States forces have effectively 
served under the operational control of foreign UN commanders.
273
 In low-stakes peace 
operations where no vital U.S. interests are involved, the military‘s desire for burden sharing has 
clearly won out over more doctrinal issues of command and control. For higher-stakes missions, 
where the possibility of protracted combat and counterinsurgency operations is anticipated and 
more important American interests are involved, the armed services‘ preference has been to 
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involve NATO instead of the UN, given the more advanced capabilities of NATO members and 
the U.S. military‘s greater familiarity with and influence over NATO structures.274  
The military‘s preference for post-combat burden sharing on peacekeeping and 
stabilization was elevated into official U.S. government doctrine in 1994, when President Clinton 
signed an executive order known as ―Presidential Decision Directive 25‖ (PDD 25).275 The 
document emphasizes that longer-term military operations aimed at stabilizing war-torn societies 
should be carried out multilaterally with allies and partners, because ―in such cases, the U.S. 
benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden.‖276 Furthermore, according to PDD 25, 
stabilization missions should not be open-ended commitments but instead should be linked to 
concrete political objectives that can be realistically achieved within a reasonable time frame; 
that is, there should be a clear exit strategy available before U.S. troops are deployed.
277
  
This marked preference for post-combat burden sharing was not just typical of U.S. 
military leaders during the immediate post-cold war period. If anything, the aftermath of the 
2003 Iraq War has further convinced already skeptical military leaders that the United States 
cannot bear the burdens of long-term stabilization all by itself. For Army leaders in particular, 
the lesson of Iraq has been that U.S. policy needs to rely on ―what the doctrine calls a 
comprehensive approach: you have to start engaging allies and the UN from the beginning, 
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otherwise there is no securing of the peace that you went in there to achieve in the first place.‖278 
General John P. Abizaid, who as head of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2003 to 
2007 oversaw all U.S. military operations in Iraq, sums it up as follows: ―As combat operations 
are over and you move towards stabilization, the force structure should be robust and it should be 
increasingly international. American troops are best employed when decisive military force 
needs to be applied; but tying down U.S. troops in long-term occupations is not in the national 
interest.‖279 
 
4. Sources of the military’s bureaucratic leverage 
Much recent scholarship on civil-military relations takes as its point of departure 
Huntington‘s model of objective (civilian) control, which prescribes a division of authority 
whereby military leaders concentrate on the art and science of warfare and policymaking is left 
to elected or appointed civilians.
280
 In Huntington‘s own words, ―politics is beyond the scope of 
military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their 
professionalism. [Hence] the military officer must remain neutral politically.‖281  
The model encapsulates a putative normative ideal, but it never provided an accurate 
description of civil-military relations in the United States.
282
 There is evidence that even during 
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the cold war period, members of the JCS explicitly disagreed on several occasions with civilian 
leaders not only about operational questions, but also about whether force should be used in the 
first place.
283
 For instance, the top military brass was initially opposed to U.S. intervention in 
Korea in 1950.
284
 In 1954, Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway opposed military intervention 
in Indochina; and according to Betts, this ―professional soldier‘s advice, in fact, was crucial in 
forestalling United States entry into Indochina in 1954.‖285 Furthermore, the JCS opposed limited 
intervention in Laos in 1961, were skeptical about U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1982, and 
played a key role in forestalling overt U.S. deployments of combat troops in Central America 
and Libya in the 1980s.
286
  
However, during the cold war period, the military‘s dissent was for the most part voiced 
in private, during the intramural debates. As Michael Desch has shown, since the Berlin Wall fell 
in 1989—with a lower threat environment and activist civilian officials more likely to want to 
use force for humanitarian and other idealist reasons—the military leaders have more frequently 
expressed their dissent in public.
287
 In addition, since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
the JCS chairman and vice-chairman have been able to speak more authoritatively on behalf of 
all the services, and they have regularly participated in NSC meetings. They are now the only 
permanent military advisers to the president, with the service chiefs (the Chiefs of Staff of the 
Army and the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of the Marine 
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Corps) relegated to a subordinate role as force providers. Thus, while interservice differences 
have hardly disappeared since 1986, it has now become more difficult for civilian leaders to 
exploit divisions among the services to weaken the military‘s political influence.  
Finally, the widespread perception of a stunning U.S. military success in the 1991 Gulf 
War validated the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of using overwhelming force in the pursuit of 
limited, clearly defined objectives. The Gulf War also provided the occasion, as Powell himself 
put it, when ―the American people fell in love again with their armed forces.‖288 The U.S. 
military regained the social standing that they had lost in the aftermath of Vietnam, and with 
increased social standing came greater latent political influence. As Risa Brooks has most 
recently written, because of their popularity and professional reputation in American society, the 
military leaders and their organizations ―can wield substantial influence over policy 
outcomes.‖289 
The military leaders can influence the Washington policy process in broadly two ways. 
First, they can seek to quietly persuade civilian authorities, relying on their acknowledged 
professional expertise in the intramural debates. Second, they can adopt a more confrontational 
bargaining strategy, by threatening to publicize their opposition and sometimes launching actual 
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Persuasion through professional expertise 
Decision making in American government, not only in the field of national security, is 
characterized by deference to expert opinion.
290
 The military‘s professional expertise on matters 
pertaining to the use of force is universally acknowledged and has always provided them with a 
significant amount of influence in the intramural bureaucratic debates on national security.
291
 But 
their ability to draw on their expertise as a means to exert leverage over their civilian peers has 
probably never been greater than today, given that increasingly fewer civilian policy officials in 
the United States have had any formal training or direct experience in the field of military affairs. 
The military leaders, notably the JCS chairman and the commanders of the unified 
commands, can seek to directly influence decision making on national security by explicitly 
recommending a specific course of action to the president and the administration. The authority 
and credibility resulting from the military‘s professional expertise usually lends their 
recommendations extraordinary weight. Beyond the JCS chairman and vice-chairman and the 
commanders of the unified commands, senior military planners on the Joint Staff in Washington 
(notably the J-3 director for operations and the J-5 director for strategic plans and policy) are 
important bureaucratic players. They can quietly influence the policy process in more subtle and 
indirect ways, through their control of operations and their monopoly of information on which 
civilian decision making ultimately relies. The military can de facto rule out certain policy 
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options, by arguing that they are either unfeasible or that their implementation would entail 
excessive risks or costs.
292
  
If the military leaders disagree with a specific use-of-force option, they can artificially 
inflate the required troop numbers and anticipated costs of the operation so as to make it appear 
politically unfeasible. The tactic is known among critics as ―McClellanism‖, after General 
George McClellan, who first employed it during the American civil war.
293
 For instance, the 
military planners‘ assumption in the late 1990s that an invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam 
Hussein‘s regime would require a long-term deployment of about half a million American troops 
made that option appear politically unfeasible, until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
vigorously challenged the assumption in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
294
 Contingency 
plans produced by the military can more generally push options as well as preclude them, thus 
constricting the policy choices of political authorities who rely on professional advice. As one 
former senior military planner explains, in the absence of strong presidential leadership, ―if the 
military discount an option, it will not be resourced. If it is not resourced, it quickly dies.‖295 
Finally, the military can help civilian policy officials think through all the likely 
consequences and possible longer-term implications of various courses of action. As Lt. Gen. 
Donald L. Kerrick, who served a brief spell as deputy national security adviser to President 
Clinton in the 1990s, explains: ―The military are very good at making the civilian leadership 
think all the way down the line in the interagency discussions and helping them understand the 
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implications of their actions.‖296 By illustrating worst-case scenarios and emphasizing the 
potential downsides of a specific policy, the military can again push decision making in a 
particular direction. For instance, leading up to interventions in Bosnia and Serbia in the 1990s, 
as well as for the recent intervention in Libya, the military brass raised awareness among the 
civilian leadership that initiating apparently low-risk air strikes would put American credibility at 
stake, which might well drag the United States into a costly ground war in case air power alone 
should prove to be ineffective. In each of those instances, that made the civilian leadership, 
including the president, more reluctant to intervene in the first place.
297
   
 Senior civilian officials at the Pentagon, including the secretary of defense, typically 
share the military establishment‘s viewpoint on matters of policy and magnify the military‘s 
concerns vis-à-vis the president and other government agencies. Research has found that military 
attitudes and mind-sets in fact penetrate the civilian component of the Pentagon bureaucracy. 
Civilian Pentagon officials become socialized into the military‘s own way of thinking and learn 
to look at complex political realities from the military‘s viewpoint. Furthermore, the Pentagon‘s 
civilian leaders usually understand that their organization‘s health and effectiveness depends on 
keeping the broader membership happy.
298
 On the other hand, on those rare occasions when the 
secretary of defense disagrees with the military leaders on matters of policy, the military‘s 
political influence is significantly weakened, and the president himself may not even hear about 
the military‘s concerns, unless the JCS chairman has the fortitude to openly disagree with the 
secretary. For instance, in 2002-03, a significant portion of the military establishment was 
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skeptical of plans for U.S. intervention in Iraq. Yet with the top civilian leadership at the 
Pentagon, including Secretary Rumsfeld, strongly supporting armed intervention (and the JCS 
chairman, Gen. Richard Myers, not daring to openly disagree with the secretary), the military‘s 
influence was limited and their concerns rarely reached the president‘s ear. 299  
 
Pressure through (the threat of) public appeals and resignation 
The military‘s influence on policy debates about national security and armed intervention 
in particular is not only the result of expertise-based persuasion in the intramural bureaucratic 
debates. Top-level military officials can also behave as more explicitly political players, by 
taking advantage of the substantial popularity and social prestige that the armed services enjoy in 
the United States.
300
 The military leaders can derive significant bargaining leverage from the 
threat of going public in their opposition to specific policies. In essence, the military can 
intimidate an administration into following their preferred line of action on issues about which 
they feel strongly, by threatening to publicly speak out and embarrass the president—especially 
when the policy under discussion is already controversial domestically.
301
 On most occasions, 
the threat of public opposition voiced in the intramural debates is sufficiently potent to persuade 
the military‘s civilian opponents to compromise on the policy.302 
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When the military leaders actually do choose to make their views public to increase their 
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis civilian authorities, their first step is usually to leak the armed 
services‘ specific viewpoint and reservations to the press.303 For instance, during the lead-up to 
U.S. interventions in Haiti and the Balkans in the 1990s, there were frequent reports in the media 
about anonymous ―military planners‖ or ―senior Pentagon officials‖ being skeptical of armed 
intervention and fearing the long-term burdens of peacekeeping and stabilization.
304
 Similarly, 
leading up to the 2003 Iraq war, there were occasional leaks to the press of military leaders and 
Army planners in particular being concerned about the civilian authorities‘ haste to resort to 
force.
305
 Press leaks are a fairly standard bureaucratic maneuver in the United States.
306
 Leaking 
is a relatively low-risk activity for the officials involved, so long as their individual identity 
remains undisclosed. On the other hand, the armed services as institutions may have an interest 
in being clearly associated with specific leaks, in view of signaling to their bureaucratic 
opponents the threat of more explicit public opposition unless some compromise solution is 
achieved that satisfies the military‘s concerns.  
A less frequent tactic on the part of the military leaders, which is usually adopted 
following a failed intimidation approach, is to launch direct public appeals, by relying on formal 
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statements, on-the-record interviews, or opinion-laden commentary to convey the armed 
services‘ own judgment of a specific government policy that is being debated in Washington.307 
Typically, because this tactic borders on insubordination to civilian authorities and carries with it 
the risk of escalating civil-military tension, only the chairman of the JCS can afford to take a 
public stance on specific policies in the absence of previous coordination with the civilian 
leadership.
308
 Alternatively, the secretary of defense may speak out publicly on behalf of the 
armed services. But a popular JCS chairman who uses public appeals sparely and wisely can 
greatly increase the military‘s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis civilian policy leaders. For instance, 
during the 1992 presidential election season, Chairman Powell granted an interview to the New 
York Times and then published an op-ed in the same newspaper, in which he openly declared the 
military‘s opposition to armed intervention in Bosnia.309 It appears that Powell‘s appeals, as well 
as military foot-dragging more generally, played a significant role in forestalling any meaningful 
U.S. armed intervention in Bosnia until mid-1995.
310
 Because of the military‘s public prestige 
and recognized expertise in matters concerning the use of force, when the JCS take a public 
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 Another means for the Joint Chiefs to increase their leverage vis-à-vis civilian authorities 
is to force a showdown by threatening their resignation, either individually or collectively.
312
 As 
Risa Brooks has written, ―resignation, in this context, is the military equivalent of a vote of no 
confidence in the political leadership‖313 It can seriously compromise domestic support for the 
president and his administration. Actual resignations by senior military officials are extremely 
rare, and since 1945 none of the Chiefs has ever resigned.
314
 However, the JCS are believed to 





Owens, the former JCS vice chairman, also claims that in the early 1990s he threatened that he 
would resign, if the Clinton administration was going to send U.S. combat troops into Bosnia in 
the absence of a peace agreement accepted by the parties.
317
 The military‘s success at exerting 
political leverage in this way suggests that embattled presidents are willing to do almost anything 
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Mobilizing external allies  
 The bureaucratic politics approach as originally developed underestimated the degree to 
which in the United States, government agencies and departments tend to develop strong ties to 
clientele groups, either in Congress, private industry, or civil society.
319
 The armed services, 
more than other government bureaucracies, can greatly increase their policy leverage by 
mobilizing their alliances with influential groups outside the executive branch, such as veterans‘ 
associations, newspaper editors, policy think-tanks, and especially members of Congress.
320
 
The 1947 National Security Act ensures the military‘s access to Congress, and 
congressional committees regularly encourage representatives of the armed services who are 
called to testify on Capitol Hill to inform the legislative branch of the military‘s disagreements 
with civilian administration officials.
321
 In this way, Congress seeks to offset the president‘s 
significant informational advantage in the field of national security and ―oversees the executive 
by dividing it against itself.‖322 For instance, during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war, Army 
Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki was called to testify before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Prompted by members of Congress, he expressed the view that a large external 
stabilization force would be needed after the end of major combat operations, thus publicly 
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challenging the rosy predictions of the administration‘s civilian hawks, which were ostensibly 
based on information not available outside the executive branch.
323
 
Beyond these established channels of communication with Congress, the military brass 
can also rely on more informal contacts with congressional leaders to shape the legislative 
branch‘s conception of the national interest and its specific policy preferences. For instance, 
during the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War, JCS chairman Powell and other uniformed leaders had 
extensive private contacts with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, during which 
the military expressed their concerns about the president‘s exceedingly bellicose stance towards 
Iraq and quietly sought to gain congressional support in restraining the administration and 
forging a large international coalition.
324
 Likewise, leading up to humanitarian interventions in 
Haiti and Bosnia, the JCS contributed to shaping the policy outlook of key congressional leaders, 
thus magnifying the military‘s own leverage vis-à-vis the president and senior civilian 
officials.
325
 Such explicit lobbying of Congress is technically illegal. However, by relying on 
informal channels of communication, the military are generally able to influence the legislative 
branch without leaving their fingerprints.
326
  
Every U.S. president knows that an overly contentious relationship with Congress can 
negatively affect domestic support for the policy he wishes to pursue, as well as his broader 
ability to implement his legislative agenda and be reelected. Therefore, as journalist Dana Priest 
has written, when the military strongly oppose a policy, including the prospective use of force, 
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they can seek to utilize their ―networks… to thwart the White House in Congress.‖327 In short, 
through their professional expertise, their threats to go public and their occasional public 
opposition, as well as their alliance with Congress, military leaders in the United States can exert 
an extraordinary amount of influence on decision making in the field of national security. As a 
result, when the military feel strongly about a prospective intervention and explicitly declare that 
the limited U.S. interests at stake do not warrant the potentially high costs involved, the Joint 





Figure 5: How the military can influence U.S. policy on armed intervention 
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JCS come close to holding a veto over prospective interventions they strongly oppose. 
 
(The policy result is likely to be U.S. nonintervention, unless the military leaders can be reassured  




5. How bureaucratic bargaining steers U.S. policy toward multilateralism 
If the United States had to bear no meaningful costs to obtain UN or NATO endorsement 
for its military interventions overseas, then American efforts to seek such endorsements would 
hardly be puzzling. Even U.S. policy leaders who are not known for their multilateralist instincts 
generally acknowledge that the endorsement of standing IOs may be beneficial at the margins in 
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terms of public relations, for ―selling‖ U.S. policy to relevant audiences both domestically and 
internationally. Therefore, if obtaining IO approval entailed no political, diplomatic, or financial 
cost, the United States should virtually always seek such endorsement before intervening 
militarily abroad.  
 
The costs of formal multilateral endorsement 
However, U.S. behavior in this field displays significant variation. The U.S. has initiated 
military interventions on more than twenty occasions in the post-cold war period. Yet 
Washington has sought explicit IO endorsement for only ten of those interventions—that is, less 
than half the time. (Excluding noncombatant evacuation missions and covert operations, which 
are always unilateral). This evidence clearly disconfirms recent scholarly arguments according to 
which U.S. ―military intervention without some effort to gain multilateral approval is now 
virtually obsolete.‖329  
 
Table 4: Post-cold war U.S. military interventions      
(excluding noncombatant evacuations and covert operations) 
 
 
Explicit IO endorsement sought            
(UNSC or NATO) 
 
 
No explicit IO endorsement sought 
 
- Iraq 1991 (Operation Provide Comfort)  
- Somalia 1992 (Restore Hope) 
- Bosnia 1993 (Deny Flight) 
- Haiti 1994 (Uphold Democracy) 
- Bosnia 1995 (Deliberate Force) 
- Kosovo 1999 (Allied Force) 
- Iraq 2003 (Iraqi Freedom) 
- Liberia 2003 (Joint Task Force) 
- Haiti 2004 (Secure Tomorrow) 




- Panama 1989 (Operation Just Cause) 
- Iraq 1991* (Northern Watch) 
- Iraq 1992* (Southern Watch) 
- Iraq 1996 (Desert Strike) 
- Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 (Infinite Reach) 
- Iraq 1998 (Desert Fox) 
- Afghanistan 2001 (Enduring Freedom) 
- Yemen 2002**  (Enduring Freedom) 
- Pakistan 2006** (Enduring Freedom) 
- Somalia 2007** (Enduring Freedom) 
 
 * Numerous air strikes until 2003. 
** Numerous air strikes and occasional commando 
incursions thereafter. 
 
                                                 




The primary reason for this striking variation in American behavior, I argue, is that 
obtaining the endorsement of relevant IOs is generally quite costly to the United States. First, it 
involves protracted international negotiations and bargaining with other IO member states, which 
make a quick military response exceedingly difficult and eliminate any element of surprise. In 
the case of Bosnia, for instance, it took the United States several years, from 1993 until 1995, to 
forge a consensus with the NATO allies to use significant air power against the Bosnian Serbs. 
In addition, protracted diplomacy aimed at obtaining an IO endorsement often brings 
international disagreements to the fore, and the resulting public cacophony of voices might 
reduce America‘s coercive leverage. For instance, leading up to the 1994 Haiti intervention, 
Washington‘s effort to involve the United Nations publicized international disagreements on the 
use of force, arguably making it more difficult for the United States to achieve a negotiated 
solution to the crisis.  
Furthermore, even once an IO endorsement has been obtained, multilateralism can 
continue to constrain U.S. freedom of action, if the available mandate restricts targeting options 
and the goals for which force can be used. For instance, NATO air strikes over Kosovo in 1999 
remained exceedingly limited and ineffectual for several weeks, in the face of European 
resistance to authorize the bombing of dual-use infrastructure and other strategic targets. Finally, 
obtaining a formal multilateral endorsement for the use of force often requires logrolling 
bargains and substantial side-payments to other IO member states that threaten to withhold their 
affirmative vote. For instance, leading up to both the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq war, 
Washington offered economic side-payments to other members of the UNSC, seeking to obtain 
their affirmative vote. In 1994, to obtain Russia‘s support at the Security Council for armed 




a Russian peacekeeping mission in Georgia, which arguably harmed broader American strategic 
interests in Central Asia.
330
  
 As former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sums it up: ―Multilateralism is hell, 
and it can be a real pain in the neck. Getting a consensus takes a long time. It often drives you 
towards the lowest common denominator. There is a lot of logrolling, and one may end up with 
not very sensible outcomes that are necessary to keep everybody on board.‖331 Therefore, I 
argue, hawkish U.S. civilian leaders who advocate the use of force as an urgent measure to 
defend American values or interests abroad typically agree to seek to obtain the endorsement of 
relevant IOs only if they realize that such a path is necessary to push their preferred policy of 
armed intervention through the Washington bureaucracy.  
My guiding assumption is that the United States, as the most powerful country in the 
world, can almost always obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs before intervening militarily 
abroad, provided that it is willing to pay the necessary costs in terms of protracted diplomacy, 
loss of secrecy and coercive leverage, side-payments, and reduced freedom of action. For 
instance, as I discuss in chapter 6, a strong argument can be made that even for the 2003 Iraq 
War, the United States could have obtained an explicit SC authorization, if only the Bush 
administration had allowed more time for negotiations and for the weapons inspections process, 
instead of hastily discontinuing its diplomatic effort in favor of military action. 
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Contesting the national interest 
 In the face of a foreign crisis that attracts the attention of senior U.S. national security 
officials, the bureaucratic debate in Washington will focus, first, on the degree to which 
American interests are involved, and second, on what the most appropriate course of action 
might be. If the security of American citizens or close U.S. allies appears to be directly at risk—
such as in the face of foreign aggression, or when there is credible intelligence about an 
imminent foreign attack—a bureaucratic consensus in favor of quick action, possibly including 
the use of force, is likely to emerge fairly soon. Furthermore, serious international crises 
affecting vital U.S. interests are likely to result in decisive presidential leadership; hence under 
such circumstances, remaining skeptics in government can be expected to be overruled by the 
president.
332
 However, such periods of supreme national emergency are exceedingly rare. The 
immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, when further attacks appeared very likely, is probably the only example in 
recent years.  
Overall, from a U.S. standpoint, for the last two decades the international threat 
environment has been much less challenging than it used to be during the cold war. The United 
States as a nation faces no existential threat today. As Robert Jervis explains, ―in the absence of a 
clear danger, let alone a clear and present danger, our external environment does not require that 
we be guided by one set of values rather than another.‖333 That generally leaves ample room for 
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interagency bickering and competition in foreign affairs, including on matters pertaining to the 
international use of force.
334
  
Hence in the absence of a vital threat, senior policy officials from various U.S. 
government agencies, such as the NSC staff, the State Department, and the Pentagon will 
typically disagree about whether the foreign crisis at issue affects important national interests, 
whether the United States should become involved, and whether direct U.S. military intervention 
should be considered. Simplifying a bit for the purpose of theory building, on such occasions 
there are usually two opposing camps in the intramural bureaucratic debates. On the one side, 
there are activist civilian policy leaders who claim that American interests or values are 
threatened and argue that direct U.S. engagement, including prompt military intervention, may 
be needed. On the other side, there are reluctant senior officials—with the military leaders and 
war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront—who insist that no vital American 
interests are at stake which could warrant the potentially high costs of direct U.S. engagement, 
let alone armed intervention.  
The president is rarely committed to any particular course of action from the outset, and 
he generally seeks to keep all options open for as long as possible.
335
 Unless the security of 
American citizens or key foreign allies is imminently at risk, the commander-in-chief may not 
even participate in most of the relevant policy debates, thus partially delegating decision-making 
authority to his principal national security advisors or their deputies. For instance, Presidents 
George H.W. Bush (―Bush 41‖), William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush (―Bush 43‖) did not 
take part in most of the relevant policy debates leading up to U.S. military interventions in 
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Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, and Liberia in 2003, respectively.
336
 Such absence of presidential 
leadership allows for an extraordinary degree of bureaucratic infighting and bargaining: various 
elements of the national security bureaucracy will be portraying the national interest in different 
ways, pulling and hauling U.S. policy in different directions based on their competing interests 
and values, and relying on their external clientele groups for added leverage, until the president 
takes a final decision. Usually, for humanitarian crises that do not involve significant U.S. 
strategic interests, the debate is at first structured against the use of force. That provides the 
military skeptics and their allies with an inherent advantage; and the activists inside government 
first need to gain the president‘s attention, reassure the skeptics, and forge a large-enough 
bureaucratic coalition, before the use of force becomes a concrete possibility. 
Hypothesis 5 (Reassuring skeptics): In the face of a foreign crisis that does not pose a 
vital threat to U.S. national security, policy leaders in Washington typically disagree 
about whether direct military intervention should be considered. Hawkish policy officials 
first need to reassure their skeptical colleagues and forge a large-enough bureaucratic 
coalition, in order to persuade the president to authorize military intervention. 
 
Unilateralist civilian activists  
I hypothesize that for civilian policy leaders who push for military intervention as an 
urgent measure to protect or promote American values and interests abroad, the endorsement of 
relevant IOs is typically not a priority. Their priority is swift and decisive action, regardless of 
their underlying motivation. Liberal activists in government such as Anthony Lake and 
Madeleine Albright during the 1990s, or more recently Anne-Marie Slaughter, may want the 
United States to intervene militarily abroad for humanitarian purposes, to fight genocide and 
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 Meanwhile neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle may 
advocate U.S. intervention to topple tyranny and promote democracy abroad. The former usually 
proclaim their attachment to international institutions in principle and recognize that 
―multilateralism…has its place as a foreign policy tool.‖338 The latter are in general more 
ideologically opposed to working with relevant IOs: in the early 1990s, for instance, Wolfowitz, 
who was then a senior Pentagon official, drafted a defense policy document that explicitly 
rejected a collective, institutions-based approach to international security and laid out a strategy 
of unfettered American primacy.
339
 
Yet what unites all the aforementioned activists beyond their disagreements on matters of 
principle is their concern that in the face of foreign crises to which they think the United States 
should respond swiftly and forcefully, multilateral bargaining at the UN or NATO may result in 
weak and delayed action based on the lowest common denominator or no action at all. Put 
differently, activist policy officials focus on what they perceive to be urgent challenges—hence 
they are likely to have a short time horizon. They will focus on the expected payoffs of their 
preferred line of action in fairly abstract terms, without much regard to questions of feasibility 
and generally underestimating the long-term costs of the policy they advocate. From that 
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viewpoint, obtaining the endorsement of relevant IOs before intervening may impose 
unnecessary costs and constraints on the United States.
340
  
Albright, for instance, advocated U.S. unilateral military action against Serbia in the 
spring of 1998, fearing that working through NATO would constrain the United States, and she 
subsequently opposed even trying to obtain a UN mandate for U.S. intervention over Kosovo, 
worrying that it would set a precedent which might allow Russia and China to constrain 
Washington in the future.
341
 As I will show in subsequent chapters, over the last two decades, 
hawkish policy leaders advocating military intervention abroad—whether in response to a 
perceived threat or to protect and promote liberal values—have at first frequently pushed for 
U.S. unilateral action, precisely because they thought that proceeding multilaterally through the 
UN or NATO would be exceedingly time consuming and might preclude the decisive response 
they sought. It appears that even for hawkish liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention, such 
as Albright or Slaughter, humanitarian norms usually trump the norm of multilateralism.  
 
Multilateralism as a policy resultant 
American military leaders, as previously discussed, are extremely skeptical about 
humanitarian interventions and other interventions aimed at changing the domestic politics of 
foreign countries, in the absence of vital threats to U.S. national security. The uniformed leaders 
are typically concerned that success is frequently elusive in such operations; they usually 
anticipate open-ended and costly deployments of ground troops; and they fear that perceived 
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failure on their part may harm the institutional standing and prestige of the armed services, which 
in turn might undermine their ability to respond effectively to more serious crises down the road.  
Therefore, assuming that the Joint Chiefs are not merely stooges of the civilian 
leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they 
believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. 
troops. American presidents are extremely unlikely to order U.S. troops into combat abroad to 
pursue secondary national interests in the face of explicit opposition from the military leadership. 
First of all, the president may be genuinely persuaded by the military that the prospects of 
achieving a specific objective through force are exceedingly low, and that the limited interests at 
stake simply do not warrant the costs and significant risks of an open-ended U.S. military 
commitment to stabilize a foreign nation. In addition, the president may fear that an open rupture 
with the Joint Chiefs might undermine domestic support for the policy in question, as well as for 
the administration more generally, and potentially even harm his prospects of being reelected.
342
  
In the face of strong skepticism or opposition from the uniformed leaders, civilian 
advocates of intervention need to be able to address the military‘s concerns and mollify the top 
brass, in order to forge a large-enough bureaucratic coalition in favor of the use of force. 
Specifically, the military need to be reassured that the use of force is indeed a last resort; that 
their mission is clearly and narrowly defined; that there is a viable exit strategy for U.S. troops; 
and that the long-term costs to the services resulting from the intervention will be kept to a 
minimum and are going to be shared with international partners to the greatest possible degree. 
In the course of the resulting back-and-forth bureaucratic debates, civilian advocates of 
intervention frequently have to change their proposals and make concessions, clarifying and 
                                                 




limiting the goals of military action and more generally seeking to reduce attendant risks and the 
foreseeable burden on American troops. Resulting changes to the policy may not actually be 
consciously thought out by the participants in advance.
343
 The ultimate goal is to make the policy 
more palatable to the Joint Chiefs and the military brass more generally. At the very least, once a 
sizeable bureaucratic coalition has been forged in support of intervention, the administration‘s 
activists need to get the Joint Chiefs (as well as their civilian allies at the Pentagon) to a point 
where they are no longer explicitly opposed, which will make it significantly easier for the 
president to truncate the bureaucratic debate and authorize military action.  
But in order to form a large-enough coalition within the bureaucracy, activist senior 
policy officials first need to be able to defeat or at least weaken the arguments put forward by 
skeptical military leaders about the excessive risks and long-term costs of armed intervention. 
For instance, when Secretary Albright was pushing for U.S. intervention over Kosovo in 1998 
and early 1999, the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon leadership more generally were initially 
resisting her, suggesting that U.S. military action would result in an open-ended and exceedingly 
costly commitment of American ground troops. Albright herself recalls that ―to forge a 
consensus‖ on intervention within the U.S. government was ―not an easy task.‖344 More 
specifically, Albright‘s former executive assistant explains that in the face of such initial 
opposition, ―to the extent that the Secretary could reject the Pentagon‘s argument,‖ by making a 
persuasive case that the operation would be limited and any long-term deployment of American 
                                                 
343 Halperin and Klapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 138. 




troops would be kept to a minimum, ―that certainly helped [the activists] in the interagency 
debate.‖345 
As activist civilian officials are confronted with the challenge of reassuring skeptical 
military leaders and countering their claims in the internal bureaucratic debates, they have to take 
their opponents‘ arguments very seriously. Generally the goal of a skilled bureaucratic actor is to 
reassure one‘s opponents in view of reducing their obstructionism, while at the same time 
persuading other bureaucratic players and ultimately the president that the skeptics‘ claims about 
the policy‘s likely risks and costs are overblown. Hence the activists, to prove the feasibility of 
their preferred course of action, need to move beyond what may initially have been a rather 
abstract advocacy of military intervention, and they need to adopt a longer time horizon, 
carefully thinking through the possible consequences of what they propose. In other words, as a 
result of bureaucratic politics, activist policy officials are forced to grapple with operational 
matters in significantly more detail than they may have previously done, which typically leads 
them to adopt a more pragmatic and less ideological outlook. They need to be able to show 
persuasively that their policy objectives are in fact sufficiently narrow, so that limited force will 
be able to achieve them; and they need to persuade skeptics within the bureaucracy and 
ultimately the president that any longer-term commitment of American troops overseas will be 
limited and that congressional support can be secured. For instance, policy activists from the 
administrations of G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W. Bush recall that leading up to humanitarian 
interventions in Somalia in 1992, Bosnia in 1995, and Liberia in 2003, in order to persuade the 
president to authorize the use of force, it was crucial to defeat the Joint Chiefs‘ and more 
                                                 





generally the Pentagon‘s skeptical arguments, by carefully working out all the relevant policy 
details and making a persuasive case that America‘s long-term liability would be limited.346 
My hypothesis is that in the course of these extensive bureaucratic debates, if the civilian 
activists are themselves sufficiently committed and influential within the administration to keep 
military intervention on the agenda, the U.S. policy process gradually shifts towards 
multilateralism. In short, as plans of action are repeatedly updated in direct response to the 
military‘s skepticism and concerns, activist policy officials who had initially pushed for quick 
U.S. military intervention and may have considered multilateralism as a costly distraction will 
increasingly come to value the benefits of IO endorsement. Channeling military intervention 
through relevant IOs, while costly in the short run, increases the prospects for locking in 
international support. That, in turn, provides the best guarantee of significant post-combat burden 
sharing and limited liability for the armed services. Therefore, obtaining an explicit IO 
endorsement for the use of force can be seen as part of a broader bureaucratic strategy on the part 
of civilian policy activists aimed at reassuring the military leaders that the costs of intervention 
will be limited and shared internationally. 
Morton Halperin, who served as a senior State Department official leading up to the 
Kosovo intervention, remembers the bureaucratic political dynamics that led the policy activists 
to progressively endorse multilateralism as follows: ―We preferred a UN mandate at the outset, 
but if we couldn‘t get the UN mandate we at least wanted NATO. We wanted this as a shared 
burden, and we wanted the U.S. forces to get out as quickly as possible. Getting NATO on board 
and knowing that NATO forces were going to go in later made it easier to sell the policy to the 
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U.S. government and particularly to the Joint Chiefs.‖347 In short, U.S. multilateralism for cross-
border military interventions is frequently the outcome of sustained bureaucratic political 
interactions, a genuine policy resultant that nobody may originally have intended in that 
particular form. The ultimate pace at which the shift towards multilateralism occurs during the 
internal bureaucratic debates is likely to be influenced by a number of factors, including: other 
recent experiences of U.S. intervention, the administration‘s general risk-aversion, and how the 




Hypothesis 6 (multilateralism as a policy resultant): U.S. efforts to seek IO endorsement 
ahead of military intervention are frequently the outcome of sustained bureaucratic 
exchanges, during which policy activists seek to reassure the JCS and other government 
skeptics about the likelihood of post-combat burden sharing with allies and partners.  
 
The military leaders generally insist on the need for limited liability, congressional 
support, and post-combat burden sharing. Yet the armed services have no deep doctrinal 
attachment to multilateral institutions as such. The standard view among American generals and 
admirals is that whether the U.S. seeks an explicit IO endorsement before intervening ―is a 
political matter, and it is up to the political leadership to ultimately decide it.‖349 What the 
military leaders desire is some reassurance that the American people will support the 
intervention and that large numbers of U.S. troops won‘t be deployed in costly peacekeeping and 
stabilization missions for the indefinite future. The endorsement of relevant IOs can be very 
helpful, insofar as it locks in international support and increases the likelihood of significant 
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burden sharing on postwar stabilization. But it is usually civilian policy leaders—frequently the 
very activists who initially opposed a multilateral path—who ultimately work to obtain the 
endorsement of relevant IOs, as a means to reassure the military brass and forge a large 
bureaucratic coalition favoring armed intervention.  
Based on my theory as laid out so far, the outcome of interest (i.e., U.S. multilateralism 
for military interventions) is caused by a combination of factors: first, senior policy officials 
pushing for U.S. intervention; second, military leaders who at first resist the prospect of armed 
intervention, based on the belief that no vital American interests are at stake that would warrant 
the anticipated open-ended U.S. troop deployment; third, a president who is initially 
uncommitted (which is typically the case when no vital American interests are at stake); and 
fourth, activist officials who are sufficiently influential to be able to muster the necessary 
resources to obtain an IO endorsement, in view of reassuring the military leaders and forging a 
large-enough bureaucratic coalition in favor of intervention. In other words, I hypothesize that 
the military leaders‘ skepticism about or opposition to armed intervention is sufficient to 
determine the outcome of interest only in combination with the aforementioned other causal 
elements. These individual causal elements are what methods scholars call INUS causes: they are 
insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the 
outcome.
350
 Put differently, this is a classic case of conjunctural causation. I hypothesize that the 
conjunction, or joint occurrence, of the individual causal elements is sufficient but by no means 
necessary to determine the outcome of interest. Put differently, there is no deterministic 
                                                 




assumption of causality underlying my theory, as one can certainly envision other causal 
pathways to the outcome of interest (so-called ―equifinality‖).351 
 
When the military explicitly insist on IO endorsement  
Sometimes, the military leaders and their skeptical allies in government may also more 
explicitly recommend that relevant IOs should be involved. For senior government officials who 
are reluctant to intervene, U.S. efforts to seek IO endorsement may be a welcome means of 
delaying or averting armed intervention—especially when key international partners are also 
known to be opposed to military action. For instance, during the early 1990s, U.S. policy leaders 
who were skeptical of the use of American air power over Bosnia—notably the military brass 
and other senior Pentagon officials— insisted that Washington should coordinate the use of force 
with its European allies and seek an explicit NATO endorsement, partially out of the expectation 
that that would make armed intervention altogether less likely. Similarly, in 2002, the Bush 
administration‘s leading war veteran, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard 
Armitage, recommended that Washington seek to obtain a UN mandate for the use of force 
against Iraq, first and foremost because they ―wanted to avoid the war.‖352 
In addition, senior military planners on the Joint Staff and at the regional combatant 
commands—especially the J5 directors for strategic planning—sometimes also explicitly 
recommend that the U.S. seek to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs before intervening, in 
view of locking in international support for post-combat stabilization. Especially leading up to 
prospective humanitarian interventions in regions of little or no strategic interest to the United 
States, such as for peace-enforcement operations in Africa, military planners laying out various 
                                                 
351 On equifinality, see also Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 161f. 




options typically recommend that an advance UNSC approval of U.S. intervention should be 
obtained. They may also advise that the approving resolution itself should contain an express 
commitment on the part of the UN to quickly establish a follow-on multilateral stabilization 
mission, so as to relieve the burden on American troops. The JCS chairman and vice-chairman, 
as well as civilian Pentagon officials, can be expected to magnify the military planners‘ 
recommendations and concerns in the interagency debates.
353
   
For instance, leading up to U.S. humanitarian interventions in Haiti in 1994 and Liberia 
in 2003, the military brass and Pentagon leaders more generally made it clear that they would 
staunchly oppose any deployment of American combat troops, unless a UN mandate was 
obtained beforehand that explicitly foresaw a handoff to a multilateral follow-on force within a 
reasonably short timeframe. William Owens, the former vice chairman of the JCS, remembers 
that on Haiti, in the summer of 1994 the military strongly recommended that Washington seek to 
obtain a commitment from the Security Council before intervening that ―a United Nations force 
would come in… to do this for the long term, because it wasn‘t going to get fixed in the short 
term.‖354 The thinking at the Pentagon and especially among the military leadership was similar 
leading up to the Liberia intervention of August 2003, under a different administration: 
There was significant interest in ensuring that there was a handoff capability in a 
reasonably short period of time. We did not want to go in without a commitment that 
there would be a UN force generated that we could hand it off to. There was a lot of push 
on that, [because] there was a potential there for a long-term presence in a policing role, 
which would lead to mission creep into nation-building.355 
 
                                                 
353 Author interviews with Gen. Walter Kross (USAF, ret.), Director of the Joint Staff, July 1994-July 1996 
(February 11, 2011); and Col. William J. Flavin (USA, ret.), Director of the Doctrine, Concepts, and Training 
Division at the Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College (January 18, 2011).  
354 Author interview with Adm. William Owens (January 27, 2011). 
355 Author interview with Gen. Bantz J. Craddock (USA, ret.), Senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 




Proponents of U.S. intervention in Liberia at the State Department and on the NSC staff 
remember that leading up to the operation, they worked very hard to obtain a commitment from 
the SC and regional partner states in the region to quickly establish a follow-on multilateral 
force: ―We wanted an answer for every argument that DOD was going to spring at us. We 
wanted to show that we weren‘t going to get trapped; so this wasn‘t going to be unilateral.‖356  
The first important precedent in this regard was set by the experience of U.S. intervention 
in Somalia in 1992. On that occasion, too, the Joint Chiefs had insisted that an explicit UN 
mandate should be obtained in advance of the intervention. Senior military officials reportedly 
declared in the internal administration debates during the fall of 1992: ―until we hear from the 
UN, our plans are nothing more than drafts.‖357 National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, 
himself a war veteran with significant combat experience, readily agreed with the military that a 
SC authorization should be obtained and Washington should seek specific reassurances from the 
UN and international partners that the operation could quickly be transferred to a follow-on UN 
force.
358
 Reportedly, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali offered verbal reassurances to 
Washington that a follow-on UN force would in fact quickly take over; yet he also requested that 
some U.S. troops remain available for the long term in case of need.
359
  
The Somalia intervention ultimately ended in a quagmire, after President Clinton, far 
from withdrawing American troops, changed their mission to peace-enforcement in 1993, which 
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resulted in a series of deadly clashes with Somali militias and culminated in the death of eighteen 
U.S. Army Rangers in October 1993.
360
 The U.S. military leaders and especially planners on the 
Joint Staff and in the services learned two important lessons from the failure in Somalia: first, 
before launching humanitarian interventions in regions of little or no strategic importance to the 
United States, Washington should obtain a written commitment from the United Nations that 
there will be a rapid handoff to a follow-on multilateral mission, and those reassurances should 
possibly be contained in the authorizing SC resolution itself; and second, the transition to follow-
on multilateral missions needs to be better planned in advance, so that when U.S. troops depart, 
the follow-on forces can in fact maintain stability and Washington won‘t be drawn back in.361  
 
How lack of multilateral approval can result in U.S. nonintervention 
The argument thus far has been that in the face of initial reluctance or opposition from the 
military brass, and partially following the military‘s explicit advice, proponents of intervention 
from other government agencies may seek inter alia to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs, 
to lock in international support and thereby reassure the uniformed leaders that the long-term 
costs of intervention to the armed services will be limited. In order to actually obtain the 
endorsement of relevant IOs, however, the activist officials pushing for intervention have to be 
able to extract the necessary diplomatic and financial resources from the U.S. political system. If 
the activists are themselves not sufficiently committed or influential within an administration to 
muster the necessary resources to obtain an IO approval, in the face of strong initial opposition to 
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the use of force from the military leaders, based on expectations of high long-term costs, the 
policy outcome is likely to be nonintervention.  
Hypothesis 7 (Nonintervention): When the military brass and other influential policy 
leaders oppose a prospective intervention, anticipating an open-ended troop 
commitment, and activist officials cannot muster the necessary resources to obtain the 
advance endorsement of relevant IOs, the most likely outcome is nonintervention. 
 
Sometimes, as previously argued, the military leaders and other skeptical policy officials 
may also directly insist that an explicit IO endorsement be obtained, anticipating that 
international opposition will in fact restrain the United States and ideally result in non-
intervention. In particular, senior policy officials who have strong reservations about intervention 
may choose to pursue this strategy when an explicit public opposition to the use of force on their 
part would either make them domestically unpopular or marginalize them within the 
administration, in the face of a growing bureaucratic coalition that favors intervention.  
There are probably numerous instances of potential U.S. military interventions being 
debated within the national security bureaucracy, where the option of using force is then 
discarded for various reasons, including the high anticipated costs and likely absence of 
multilateral support. Unless such policy options are debated at the highest levels of the 
bureaucracy, among the president‘s principal national security advisers or their deputies, the 
resulting ―non-intervention‖ decisions may not even be recorded, let alone publicly reported. 
However, there are a few specific examples of U.S. military intervention being debated at the 
highest bureaucratic levels, and where the use-of-force option was either permanently or 
temporarily shelved, among other things because of the lack of multilateral support.  
For example, between 1992 and 1994, activist policy officials in Washington were 
pushing for U.S. intervention in Bosnia. Yet the uniformed leaders and their civilian allies at the 




be forthcoming, strongly insisted that force should only be used multilaterally. Given 
considerable European reluctance about the use of force, until mid-1995 the resulting policy was 
in fact essentially U.S. nonintervention. It was only following the Srebrenica massacre of July 
1995, which resulted in greater multilateral support for decisive military action at the UN and 
NATO, that the Pentagon skeptics ultimately came on board and the U.S. was able to take the 
lead in a broader NATO air campaign.  
Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, hard-
line policy officials in Washington were pushing for U.S. military intervention in Iraq. However, 
JCS Chairman Shelton and Secretary of State Powell were adamantly opposed to attacking Iraq 
in 2001. They managed to avert a U.S. intervention on that occasion, voicing concerns that there 
would be no multilateral support for such an endeavor and that the long-term costs to the United 
States would be exceedingly high.
362
 Finally, in 2005 and 2006, activist policy officials in 
Washington were pushing for a U.S. humanitarian intervention in Darfur, to support African 
Union (AU) peacekeepers already deployed on the ground. Hoping to mollify the Pentagon‘s 
opposition to armed intervention, and apparently following the recommendation of senior U.S. 
military officials, President Bush advanced the idea of ―NATO stewardship‖ for Darfur. But 
when the administration‘s activists were subsequently unable to garner NATO support for a 
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6. Understanding post-cold war U.S. unilateral interventions 
One implication of the theory outlined in this chapter is that when the military brass 
agrees with a proposed intervention from early on, in the face of a decisive push for using force 
from the civilian leadership, the United States is likely to circumvent relevant IOs and act 
unilaterally or with only token coalitions of allies. The military leaders can be expected to have 
few qualms about using force under two circumstances: first, when they perceive that vital U.S. 
national interests, involving the security of American citizens or close allies, are imminently at 
risk; and second, when they anticipate that a prospective intervention will be limited in time and 
scope, entailing no costly deployment of ground troops.  
 
U.S. unilateralism when vital national interests are perceived to be at stake  
Scholars who view U.S. multilateralism for the use of force as the result of cost-benefit 
calculations on the part of Washington leaders generally concur that the least likely scenario for 
American multilateralism is ―associated with immediate, military attacks on the homeland, a 
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Pearl Harbor or 9/11 style of attack.‖364 In the face of a direct attack on the homeland or a 
foreign crisis threatening the security of American citizens or key allies, there will be incentives 
for quick and decisive action. The endorsement of relevant IOs has tangible long-term benefits, 
as discussed above; but in the short run it imposes restrictions on American freedom of action 
(resulting from the need to negotiate, consult, and find a mutually agreeable compromise with 
other IO member states) that may appear exceedingly costly in times of crisis. Heightened threat 
perception shortens leaders‘ time horizon, meaning that they are likely to focus on the most 
immediate challenges to security. Policy leaders who concentrate on devising a quick response to 
vital threats will value present gains over potential future costs, thus discounting the potential 
longer-term implications of U.S. military intervention. Under such circumstances, the long-term 
benefits of IO endorsement will not be central to their thinking.
365
  
Furthermore, in the face of a perceived vital threat, the public usually rallies around the 
flag and is willing to shoulder significant costs to defend the national interest. Congress, too, can 
be expected to explicitly endorse military action in the face of a serious international threat, and 
congressional support may reassure remaining skeptics within the administration about using 
force.
366
 In short, the urge to limit liability abates under conditions of rising threat, and 
government bureaucracies can be expected to put their own particularistic interests aside. When 
the military leaders, too, agree that vital U.S. national interests are at stake, their thinking will 
increasingly resemble that of the hawkish policy officials they usually oppose—they will become 
more risk acceptant, their time horizons will be shortened, and they will focus primarily on the 
perceived imminent threat, worrying less about the potential longer-term costs of intervention. 
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Even when the military leaders are fully aware that the use of force aimed at neutralizing a vital 
threat might result in an open-ended troop commitment overseas, they are likely to conclude—
again agreeing with their activist civilian colleagues—that the short-term costs of seeking to 
obtain a formal IO endorsement would outweigh any longer-term benefits in terms of greater 
international buy-in. As General Powell sums up the cost-benefit calculus of U.S. policy leaders 
under such circumstances: ―When you are invoking your inherent right of self-defense you don‘t 
need the international community, and frankly you don‘t have time to round them up.‖367 
Hypothesis 8 (unilateralism to defend vital interests): When the military leaders, as well 
as most other senior policy officials, agree that vital national interests are at stake, the 
expected short-term costs of multilateralism will outweigh its longer-term benefits. Thus, 
the U.S. is likely to intervene unilaterally or with only token coalitions of allies.  
 
One obvious example is the process of U.S. decision making leading up to the 2001 
Afghanistan intervention. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
9/11/2001 killed almost 3,000 American citizens. During the days immediately following the 
attacks, U.S. policy leaders at the NSC scrambled to develop a decisive military response aimed 
at reducing the terrorist threat and satisfying the nation‘s desire for retaliation.368 The 
administration quickly agreed to intervene militarily in Afghanistan, ostensibly to kill or capture 
the individuals who had been involved in planning the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and then leave. 
There was at first no consideration of a long-term nation building effort.
369
  
Focusing on short-term security challenges, the president and his senior advisers did not 
adequately consider the possibility that once the U.S. had intervened, it might end up ―owning‖ 
Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. It appears that some military planners, notably on the 
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Army staff, raised related concerns; yet most of the military leaders, including the JCS 
Chairman, supported a quick U.S. response and were not particularly worried at the time about 
limiting U.S. liability.
370
 The president himself was strongly committed to a rapid armed 
response to confront what appeared to be a vital threat to American security.
371
 As Stephen J. 
Hadley, at the time the deputy U.S. national security advisor, recalls: ―We had a threat arising 
out of Afghanistan that had just killed more American civilians than any single military 
engagement, and it was widely predicted that this was the first of a series of attacks that might 
involve weapons of mass destruction. So the priority was to eliminate the threat. We did not 
anticipate that we would still be in Afghanistan ten years later.‖372 
 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks there was widespread international 
solidarity with the United States. On September 12, 2001, the UNSC acting under French 
initiative adopted res. 1368, which implicitly recognized for the first time that the traditional 
right of self-defense enshrined in Art. 51 of the Charter could be invoked for military action 
against terrorist threats. On that same day, NATO also invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, offering Washington broad political and military support.
373
 However, senior policy 
officials in Washington, including the military leaders, were more interested in maximizing U.S. 
freedom of maneuver than in locking in third-party state support for the long term. Therefore, the 
United States stopped short of requesting an explicit SC endorsement of military action under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, anticipating that it would have been somewhat costly to obtain 
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and might have limited U.S. policy flexibility.
374
 Also, in its focus on short-term security 
challenges, the administration decided to conduct initial combat operations in Afghanistan 
largely on its own, relying on a combination of Army special forces and CIA units.
375
 In 
retrospect, a closer involvement of NATO and the UN from the outset might have helped the 
United States to maintain greater European and international support for stability operations in 
Afghanistan over the years.
376
 However, limiting long-term U.S. liability was decidedly not 
Washington‘s focus in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. As a former senior U.S. government 
official recalls: ―We felt that we had been attacked and wanted to conduct the operation under 
the mandate and ground rules that we were setting for ourselves. We didn‘t want this to be 
consultative.‖377 
In the years since 9/11/2001, on various occasions the United States has launched 
unilateral air strikes or commando raids abroad in countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and 
Pakistan to kill or capture suspected members of terrorist organizations. Unilateral U.S. military 
action in defense of perceived vital interests is unlikely to disappear in the future. President 
Barack Obama recently declared that in line with previous American presidents, he will ―never 
hesitate to use [the American] military swiftly, decisively, and unilaterally‖ to defend the 
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U.S. unilateralism when long-term costs are widely anticipated to be low 
The theory laid out in this chapter has one further implication. Even in the absence of 
perceived vital threats to U.S. national security, the United States is likely to intervene militarily 
overseas without seeking the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs, provided that two conditions 
apply: (a) there is a broad coalition of senior U.S. policy officials, crucially including the 
president, that is committed to armed intervention; and (b) U.S. military leaders, including the 
JCS and the commander of the relevant regional command, expect that the prospective 
intervention will not result in a costly entanglement and open-ended troop commitment overseas. 
In the absence of vital threats to American national security, both conditions are necessary, and 
together they are sufficient, to produce a U.S. unilateral intervention.  
When the military leaders do not anticipate long-term entanglements and costly troop 
deployments for counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and stabilization, they can be expected to put 
up little resistance, in the face of a strong push for armed intervention from senior civilian policy 
officials. Hence under such circumstances, the administration‘s civilian hard-liners do not need 
to reassure the military brass that the long-term costs of intervention will be limited, by among 
other things seeking to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs. Put differently, when senior U.S. 
policy officials—crucially including the military—do not anticipate a protracted troop 
deployment, the predominant view in Washington is likely to be that the policy payoffs of 
multilateralism are negligible, given that long-term international buy-in is unnecessary. 
Consequently, the administration as a whole can be expected to conclude that the costs of 
obtaining an explicit IO endorsement, in terms of protracted diplomacy, possible side-payments, 
and constraints on U.S. freedom of action are unacceptably high. As a result, for quick in-and-




interventions anticipated to be limited in time and scope, the United States is likely to intervene 
unilaterally or with only ad-hoc coalitions of allies:  
Hypothesis 9 (unilateralism for limited operations): In the absence of vital threats, the 
U.S. is likely to intervene without seeking IOs endorsement when (a) senior civilian 
policy officials, including the president, are committed to armed intervention, and (b) the 
military leaders do not anticipate a protracted and costly troop deployment. 
 
For instance, in the fall of 1989, President G.H.W. Bush and most of his senior civilian 
advisers became increasingly committed to a military intervention in Panama to oust local 
strongman Manuel Noriega from power. By December of that year, the Joint Chiefs, too, 
unanimously supported a unilateral U.S. intervention, although it was far from clear that vital 
American interests were at stake. The military leaders crucially anticipated that the operation 
would be limited and was unlikely to result in a long-term entanglement: in fact, the expectation 
was that a friendlier new government would take office in Panama ―within hours‖ of the initial 
American landing, allowing most U.S. forces to be withdrawn soon thereafter.
379
 Given the 
expectation of low operational costs and the prospect of a swift and successful completion of the 
mission, the lack of international legitimacy and support was not a concern.
380
  
Similarly, between 1991 and 2003, three successive U.S. administrations conducted 
numerous air strikes against Iraq to police two no-fly zones aimed at protecting the country‘s 
Kurdish population in the North and the Shi‘a population in the South. These were essentially 
humanitarian missions, with no vital U.S. national interests at stake. But although the UK (and 
until 1996, France) participated in those operations on an ad-hoc basis, there was never an 
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explicit SC authorization for enforcing the no-fly zones. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who served as 
UN Secretary-General from 1992 to 1996, confirms that the no-fly zones over Iraq were 
―imposed unilaterally by the United States and its allies.‖381 Also, in 1993, 1996, and 1998 the 
Clinton administration carried out more substantial air strikes against Iraq without explicit UN 
authorization.
382
 As I seek to demonstrate in chapter six, Washington could probably have 
obtained explicit SC authorizations for each of those interventions, including for the Clinton 
administration‘s significant bombing campaign against Iraq in 1998, code-named Operation 
Desert Fox—provided that the United States had been willing to pay the necessary price in terms 
of protracted international negotiations and side-payments to other Council members such as 
Russia and France. However, the military leaders readily supported the air strikes against Iraq, 
based on the expectation that no American ground troops would be drawn into the conflict, and 
thus the lack of explicit IO endorsement was never a major concern in Washington.
383
  
In many regards, a similar dynamic occurred leading up to the 2003 Iraq war.
384
 During 
the course of 2002, President Bush and several of his top civilian advisors became increasingly 
committed to overthrowing Saddam Hussein‘s regime by military force. The expectation among 
hard-line advocates of armed intervention, such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
and his collaborators, was that the military operation would be short and impose no major burden 
on American troops. Hence the hard-liners felt it unnecessary and indeed counterproductive to 
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invest precious time and resources into seeking to obtain an explicit UN endorsement, aimed at 
locking in international support.  
Senior U.S. military planners, for their part, had significant doubts about the hard-liners‘ 
rosy assumptions on the postwar transition and cautioned that a long-term troop commitment 
would be needed, which in turn made broad international support highly desirable in their 
eyes.
385
 This analysis was also shared by Secretary of State Powell, the Bush administration‘s 
leading war veteran, who explicitly recommended that the president seek to obtain a UN 
endorsement for armed intervention. On that occasion, however, the nation‘s top military 
authorities, Generals Richard Myers and Peter Pace, respectively the chairman and vice chairman 
of the JCS, as well as CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks, were for various reasons closely 
aligned with the administration‘s civilian hawks and never openly challenged the hard-liners‘ 
exceedingly optimistic assumptions about postwar Iraq.
386
 In the absence of strongly voiced 
skepticism or outright opposition to armed intervention from the top military brass, the American 
effort to seek a UN endorsement was always half-hearted, and it was completely abandoned in 
early 2003, as it became clear that the SC was unwilling to hastily rubber-stamp a U.S. invasion 
aimed at changing a foreign political regime.
387
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    [*Or do not challenge the optimistic assumptions of civilian authorities.] 
 
 
1. Activist policy officials, including 
the president, push for intervention.  
         + 
2. Military leaders believe that vital 
U.S. national interests are at stake 
 
(e.g. Afghanistan 2001). 
 
1. Activist policy officials, including 
the president, push for intervention.  
         + 
2. Military leaders do not anticipate 
a protracted troop commitment*  
 
(e.g. Panama 1989, Iraq no-fly zones 
1991-2003, Iraq invasion 2003). 
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Observable implications of the theory         
My principal hypothesis is that U.S. multilateralism for military interventions is 
frequently the outcome of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining in Washington 
between hawkish civilian leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of 
force, on the one side, and skeptical officials—with the top military brass and war veterans in 
senior policy positions at the forefront—who highlight the potential downsides and long-term 
costs of armed intervention, on the other. The theory implies that relevant bureaucratic players 
should modify their preferences and policy stances over time, as a result of mutual persuasion 
and strategic adjustment.  
Specifically, in those cases where the U.S. ultimately obtains the advance endorsement of 
relevant IOs, the bureaucratic game should evolve roughly as follows. First, in the face of a 
foreign crisis, there should be some evidence of activist civilian policy leaders pushing for armed 
intervention, initially without much concern for IO endorsement, or even expressing open 
aversion to multilateralism. That initial push for (unilateral) intervention should result in 
expressions of skepticism or opposition on the part of the military brass and its bureaucratic 
allies, based on their belief that no vital U.S. national interests are at stake that would warrant the 
anticipated open-ended troop deployment. Only thereafter, hawkish civilian officials seek to 
obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs, in view of reassuring the military and forging a winning 
bureaucratic coalition in favor of armed intervention. Finally, once IO endorsement has been 
obtained, the military leaders, in turn, should visibly change their attitude towards intervention 
and offer at least their tacit assent. The strongest type of evidence for my theory would consist in 
subsequent acknowledgments by activist senior officials that overcoming the military‘s 
opposition to armed intervention was in fact among the administration‘s principal reasons for 
 
U.S. intervenes 
unilaterally or with 
only ad-hoc 




seeking IO approval in the first place. In short, to test my bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. 
multilateralism for military interventions, it will be crucial to identify the preferences of relevant 
bureaucratic players at different times in the policy process, seeking to determine whether the 







Haiti, 1993-94: Securing a UN handoff before going in 
 
 
In September 1994, the United States intervened militarily in Haiti to restore Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the nation‘s exiled leader, to the presidency. Before launching the 
intervention, the administration of President William J. Clinton worked hard to obtain an explicit 
endorsement of military action through relevant IOs. After it became clear that a hemispheric 
mandate from the Organization of American States (OAS) would be unattainable, the 
administration concentrated its efforts on the UN Security Council. Obtaining a UN mandate for 
military action was exceedingly costly to the United States: it required a month-long 
international negotiation effort that involved logrolling bargains and strained relations with 
foreign partners. Furthermore, the publicly voiced international disagreements leading up to the 
UN vote significantly reduced the effectiveness of U.S. coercive diplomacy, making Washington 
less likely to achieve its objectives short of actual military intervention. The question I seek to 
answer, then, is the following: Why did the United States seek to garner multilateral approval 
through the UNSC? Or, to put it differently: What were the material or non-material benefits 
that senior administration officials anticipated from an explicit multilateral endorsement of 
military intervention?  
 The main argument of this chapter is that the U.S. military leaders, who were extremely 
skeptical of armed intervention and notably feared an open-ended commitment of American 
troops, drove the Washington policy process toward the SC in the summer of 1994. Activist 




intervention, did at first not worry about seeking any explicit multilateral endorsement for the 
use of force. However, the activists soon realized that in order to forge a large-enough 
bureaucratic coalition supporting armed intervention and persuade President Clinton to authorize 
the use of force, they needed among other things to reassure the military brass that a follow-on 
UN force would quickly take over responsibility for longer-term peacekeeping and stabilization, 
so that the majority of U.S. troops could be withdrawn. For that reason, activist policy officials 
agreed to seek a SC mandate for the use of force that also explicitly foresaw the establishment of 
a follow-on UN mission within a short time frame. While troops for the follow-on mission would 
still have to be subsequently recruited among member states, the authorizing SC resolution 
committed the United Nations to the process. That reassured the uniformed leaders that a viable 
exit strategy for American troops was available. Thus, the military brass reluctantly came on 
board behind the use of force. In short, working through the SC was part of a multipronged 
strategy on the part of advocates of military intervention in the Clinton administration aimed at 
reducing bureaucratic opposition to the use of force, notably from the military leaders and their 
allies in government. 
 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. I first provide a short overview of U.S. 
policy on Haiti during the years and months preceding the military intervention. Thereafter, I 
show in more detail that obtaining an explicit UNSC endorsement for the use of force entailed 
significant costs for the United States. In the central part of the chapter, I discuss how U.S. 
bureaucratic politics, and specifically deliberations and bargaining between the skeptical military 
leaders and activist civilian officials, drove the Washington policy process toward 
multilateralism. The chapter ends with an examination of two alternative hypotheses on U.S. 




constructivist theories, which in their strongest and most distinctive version claim that U.S. 
policy leaders have internalized norms of international legitimacy requiring multilateral 
endorsement as a matter of moral duty. Thereafter, I examine the argument that U.S. leaders seek 
the endorsement of relevant IOs in order to signal benign intentions to other states and thereby 
reduce the risk of costly international opposition, or ―soft balancing,‖ against the United States.  
  
1. Origins and evolution of the Haitian crisis 
 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a leftist Catholic priest, was elected to the presidency of Haiti in 
December 1990, with a staggering 67 percent of the popular vote. The Haitian people were eager 
for a radical break with decades of corrupt authoritarian rule. However, Haiti‘s economic and 
military elites feared that the new radical president would put their wealth and political privileges 
in jeopardy. Aristide‘s populism and his encouragement of violent street-mobs, as well as his 
firing of the entire military high command soon after his accession to power, did anything but 
reassure his domestic opponents. Thus, on September 29, 1991, Aristide was overthrown in a 
military coup, after having been in power for only eight months. The presidency was taken over 
by a military junta, headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, whom Aristide himself had 
earlier appointed to the command of the Haitian army. Aristide was sent into exile and received 




The Bush administration’s hands-off approach, 1991-1992 
 The administration of President George H. W. Bush was initially quick to condemn the 
coup. On September 30, 1991 Secretary of State James Baker unambiguously declared at an 
emergency meeting of the OAS: ―We do not and we will not recognize this outlaw regime. Until 
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President Aristide‘s government is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this 
hemisphere.‖389 A few days later, however, the administration began to back away from 
unqualified support for Aristide, citing concerns over his human rights record and insisting that 
he ―must publicly disavow mob violence and work toward sharing power with the 
Parliament.‖390  
The U.S. military brass under JCS Chairman Colin Powell strongly opposed the 
possibility of an armed intervention, fearing a repeat of 1915, when a planned short-term 
deployment of Marines, aimed at reasserting political order in Haiti, turned into a protracted and 
costly American occupation that lasted until 1934.
391
 But there was more generally little 
enthusiasm for military intervention in the Bush administration. The view gradually took hold 
among senior administration officials that while efforts should be made to restore democracy in 
Haiti, Aristide himself ought not necessarily to be a part of the solution. The only senior U.S. 
official who kept pushing for Aristide‘s return behind the scenes was Bernard ―Bernie‖ Aronson, 
an avowed liberal internationalist who was serving as assistant secretary of state for Latin 
American affairs at the time. Aronson repeatedly prodded the Joint Chiefs and the administration 




 The political situation in Haiti and its humanitarian implications subsequently became an 
important topic in the 1992 U.S. presidential election campaign. Candidate William J. Clinton 
had chosen to single out Haiti as one of the few issues on which to criticize the Bush 
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administration‘s foreign policy. For most of 1992, the Bush administration‘s policy vis-à-vis 
Haiti had focused on intercepting Haitian boats carrying migrants headed for the United States 
on the high seas and returning all undocumented passengers. Clinton called the Bush 
administration‘s forced repatriation of Haitian migrants ―cruel‖ and ―criminal‖ and pledged that 




Washington’s missed opportunity for a diplomatic solution in 1993  
Following Clinton‘s election to the presidency, however, his engagement in favor of Haiti 
initially fell short of his vigorous campaign rhetoric. Fearing a massive influx of economic 
migrants from the Caribbean Island, the president-elect declared in January 1993 that the forced 
repatriation policy would temporarily remain in place.
394
 Thereafter, for most of 1993, the new 
administration pursued a low-key diplomatic effort vis-à-vis Haiti. Washington‘s goal was to 
cajole the reluctant Haitian military rulers, on the one side, and an equally skeptical Aristide, on 
the other, into a power-sharing arrangement. The administration was engaged in a difficult 
balancing act: to satisfy Aristide‘s liberal backers in the United States, it wanted to restore the 
deposed Haitian leader as quickly as possible; yet at the same time, to facilitate a political 
compromise among the Haitian parties and allay powerful Aristide skeptics at the Pentagon and 
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in Congress, the administration‘s policy was to bring Aristide back ―in some way that 
significantly reduced his role, in fact, ideally, to that of a figurehead.‖395  
By the summer of 1993, the Haitian crisis appeared to be close to a political solution. In 
late June and early July, during a week of intense negotiations between the Haitian parties held 
on Governor‘s Island in New York City, U.S. and UN diplomats brokered a compromise 
agreement that foresaw Aristide‘s restoration to the presidency of Haiti, in return for his 
agreement to nominate a new prime minister, issue an amnesty decree, and engage in a political 
dialogue with his domestic opponents.
396
 The agreement also crucially foresaw that a UN 
assistance mission would be deployed under American leadership, in view of retraining the 
Haitian army and establishing an independent police force.
397
 On September 23, in preparation 
for Aristide‘s return, the SC authorized the deployment of the UN assistance mission in Haiti 
(UNMIH), to be composed of several hundred international police monitors, as well as military 
trainers and engineers. Although the international military and police trainers were to be only 
lightly armed, the UN special representative for Haiti, Dante Caputo, publicly referred to the 
prospective deployment as a ―dissuasive force.‖ The UN resolution itself called UNMIH a 
―peace-keeping mission,‖ thus making for a somewhat ambivalent mandate.398  
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In Washington, members of the military brass, who had never been enthusiastic about 
restoring Aristide in the first place, strongly resented the idea of sending lightly armed U.S. 
military trainers to Haiti with an ill-defined mandate that ostensibly aimed at ―stopping bad 
things from happening just by their presence.‖399 Pentagon fears about the prospective Haiti 
deployment were greatly exacerbated following an ambush in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 
3, 1993, when eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed, seventy-five were wounded, and one 




 On the morning of October 11, 1993 the USS Harlan County, a navy ship carrying 200 
lightly armed American soldiers and twenty-five Canadian military trainers that should have 
constituted the first sizeable contribution to the UN mission, arrived in the harbor of the Haitian 
capital, Port-au-Prince. The ship could not immediately dock, since its berth at the pier had been 
occupied by an old Cuban tanker. While the ship was waiting, a mob of drunken Haitian thugs, 
some of them armed, arrived at the pier. They started to jump around wildly, waving their arms, 
and screaming: ―Somalia, Somalia!‖ The entire scene was broadcast live by American television 
crews that had arrived in Haiti to document the arrival of the Harlan County.
401
 There was no 
immediate threat to American lives, and the thugs would probably have dispersed at the first sign 
of U.S. assertiveness. However, under pressure from a risk-averse Pentagon, and following the 
recommendation of his closest political advisors, President Clinton ordered the Harlan County 
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 The Harlan County incident seriously damaged the Clinton administration‘s international 
credibility. As one of the president‘s closest foreign-policy advisors candidly admits, ―that image 
came to symbolize the weakness of the Clinton foreign policy— an image that came to represent 
his early presidency.‖403 But at least in the short run, it was in Haiti itself that the image of 
American soldiers retreating at the slightest sign of resistance had its most deleterious effect. The 
incident significantly undermined the administration‘s diplomatic leverage toward the Haitian de 
facto rulers. As a former State Department envoy recalls, after the Harlan County incident, ―a 
negotiated solution to bring Aristide back to power had practically no chance of succeeding.‖404  
 
Why President Clinton authorized a military intervention in 1994 
The military junta led by General Cédras was ruling Haiti with an iron fist. However, 
there was no widespread starvation or large-scale violence against civilians on the Caribbean 
island in 1993 and 1994 that might have warranted a humanitarian military intervention. Nor was 
the political situation in Haiti of major strategic importance to the United States. Why, then, did 
President Clinton authorize a U.S. military intervention in September 1994 aimed at restoring 
Aristide? For several weeks in late 1993 and early 1994, with diplomacy at a standstill following 
the Harlan County incident, the NSC in Washington discussed the possibility of restoring 
democracy in Haiti without Aristide. As one former administration official recalls, such a 
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political compromise appeared to be the only solution left, short of a U.S. military intervention: 
―The dynamic was becoming, get rid of Cédras, get rid of his military dictatorship, and then hold 
national elections without Aristide‖405  
However, in the spring of 1994, Aristide himself moved on to the political offensive. On 
February 8, 1994, he publicly criticized the U.S. practice of forced repatriation of migrants, 
comparing it to a ―floating Berlin Wall.‖406 Several weeks later, he stepped up the pressure by 
giving the Clinton administration six months‘ notice of termination of a 1981 bilateral agreement 
that allowed the U.S. to automatically repatriate Haitian migrants.
407
 Aristide‘s U.S. domestic 
political backers also began to mobilize in his favor. In late March, Aristide supporters in the 
Hollywood community, the U.S. Congress, and the human rights NGO world began to strongly 
criticize the Clinton administration‘s policy on Haiti. Movie stars and producers such as Julia 
Roberts, Robin Williams, Paul Newman, and Jonathan Demme turned up the heat on the 
administration through several open letters and public statements. Furthermore, the pro-Aristide 
lobby in Congress made its influence increasingly felt: liberal congressmen such as Joseph 
Kennedy, and especially the Congressional Black Caucus, which had recently grown in size and 
political clout, began pressing the administration to change its policy on Haiti, hinting that there 
was an underlying racial prejudice in Clinton‘s forced repatriation of (black) Haitian migrants.408 
Finally, in April 1994 Randall Robinson, executive director of Trans Africa, an influential 
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human-rights lobby group, attained high visibility through a protracted hunger strike directed 
against the administration‘s Haiti policy. Robinson did not mince his words, calling the U.S. 
practice of forced repatriation ―cruel,… and profoundly racist.‖409   
 To defuse the political pressure, in early May the administration chose to strengthen 
economic sanctions, supporting the adoption of a UNSC resolution that banned all non-
commercial flights to Haiti and imposed a near-total trade embargo.
410
 Washington also changed 
its policy on Haitian migrants. On May 8, President Clinton announced that U.S. immigration 
processing centers would soon be set up on American ships anchored off the Haitian coast or in 
nearby Caribbean countries, so that henceforth no Haitian would be repatriated without being 
given a chance to make the case for asylum.
411
 The administration expected that the number of 
Haitian refugees actually admitted to the United States would increase only marginally. 
However, over the next several weeks, the numbers of Haitian boat people seeking to reach the 
United States virtually exploded. That greatly increased the leverage of activist policy officials in 
Washington who were calling for a resolution of the crisis through military force. From mid-June 
to early July 1994, close to 15,000 Haitian migrants were picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard. 
The processing system at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo, Cuba, was soon overwhelmed.
412
 
Strobe Talbott, at the time the deputy U.S. secretary of state, acknowledges that the economic 
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migrants were ―frankly one of the reasons why [American forces] had to go in. The refugee issue 
was getting totally out of control, and where we didn‘t want them coming was Florida. That was 
a big driver here.‖413  
 Finally, by the summer of 1994, Clinton‘s lackluster foreign-policy performance was 
increasingly affecting his overall political standing among the American people. There had been 
the disaster in Somalia in October 1993, followed by the Harlan County debacle. Furthermore, 
U.S. policy towards Bosnia was deadlocked, and most recently the world‘s only superpower had 
failed to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in the spring of 1994, as an estimated 800,000 died 
in one of the worst instances of ethnic violence of the twentieth century. These images of 
American weakness or outright inaction in the face of large-scale human rights violations abroad 
were particularly costly for a Democratic administration that had abundantly relied on values-
based internationalist rhetoric to legitimize its foreign policy.
414
 With congressional midterm 
elections scheduled for November 1994, national security heavyweights associated with the 
Republican Party, such as Henry Kissinger, James Baker, and Richard Cheney, were calling into 
question the administration‘s competence to effectively tackle some of the most pressing 
international challenges of the day.
415
 
 Thus, quite apart from the refugee challenge, the administration had strong political 
incentives to try to find a solution to the Haitian crisis, by using force if necessary. After all, the 
Haitian problem appeared to be one of the most tractable foreign policy conundrums the 
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administration was facing, compared with the situations in North Korea, Bosnia, Rwanda, or 
Iraq. Senior White House advisors had long convinced themselves that a forcible removal of the 
Haitian military junta was not only feasible, but that it would indeed be relatively easy.
416
 
Richard Feinberg, at the time a senior NSC staffer dealing with inter-American affairs, offers a 
candid assessment of the administration‘s political calculus:  
 
Looking strategically around the world, in 1993-94, what did we see? Frustration in 
Somalia, frustration in Bosnia; North Korea being difficult ─ and we couldn‘t bring any 
of these difficult problems to a solution. We were frustrated everywhere, and there were 
the upcoming midterm elections. The White House was thinking: we need at a minimum 




 Yet in spite of these strong political incentives to act, President Clinton himself hesitated 
for most of the summer to authorize U.S. military action. The president was fully aware that after 
Somalia, his administration could ill afford another botched military operation.
418
 Most 
importantly, with no domestic consensus that vital American interests were involved, the 
president was unwilling to authorize the use of force in the face of serious concerns from the 
Pentagon leadership and the military establishment in particular. Hence Clinton waited until the 
end of the summer, and he authorized a U.S. military intervention—Operation Uphold 
Democracy—only on August 26, 1994, once the United States had obtained an explicit SC 
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2. The costs of U.S. multilateralism on Haiti 
 One obvious regional IO that the United States might have lobbied for an endorsement of 
military intervention in Haiti was the OAS. The OAS had in fact been deeply involved in 
managing the Haitian crisis from early on: the OAS Permanent Council unanimously condemned 
the Cédras coup one day after it took place, on September 30, 1991, and the OAS foreign 
ministers subsequently called for the imposition of tough multilateral sanctions against the de 
facto regime. Moreover, following intense U.S. lobbying, at a meeting held in Belem, Brazil, in 
June 1994, the OAS formally endorsed a strengthening of the planned UN peacekeeping and 
training mission for Haiti.
420
 However, leading up to the invasion, senior Clinton administration 
officials understood that most Latin American states would be unable to straightforwardly 
endorse a U.S. military intervention in the hemisphere. Washington would have had to obtain a 
two-thirds majority vote on the OAS Permanent Council, making for a high threshold.
421
 Harriet 
Babbitt, the U.S. permanent representative to the OAS at the time, suggests that it would have 
been ―unthinkable‖ to obtain an explicit OAS endorsement of the intervention and subsequently 
bring in an OAS peacekeeping force under American leadership, because ―there is too much 
history, too much precedent of unwelcome [U.S.] intervention‖ in the hemisphere.422 Therefore, 
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the Clinton administration chose to look elsewhere for an explicit IO endorsement of its military 
intervention in Haiti and focused its efforts on the UNSC in New York. 
 Obtaining an explicit SC endorsement for the use of force involved a high cost to the 
United States. First, it required a sustained diplomatic effort that delayed the intervention by 
several weeks and constrained U.S. freedom of action. Second, Washington had to engage in 
significant bargaining and international logrolling, notably with Russia, which arguably 
negatively affected broader U.S. strategic interests beyond the hemisphere. Finally, the lengthy 
UN deliberations produced a number of often conflicting public statements by various foreign 
capitals. The resulting cacophony of voices undermined U.S. coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis the 
Haitian military rulers, arguably making a peaceful resolution of the crisis more difficult during 
the final weeks preceding the intervention.  
It took the Clinton administration more than one month to secure an explicit mandate 
authorizing military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Madeleine Albright, the 
U.S. permanent representative to the UN at the time, remembers that she ―spent most of July 
1994 persuading the Security Council to authorize the use of ‗all necessary means‘—code for 
force—to restore Haitian democracy.‖423 Albright‘s first challenge in the summer of 1994 was to 
convince UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, with whom she notoriously had a rocky 
relationship, to support the intervention.  
The UN Secretary-General of course had to accept any decision by the Security Council, 
the UN‘s supreme body on matters of international peace and security. However, any less-than-
wholehearted cooperation on Boutros-Ghali‘s part would have made a positive vote at the SC 
more difficult to achieve, and it might subsequently have increased frictions during the 
                                                 




implementation phase. Thus, the Clinton administration and Ambassador Albright in particular 
took Boutros-Ghali‘s concerns very seriously and partially revised U.S. intervention plans to 
gain his acquiescence. Washington‘s preferred solution would have been for the SC not only to 
authorize the use of force, but to actually establish a large blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping 
mission for Haiti soon after the initial combat phase, so as to quickly relieve the bulk of 
American troops.
424
 However, Boutros-Ghali and his staff were fundamentally opposed to 
quickly bringing in a UN blue helmet mission after the U.S. invasion.  
The Secretary-General thought that the United Nations simply did not have the logistical 
capacities to organize such a complex stabilization mission within the short timeframe laid out 
by the United States. Furthermore, Washington insisted on commanding the entire operation, and 
Boutros-Ghali was concerned that a UN mission under American command and with a high 
proportion of U.S. troops, deployed in the United States‘ own regional backyard, would have 
tarnished the reputation of UN peacekeepers for independence from great-power political 
interests.
425
 Hence the Clinton administration and the UN secretariat agreed on a compromise 
solution: following the initial U.S. military intervention, an interim multi-national force (MNF) 
would be quickly deployed under American leadership. The MNF, while authorized by the SC, 
would remain under complete U.S. command and control, and it would be funded exclusively 
through U.S. government funds and ad-hoc contributions from other participating countries. 
Only after several months, once a ―secure and stable environment‖ had been reestablished on the 
ground, would a formal UN follow-on mission take over peacekeeping responsibilities in 
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 Thus, in the short run, Washington would have to shoulder most of the military and 
financial burden and practically all of the related political risk.  
 
Persuading China and Brazil to abstain at the Security Council 
 The next challenge for the Clinton administration consisted in actually convincing the 
Security Council, and especially the other four veto-wielding permanent members (China, 
Russia, Great Britain, and France), to endorse the aforementioned compromise agreement and 
authorize a U.S.-led military intervention. The most recalcitrant SC members at the time were 
China, Russia, and Brazil. They all initially opposed a U.S. military intervention aimed at 
restoring Aristide, although for different reasons. The Chinese government was actively opposed 
to Aristide, given that the latter had officially recognized Taiwan during his short-lived 
presidency in 1991; and there was significant concern that China might in fact have vetoed any 
resolution authorizing the use of force to restore him to office. For more than two years 
following the September 1991 coup, Chinese opposition at the SC had prevented the adoption of 
any resolution condemning the de facto regime in Haiti.427  
The Brazilian government, for its part, was opposed to U.S. military intervention in the 
western hemisphere as a matter of principle. At an OAS foreign ministers‘ meeting held in early 
June 1994, the Brazilian representative reiterated his government‘s firm commitment to the 
search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
428
  Finally, Russia had no intrinsic interest either in 
Haiti or in U.S. policy in the western hemisphere. However, the Yeltsin government held a 
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grudge against the United States at the time, due to the Clinton administration‘s recent 
unwillingness to support a UN mandate for Russia‘s own military intervention in Georgia, and 
thus a positive Russian vote appeared in turn unlikely.
429
  
 For all of the aforementioned reasons, it was anything but certain in the summer of 1994 
that a SC mandate authorizing a U.S. military intervention in Haiti could actually be obtained. 
Yet the Chinese government, while strongly opposed to Aristide, had little interest in Haiti as 
such or in the politics of the western hemisphere more generally. Throughout the early 1990s, 
China had kept a low profile at the SC. On the occasion of several previous UN votes concerning 
the international use of force, the Chinese representative had spoken out for non-intervention in 
principle, while subsequently abstaining on the relevant votes authorizing U.S.-led military 
action in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. In the summer of 1994, realizing that the Clinton 
administration was increasingly committed to a military intervention in Haiti, Chinese 
pragmatism again prevailed. The Chinese government signaled its willingness to abstain on the 
crucial SC vote, provided that the UN Latin American caucus was not uniformly opposed to the 
prospect of U.S. military intervention.
430
 Undoubtedly, the Chinese government perceived a 
strong self-interest in upholding good bilateral relations with the U.S. at a time of growing 
economic interdependence.
431
 Also, the U.S. was able to allay Chinese fears about setting a 
precedent for pro-democracy intervention, by inserting an explicit passage in the UN resolution 
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emphasizing the ―unique character‖ of the situation in Haiti and its ―extraordinary nature, 
requiring an exceptional response.‖432  
Brazilian authorities made it clear that they would vote against any explicit authorization 
of U.S. military action, unless Aristide, the elected president of Haiti, was going to explicitly call 
for a deployment of American troops. The prospect of a negative vote from Brazil was 
particularly worrisome, because it would in turn have made a Chinese veto very likely.
433
 But 
Aristide was reluctant to be seen as explicitly calling for a U.S. intervention, which he feared 
might delegitimize him in the eyes of the Haitian people. As late as June 1994, he said he would 
―never, never, and never again‖ agree to be restored by a U.S. invasion.434 With Aristide‘s 
endorsement remaining in question, the Brazilian government was subjected to strong bilateral 
diplomatic pressure from Washington. Several leading officials from the Clinton administration, 
including senior NSC staffer Richard Feinberg and Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, 
traveled to Brasilia to deliver not-so-veiled threats that good relations with the U.S. and 
increasing economic integration should not be taken for granted.
435
 Ultimately, Aristide himself 
offered a vague endorsement of military action on July 29, only hours before the scheduled SC 
vote.
436
 That, combined with significant lobbying on the part of Washington, convinced Brazil, 
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and by implication, China, to abstain on the crucial SC vote—although both countries let it be 




Washington’s logrolling bargain with the Russians 
 The Clinton administration had to pay a greater cost to obtain Russia‘s cooperation at the 
SC. The Russians, as former Ambassador Albright recalls, ―didn‘t care much about what [the 
U.S.] did in Haiti, but they were determined to play a little diplomatic poker.‖438 The Russian 
ambassador, Yuli Vorontsov, told Albright that Moscow‘s support at the SC for the planned U.S. 
intervention would depend on Washington‘s endorsement of a similar UN mandate for Russian 
―peacekeepers‖ that had been deployed in the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia earlier 
that year.
439
 Moscow appeared quite determined not to budge on this issue.
440
  
Thus, following some intense backroom diplomacy, the United States and Russia agreed 
to accommodate each other‘s respective concerns: on July 21, the U.S. endorsed a SC resolution 
that commended and welcomed ―the contribution made by the Russian Federation,… of a peace-
keeping force‖ in Georgia. Ten days later, Russia reciprocated by supporting the draft resolution 
authorizing the use of ―all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership,… [and] the prompt return of the legitimately elected President.‖441 Furthermore, 
given that the Clinton administration had insisted on independent UN monitoring of Russian 
troops in Georgia, the Yeltsin government required that UN observers also supervise the U.S.-led 
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multinational force in Haiti.
442
 This logrolling bargain was reminiscent of nineteenth-century 
diplomacy and appeared to many like a revival of the classical spheres-of-influence approach to 
international relations: it was harshly criticized in the international press; it legitimized Russia‘s 
continued military interference in Central Asia, arguably undermining U.S. interests in the 
region; and it probably encouraged the Russians to more assertively defend their own interests at 




The cacophony of international voices undermines Washington’s coercive leverage 
 The aforementioned diplomatic efforts and bargains, which put significant strain on U.S. 
bilateral relations with important partners, do not exhaust the costs that the Clinton 
administration had to pay for its multilateral approach. The UN negotiations on Haiti, by 
exposing serious international divisions, also appear to have undermined the effectiveness of 
U.S. coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis the Haitian de facto rulers. Robert Malval, who served as 
Haiti‘s interim prime minister at the time, points out that for most of the spring and early summer 
of 1994, the de facto rulers in Port-au-Prince drew comfort from China‘s well-known anti-
Aristide stance and Russia‘s publicly declared skepticism about military intervention in Haiti. 
The military junta concluded that the UN would never authorize the use of force, and therefore 
American threats of military intervention should not be taken seriously.
444
  
Even as it became clear that the SC would in fact endorse the use of force in late July, a 
significant number of Latin American states remained opposed to the prospect of U.S. military 
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intervention, and their leaders said so in public. The representatives of Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Nicaragua spoke out against the draft resolution at a 
meeting of the UN Latin American caucus (Grulac) shortly before the vote. After the resolution 
was actually adopted, the aforementioned states all remained opposed, and they were now joined 
by Peru and Bolivia in publicly condemning the prospective invasion.
445
 This image of half-
hearted international support, combined with the Clinton administration‘s strong multilateralist 
rhetoric, seems to have persuaded the Haitian de facto rulers that U.S. threats of military 
intervention should not be taken too seriously.
446
 Paradoxically, if the United States had clearly 
signaled its disregard for multilateralism and announced its intention to intervene unilaterally 
from the outset, the threat of military action would have been more credible, and Washington 
might have been able to broker a political compromise agreement without actually having to 
deploy large numbers of combat troops.  
 
3. U.S. multilateralism as the result of bureaucratic politics 
 On July 31, 1994, the UNSC adopted Resolution 940, which authorized the use of force 
aimed at restoring Aristide to the Haitian presidency. The foregoing discussion, however, has 
shown that obtaining a formal multilateral endorsement involved significant costs to the United 
States. Why, then, did Washington pursue such an endorsement in the first place? 
 I hypothesize that the Clinton administration‘s efforts to seek a SC endorsement for its 
military intervention in Haiti were the result of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and 
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bargaining in Washington. The U.S. not only obtained an explicit SC endorsement for the use of 
force in July 1994—the authorizing resolution also expressly foresaw that the United States 
would hand off primary responsibility for maintaining a ―secure and stable environment‖ in Haiti 
to a follow-on UN force within a short time frame. That offered the prospect of a quick exit for 
the majority of American troops and could be expected to limit American liability. Based on my 
bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism, I expect that supporters of military 
intervention at the White House and the State Department sought to obtain precisely such an 
explicit SC endorsement with a built-in mechanism for a UN handoff, in order to reassure their 
skeptical administration colleagues, notably from the Pentagon, and thereby forge an interagency 
consensus on the use of force. 
 Supposing that U.S. bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining in fact largely determined 
the Clinton administration‘s effort to obtain a formal multilateral mandate for the use of force in 
1994, one ought to be able to observe the following political dynamics. First, there should be 
evidence of activist policy leaders in Washington initially pushing for armed intervention 
without much regard for multilateral endorsement, and possibly counseling against efforts to 
obtain it, based on the fear that it might unnecessarily constrain the United States. Second, other 
senior U.S. policy officials, notably the military leaders and their bureaucratic allies, should at 
first have viewed the prospect of armed intervention with great skepticism, based on the fear that 
American troops might get bogged down in an open-ended and costly stabilization effort 
unwarranted by the low U.S. interests at stake. Furthermore, as the policy debate in Washington 
evolved and the political pressure toward military intervention increased, the skeptics should 
have stepped up their opposition in the internal bureaucratic debates, as well as possibly in 




reassurances were obtained before the launch of offensive operations that international allies and 
partners would subsequently share the burden of peacekeeping and stabilization in Haiti.  
Faced with such staunch bureaucratic resistance, the administration‘s leading activists 
should in turn have realized that obtaining an explicit IO endorsement for military intervention, 
along with a specific commitment from the UN to establish a follow-on peacekeeping mission 
soon after the invasion, would help reassure the skeptical military leaders and overcome their 
opposition. Put differently, the timing of successive steps in U.S. policy planning and 
implementation should confirm that interagency disagreements within the administration largely 
drove the overall U.S. effort to obtain an explicit SC mandate for the intervention. If in addition 
to that, former senior administration officials who advocated the use of force acknowledged that 
bureaucratic politics and interagency disagreements indeed largely drove the administration‘s 
effort to multilateralize the policy, that would further support for my theory.  
 
Bureaucratic disagreements on the use of force 
 It is well known that international affairs were not a priority for President Clinton.
447
 
Seeking to be ―internationalist on the cheap,‖ the president typically resisted escalating 
America‘s commitment to foreign crises until they had become a domestic political liability, and 
even then he rarely took a decisive lead and usually left it to his senior advisors to set the course 
of U.S. policy. This pronounced lack of presidential leadership resulted in an overall weak and 
reactive foreign policy, marked by frequent bureaucratic infighting and intense competition 
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among various agencies and senior officials, who sought to convince the president that their 
preferred course of action was worth pursuing at the expense of alternative options.
448
  
 Interagency disagreements and bureaucratic infighting were especially pronounced over 
the Haitian crisis of 1993-94. The president was largely uninterested in Haiti throughout his first 
year in office, notwithstanding his strong statements on the plight of Haitians during the 1992 
presidential election campaign. For most of 1993, the administration‘s policy vis-à-vis Haiti was 
limited to the imposition of economic sanctions and a low-key diplomatic effort aimed at 
brokering a political compromise solution. In October of that year, Clinton himself did not even 
participate in the crucial policy debates that led to a hasty withdrawal of the Harlan County, the 
U.S. navy ship bound for Haiti carrying American and Canadian military and police trainers.
449
 
In subsequent months, under pressure from a powerful pro-Aristide lobby in Congress and U.S. 
civil society, President Clinton progressively escalated America‘s commitment to the restoration 
of Aristide to office, until military intervention increasingly appeared the least bad solution. 
However, as former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali pointedly recalls, leading up to the 
intervention ―the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA each seemed to have 
its own position and to be conducting its own policy in Haiti.‖450 Boutros-Ghali should probably 
have added the NSC staff, which under Lake‘s guidance played a leading role on U.S. policy vis-
à-vis Haiti and consistently advocated a force-based strategy from the spring of 1993 onwards.  
 Already during one of the administration‘s first NSC meetings in March 1993, Lake 
raised the possibility of a U.S. military intervention to restore Aristide to office.
451
 Subsequently 
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Lake and his staff, notably his deputies Samuel Berger and Nancy Soderberg and Haiti policy 
director Lawrence Rossin, became increasingly convinced that no meaningful progress would be 
possible unless the U.S. clearly put the threat of military force on the table. Lake and his fellow 
interventionists on the NSC staff initially did not worry at all about the need to obtain 
multilateral endorsement for U.S. military action. As Rossin explains, ―dealing with Lake and 
Berger, I don‘t remember that they ever agonized over whether or not there was international 
approval for this intervention.‖452 In October 1993, when the Harlan County was met by 
protesting Haitian thugs at the Port-au-Prince harbor, Lake explicitly called for a U.S. display of 
force to disperse the Haitian thugs and land the American and Canadian trainers.
453
 While 
skeptical officials in Washington feared that the result would have been a unilateral U.S. 
invasion of Haiti, Lake bemoans in his memoirs that at the time ―there was little—too little—
debate in our meetings about whether to use force to compel Cédras‘ compliance.‖454  
Subsequently, from about March 1994 onward, Lake became increasingly outspoken in 
his advocacy of U.S. armed intervention aimed at restoring Aristide to power.
455
 However, until 
the late summer of that year, the president remained unwilling to follow Lake‘s advice, mainly 
due to strongly voiced skepticism about any use-of-force option from the Joint Chiefs and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Pentagon‘s civilian policy branch. ―It‘s not like 
there was a great deal of enthusiasm for this in the bureaucracy,‖ Rossin recalls with diplomatic 
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understatement. ―So the threat of force option was put on the table, but it wasn‘t yet picked 
up.‖456  
 The State Department leadership, for its part, accepted that Aristide should be brought 
back to Haiti and restored to the presidency. However, Secretary Christopher, along with Special 
Haiti Advisor Lawrence Pezzullo and Alexander Watson, the assistant secretary for Latin 
American affairs, had a strong preference for a negotiated political solution that should result in a 
power-sharing agreement between the main Haitian parties. In the spring of 1994, those State 
Department officials came to strongly resent what they saw as an effort on the part of the NSC 
staff to work behind their backs: Pezzullo and other senior U.S. diplomats complained that by 
unconditionally endorsing Aristide in public, Lake and his collaborators changed U.S. policy in 
the absence of a prior interagency debate and made a negotiated political solution to the crisis de 
facto impossible.
457
 Until April or May 1994, most of the State Department, including Secretary 
Christopher himself, opposed the use of force to restore Aristide to office and insisted that 
international economic sanctions should be given more time to achieve their desired effect. 
However, the U.S. diplomatic community was itself internally divided, and in the spring of 1994, 
the State Department gradually shifted towards a pro-interventionist stance. Pezzullo, the most 
ardent opponent of military action, resigned from his position of U.S. special envoy to Haiti in 
April 1994.
458
 Strobe Talbott, a liberal Democrat who had become the new deputy secretary of 
state in February 1994, was quite receptive to the idea of a force-based policy on Haiti, and so 
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During the spring of 1994, Talbott and Dobbins increasingly became the leading figures 
on Haiti at the State Department, and they gradually brought the rest of the U.S. diplomatic 
community around to support a possible U.S. invasion, if only reluctantly. Thus, as the prospect 
of armed intervention in Haiti became increasingly likely in the summer of 1994, there was no 
meaningful opposition to the use of force from the State Department. Crucially, the department‘s 
leading officials did not think that an explicit multilateral mandate would be necessary, and the 
U.S. diplomatic community was in fact internally divided over whether the endorsement of 
relevant IOs should be sought at all. Dobbins, in particular, straightforwardly opposed the idea of 
even trying to obtain a UN mandate. He thought the effort would be exceedingly costly and time-
consuming. Washington, he argued, could live with the consequences of a unilateral invasion. 
The worst possible outcome in his view would be a failed American attempt to obtain a SC 
mandate (e.g., because of a Russian or Chinese veto), which by dramatically exposing the lack of 
international legitimacy, would empower those within the bureaucracy and the American 
Congress who opposed military action altogether. Dobbins insisted that rather than taking this 
risk, the United States should intervene unilaterally or only with an ad-hoc coalition of the 
willing.
460
 For several weeks in the spring of 1994, Dobbins‘s views reportedly enjoyed 
significant support inside the State Department.
461
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 The strongest and most effective bureaucratic opposition to American military 
intervention in Haiti was put up by the U.S. defense establishment, through the OSD and the 
JCS. The defense establishment first of all was convinced that there were no vital U.S. national 
interests at stake in Haiti that would have warranted the high costs and risks of military action. 
Furthermore, the Pentagon had serious reservations about Aristide, whom it saw as a firebrand 
politician likely to destabilize the country upon his return. ―Most of us at the Pentagon actually 
thought that restoring Aristide was not a good idea,‖ recalls a former senior U.S. defense 
official.
462
 The Pentagon‘s reservations were fuelled by U.S. intelligence reports that 
characterized the exiled Haitian leader as mentally unstable and essentially a psychopath. 
Meanwhile, the CIA‘s Latin America division had described Cédras and his military junta as a 




Finally, the Pentagon leadership and the top military brass in particular feared that any 
forcible U.S. intervention in Haiti would result in an open-ended occupation with attendant high 
costs and risks. Perhaps the strongest opponent of U.S. military intervention in Haiti was General 
Colin Powell, a Bush appointee who continued to serve as JCS chairman until October 1993. 
Powell‘s attitude on the Haiti question had essentially remained unchanged since 1991: ―We can 
take the place in an afternoon with a company or two of marines,‖ he believed, ―but the problem 
will be getting out.‖464  
                                                 
462 Author interview with Walter B. Slocombe, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 1993-94; and 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 1994-2001 (March 9, 2010). 
463 Christopher Marquis, ―CIA Memo Discounts ‗Oppressive Rule‘ in Haiti,‖ Washington Post, December 18, 1993. 
464 Colin L. Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 544. See 




In the fall of 1993, Powell and the OSD had expressed great skepticism about the planned 
deployment of U.S. military and police trainers to Haiti aimed at facilitating Aristide‘s return. 
The hasty withdrawal of the Harlan County, as recounted above, appears to have been 
determined to a significant degree by the Pentagon‘s opposition to a forcible U.S. deployment at 
the time. Following the incident, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested that the Clinton 
administration withdraw its support from Aristide altogether.
465
 At about the same time, senior 
defense department official Walter Slocombe declared at a party that he strongly resented the 
idea of risking American lives ―to put that psychopath back in power.‖466 Such publicly 
expressed skepticism about Aristide on the part of senior defense officials, combined with their 
outright opposition to the use of force, made it difficult for President Clinton to build up 
domestic political support for armed intervention among Congress and the American public.
467
   
 
U.S. defense leaders emphasize the need for an exit strategy before going in 
In 1994, under the new Secretary of Defense William Perry (who replaced Aspin) and the 
new JCS chairman, John Shalikashvili (who replaced Powell), the defense establishment was 
slowly brought around on the idea of restoring Aristide to office. However, for several months 
the OSD and JCS continued to remain highly skeptical of U.S. military intervention in Haiti, 
fearing the prospect of an open-ended commitment that would involve American troops in costly 
counterinsurgency operations and nation-building for several years. The military brass continued 
to believe that invading the Caribbean island, with its ragtag army of about 5,000 poorly trained 
men that lacked virtually any functioning heavy equipment, would be easy. Yet ―getting out‖ 
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would be a serious problem.
468
 Hence the uniformed leaders, supported by OSD, insisted that a 
political compromise solution should be found, which would obviate the need for a massive U.S. 
invasion. As a former senior Joint Staff official recalls, the Clinton administration‘s failure in 
Somalia in 1993 ―caused the military leaders to be very risk-averse, particularly if there were 
unknowns. And there were many unknowns in Haiti.‖469  
If there was going to be an armed intervention at all, it was essential to the U.S. defense 
community, and the uniformed leaders in particular, that Washington develop a clear exit 
strategy for American troops before the launch of offensive operations. The view among military 
planners on the Joint Staff in Washington was that as part of the exit strategy, political 
stabilization and nation-building tasks in Haiti should be handed over to a follow-on UN mission 
as quickly as possible. That would relieve the burden on the United States, allowing the bulk of 
American troops to be rapidly withdrawn as peacekeepers from other nations moved in. The U.S. 
military planners wanted to ensure that the transition to a follow-on UN mission, which had been 
poorly planned and executed in the recent case of Somalia, would be better prepared this time 
around. Hence the Joint Staff, in cooperation with the U.S. Atlantic Command, developed a 
matrix of specific tasks to be accomplished by American forces, before longer-term stabilization 
and nation building could be handed off to the United Nations.
470
   
In order for this exit strategy to be successfully implemented, however, the military 
leaders emphasized that a commitment would have to be obtained from the United Nations in 
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advance of the intervention to establish a follow-on UN force shortly thereafter. As Admiral 
William Owens, at the time the vice chairman of the JCS, recalls:  
We felt strongly that without that kind of commitment from the United Nations, one 
could not envision an American occupying force going in. There were two elements [to 
the strategy]. First, we needed strong intragovernment support, from the State 
Department, the Treasury, from the Justice Department. And then once America had gone 
in, there needed to be a United Nations force that would come in and be committed in 





The military leaders proceeded in close coordination with senior officials at OSD, in 
order to maximize their leverage vis-à-vis the rest of the administration. ―The interagency 
coordination from the perspective of the Pentagon was done shoulder to shoulder between the 
OSD staff and the Joint Staff,‖ remembers a former senior military planner.472 During the 
relevant interagency meetings, the Pentagon representatives advised that if there was going to be 
a U.S. military intervention at all, an explicit UNSC mandate should be obtained in advance, 
with a specific commitment that a follow-on UN force would be quickly established. John 
Christiansen, the former chair of the OSD Haiti task group, recalls how the defense leaders 
worried that it would be exceedingly difficult ―to get the UN eventually to come in,‖ unless an 
explicit SC endorsement was obtained for the actual invasion, along with written guarantees of a 
rapid handoff. ―That was absolutely critical. The Pentagon would have strenuously objected to 
going into Haiti by ourselves, without having the commitment of a follow-on [UN] force.‖473 
General Walter Kross, who directed the Joint Staff at the time, confirms that whenever the 
military brass briefed the president and the NSC, ―the UN sanction upfront would certainly be in 
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the recommended option.‖474 In sum, the defense leaders saw the quick handover of 
peacekeeping responsibilities to a follow-on UN mission as crucial to avoid what they 
considered the worst possible outcome, namely an open-ended U.S. stabilization effort with no 
exit in sight. ―The UN resolution, and the commitment from the UN to start the process [of 




 As previously pointed out, during the spring of 1994 the greatest impetus for shifting 
toward a force-based strategy on Haiti came from the NSC staff. Lake and his collaborators 
viewed the threat of force primarily as a coercive instrument; but there was little doubt in their 
minds that the United States would have to actually follow through on its threat to use force in 
case the Haitian de facto rulers refused to step down. Until May or early June 1994, however, the 
NSC staffers who most strongly advocated a force-based strategy on Haiti either did not 
explicitly consider the prospect of a protracted U.S. occupation of Haiti or did not see it as a 
major concern. Rossin, the NSC policy director for Haiti, does not remember ―any particular 
preoccupation‖ among the NSC staff about U.S. troops getting stuck in Haiti:  
That was not a particular preoccupation. There was at one point a discussion about 
several different ways of restoring Aristide, ranging from a proper military intervention 
with a longer-term presence, to just putting special forces in to take him back to the 
palace and leave. But the idea that we would somehow get stuck there and therefore 
needed to have an exit strategy before we got in was not something that was part of the 




That confirms the theory, discussed in chapter two, according to which activist officials 
usually focus their attention on the expected short-term payoffs of the policy they advocate and 
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do not adequately consider the policy‘s longer-term feasibility. It was the Pentagon and the 
military leaders in particular that drew the administration‘s attention to the need for an exit 
strategy as a prerequisite for military intervention. Admiral Owens recalls attending several NSC 
meetings on Haiti, ―where the idealism of senior administration officials was running rampant,‖ 
and the military were cautioning against the view that ―everything was going to be rosy after [the 
U.S.] had gotten in and reestablished the leader.‖477 
 
How the military pushed the U.S. policy process towards multilateralism  
Taking a closer look at the timing of successive steps in U.S. policy planning and 
implementation further clarifies the military‘s crucial role. The Joint Chiefs had been asked to 
develop contingency plans for a U.S. invasion of Haiti in late 1993, following the Harlan County 
incident. Thus, a secret operational planning cell was set up at the U.S. Atlantic Command 
(USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. Under the supervision of Major General Michael J. Byron, the 
cell developed a draft operations plan (codenamed OPLAN 2370), which was completed in late 
February 1994: the plan foresaw a twenty-four day U.S. military operation in Haiti, after which 
longer-term stabilization tasks would be handed off to a multinational (preferably UN) follow-on 
force.
478
 Thus, from the earliest days of military planning, the military leaders and their civilian 
allies at the Pentagon considered that a quick handoff to a follow-on multilateral mission would 
be all but essential. As former Undersecretary of Defense Frank Wisner recalls, there was 
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―practically a doctrinal assumption‖ among the U.S. military that the mission would need to be 
internationalized from the beginning, to secure a quick exit for American troops.
479
  
 Senior defense officials made it clear that unless a commitment could be obtained from 
the United Nations in advance of the intervention that a follow-on UN mission would be quickly 
established thereafter, they would remain opposed to any full-scale U.S. invasion of Haiti. The 
military brass also crucially warned that if such a policy was nevertheless going to be forced 
upon them by the president, the most likely outcome would be failure. First, the U.S. military 
lacked sufficient nation-building skills and experience. Second, there would be little domestic 
political support for such a protracted stabilization effort. The JCS, in the absence of clear 
presidential guidelines to the contrary, had been explicitly planning for a short-term U.S. military 
involvement. That put significant pressure on the rest of the administration to cooperate in 
devising a viable exit strategy for American troops.  
During an NSC principals‘ meeting on May 7, 1994, Lake suggested that it would be 
―useful‖ to take a decision on the shift towards a force-based strategy. Thereupon JCS chairman 
Shalikashvili, who was not as inherently hostile to the possibility of military intervention as 
some of his colleagues from the armed services, informed the president and the administration‘s 
other top officials that the military had plans to go in if needed and neutralize the Haitian defense 
forces. But he insisted that the military planners, on their own, could not ―deliver… a plan on 
how to get out‖ and made it clear that in the absence of a clear exit strategy for U.S. troops he 
would advise against moving ahead with the operation.
480
 In previous days, high-level military 
officials had gone public in their opposition to a U.S. invasion of Haiti. Given President 
Clinton‘s recent policy shift and his now unequivocal support for the exiled Haitian leader, the 
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military brass could no longer afford to directly attack Aristide, which would have forced a 
showdown with the civilian leadership. Instead, the skeptical military officials now emphasized 
problems of policy implementation: they mentioned as one important reason for their resistance 
the fear that no standing IO, neither the UN nor the OAS, would endorse the intervention, which 
might result in American troops having to police the island for several years.
481
  
 By June 1994, senior military leaders at USACOM publicly announced that they 
―assumed‖ any military intervention in Haiti would be conducted with a UN Security Council 
mandate, thereby suggesting that they considered such a mandate essential to the operation‘s 
overall success.
482
 Also in June, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch invited Strobe 
Talbott, his equal in rank from the State Department, and James Steinberg, the State 
Department‘s policy planning chief, to several informal conversations with the JCS and other top 
military officials. Over the following weeks, Talbott in particular, who had for several months 
been a staunch advocate of military intervention, became much more aware of what the military 
planners viewed as the operation‘s principal risks.483 Thus, by the end of June, U.S. defense 
leaders had successfully convinced other senior figures within the administration that serious 
efforts should be made to obtain an explicit SC mandate for the use of force, because that alone 
would effectively guarantee a quick handover to a UN follow-on mission and thereby offer a 
smooth exit strategy for American troops.  
 In retrospect, former Deputy Secretary of State Talbott has little doubt that the main 
reason why the Clinton administration sought to obtain an explicit SC mandate for the use of 
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force in Haiti was to have a virtual certainty before going in that there would be a rapid transfer 
of post-combat stabilization tasks to a follow-on UN mission. That, in turn, was considered 
essential to appease skeptics at OSD and the JCS: ―Our principal reason for wanting to do a 
handoff to the UN as quickly as possible was that our military really wanted it. It was not so 
much about dealing with many skeptics in Congress. It really had to do with Shalikashvili.‖484 
Similarly, Morton Halperin, at the time a senior NSC staffer, recalls that ―the deal that was 
brokered with the UN was very much to get the military to go in; [because] they were concerned 
about how quickly they could get out.‖485 It was only in mid-August 1994, once a formal UN 
mandate had been obtained and most of the Pentagon‘s concerns had been addressed, that 
Secretary of Defense Perry reportedly told his staff: ―That‘s it, we‘re not going to mess around 
any more‖ by opposing military intervention.486 The UN mandate, which explicitly foresaw a 
rapid handoff to a follow-on UN force, had contributed to reassuring the military brass. Senior 
military planners in Washington understood that international troops for the follow-on force 
would still have to be recruited, but what reassured them was ―the commitment from the UN to 
start that process.‖487 
A few days later, on August 26, President Clinton finally decided to authorize an invasion 
of Haiti aimed at ousting the Cédras junta and restoring Aristide to office. Unnamed senior 
administration officials subsequently confirmed to the Washington Post that ―he [Clinton] waited 
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until September to satisfy Pentagon reservations.‖488 On September 10, the president delivered a 
nationally televised ultimatum to the Haitian de facto authorities: ―Your time is up. Leave now, 
or we will force you from power.‖489 But having issued a clear coercive threat, Clinton decided 
to have one last try at diplomacy: on September 17, with American invasion forces already on 
their way toward Haiti, a negotiating team composed of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 
retired General Colin Powell, and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Samuel 
Nunn, landed in Haiti. In little more than twenty-four hours, the American negotiators persuaded 
the Haitian de facto rulers to agree to step down and consent to a peaceful deployment of 
international troops. The diplomatic agreement did not explicitly foresee as full-fledged invasion; 
yet it created an opening that allowed roughly 20,000 U.S. troops to deploy without combat 




By the end of September, American troops were joined by a small contingent of 295 
Caribbean soldiers. One month later, a Bangladeshi peacekeeping contingent of 1,100, as well as 
roughly 200 international police monitors from Argentina, Jordan, and various Caribbean 
nations, had also been deployed.
491
 General Cédras resigned on October 10 and was granted 
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political sanctuary in Panama. By October 15, the situation had become sufficiently stable for 
Aristide to return to Haiti and resume the presidency.
492
 For several months, the U.S. had to 
shoulder virtually the entire cost of the multi-national force (MNF) in Haiti.
493
 However, by the 
end of March 1995, the U.S. was able to hand off all peacekeeping responsibilities to a follow-on 
UN mission of 6,000 men, which was composed of a majority of non-U.S. troops and supported 
itself through assessed UN peacekeeping funds. Thanks to the smooth handover to a follow-on 
UN mission, the specter of a large number of American troops getting ―stuck‖ in Haiti for the 
indefinite future was successfully averted. 
 
Understanding the Pentagon’s bureaucratic political influence 
 U.S. defense leaders and the military brass in particular influenced the Clinton 
administration‘s policy making on Haiti in two ways. First, they managed to genuinely persuade 
several of their colleagues in other agencies, such as Talbott and Lake, that devising an exit 
strategy for American troops in advance was essential to the operation‘s overall success. The 
Joint Chiefs convinced their colleagues within the administration that some type of longer-term 
military presence would be necessary to stabilize the situation on the ground; but it was unlikely 
that Congress and the American people would support a large-scale U.S. military deployment in 
Haiti for the indefinite future. Since late 1993, the Joint Chiefs had been developing contingency 
plans for a short-term U.S. military operation, with a rapid handover of stabilization and 
reconstruction functions to the international community. In the spring and summer of 1994, those 
plans came to set the framework for the administration‘s overall policy toward Haiti.  
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 Second, the Joint Chiefs and their civilian allies at OSD could leverage the Clinton 
administration in more indirect ways. So long as the president remained undecided and did not 
publicly commit the nation to a given course of action, opponents of the use of force from the 
defense establishment (who were able to speak on those issues with great authority) could further 
undermine an already weak popular support for military intervention by means of critical public 
statements and deliberate press leaks. That created significant problems for their counterparts 
from other agencies, who were trying to build up momentum for an invasion of Haiti.
494
 Frank 
Wisner, undersecretary of defense for policy in 1993-94, describes the opening that Clinton‘s 
lack of decisiveness created for bureaucratic opponents of a force-based strategy as follows: 
If the president had decided that he wanted to go to Haiti and invade the country then the 
Pentagon would have carried it out. In the face of a decision by the president that is clear, 
the Secretary of Defense is going to carry out the decision, whether or not he himself has 
second thoughts. The Pentagon will follow—provided that there is a clear mission that 
has been approved by the president. But here‘s the problem: the Haiti issue was a 




 The president‘s awareness that another botched military operation after Somalia might be 
extremely costly in domestic political terms, and his resulting overall indecisiveness on what the 
administration‘s policy on Haiti should be, allowed the powerful U.S. defense community to set 
the parameters for any military action in Haiti to a higher degree than might otherwise have been 
the case. As a former senior national security official recalls: ―The deaths of thirteen American 
servicemen in Mogadishu led to a very sharp response in the public and the Congress. As we 
debated the use of force elsewhere, there was a concern that a similar incident would be like an 
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anaphylactic shock. The first bee-sting you‘re OK, the second bee-sting you‘re dead.‖496 The 
president, moreover, felt clearly uncomfortable taking on the military leaders, with whom as a 
draft evader he had always had a somewhat awkward relationship. As General Kross recalls:  
After Somalia, Clinton began paying a lot of attention to risk-averse military advice. And 
there are numerous instances starting in Haiti, where he was following all the advice, 
about focusing on the exit strategy and all that. There are lots of examples where 





 It should also be noted that obtaining an explicit SC mandate for military intervention, 
and thereby ensuring that a UN follow-on mission would quickly take over, was only one, albeit 
crucial, dimension of a multi-faceted strategy on the part of civilian activists aimed at averting a 
showdown with the Pentagon and with the military leaders in particular. Other elements of that 
strategy included: a CIA-led covert operation in the late summer of 1994 aimed at promoting an 
internal army coup in Haiti,
498
 as well as systematic efforts to bribe the Haitian army leaders into 
exile by offering sizeable financial incentives
499—two approaches which, if successful, might 
have allowed UN peacekeepers to deploy immediately and without combat; and finally the 
aforementioned last-ditch diplomatic mission led by former President Carter, which was able to 
avert a forcible entry of U.S. troops, but at the cost of a muddled political agreement, which, had 
it been fully implemented, would have allowed Cédras and his fellow junta leaders to remain in 
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4. The importance of domestic political factors: public opinion and Congress 
In the foregoing pages I have shown that the military leaders were much more anxious 
than civilian policy officials from other U.S. government agencies about the need to develop a 
clear exit strategy for American troops in advance of offensive operations. One important reason 
for the military‘s concern about protracted peacekeeping and nation-building commitments 
overseas is their fear that such open-ended deployments will not be supported by the will of the 
American people, as expressed notably through Congress. In the case of Haiti, too, because of 
the military‘s focus on the operation‘s long-term feasibility, they worried more than other policy 





U.S. popular preferences for intervening with allies and partners 
Some scholars have suggested that the Clinton administration‘s concerns about U.S. 
popular support for the use of force were in fact the most important factor behind Washington‘s 
effort to obtain an explicit SC mandate in July 1994. Sarah Kreps, for instance, suggests that: 
―Perhaps the only way that the Clinton administration could execute the Haiti mission and not be 
punished by its domestic political audience was to conduct the mission multilaterally.‖502  
                                                 
500 Author interview with Strobe Talbott, July 8, 2009; see also Elaine Sciolino, ―Mission to Haiti: On the Brink of 
War, a Tense Battle of Wills,‖ New York Times, September 20, 1994; and Morley and McGillon, ―‘Disobiedient‘ 
Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization,‖ p. 131. 
501 Soderberg, The Superpower Myth, p. 49. 
502 Sarah Kreps, ―The 1994 Haiti Intervention: A Unilateral Operation in Multilateral Clothes,‖ Journal of Strategic 




As discussed in chapter one, U.S. public opinion polls generally suggest a clear 
preference among Americans for multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, military interventions. 
However, what appears to matter most to the American public is not so much IO endorsement, as 
participation by other states in U.S.-led coalitions. Opinion polls taken during the summer of 
1994 confirm this general finding: while popular support for military intervention in Haiti was 
generally low, Americans were significantly more likely to support a multinational, U.S.-led 
intervention, rather than a straightforwardly unilateral one. U.S. public opinion polls taken 
between July 1, 1994 and September 15, 1994, suggest that 45.5 percent of Americans supported 
a multinational, or coalition-based military intervention led by the United States. Significantly, 
explicit references to UN endorsement did not meaningfully increase U.S. public support on 
average. Yet if poll questions expressly characterized the intervention as a U.S. unilateral 
operation, without any kind of international participation or endorsement, popular support 
dropped to as low as 23 percent on average.
503
  
 Senior foreign policy officials from the Clinton administration appear to have been well 
aware during the lead-up to the Haiti intervention that explicit UN endorsement would not have 
been particularly helpful in terms of increasing U.S. popular support for the use of force. It was 
believed that in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle, the American public was at best highly 
ambivalent about U.S. participation in UN-sponsored enforcement operations abroad.
504
 
According to Lake, the president‘s foreign policy team interpreted public opinion polls at the 
time as suggesting significant ―American support for the UN in principle;‖ yet it was also clear 
to most senior foreign policy officials that the UN ―doesn‘t make a pivotal difference [in terms 
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of public support] when considering interventions.‖ Lake and his colleagues correctly 
interpreted the polls as suggesting that for U.S. popular support, the participation of other states 
in a U.S.-led coalition would be more important than the endorsement of relevant IOs. In short, 
the prevailing view was that ―allies are more important than the UN.‖505 
 Still, a UN mandate for military intervention should in principle have made it easier to 
persuade other states to join a U.S.-led coalition, which in turn might have helped with the 
American public. But the evidence suggests that this was not actually the case. To begin with, 
senior U.S. officials working on Haiti knew all along that regardless of a UN mandate, it would 
be extremely difficult for any Latin American nation to participate actively by contributing 
troops to a U.S.-led invasion.
506
 Only the Argentine government, eager to improve relations with 
the United States, at one point considered the possibility of contributing troops to the U.S.-led 
multinational force; yet it soon had to back away in the face of strong domestic opposition from 
parliament and its own defense establishment.
507
  
 States outside of the western hemisphere were not interested in contributing militarily to 
what they essentially saw as an intervention dictated by U.S. domestic political concerns. The 
only states that had pledged their virtually unconditional support for a U.S.-led military 
intervention were Haiti‘s Caribbean neighbors. The Caribbean states were themselves greatly 
affected by the Haitian refugee crisis, which was putting a serious strain on their fragile national 
economies. Thus, in order to stop the refugee flow, the sub-regional community of Caribbean 
states, CARICOM, had called for the use of ―all necessary means‖ (code for force) to restore 
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Aristide to office already in late 1991—that is, long before the UNSC approved military action. 
In the summer of 1994, the Caribbean nations strongly backed U.S. military intervention plans, 
again regardless of any formal UN endorsement.
508
 Subsequently the Caribbean nations, led by 
Jamaica, were the first to offer some active operational support, by deploying several hundred 
peacekeepers a few days after U.S. combat troops had successfully taken over the island.
509
  
 Hence in the summer of 1994 it was clear to foreign policy leaders in Washington that a 
SC mandate for military action would add few, if any, international partners and would therefore 
offer only scant benefits in terms of U.S. public support. But it appears that senior Clinton 
administration officials who were pushing for armed intervention did not worry too much in the 
first place about the need for multinational participation to increase public support. First, 
Clinton‘s strategic advisers counseled that given the skeptical mood in the country about the 
administration‘s foreign policy overall, it would be virtually impossible for the White House to 
build up public approval for the invasion before U.S. troops were actually going to be 
deployed.
510
 At the same time, the president and his advisers expected that once the invasion had 
started, with American soldiers engaged in potentially deadly combat, the nation would rally 
behind the president and the troops, regardless of multi-national support. The Clinton 
administration had already benefitted from this ―rally around the flag‖ effect once before: in June 
1993, following a cruise-missile attack against Baghdad, the president‘s approval ratings had 
jumped by fifteen points. Apparently the expectation at the White House was that a similar short-
term rally would again occur in 1994, provided that U.S. casualties remained low and 
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government elites united behind the troops.
511
 As early as May 1994, UN Special Advisor Dante 
Caputo reported in a confidential note addressed to the Secretary-General, based on 
conversations with senior U.S. officials, that the predominant view in Washington was ―that the 
current opposition of public opinion to an armed intervention [in Haiti] will change radically, 
once it will have taken place.‖512  
 Nevertheless, senior policy officials in Washington might have viewed explicit UN 
endorsement, to be obtained before the launch of offensive operations, as helpful in terms of 
preserving U.S. popular support for the long run, in the event of a protracted military 
deployment. Yet as previously shown, the most activist policy officials who pushed for military 
intervention in the spring and early summer of 1994, especially at the White House and State 
Department, focused primarily on the short-term payoffs of a military intervention. The activists 
did initially not worry too much about the possibility of an open-ended stabilization effort; and 
hence they were not particularly concerned about the challenges of maintaining U.S. popular 
support in the long run. As General Kross recalls, leading up to the intervention, policy proposals 
developed by the NSC staff, in particular, reflected ―superficial, wishful thinking—they were 
just not thinking through the risks of failure.‖513 It was the military brass who drew the 
administration‘s attention to the need for a protracted peacekeeping and stabilization effort. The 
uniformed leaders, because of their focus on long-term policy implementation, also emphasized 
more than other administration officials the importance of maintaining U.S. domestic political 
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support for any protracted deployment of American troops. However, the military focused less 
on public opinion polls than on the political mood in Congress. That is consistent with the 
general tendency of senior policy officials to view congressional sentiment as a pragmatic 
substitute for public opinion—since it is Congress, and not the general public, that those officials 




IO endorsement to keep Congress on board 
 To what extent did concerns about congressional support influence the Clinton 
administration‘s effort to obtain a UNSC endorsement for military action? Some scholars suggest 
that fears of congressional opposition in fact drove the administration to multilateralize its policy 
on Haiti in the summer of 1994.
 515
 There is little doubt that throughout the spring and summer of 
1994, Congress, if formally asked, would have refused to authorize U.S. armed intervention in 
Haiti.
516
 Not only were Republicans on Capitol Hill almost unanimously opposed, but centrist 
Democrats, too, became more outspoken in their criticism as a military operation appeared 
increasingly likely in July and August 1994. However, while Congress appeared very unlikely to 
explicitly endorse the use of force in Haiti, it was equally unlikely to formally oppose it, 
especially through any binding resolutions. Congressional leaders on both sides understood that 
such binding measures would greatly undermine the credibility of U.S. coercive threats and thus 
make a full-scale military invasion more, and not less, likely. Also, Democrats still controlled 
both branches of Congress in 1994, and they were unwilling to take the risk of constraining (and 
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thereby humiliating) their president on such a high visibility foreign-policy issue during the lead-
up to congressional mid-term elections.
517
 In short, the most likely scenario was that during the 
lead-up to the intervention, Congress would adopt a classic risk-avoidance strategy by shifting 
responsibility for the use of force more or less entirely to the executive branch. 
 Between May and July 1994, Republicans in the House and Senate sponsored various 
resolutions and amendments opposing the use of force in Haiti. But all efforts to limit the 
executive‘s freedom of maneuver were rejected by the Democratic majority in Congress, often 
with the support of senior Republicans who were unwilling to constrain the president on foreign 
policy.
518
 On June 29, 1994 freshman Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) proposed an amendment to 
the 1995 foreign operations bill that would have required the president to seek congressional 
authorization before ordering military action against Haiti. But the Gregg amendment was 
defeated 34-65, with several Republicans voting against it. Subsequently the Senate adopted (93-
4) a much milder, non-binding amendment that in general terms called on the president to seek 
congressional approval before committing troops to Haiti.
519
 The Senate rejected two further 
Republican-inspired amendments, which would have prohibited Clinton from deploying troops 
to Haiti in the absence of congressional authorization, on July 14 and August 5.
520
 The House, 
for its part, voted 223-201 on May 24 in favor of a non-binding amendment tabled by 
congressman Porter Gross (R-FL), which urged Clinton not to invade Haiti in the absence of a 
―clear and present danger‖ to U.S. citizens and interests. However, about two weeks later that 
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same proposal was rejected in a second vote (195-226), after twenty-five House Democrats had 
switched their position under pressure from their party‘s leadership.521 
 Based on the aforementioned congressional votes on Haiti during the spring and early 
summer of 1994, most Clinton administration officials—but especially those who favored 
military action—expected that congressional opposition, while sometimes boisterous, would 
remain politically manageable.
522
 Furthermore, senior administration officials anticipated that 
opposition from Capitol Hill would soften once the president had fully committed America‘s 
prestige to the use of force, and especially once U.S. combat troops were actually going to be 
deployed.
523
 In fact, shortly after U.S. troops had landed in Haiti, House Democrats quite easily 
defeated (205-225) a resolution sponsored by congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) calling for 
the ―immediate withdrawal of American troops‖ from Haiti. Subsequently both the House and 
the Senate approved resolutions that, without explicitly commending the administration on the 
use of force, expressed support for the president and the troops.
524
 
   Under those circumstances, an explicit UNSC mandate for the use of force offered few 
advantages to the administration in its relations vis-à-vis Congress, at least in the short run. 
Democratic representatives were ultimately expected to support the president‘s policy regardless 
of multilateral approval, on grounds of partisan loyalty. But the Republican minority, too, was 
extremely unlikely to withdraw its support from U.S. troops once they were deployed in combat 
operations abroad—so long as the operation was going to proceed without major complications. 
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If the intervention had manifestly failed to achieve its stated objectives and there had been 
significant casualties, even an explicit SC mandate would probably not have prevented Congress 
from rapidly withdrawing its support—as the recent Somalia experience suggested.525 
Following the Clinton administration‘s debacle in Somalia and the ensuing heavy-handed 
scapegoating of the United Nations in U.S. foreign-policy circles, senior White House officials 
had come to the conclusion that ―with a lot of the Congress, having a UN cover was not 
particularly useful.‖526 For this reason, during the lead-up to the military intervention in Haiti, 
the White House actually sought to downplay reliance on the UN in its relations with Congress. 
Lake remembers that ―we were walking away from the UN as much as we were wrapping 
ourselves in that mantle‖—hence from the point of view of the NSC staff, at least, concerns 
about congressional opposition ―were not an important consideration‖ in the choice to seek to 
obtain a SC mandate for military action.
527
 Talbott suggests that at the State Department, too, 
obtaining an explicit SC endorsement was not viewed as particularly helpful in view of 
mollifying critics in Congress, ―because a lot of those domestic critics weren‘t very crazy about 
the UN, either.‖528 Finally, as previously shown, the Clinton administration‘s leading activists on 
Haiti from the NSC staff and the State Department initially did not envision an open-ended 
stabilization mission in Haiti, and hence they were not particularly concerned about the need for 
international burden sharing in view of securing congressional support for such a protracted 
deployment. Lake in fact points out that he never envisioned a protracted U.S. military presence 
in Haiti, in which American forces could get trapped. His principled view was that after the 
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United States had restored Aristide to the presidency, the Haitian nation would need to ―sort out 
its own affairs,‖ without Washington assuming long-term responsibility.529 
 Among senior policy officials in Washington, only the military leaders and their civilian 
allies at the Pentagon understood from early on that U.S. armed intervention would most likely 
result in an open-ended peacekeeping and stabilization mission. Hence the military leaders also 
emphasized, more than their civilian colleagues from other agencies, the need to secure a viable 
exit strategy and more generally to limit the liability of American troops, in view of securing 
congressional funding and support for the long run. During the spring and early summer of 1994, 
members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee, who bear primary responsibility 
for approving funding for overseas military deployments, insisted in meetings with the 
uniformed leaders that any U.S. intervention in Haiti would have to be limited and should be 
kept as short as possible. ―The Senate Armed Services Committee really had to be promised that 
we had our strategy together on this intervention,‖ remembers General Kross. ―Admiral Owens 
and General Shalikashvili were often on the phone with congressional leaders. Owens was every 
bit as involved in this as was the chairman. And the big discussion was, don‘t get bogged down, 
have an exit strategy.‖530 
 At the same time, congressional leaders helped the military magnify their own concerns 
about the prospective intervention vis-à-vis the rest of the administration. Owens recalls that 
since congressional leaders were mostly skeptical about the administration‘s drive towards 
armed intervention, they were also ―quite amenable to the kinds of arguments that [the military] 
brought up‖—including on ―the need for UN authorization first.‖531 Especially in the specialized 
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House and Senate committees on foreign affairs/foreign relations and armed services, several 
representatives, both Republican and Democrat, spoke out repeatedly against the use of force. 
First, they emphasized that no vital U.S. interests were involved in Haiti that warranted a high-
risk military intervention. Second, they worried about a costly U.S. commitment to political 
stabilization and nation-building in Haiti for the indefinite future. As a military intervention 
appeared increasingly likely in May and June 1994, the focus of congressional leaders—
mirroring the military‘s concerns—increasingly shifted to securing a quick exit for the majority 
of American troops.
532
 For instance, during a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on June 8, congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) questioned the Clinton 
administration‘s special adviser on Haiti, William Gray, about the likelihood that a multilateral 
follow-up mission would be deployed anytime soon after the initial invasion, and he linked this 
explicitly to the question of a U.S. ―exit policy.‖533 During the same hearing, congressman Albert 
Russell Wynn (D-MD) similarly asked ―whether there is a firm commitment from the UN 
mission to move in and perform the long-term peacekeeping function… so that in the event of a 
U.S. intervention we would not also have to perform the follow-up functions.‖534 
 In short, to the extent that concerns about congressional opposition influenced the Clinton 
administration‘s efforts to seek a UN mandate for armed intervention in Haiti, it appears that the 
military leaders functioned as a crucial transmission belt. The military leaders and senior U.S. 
defense officials more generally, who initially strongly opposed the prospect of armed 
intervention in Haiti for their own set of reasons (notably the lack of vital U.S. interests involved 
and of clear strategic objectives), drew the attention of their colleagues from other administration 
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branches to the challenges of maintaining long-term domestic political support. This allowed 
Pentagon leaders to somewhat moderate the enthusiasm for military intervention of their more 
hawkish colleagues from other branches of the administration, and it created a stronger sense of 
urgency within the administration as a whole that a quick handover of peacekeeping functions to 
a UN follow-on mission would be desirable to secure the operation‘s long-term success.  
  
5. Alternative explanations of U.S. multilateralism in Haiti 
 In the final part of this chapter I examine two prominent alternative hypotheses, derived 
from the scholarly literature, as to why the United States might have sought an explicit UN 
endorsement for the 1994 Haiti intervention. First, U.S. policy leaders might have internalized 
international legal or moral norms that require IO endorsement as a condition for appropriate 
military action. Second, the Clinton administration might have sought to reassure third-party 
states of American motives, in order to prevent potentially costly ―soft balancing‖ against the 
United States, or reduced cooperation with Washington in other issue areas.  
 
Multilateral legitimacy as an end (U.S. leaders have internalized relevant norms) 
 Scholars in the social constructivist tradition claim that over the last two decades or so 
foreign policy leaders in the western world have internalized new international legitimacy norms, 
which require multilateral endorsement for the use of force as a matter of moral obligation.
535
 
Even if statesmen have not yet fully internalized relevant rules of legitimate behavior, the 
argument goes, they cannot for all practical purposes conceive of rule-deviant behavior, because 
they inherently desire the international social approval that results from being seen by others as 
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 In short, as discussed in chapter one, the social constructivist logic predicts 
that foreign policy leaders should always desire to comply with the norms and rules of 
international legitimacy (except perhaps under conditions of supreme emergency), regardless of 
the domestic or international material consequences. As one IR theorist explains, ―compliance is 
no longer motivated by the simple fear of retribution, or by a calculation of self-interest, but 
instead by an internal sense of moral obligation‖537  
 With specific regard to U.S. decision making on military intervention, for the 
aforementioned theoretical claims to be confirmed, the following implications would have to be 
observed. First, U.S. policy leaders, desirous to comply with a perceived international duty,  
should seek the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs as an all but necessary condition for 
proceeding with the use of force. They should acknowledge as much, especially in intramural 
policy debates and ex-post facto analyses. Furthermore, the endorsement of military action 
through the SC or regional IOs should be sought as an end in itself, regardless of the political and 
strategic advantages it offers at the domestic or international levels.  
 The most widely accepted rules of international legitimacy are, almost by definition, 
those enshrined in formal legal conventions. Therefore, the first question that needs to be 
answered is: To what extent did fundamental concerns about international legality determine the 
Clinton administration‘s efforts to obtain an explicit SC endorsement of military intervention in 
1994? The short and straightforward answer is: not very much. Throughout the Haitian crisis, 
concerns about international legality were secondary at best to the leading U.S. foreign policy 
officials. Lake candidly admits that ―in the internal [foreign-policy] meetings, I don‘t recall us 
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talking about international law.‖538 William Gray, the administration‘s special Haiti adviser at 
the time, denied during a congressional hearing in June 1994 that considerations about 
international legality should play any role in driving the administration‘s policy:   
Ultimately the decision to use a military option must be made by the President of the 
United States, not by an international body… So from a legal point of view the ultimate 
decision of whether or not to use the military option would be up to the President … 




 The only officials who genuinely cared about compliance with international legal norms 
were, not surprisingly, the administration‘s juridical advisors. Secretary of State Christopher, 
himself a lawyer, also took some interest in the debate about the international legality of a 
prospective U.S. military intervention in Haiti.
540
 But overall, as one former NSC staffer recalls, 
concerns about international legality ―never intruded into the main discussion.‖541 Furthermore, 
once Aristide, the elected president of Haiti, had formally consented to the international use of 
force, the argument could be made that even in the absence of a UN mandate, a U.S. military 
intervention would not have breached international law. Foreign military intervention based on 
host government consent has been traditionally seen as unproblematic under international law, 
although it is unclear whether a government in exile (even if internationally recognized) retains 
the legal authority to extend such an invitation.
542
  
 But even though senior Clinton administration officials were not motivated by concerns 
about compliance with international legal rules, perhaps they had internalized relevant moral 
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norms requiring IO endorsement for the use of force. Planning for U.S. intervention in Haiti was 
largely driven by the White House and especially by the NSC staff until the mid-summer of 
1994, when a formal interagency planning cell was eventually established.
543
 Thus, it is essential 
to seek to establish first and foremost the normative convictions of President Clinton and his 
NSC staff with regard to multilateralism and the use of force. Did those individuals sincerely 
believe that an explicit multilateral endorsement of military intervention through the UN or the 
OAS would have to be obtained as a necessary condition for international legitimacy, quite apart 
from its expected political and strategic benefits? Put differently, if Clinton and his advisors 
inherently believed in the normative value of multilateral legitimacy, it should have been 
difficult for them to even conceive of the possibility of intervening without explicit IO 
endorsement. 
 However, Rossin, the Haiti policy director on the NSC staff in 1993-1994, suggests that 
Lake and Berger never ―agonized over whether or not there was international approval for this 
intervention.‖544 Indeed, the administration‘s leading civilian policy activists on Haiti never 
considered that an explicit multilateral endorsement through the UN or the OAS would be a 
necessary, or nearly necessary, condition for military intervention. Lake, as previously argued, 
had been pushing behind the scenes for a more assertive U.S. strategy potentially involving the 
use of force since the earliest days of the Clinton administration. In October 1993, when the 
Harlan County was met by protesting Haitian thugs at the Port-au-Prince harbor, Lake and some 
senior State Department officials called for a U.S. display of force to disperse the Haitian thugs 
and land the American and Canadian military trainers aboard the ship. Only in the face of strong 
opposition from the top military brass, who feared being dragged into a high-risk unilateral 
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invasion, the U.S. national security team eventually backed down.
545
 Over the following months, 
Lake became one of the strongest advocates within the administration of U.S. military 
intervention to restore Aristide to power. He repeatedly made the case for moving toward a 
force-based strategy in late 1993 and early 1994, long before there was any talk of seeking a UN 
mandate for military intervention.
546
  
 Following the Harlan County incident, President Clinton himself, exhorted by his senior 
political advisor David Gergen, came close to authorizing a U.S. unilateral intervention. 
Apparently, Clinton‘s belief at the time was that regardless of UN endorsement, a strong U.S. 
display of military force would have been beneficial to the administration‘s domestic political 
standing and to Washington‘s tarnished international reputation for resolve. President Clinton 
was extrapolating from Ronald Reagan‘s experience in 1983, when the latter had chosen to 
invade Grenada shortly after 250 U.S. marines were killed in a terrorist attack in Beirut, 
Lebanon. ―The Reagan people were much better at the politics of foreign policy than we are,‖ 
Clinton reportedly told his national security team. ―Look at Lebanon. They went into Grenada 
two days later and fixed it.‖547 In the eyes of Clinton and some of his political advisors, the 
Grenada invasion had significantly reduced the negative domestic political fallout from the 
Beirut disaster. Now Clinton was musing about whether a U.S. invasion of Haiti following the 
Harlan County incident and the earlier humiliation in Somalia might not similarly benefit his 
administration.
548
 In short, in late 1993 and early 1994, senior White House officials—crucially 
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including the president—were not particularly concerned about multilateral endorsement for a 
prospective U.S. intervention in Haiti, and they certainly did not consider it a matter of moral 
obligation.  
 Even as a full-scale U.S. invasion appeared increasingly likely in the spring and early 
summer of 1994, few, if any, of the president‘s senior advisors seem to have thought that a 
formal SC endorsement would be necessary on grounds of moral duty. In May and June 1994, 
Lake insisted that Washington had to show a willingness to use force unilaterally, in order to 
minimize the likelihood that the most recalcitrant SC members at the time, notably Russia, 
China, and Brazil, would cast a negative vote. The assumption was that if the United States 
credibly signaled its willingness to intervene unilaterally, other Council members could be 
persuaded to come on board and approve the use of force.
549
 There was a virtual consensus 
inside the administration that in order to maintain U.S. credibility at the SC into the future, the 
threat would have to be carried out if necessary—that is, if the world body had not authorized the 
use of force, the United States would have intervened unilaterally.
550
 Soderberg, at the time one 
of Lake‘s deputies on the NSC staff, confirms that the administration never viewed a formal UN 
endorsement as necessary on grounds of moral duty: 
Had the UN not been willing to do it [authorize U.S. military intervention], we would 
probably still have done it. I think we would have done it anyway, because we had to do 
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something. We were not going to let the UN dictate our [policy] ─ especially in Haiti! 




 Finally, as previously pointed out, some leading officials at the State Department even 
opposed the very attempt to seek to obtain a SC mandate for armed intervention. Dobbins, in 
particular, recalls that he opposed making the effort, because he thought it would be exceedingly 
costly and time-consuming for Washington to obtain an explicit SC endorsement.
552
 The 
administration‘s activists ultimately agreed that a serious effort should be made to obtain an 
explicit UNSC mandate, but they did so only after it became clear that they would otherwise not 
have been able to push their preferred policy of armed intervention through the national security 
bureaucracy. That is incompatible with the notion of compliance with international legitimacy 
norms based on a sense of moral duty. 
 
Multilateralism to reduce costly international opposition (Prevent ―soft balancing‖).  
 Nevertheless, Washington policy officials might have sought the endorsement of relevant 
IOs to satisfy the beliefs about legitimate behavior held by foreign countries, in view of avoiding 
potentially costly international countermeasures, or ―soft balancing,‖ against the United States. 
Prominent IR scholars argue that unilateral military interventions, carried out without the formal 
endorsement of relevant IOs, are likely to signal revisionist intentions and arouse widespread 
international opposition. That might in turn lead third-party states to reduce their cooperation 
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with the intervener in other issue-areas, or, worse, form soft balancing coalitions aimed at 
frustrating and undermining the intervener‘s foreign policy more generally.553  
 If soft balancing concerns had driven U.S. behavior on Haiti, one ought to be able to 
observe the following implications. First, Washington policy officials should indicate that they 
were in fact deeply concerned about potential international opposition to the use of force, 
because of the anticipated material consequences in terms of reduced international cooperation 
with the United States or outright efforts to frustrate U.S. policies. Second, those same American 
officials should acknowledge that reducing third-party state opposition to U.S. military 
intervention was, in fact, a significant reason for seeking to obtain the endorsement of relevant 
IOs. Finally, the endorsement of relevant IOs, once obtained, should have persuaded initially 
skeptical third-party states that U.S. intentions were indeed benign, and consequently 
international opposition to the use of force should have visibly diminished. 
 In the spring of 1994 it became apparent to the Clinton administration that any principled 
international opposition to a U.S. military intervention in Haiti would be concentrated in the 
western hemisphere, and specifically in Latin America. With the notable exceptions of France, 
the former colonial power in Haiti, and Russia, which appeared willing to create problems at the 
UNSC to increase its own bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States, political leaders and 
their publics outside of the western hemisphere had little or no interests in Haiti. Few states 
outside of the Americas actively supported the use of force to restore Aristide to the presidency; 
but at the same time, virtually no foreign leader outside of the hemisphere was willing to openly 
oppose what appeared to be an increasingly likely U.S. military operation, thereby upsetting 
bilateral relations with Washington. The only third-party states that cared strongly about U.S. 
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military intervention in the hemisphere were the Latin American nations. As the use of force in 
Haiti appeared increasingly likely, several Latin American governments publicly expressed their 
opposition to U.S. intervention. Furthermore, although the Cédras regime enjoyed little 
sympathy in the hemisphere, most Latin American leaders felt uneasy about restoring Aristide, 
an unpredictable political radical who had never taken liberal constitutional principles very 
seriously.  
 On the occasion of an ad-hoc meeting of OAS foreign ministers held in Belem, Brazil, in 
June 1994, several Latin American governments went on record as emphatically opposing any 
use-of-force option to restore Aristide to the presidency. The representatives of the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil denied that the situation in 
Haiti at the time constituted a threat to international peace and security (in the absence of which 
there can be no justification for intervention under the UN Charter). Several of them further 
suggested that the international use of force in Haiti would blatantly violate the hemispheric rule 
of non-intervention solemnly enshrined in the OAS Charter.
554
 Some Latin American states, such 
as Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, went so far as to state explicitly that for those reasons, 
they would oppose any U.S.-led military action in Haiti, ―no matter whether unilateral or 
multilateral.‖555 A few weeks later, the Parlamento Latinoamericano, a regional assembly 
representing eighteen national legislatures and largely unaffected by geo-political calculations, 
came closest to expressing popular sentiment in the region: first, it objected to any kind of 
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outside military intervention in Haiti; and second, it explicitly called on Aristide to resign and 
allow new presidential elections to be held.
556
  
 Widespread Latin American skepticism about U.S. military intervention in Haiti did not 
come as a surprise to the Clinton administration‘s leading foreign policy officials. After all, most 
Latin American states had strongly condemned previous U.S. military interventions, notably the 
most recent ones in Grenada and Panama. The latter had even been formally censured by the 
OAS in a vote of 20 to 1.
557
 Thus, in 1994, most of the administration‘s foreign-policy officials 
anticipated significant Latin American protests over U.S. military action in Haiti, long before the 
above-mentioned states openly spoke out against it. Alexander Watson, who led U.S. diplomacy 
on Latin America at the time, was not in the least surprised that several states in the hemisphere 
were opposed to any potential U.S. military intervention. After all, he explains, ―nobody on the 
planet has more experience with U.S. military intervention than the Latin Americans.‖558   
 However, it was equally clear to most senior Clinton administration officials dealing with 
Haiti that Latin American opposition to U.S. military intervention was largely a matter of 
principle, aimed primarily at appeasing restless domestic audiences, and had little to do with 
perceptions of threatening American motives or fears of a revamped ―Yankee imperialism.‖ 
Richard Feinberg, at the time a senior NSC staffer dealing with inter-American affairs, candidly 
recalls that he and most of his colleagues from the administration saw Latin American hostility 
to U.S. military action in Haiti as ―just part of the background noise.‖559 In other words, there 
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was never much doubt among senior Clinton administration officials that hemispheric opposition 
to the use of force would largely remain confined to the level of rhetoric and would have no 
negative consequences for wider U.S.-Latin American relations.
 
 
 First, the historical record of U.S. military intervention in the hemisphere allowed for 
some useful and quite reassuring extrapolations. About half a decade earlier, in December 1989, 
most Latin American governments had protested loudly against U.S. military intervention in 
Panama; but they had done so largely to appease their own outraged domestic audiences. In 
private conversations with Washington, several Latin American leaders had acknowledged 
leading up to the Panama intervention that they did in fact have few qualms about the forcible 
removal from office of general Noriega, the Panamanian dictator. Significantly, in the aftermath 
of the Panama intervention, nobody in the hemisphere took any retaliatory measures against the 
United States, regardless of the blatantly unilateral character of the U.S. invasion, and indeed, 
Latin American cooperation with Washington increased steadily in subsequent years.
560
 During 
the lead-up to the Haiti intervention in 1994, the Panama precedent was interpreted in 
Washington as suggesting that regardless of formal multilateral approval, Latin American 
nations were unlikely to react to a renewed U.S. pro-democracy intervention in the hemisphere 
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561 Most Latin American countries actually cared less about Haiti and its international sovereignty than they had 
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 Second, by the mid-1990s, most Latin American states were deeply enmeshed in 
mutually beneficial political and economic relationships with the United States. Foreign-policy 
leaders in Washington expected that their Latin American counterparts would be pragmatic 
enough to understand that they would pay the highest price from a deterioration of those 
relationships. The Clinton administration had actively sought since early 1993 to promote free 
trade agreements, liberal market reforms, and U.S. private investment in the region, while also 
increasing the overall amount of U.S. development assistance to its southern neighbors.
562
 
NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico, had just come into force in January 1994; and by calling for the first Summit of the 
Americas to be held in Miami, Florida, in December 1994, the Clinton administration had 
announced its intention to further promote cross-border economic integration in the hemisphere 
as a whole. Senior administration officials at the time never made a secret of the fact that the 
White House would ―work a lot harder to get a trade agreement through Congress with a country 
that had cooperated with [the U.S. government] on issues that mattered to [the United States].‖563 
 In short, most senior officials in Washington took it essentially for granted that even 
those Latin American states which during the spring and early summer of 1994 had most loudly 
opposed the prospect of U.S. military intervention in Haiti would refrain from actively trying to 
disrupt U.S. policy—and certainly they would not deliberately reduce their cooperation with the 
United States in other issue-areas. Latin American leaders would have little to benefit and 
potentially a great deal to lose from upsetting the regional hegemon, upon whose benevolence 
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their own nations‘ prosperity and democratic consolidation depended to a greater degree than 
ever.  
 There was also no expectation among senior U.S. policy officials at the time that a SC 
mandate explicitly authorizing the use of force could lead those Latin American states that had 
most strongly opposed the prospect of U.S. military intervention during the spring and early 
summer of 1994, such as Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to subsequently reduce their 
rhetorical opposition in any meaningful way.
564
 Lake recalls that he didn‘t ―expect them [the 
skeptical Latin Americans], practically under any circumstances, to be in favor of an American 
intervention in the hemisphere, because of history.‖565 William Gray, the administration‘s special 
Haiti advisor at the time, similarly predicted in congressional testimony that ―under no 
circumstances would [some Latin American states] favor military intervention.‖566 
 Lake and his colleagues were right in their expectation that an explicit UN mandate 
would have little impact on hemispheric opposition to the use of force. As negotiations at the SC 
entered their crucial phase in late July 1994, those Latin American nations that had most strongly 
opposed the prospect of U.S. military intervention earlier on made it clear that they would 
inexorably condemn the use of force, regardless of whether the UN was going to endorse it or 
not. On July 31, on the occasion of a debate at the SC immediately preceding the adoption of 
Resolution 940, which authorized U.S. military intervention, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
(the same states that had been most unmistakably critical of any U.S. military action at the OAS 
meeting held in Brazil several weeks earlier) asked to speak again. Now joined by Cuba, they 
insisted that in their view, the situation in Haiti did not constitute a threat to international peace 
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and security, which made it impossible for them to support a U.S.-led military intervention. The 
Venezuelan representative, capturing the political mood among several of his Latin American 
colleagues, plainly stated that his government could ―not support unilateral or multilateral 
military actions in any nation of the hemisphere.‖567  
 Among Latin America‘s group of skeptical states, Brazil was the only one to be 
represented on the UNSC. The Brazilian government instructed its representative at the UN to 
abstain on the crucial vote, instead of voting against the resolution, having been subjected to 
significant political pressure by Washington in previous days. Yet the Brazilian representative 
nevertheless criticized the resolution‘s text as ―not felicitous‖ and acknowledged that his 
government had ―serious difficulties‖ with its content.568 SCR 940, which authorized the use of 
―all necessary means‖ to restore democracy in Haiti, was adopted with twelve favorable votes 
and two abstentions (Brazil and China, while the representative of Rwanda was absent). 
Following the resolution‘s adoption, the governments of Peru and Bolivia joined their 




 In conclusion, the Clinton administration‘s top foreign policy officials expected 
significant verbal opposition to military intervention in Haiti from Latin American governments. 
However, it was clear from the outset that nobody in the hemisphere would seek to actively 
undermine U.S. policy on Haiti. Even the loudest public protests would have practically no 
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consequence in terms of overall political and economic cooperation between the U.S. and its 
regional partners. Crucially, senior Clinton administration officials anticipated that even a formal 
endorsement of military intervention by the UNSC would not be particularly helpful in terms of 
reducing the principled opposition of several Latin American states. Therefore, it appears 
unlikely that concerns about potentially costly international opposition were a primary 
determinant of Washington‘s effort to seek an explicit SC mandate for military intervention in 
the summer of 1994. Ultimately, once a UN endorsement was obtained, it did little to change the 
attitude of those governments that in previous months had most strongly objected to the prospect 
of a U.S. military intervention. At the same time, as most U.S. leaders had expected, there was 
no ―soft balancing‖ against the United States or any other type of retaliatory activity. Indeed, in 
subsequent years overall political and economic relations between the United States and its 
hemispheric partners continued to improve.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 A detailed analysis of U.S. decision making on Haiti in 1994 confirms that bureaucratic 
politics in Washington, more than anything else, determined the Clinton administration‘s effort 
to obtain an explicit SC mandate for the use of force. By skillfully deploying their bureaucratic 
and political influence, the military leaders, in cooperation with OSD, successfully convinced the 
rest of the administration that a serious effort should be made to obtain an explicit UN mandate 
for the use of force, because that alone would effectively guarantee a quick handover to a follow-
on UN mission and thereby offer a smooth exit strategy for American troops.  
At the same time, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that international 
legitimacy norms, or concerns about potentially costly international opposition, played at best a 




domestic political factors, such as concerns about broader popular and congressional support for 
a longer-term deployment, played a significant but indirect role. Concerns about potential 
congressional opposition, in particular, arose only after the military leaders had emphasized in 
the intramural debates that a U.S. invasion would almost certainly have to be followed by a 
protracted peacekeeping and stabilization mission in Haiti. Also, as I have shown, the military 
brass quietly encouraged congressional leaders to be outspoken in expressing their concerns—
since the uniformed leaders expected that that would increase their own leverage vis-à-vis the 
rest of the administration. This only reinforces my central argument that the U.S. defense 
establishment, notably the JCS and their civilian allies at OSD, played a very significant and 
hitherto unacknowledged role in steering Washington policy on Haiti toward the United Nations 







Bosnia, 1992-95: We did not want to “own” it 
 
 
The Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 was marked by ethnic and religious violence on 
a scale unseen in Europe since the end of World War II.
570
 Soon after the fighting erupted, liberal 
activists in the United States began calling for armed intervention to relieve the suffering of the 
Bosnian Muslims and bring an end to the genocidal violence on the ground. However, the U.S. 
military leaders and the Pentagon more generally put up a staunch bureaucratic resistance to 
armed intervention in the Balkans. The military were adamantly opposed to deploying American 
ground troops to Bosnia in a combat role. Their argument was that the limited U.S. strategic 
interests at stake in the region did not warrant the risk to American lives. But the uniformed 
leaders were also skeptical of using air power: they claimed that even limited air strikes would 
put America‘s credibility at stake, and in the absence of meaningful results, Washington would 
then have to escalate, by deploying U.S. ground troops in a dangerous peace-enforcement role.  
The main thesis of this chapter is that between 1993 and 1995, bureaucratic resistance to 
the use of force from the Department of Defense and from the military leadership in particular 
kept U.S. Bosnia policy on a steady multilateral track. In 1993 and 1994, the top military brass 
agreed in principle to limited air strikes aimed at protecting several so-called UN safe areas, 
provided that the attacks were carried out multilaterally through NATO. However, Washington‘s 
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European allies were initially reluctant to move ahead with the bombing, given that they were 
highly skeptical of the Bosnian Muslim faction. Also, several western European countries had 
already deployed thousands of their own troops to Bosnia as part of a UN peacekeeping force 
(UNPROFOR), which would be vulnerable to Serb retaliation in the face of NATO air strikes. In 
subsequent months the Clinton administration‘s humanitarian activists, led by Madeleine 
Albright, began to insist that Washington had a moral duty to intervene unilaterally in the face of 
European inaction. But the top U.S. military brass remained vehemently opposed. Over and over 
in the internal bureaucratic debates, the military leaders insisted that if the United States acted on 
its own, Britain and France would almost certainly withdraw their troops from the UN 
peacekeeping force, and Washington would then be left with full responsibility for Bosnia—
meaning that American ground troops would almost certainly have to be deployed. The result of 
this effort on the part of the military leaders and the Pentagon more generally to limit U.S. 
liability was a strictly multilateral, if largely ineffectual, American policy until well into 1995. 
Things began to change only in the summer of 1995, when a Serb assault on the UN-
protected enclave of Srebrenica killed more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian crisis had 
now become a serious domestic political liability for President Clinton. But the U.S. military 
leaders remained adamant that Washington should continue to follow a multilateral course of 
action through NATO, whose credibility was now at risk. In late August and early September 
1995, Washington was finally able to cajole its European partners into launching a broader 
NATO air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, Operation Deliberate Force, which facilitated a 
negotiated settlement of the Bosnian war. The military brass in Washington insisted that the 
largest possible number of NATO allies should be actively involved in the air campaign, by 




while this would reduce U.S. freedom of action, it would commit the European allies to 
protecting the Bosnian Muslim population and lock in their support for Bosnia‘s long-term 
stabilization. The Pentagon‘s goal was to entirely hand off postwar stabilization and 
reconstruction to the European allies after a short period of time—possibly by the end of 1996.   
This chapter is structured as follows. After briefly setting the context, I highlight the very 
significant costs to Washington of channeling U.S. Bosnia policy through the UN and NATO. 
Thereafter, I describe U.S. bureaucratic disagreements on the use of force in more detail and 
focus in particular on the military‘s preferences and concerns. I seek to demonstrate that the top 
military brass, by asserting itself and seeking to limit American liability for events on the ground 
in Bosnia, played a decisive role in keeping the United States on a steady multilateral course of 
action from 1993 to 1995. In the final part of the chapter, I briefly consider two possible 
alternative explanations of Washington‘s efforts channel its Bosnia policy through relevant IOs. 
First, U.S. leaders may have internalized new international norms which, quite apart from 
strategic or political considerations, require that armed interventions be multilaterally approved. 
Second, Washington may have sought to reassure third-party states about American motives, in 
view of preventing costly international countermeasures, or ―soft balancing,‖ in other issue areas.   
 
1. Limiting U.S. liability by staying out of it, 1992-93.  
The Yugoslav Federation began to unravel in June 1991, following the secession of 
Slovenia and Croatia and their hasty international recognition, led by Germany. In early 1992, 
fighting broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Bosnian Serb military units (supported by 






 By the fall of 1992, the Bosnian Serb faction (roughly one-third of Bosnia‘s 
total population), had gained control of about 70 percent of Bosnian territory, with assistance 
from Belgrade. The Bosnian Serb offensive soon culminated in the siege of Sarajevo, a formerly 
thriving multicultural city, and the resulting humanitarian tragedy was broadcast live by 
television networks all over the world—creating pressure on western governments to act.572  
 Already in the fall of 1991, the UN Security Council had imposed a weapons embargo 
on the entire former Yugoslavia.
573
 During the Bosnian war the embargo hit the Muslim 
population hardest, given that the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats had their arsenals refueled 
through illicit transfers from Belgrade and Zagreb, respectively. A UN peacekeeping operation—
known as UNPROFOR—was established under European initiative as early as 1992, with the 
limited goal of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina (henceforth: Bosnia).
574
 The United States did not contribute any troops to 
UNPROFOR, as U.S. military leaders were staunchly opposed to any deployment of American 
ground troops to Bosnia. ―The U.S. military were not that anxious to get into what looked like a 
real swamp,‖ recalls General Colin Powell, at the time the JCS chairman.575 The administration 
of President George H.W. Bush more generally viewed the breakup of Yugoslavia as a regional, 
or European, problem that did not affect major U.S. strategic interests. ―We don‘t have a ‗dog‘ in 
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this fight,‖ was the famously dismissive analysis of Secretary of State James Baker.576 U.S. 
foreign policy at the time focused on ostensibly more important geo-strategic challenges, namely 
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, with the nascent containment regime for Iraq, and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union.  
During the 1992 U.S. presidential election campaign, candidate William ―Bill‖ Clinton 
strongly criticized the Bush administration‘s passive approach on Bosnia and called for greater 
American involvement. Clinton insisted on the need for Washington to show ―real leadership,‖ 
and while he stopped short of calling for the deployment of American ground troops, he 
suggested that the U.S. might take the lead on launching air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and 
lifting the arms embargo.
577
 Once in office, however, Clinton backtracked on his forceful 
campaign rhetoric. President Clinton, inexperienced in foreign policy and focused on his 
domestic political agenda, was reluctant to spend precious resources and political capital on a 
faraway ethnic conflict. Hence the new administration, seeking to limit American liability, 
wanted to be internationalist on the cheap: it adopted a tough stance in public, desirous to 
appease various domestic constituencies that were calling for greater U.S. leadership on Bosnia, 
while at the same time continuing to minimize America‘s actual military and political 
involvement. Significantly, in 1993 the Clinton administration declined to support the Vance-
Owen peace plan, the diplomatic proposal then on the table, claiming that it was too favorable to 
the Bosnian Serbs and thus arguably contributing to its failure.
578
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As part of Washington‘s effort to appear politically active while minimizing its own 
exposure, the United States also sought to involve relevant multilateral bodies from early on. 
Soon after the breakout of the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992, the U.S. government had 
chosen to involve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was then in search of a 
new strategic identity. In mid-1992, NATO began a low-key effort to monitor, and subsequently 
enforce, the UN arms and trade embargo on the Adriatic Sea.
579
 When the UN imposed a ban on 
all military flights over Bosnia in late 1992, NATO also started to monitor and then (following 
the adoption of SCR 816 in March 1993) enforce the no-fly zone, by activating Operation Deny 
Flight. In February 1994, this led NATO to become engaged in its first combat action ever, when 
two U.S. F-16 fighter airplanes shot down four Bosnian Serb Galeb aircraft that had violated the 
no-fly zone.
580
 Washington also supported the adoption of relevant SC resolutions, including on 
the establishment of UNPROFOR, although the administration‘s position was that no American 
soldiers should be deployed to Bosnia until after a peace agreement had been negotiated and 
accepted by the local parties. As journalist Bob Woodward explains, those multilateral 
instruments, ―the United Nations and NATO… somewhat insulated [the Bush team and then for 
some time] the Clinton administration from full responsibility in Bosnia.‖581  
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2. The costs of U.S. multilateralism on Bosnia 
Clinging to a multilateral consensus on Bosnia through NATO and the UN allowed 
Washington to limit its own exposure and liability. However, the policy was anything but 
costless to the United States. First, it required that Washington channel any use of airpower 
through a cumbersome mechanism of UN authorization and oversight, known as the ―dual key‖ 
arrangement, which greatly reduced U.S. freedom of action and undermined U.S. coercive 
diplomacy. Second, internal NATO disagreements over the use of air power resulted in growing 
and quite serious transatlantic tensions. Finally, by the spring and early summer of 1995, the 
Clinton administration‘s strategy of proceeding multilaterally and adopting a tough rhetorical 
stance in public while shifting most of the actual burden (and the blame) to the UN and the 
European allies had become a serious political burden for President Clinton.  
 
Limited and ineffectual air strikes 
The use of airpower became a topic of contention between Washington and its European 
allies from the spring of 1993 onwards. In April and May of that year, the UNSC—with 
Washington‘s support—proclaimed the Bosnian towns of Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and 
Bihac, as well as the capital, Sarajevo as ―safe areas.‖ The ostensible goal was to prevent the 
Bosnian Serbs from taking control of those Muslim enclaves under siege.
582
 Several weeks later, 
on June 4, 1993 the SC adopted Resolution 836, which authorized ―member states, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations,‖ to take ―all necessary measures, through the use of 
air power‖ to support UNPROFOR in deterring attacks against the safe areas.583  
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Neither the United States nor its European allies were willing to mount a full-fledged 
defense of the safe areas. Yet President Clinton, under domestic political pressure, was 
advocating a policy of limited NATO air strikes to repel and deter Serb attacks against the UN 
enclaves. The Europeans, and notably the British and French, who had thousands of their own 
troops deployed as UN peacekeepers on the ground, were reluctant, fearing possible Serb acts of 
reprisal. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake recalls that Washington‘s 
European ―allies were somewhere between strongly opposed and apoplectic about… heavier 
bombing, [since] such a measure could imperil their troops in UNPROFOR.‖584 Furthermore, the 
Europeans were hesitant to appear to openly take sides in the conflict on the part of the Bosnian 
Muslims. ―The Bosniak [Bosnian Muslim] tactic of course was to induce the United Nations into 
the war,‖ explains Walter Slocombe, at the time a senior Pentagon official. The Bosnian 
Muslims were using the ―safe areas‖ as staging grounds for their own military offensives, which 
inevitably resulted in Serb counterattacks that put large numbers of civilians at risk. Meanwhile 
the United States, under pressure from Congress and public opinion, was taking a more openly 
pro-Muslim stance and clearly identified the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressor.
585
  
The French attitude, in particular, was more or less openly pro-Serb, reflecting 
longstanding historical ties, at least until the spring of 1995, when Jacques Chirac replaced 
Francois Mitterrand at the Elysée Palace. The British government under John Major was 
fundamentally constrained by a highly risk-averse Tory Party, which opposed taking a tougher 
line on Bosnia and insisted that UNPROFOR stick to its mandate of neutral peacekeeping until a 
negotiated solution to the conflict was found. Germany under Helmut Kohl, finally, was opposed 
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to any coercive action due to the constraints of a coalition-based government, the memory of 
Nazi atrocities committed against the Serbs during the occupation of Yugoslavia in WWII, and 
the generally pacifist instincts of contemporary German public opinion.
586
  
The Europeans‘ reluctance to openly take sides against the Bosnian Serbs was 
compounded by the United Nations‘ own culture of neutrality and ingrained institutional 
preference for consensual operations. Among senior UN officials, the Secretary-General‘s 
special representative for the Former Yugoslavia, Japanese diplomat Yashushi Akashi, was 
particularly attached to the idea of traditional peacekeeping based on neutrality and consent.
587
 
Akashi‘s extreme reluctance to authorize NATO air strikes on various occasions earned him 
strong international criticism, particularly after the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.
588
 At the same 
time, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and especially Kofi Annan, the head of UN 
peacekeeping at the time, were more forward leaning and would probably have approved of 
forceful action from early on, if the Security Council had endorsed a robust mandate for peace-
enforcement and member nations, including the United States, had been willing to contribute the 
necessary troops.
589
 Therefore, if the UN Secretariat in New York largely supported Akashi‘s 
cautious approach until the summer of 1995, that largely reflected the aforementioned 
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fundamental divisions between Washington, on the one side, and its chief European allies, 
Britain and France, on the other.
590
 
By late July 1993, the Bosnian Serbs appeared close to capturing Mount Igman near 
Sarajevo. If Mount Igman fell, the strangulation of the Bosnian capital would be complete. For 
several weeks, the Europeans continued to resist Washington‘s calls for NATO air strikes, citing 
the risk of reprisals to their peacekeepers.
591
 Only in August 1993 the main European capitals 
eventually agreed to support NATO air strikes in principle. But their acquiescence came at a 
heavy price: the decision on whether to conduct specific air strikes would be shared by NATO 
and the UN, thereby giving both organizations an effective veto.
592
 The exceedingly cumbersome 
―dual key‖ arrangement was thus born, under which air strikes would have to be approved by 
NATO‘s Southern Command in Naples, on the one side, and the UN Secretary-General or his 
designated representative acting in consultation with the Security Council, on the other.
593
 Given 
dominant British and French roles in the UNPROFOR command, the dual-key allowed London 
and Paris to manipulate the air strikes threat for their own purposes; and over the next two years 
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Growing tensions within NATO 
The French and the British played what Robert Hunter, at the time the U.S. permanent 
representative to NATO, calls a ―double game‖ with regard to the use of air power: under 
pressure from Washington, on several occasions London and Paris reluctantly agreed ―to turn 
NATO‘s key, but each time they were then going to Boutros-Ghali and telling him not to turn the 
UN key.‖595 The growing frictions within NATO, fuelled by the Europeans‘ reluctance to shift to 
peace-enforcement, on the one side, and the Clinton administration‘s insistence on air strikes 
combined with its staunch opposition to deploying American ground troops, on the other, greatly 
jeopardized the security of the ―safe areas‖ that the allies had solemnly pledged to protect. 
Transatlantic disagreements over the use of air power resulted in a serious transatlantic 
crisis in the fall of 1994. In October of that year, Bosnian Muslim forces had launched an 
offensive out of the UN-protected enclave of Bihac, but they were soon pushed back by a 
Bosnian Serb counterattack, and the ―safe area‖ came under heavy shelling.596 By mid-
November, Bihac risked being overrun by Serb troops, and France and Britain reluctantly gave in 
to Washington‘s prodding to launch limited NATO air strikes.597 Yet the Serbs, far from 
withdrawing, escalated the crisis by taking about 250 UN peacekeepers hostage. Radovan 
Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, threatened that if NATO air strikes continued, UNPROFOR 
troops would no longer be treated as peacekeepers but instead be dealt with as hostile forces.
598
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When in subsequent days Washington insisted on a further and tougher use of NATO 
airpower, the French and the British reacted furiously: ―It‘s nice to say you want to help the 
victims against the aggressors, but it bears no relation to what is happening on the ground,‖ a 
senior French military official told the American media, before adding: ―The Americans say they 
know what is right and what we should do, but they don‘t even dare to put their troops on the 
line.‖599 The British defense minister concurred, pointing out that the United States should 
―match words [with] deeds and that doesn‘t include just a few aircraft.‖600 British and French 
leaders increasingly saw U.S. behavior as reckless, given the Clinton administration‘s apparent 
willingness to put at risk the lives of European, but not American, soldiers. Over the following 
days, London and Paris began to openly question the reliability of American security 
commitments in Europe and thus ultimately the viability of NATO.
601
 With the alliance at 
breaking point, the Clinton administration retracted its call for further NATO air strikes. Several 
analysts suggest that the transatlantic quarrel over air strikes in November 1994 was the worst 
crisis the alliance had faced since Suez 1956.
602
  
In early December, President Clinton made a costly pledge to reaffirm America‘s security 
commitment to Europe and persuade the allies to keep their troops in Bosnia: if the peacekeeping 
forces of NATO allies came under fire and had to be withdrawn, he promised, the United States 
would be prepared to supply up to 25,000 of its own troops for an emergency extraction 
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 But as the situation on the ground in Bosnia rapidly deteriorated in subsequent 
months, the prospect became increasingly real that the U.S. might have to actually carry out the 
promise (a failure to do so in case of need would have probably sealed NATO‘s fate for good). 
Thus, in the spring of 1995, the Clinton administration was getting closer to being drawn into 
precisely the situation it had doggedly sought to avoid over the previous two years—U.S. ground 
troops deployed into Bosnia, and that under the most dangerous of circumstances.
604
 Only the 
Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, as I will show below, finally galvanized the allies into united 
action and arguably saved NATO from suffering permanent damage.
605
 As Richard Holbrooke, 
then the assistant secretary of state for European affairs, sums it up, by 1995, ―keeping the 
Atlantic Alliance, the main pillar of American foreign policy for over half a century, from 
coming apart over Bosnia‖ had become one of the administration‘s ―greatest foreign policy 
challenges.‖606 
 
A growing political burden for the president 
Finally, by the spring and early summer of 1995, the Clinton administration‘s tentative 
multilateral approach to Bosnia had become a serious domestic political burden. In previous 
years, Washington‘s tough rhetorical stance against Serb aggression and public support for the 
Bosnian Muslims had quite visibly emboldened the latter faction, making it militarily more 
daring and less willing to compromise at the negotiating table. At the same time, the Clinton 
administration‘s unwillingness to deploy U.S. ground troops to Bosnia in a peace-enforcement 
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role led the Bosnian Serbs under Radovan Karadzic to react to Muslim provocations in an 
increasingly brutal fashion.
607
 This vicious circle reached its climax in the summer of 1995, 
when the Bosnian Serb army led by Ratko Mladic overran the ―safe area‖ of Srebrenica, brutally 
killing over 7,000 Bosnian Muslims in a few days.  
Soon after the Srebrenica massacre, Jacques Chirac, the newly elected French leader, 
challenged President Clinton: he offered to deploy around 1,000 French rapid reaction troops to 
the threatened Muslim enclave of Gorazde and explicitly called for Washington‘s assistance in 
the operation. When Washington hesitated, Chirac noted in a grandstanding move that 
regrettably, France stood ―alone in wanting to take action‖ and compared the situation to the time 
in 1938 when the West had appeased Hitler.
608
 President Clinton was clearly annoyed that Chirac 
had seized the initiative – and the limelight. ―I‘m getting creamed on Bosnia,‖ Clinton fumed on 
July 14 1995, in the presence of two senior national security aides.
609
  
The deteriorating situation in Bosnia and the administration‘s hesitant approach were 
increasingly affecting the president‘s domestic political standing, and his approval ratings on 
foreign policy were falling.
610
 Few Americans were going to vote one way or another in the 1996 
presidential election because of events in Sarajevo or Srebrenica. Yet the more open the sore, the 
less this was about the specific foreign policy crisis in Bosnia and the more it was about general 
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presidential effectiveness. ―The political damage resulting from the portrayal of the president and 
the administration as being inept and allowing something like this to happen was no longer 
acceptable,‖ remembers a former senior aide to the president.611 Unless the violence in Bosnia 
was ended soon, Clinton feared, the decision would be ―dropped in during the middle of the 
[upcoming presidential] campaign.‖612  
Furthermore, Robert Dole, the Republican Senate majority leader and a likely 1996 
presidential candidate, was an outspoken activist on Bosnia and had long been pushing for a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, creating significant political problems for the 
administration. On July 26, 1995 the Senate voted 69-29 to end U.S. participation in the arms 
embargo. The House followed suit on August 1, by a vote of 298-128. President Clinton vetoed 
the arms embargo bill on August 11—yet both bills had passed with enough votes to override a 
presidential veto in the future, once Congress came back from its summer recess in September. 
That, in turn, would in all likelihood have precipitated a withdrawal of European troops from 
UNPROFOR.
613
 Had the U.S. and its European partners not finally been able to overcome their 
disagreements following the massacre at Srebrenica and facilitate an ending of the Bosnian war, 
the Clinton administration‘s half-hearted approach and its unwillingness from 1993 onward to 
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3. The U.S. military insisting on multilateral consensus, 1993-95 
The Clinton administration‘s principal national security officials shaping U.S. Bosnia 
policy from 1993 onward were: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who chaired the 
relevant NSC meetings; Secretary of State Warren Christopher; Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
(replaced by William Perry in early 1994); U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine 
Albright; JCS Chairman Colin Powell (replaced by John Shalikashvili at the end of 1993), and 
Director of Central Intelligence James Woosley (replaced by John Deutch in early 1995). Vice 
President Albert ―Al‖ Gore and his national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, also played an 
important role in the intramural debates.
615
 Soon after the administration entered office in early 
1993, it became apparent that there was no consensus among its senior officials on greater U.S. 
involvement in Bosnia. In the absence of decisive presidential leadership, sometimes heavy 
bureaucratic infighting ensued, and for the next two-and-a-half years, Clinton‘s campaign 
promise of a more assertive American policy on the Balkans remained unfulfilled.  
For the bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism laid out in chapter two of this 
dissertation to be corroborated, one ought to be able to observe the following dynamics. First, 
there should be evidence that leading civilian activists in the Clinton administration were at first 
unconcerned by the need for IO approval and maybe even pushing for U.S. unilateral 
intervention, because of the expectation that multilateralism would be exceedingly constraining. 
Second, the top military brass should have been highly skeptical about armed intervention in 
Bosnia and altogether opposed to U.S. unilateral intervention. The military‘s principal concern 
should have been that American troops might end up owning responsibility for Bosnia—i.e., they 
might get bogged down in a costly, protracted, and exceedingly dangerous enforcement and 
                                                 




stabilization mission on the ground. Third, the uniformed leaders should have made it clear that 
the only kind of military action they were willing to countenance was a limited use of force 
endorsed by relevant IOs, such as the UN or NATO. There should be evidence that skeptical 
military leaders, relying on intramural persuasion and political leverage, were able to constrain 
more hawkish civilian policy officials. Fourth, the Clinton administration‘s civilian activists 
themselves should have gradually realized that the only type of military intervention they could 
push through the Washington bureaucracy was strictly limited and multilateral. If those activists 
acknowledged that that the military leaders in fact constrained them and played a key role in 
keeping U.S. policy on a multilateral track, that would offer further strong support for my theory.  
 
A deeply divided administration 
The administration‘s leading interventionists on Bosnia were Albright, Lake, Gore, and 
Fuerth. More than anyone else in the administration, Albright championed U.S. military 
intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. She had spent part of her childhood in Yugoslavia and 
saw the conflict there in highly moralistic terms.
616
 Lake, too, was an avowed activist on Bosnia, 
although his overall attitude was quite pragmatic. Initially, at least, he sought to proceed by 
means of a consensus with the other principals, reflecting his institutional role as the 
administration‘s chief foreign policy coordinator.617 Secretary Christopher clearly had 
reservations about military intervention and always proceeded with great caution, trying to 
understand and reflect what the president wanted. But below Christopher, the State Department 
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bureaucracy was generally quite hawkish—and it became more so after Richard Holbrooke was 
appointed as assistant secretary for European affairs in 1994.
618
 
From the administration‘s earliest days, Albright, Gore, and Lake advocated a policy that 
came to be known as ―lift and strike‖: the United States, they claimed, should lift the arms 
embargo, thus enabling the Bosnian Muslims to better defend themselves, and strike Bosnian 
Serb strongholds from the air. As one former senior administration official who was skeptical of 
the policy recalls, they ―wanted to end the fighting in Bosnia without having to send in ground 
troops, and believed that by using a combination of air power and extra assistance to the Bosnian 
Muslims it could be done.‖619 From mid-1993 onward, Albright, subsequently joined by 
Holbrooke, insisted on several occasions that if the European allies were not willing to go along 
with the policy, the U.S. should simply move ahead on its own and use force unilaterally as a last 
resort, to seek to bring the humanitarian catastrophe to an end.
620
  
Meanwhile the Pentagon, with the military leaders at the forefront, was the main locus of 
bureaucratic resistance to greater U.S. involvement in Bosnia. Most senior officials at the 
Defense Department saw lift and strike as an ill-thought-out and dangerous policy that might 
well drag American ground troops into Bosnia, where they would potentially face a Vietnam-
style quagmire. Powell, a highly respected and influential public figure who had been held over 
from the previous administration as JCS Chairman, vehemently and publicly opposed any deeper 
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U.S. involvement in the Balkans.
621
 The military leaders were not necessarily opposed to 
intervention in Bosnia on political or ideological grounds (unlike for the case of Haiti, where the 
top brass had long been ideologically opposed to restoring Aristide). In the case of Bosnia, 
Senior Pentagon leaders acknowledged that there was a serious humanitarian emergency and that 
stopping the bloodshed would be desirable.
622
 But the Pentagon and especially the Joint Chiefs 
were skeptical of military intervention as a policy: they believed it would entail unwarranted 
risks and costs, in view of the limited U.S. national interests at stake. As Secretary Perry put it, 
―while Bosnia is in our interest, it is not in our vital interest and therefore it does not…warrant 
the risk of the lives of thousands of troops.‖623 
 
Understanding the military’s skepticism about U.S. intervention in Bosnia 
The Pentagon and the military leaders in particular were, first, staunchly opposed to any 
deployment of U.S. ground forces in a combat role. Given that there was no peace to keep, they 
insisted, American troops might soon find themselves caught up in a Vietnam-style quagmire. 
―Madeleine [Albright] was very aggressive in this area, and that was very concerning to us,‖ 
remembers General Walter Kross, at the time director of the Joint Staff in Washington. ―We 
were very worried we were going to get stuck in there.‖624 Most U.S. military leaders based their 
pessimistic assessment on the ferocity and skill with which Yugoslav partisan guerrillas had 
fought the Germans during WWII. Invading Americans, the argument went, might now trigger a 
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similar guerrilla-type resistance by the Serbs and the Yugoslav army. Hence the top military 
brass saw any deployment of American combat troops to enforce peace in Bosnia as anathema. 
―If we had made the decision to move to a full military intervention in the Balkans—that would 
have been the point at which I would have resigned,‖ explains Admiral William Owens, who 
served as Vice Chairman of the JCS during the Bosnia crisis.
625
  
In the spring of 1993 General Powell, who had always ruled out the possibility of 
deploying U.S. ground troops to enforce peace in Bosnia, told the NSC that Washington‘s 
―choices ranged from limited air strikes around Sarajevo to heavy bombing of the Serbs 
throughout the theater.‖ Powell then went on to emphasize the risks of military action, insisting 
that none of these options was guaranteed to change Serb behavior, and ―it would be easy for the 
Serbs to respond by seizing UN humanitarian personnel as hostages.‖626 Throughout 1993 and 
1994, the military insisted that the only realistic option on the table was the use of tactical 
airpower against Serb artillery positions and airfields. The president himself quickly concluded 
that without solid support from the uniformed leaders, Congress and the American people would 
not support ―military deployments in faraway places not vital to [U.S.] national interests.‖627 He 
therefore decided that under no circumstances short of a comprehensive peace settlement that 
was voluntarily accepted by the parties should U.S. troops be deployed to Bosnia.
628
 
The administration‘s hope was that limited air strikes might be sufficient to placate an 
increasingly interventionist American public, without provoking the Bosnian Serbs into 
retaliation against UNPROFOR and thereby putting the lives of European peacekeepers at 
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 However, that raised a number of questions about military effectiveness, American 
credibility, and the ultimate purpose for which airpower should be used. Walter Slocombe, at the 
time a senior policy official at the Pentagon, recalls the military‘s concerns about the 
effectiveness of limited airpower as follows: ―The military position was that there was no reason 
to believe that at the first whiff of gunpowder [Yugoslav president] Milosevic and [Bosnian Serb 
General Ratko] Mladic and [Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic would cave. And we would 
have to explain that there is no example of quickly bombing somebody into submission. And we 
needed to have a plan for what to do next.‖630 As U.S. domestic political pressure to use limited 
airpower increased in the spring of 1993, General John Shalikashvili, then the Supreme Allied 
Commander (SACEUR) at NATO, publicly emphasized the risks of tactical air strikes against 
Bosnian Serb military positions, pointing out that they would be largely ineffective, given that 
the Serbs could easily move around and hide their artillery.
631
  
The use of airpower would also considerably increase America‘s commitment to Bosnia. 
If tactical air strikes were ineffective, the United States would sooner or later have to escalate, 
and it might even be forced to deploy ground troops to prevent a wholesale massacre of the 
Bosnian Muslims and maintain the credibility of its armed forces. Thus, Powell and the other 
generals warned, even limited military action from the air, while seemingly low-cost, might drag 
the United States into a prolonged and indefinite commitment of ground forces to the region.
632
 
General John J. Sheehan, then director for operations at the Joint Staff, declared in public that he 
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found it difficult to fathom how after launching air strikes over Bosnia the U.S. could possibly 
―declare victory and walk off the battlefield‖ without sending in ground forces.633 
The military leaders were not as categorically opposed to airstrikes as they were to the 
use of ground troops. The JCS in particular understood that the administration was under 
growing political pressure to react in some way to the violence and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 
Thus, for instance, Owens thought at the time that ―if there were limited strikes, not strategic 
strikes, but limited strikes to teach them a lesson, that was a reasonable thing; [because] there 
was a lot of pressure to do something. But it would have to be very surgical, so as not to get [the 
United States] in deeper.‖634 At the same time, the military leaders cautioned that given the 
limited U.S. strategic interests at stake in Bosnia, even tactical air strikes might exact an 
excessively high price from the administration, by unnecessarily and dangerously increasing 
America‘s commitment. Hence the best policy to follow from the military‘s standpoint would 
have been for the administration to simply hold its nose and accept Serb territorial gains, while at 
the same time seeking to persuade the Bosnian Muslims to sign a permanent cease-fire along the 
existing lines of confrontation. For the entire duration of the Bosnian conflict, the military brass 
and its civilian allies at the Pentagon argued that this would be an effective, relatively low-cost 
way of quickly ending a brutal ethnic war, according to the principle of lesser evil.
635
  
In the eyes of the administration‘s leading hawks like Albright and Fuerth and influential 
constituencies within Congress and U.S. civil society, the Pentagon‘s suggestion that 
Washington ought to accept the results of ethnic cleansing on the ground as a means to stabilize 
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Bosnia was altogether unacceptable. The United States, Albright and her followers insisted, had 
a moral obligation ―to resist evil.‖636 Therefore, the United States should seek to reverse Serb 
territorial gains and deploy its formidable military muscle to help the Bosnian Muslims recover 
lost territory. For the administration‘s leading activists, in other words, increasing America‘s 
commitment by using airpower—unilaterally if needed— was precisely desirable. ―What are you 
saving this superb military for,‖ Albright famously asked Colin Powell, ―if we can‘t use it?‖637  
 
How the military kept U.S. policy on a steady multilateral path 
The military leaders, while skeptical about air strikes in general, were staunchly opposed 
to the possibility of any U.S. unilateral implementation of lift and strike outside of a NATO 
consensus. Partially, by insisting on the need to maintain a NATO consensus, the military brass 
hoped to be able to avert U.S. armed intervention altogether. But the argument the American 
generals proffered in the interagency meetings in Washington was that unilateral initiatives 
should be avoided, because the European allies might react to a further escalation of the conflict 
by withdrawing their UNPROFOR peacekeepers from Bosnia. That, in turn, would leave the 
United States fully responsible for the humanitarian and political crisis, and Washington might 
be forced to deploy American combat troops on the ground. As General Kross recalls, the U.S. 
military leadership really ―didn‘t want UNPROFOR to leave. This was a potential quagmire, and 
we were briefing the NSC and the White House every week on this.‖638  
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A Pentagon paper authored by (then) Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, the director for 
strategic plans and policy on the Joint Staff, provided a detailed analysis to back up the military‘s 
view that lifting the arms embargo and conducting unilateral air strikes would ―be very 
dangerous, in view of the prospect for UNPROFOR withdrawal.‖639 So long as the European 
allies kept their UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, that would ensure some form of buffer on the 
ground and greatly reduce the risk that American troops would have to be deployed. Kerrick 
summarizes the prevailing view at the time among the military leaders and their civilian 
Pentagon allies as follows: ―UNPROFOR was there, the view was that they were ineffective, but 
at least they were trying to do something.‖ The principal concern, Kerrick further explains, was 
that if Washington implemented lift and strike unilaterally, ―one, it could endanger UNPROFOR 
on the ground; two, it could cause UNPROFOR to withdraw—and then we would really own 
it.‖640 
As early as May 1993, after several weeks of lobbying by the administration‘s activists 
and in view of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Bosnia, President Clinton agreed in 
principle to a policy of lift and strike. But the Pentagon and particularly the Joined Chiefs 
remained extremely wary and recommended that at a minimum, the NATO allies had to be 
brought on board. It was of course known in Washington that the Europeans remained altogether 
opposed to lifting the arms embargo and were hesitant about implementing air strikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs, fearing it would intensify the fighting on the ground and possibly lead to Serb 
retaliation against the lightly armed peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. In May 1993, 
Secretary Christopher was dispatched across the Atlantic with instructions to ―consult‖ with the 
European allies about lift and strike. Yet the Europeans, used to American secretaries of state 
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politely ―informing‖ them of what U.S. presidents had decided, were left unpersuaded by 
Christopher‘s consultative and almost tentative style, which reflected internal divisions within 
the Clinton administration.
641
 Upon returning from his fruitless consultations across the Atlantic, 
Christopher reported to the president that the allies ―will only be persuaded by the raw power 
approach. That is, we have to tell them that we have firmly decided to go ahead… and that we 
expect them to support us.‖642 But that would have required American willingness to actually 
move ahead and carry out the air strikes unilaterally as a last resort—otherwise, if the threat 
turned out to be hollow, it would have undermined U.S. credibility in the future.
643
  
By then, however, the top military brass had persuaded several key players in the 
administration, including Christopher and Lake, that U.S. unilateral intervention would be out of 
the question. In June of 1993, with Sarajevo under siege, the Clinton administration‘s activists—
with Albright at the forefront—explicitly insisted that the United States should threaten to 
proceed unilaterally unless the European allies came on board, and indeed Washington issued 
vague warnings pointing in this direction.
644
 But as one former senior American diplomat 
remembers: ―That policy survived for about three days.‖645 Christopher and especially Lake had 
joined the administration believing that in principle, to stabilize the situation in the Balkans and 
keep the president‘s electoral promise, the U.S. should lift the arms embargo and combine this 
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with limited air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.
646
 Yet in the face of a barrage of criticism from 
the military, who insisted that this policy, if implemented unilaterally, would almost certainly 
draw American ground troops into the conflict, the secretary of state and national security 
advisor quickly came to the conclusion that the administration would have to proceed by means 




By April 1993, Christopher, who had always been risk-averse and politically cautious, 
agreed that ―anything that increases the level of fighting there may well cause [the] allies to draw 
back, indeed maybe pull out their humanitarian efforts,‖ with potentially costly consequences for 
the United States.
648
 Lake, while an interventionist by instinct, also acknowledges that it was 
important to proceed multilaterally to keep U.S. troops out of Bosnia and satisfy the Defense 
Department‘s concerns: ―It was certainly necessary to work on it vis-à-vis the Pentagon—they 
were very hesitant about stronger action in Bosnia.‖649 With Christopher and Lake persuaded that 
unilateral U.S. military action—even if initially limited to air strikes—might be exceedingly 
costly, the president soon followed suit: ―I was reluctant to go [ahead with] unilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo,‖ Clinton recalls. ―I also didn‘t want to divide the NATO alliance by 
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unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, especially since there were European, but no 
American, soldiers on the ground.‖650  
 
Further specific examples of the military’s insistence on multilateralism  
Throughout 1993 and early 1994, NATO issued only vague threats of military action. 
Then, following more insistent American pressure, in the late spring of 1994 the alliance began 
carrying out a few very limited bombing raids on Bosnian Serb military installations, which were 
decried as ineffective ―pinpricks‖ by Albright and her fellow activists. ―It was really just the odd 
bomb here and there,‖ as one former senior State Department official recalls.651 Then, in 
November 1994, in the face of rapid Serb advances against the Bihac ―safe area,‖ Washington 
again began prodding its European allies to support broader NATO air strikes. The French and 
British, as previously argued, eventually came on board, and the bombing began. However, 
instead of pulling back, the Bosnian Serbs almost immediately took about 250 UN peacekeepers 
hostage. At that point, the distressed Europeans were clearly unwilling to escalate further. Yet 
several of the Clinton administration‘s activists, led by Albright and Holbrooke, now also joined 
by Lake, insisted that the air strikes should be expanded further. Over the following weeks, 
tensions among the allies soared and a serious transatlantic crisis ensued.
652
 
As the quarrel between the United States and its European allies was becoming more 
acute in the final days of November 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry, reflecting the growing 
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anxieties of the top military brass about triggering an UNPROFOR withdrawal, seized the 
initiative. Perry, joined by Secretary of State Christopher, took a firm stance and convinced Lake 
and the president that the policy of using air strikes to pressure the Serbs should be abandoned. 
Perry was now publicly challenging the administration‘s hawks: he insisted that air strikes were 
no longer useful and declared on national television that the U.S. should once and for all accept 
the existing status quo on the ground, before adding that anyway, the Bosnian Muslims had ―no 
prospect‖ of winning back the territory they had lost.653 Lake, outflanked by opponents of 




The Pentagon subsequently flexed its bureaucratic muscle to constrain the 
administration‘s hawks on at least one further occasion. In the spring of 1995, the Bosnian Serb 
army once again began shelling Sarajevo. Albright, Holbrooke, and lower-ranking civilian 
activists in the administration pushed for NATO air strikes. Now it was Albright who tried to 
outmaneuver her opponents within the bureaucracy, by directly appealing to the public and 
proclaiming: ―We do not understand why air power is not appropriate at this time.‖655 With U.S. 
public sentiment favorable to air strikes, the civilian hawks won the first round of the 
bureaucratic debate.
656
 Under American pressure, the Europeans reluctantly agreed to limited air 
strikes, and on May 25, NATO bombers went into action, destroying two ammunition sites near 
the Bosnian Serb town of Pale. But the Bosnian Serbs reacted swiftly, this time taking almost 
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400 UN peacekeepers hostage, and chaining several of them to telephone poles and using them 
as human shields. The spectacle of French, Canadian, and other UN peacekeepers being held 
hostage, broadcast live on television networks across the globe, was deeply humiliating to 
UNPROFOR and the troop contributing countries.
657
  
Holbrooke now boldly recommended that Washington issue an ultimatum of forty-eight 
hours for the release of all hostages and threaten massive air strikes against Pale in case of 
noncompliance.
658
 Given staunch European opposition to further air strikes as long as the 
peacekeepers were kept hostage, the bombing would clearly have been a U.S. unilateral affair. 
But without rebuking Holbrooke in public, Perry and JCS Chairman Shalikashvili, again joined 
by Christopher, firmly insisted that U.S. demands for NATO air strikes should be ―quietly‖ 
abandoned. The Pentagon‘s longstanding concerns about keeping American soldiers out of 
Bosnia were now heightened by the president‘s pledge, made in December 1994, that the U.S. 
would contribute up to 25,000 troops to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR if needed. 
President Clinton was acutely aware of the Pentagon‘s disquiet and the potentially disastrous 
broader political implications. Hence he quickly agreed that any talk of U.S. air strikes should be 
abandoned, after British Prime Minister Major and the newly elected French president, Jacques 
Chirac, called him on the telephone and explained in unmistakable terms that UNPROFOR‘s 
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4. Endgame: NATO air strikes and a NATO-led stabilization force  
In the late spring of 1995, Lake and his senior Balkans aide Alexander Vershbow had 
begun to develop a comprehensive policy proposal for Bosnia, which became known as the 
―Endgame Strategy.‖ The thrust of the new proposal set forth by the NSC staff was that 
Washington should launch a major new diplomatic initiative, backed up by an array of carrots 
and sticks, to get a peace settlement before the end of the year that would preserve Bosnia as a 
viable state and reduce the Serb-controlled area to about 49 percent of Bosnian territory.
660
 If a 
negotiated settlement could be achieved, the United States would then deploy about 20,000 
troops as part of an international peace-implementation force. But if this final diplomatic effort 
failed, Washington should facilitate a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, lift the arms embargo, and 
begin arming and training the Bosnian Muslims. Also, if a negotiated settlement could not be 
achieved, the U.S. should conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets for several 
months until a more stable balance of power emerged on the ground. After the crisis over Bihac 
in November 1994, Lake and his staff had concluded that what Washington needed to avoid was 
no longer UNPROFOR‘s withdrawal as such, but only being blamed for the departure, because 




The policy changes after Srebrenica 
President Clinton finally came to agree that a dramatic change in policy was necessary, 
when in the days following July 11, 1995 the Bosnian Serb army led by Ratko Mladic overran 
the UN ―safe area‖ of Srebrenica and more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed. In July and 
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early August 1995, Lake exploited his physical proximity to the president and pushed the 
endgame strategy through the Washington bureaucracy. For the first time, Lake acted as a 
genuine policy entrepreneur and partially circumvented the formal interagency process, which 
until then had yielded an overly reactive and piecemeal approach to the crisis in Bosnia. At a 
foreign policy team meeting on July 17, Lake disclosed the complete endgame strategy to 
Christopher, Perry, Shalikashvili, and Albright. But the national security advisor had previously 
shown a draft of the strategy to Clinton, and when the president said he liked it, Lake had asked 
him to drop by the meeting to voice his support.
662
  
During the meeting on July 17, the Pentagon initially expressed strong reservations at the 
prospect of implementing lift, arm, train, and strike in case the diplomacy failed. Perry and 
Shalikashvili had come to support the use of airpower in Bosnia for clearly defined purposes. In 
fact, they now considered that firm military action from the air, aimed at defending the 
remaining safe areas, had become necessary to prevent an imminent UNPROFOR withdrawal, 
which in turn would have required U.S. troops to assist in a potentially dangerous evacuation.
663
 
However, at the same time, Perry and Shalikashvili thought that U.S. strategic interests were not 
sufficiently engaged for Washington to become more actively involved in the conflict on the side 
of the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore, the Pentagon leaders insisted, even with the arms embargo 
lifted, the Bosnian Muslims would not be able to defend themselves for a long period of time. 
Hence U.S. air strikes would almost inevitably result in an incremental escalation, a demand to 
send in trainers and air support liaison staff at first and then increasing numbers of American 
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 Yet towards the end of the meeting, Clinton appeared, as previously arranged with 
Lake. ―I don‘t like where we are now,‖ the president said. ―This policy is doing enormous 
damage to the United States and to our standing in the world. We look weak.‖ Without a change, 
he anticipated more trouble. ―And it can only get worse down the road.‖ Then Clinton left. No 
decision had yet been taken, but the president, with Lake‘s orchestration, had come as close as he 
ever had to exercising real leadership on Bosnia.
665
  
On August 8, the NSC met to discuss the merits of the endgame strategy one last time 
before taking a final decision. By then, Clinton had clearly indicated his support for the approach 
outlined by Lake and his staff. The Pentagon leaders, preferring to avoid a showdown with the 
president and sensing that in the aftermath of Srebrenica, the Europeans, too, were coming on 
board, no longer explicitly opposed the policy.
666
 The NSC staff again went through the details 
of the policy proposal on the table: there would be a last-ditch effort to get a comprehensive 
peace settlement that year, involving a diplomatic shuttle by a senior presidential envoy; but if 
the diplomatic effort failed, the U.S. would lift the arms embargo, arm and train the Bosnian 
Muslims, and rely on air strikes during a nine-months transition period.
667
 Lake would travel to 
Europe and inform the allies of the president‘s decision, making it clear that their support would 
be very much desired but not necessary. Yet the sense in the administration was that unlike in 
1993, the European allies would now welcome Washington‘s proposal and follow the American 
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 Clinton himself mused during the crucial meeting on August 8: ―We‘re not asking for 
something the Europeans won‘t like. This time we‘ll be pushing on an open door.‖669  
 
The Croatian ground offensive: brutal yet valuable to the negotiations 
By the time President Clinton formally endorsed the NSC staff‘s endgame strategy on 
August 8 and dispatched Lake to Europe, the situation on the ground in Bosnia had also begun to 
change significantly. On July 22, the presidents of Bosnia and Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic and 
Franjo Tudjman, had met in Split, Croatia and agreed to defend the Bihac pocket in Bosnia 
jointly against Serb advances. Peter Galbraith, the U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb, attended the 
meeting and may even have engineered it.
670
 Over the previous year, the Clinton administration 
had promoted an alliance between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, known as the 
―Federation agreement,‖ and relied on third-party states (notably Iran) to funnel covert arms 
shipments to Bosnia and Croatia. Also, several retired U.S. generals had trained the Croatian 
army since late 1994 with the Clinton administration‘s tacit support.671  
On July 25, 1995 Croatian forces launched an offensive into Bosnia near Bihac, and 
reinforced by Bosnian Muslim troops, they easily overran the Serb military, sending an estimated 
8,000 Serb troops and civilians fleeing.
672
 On August 4, the Croatians, emboldened by their 
quick success in Bihac and by Washington‘s tacit approval, launched a much broader offensive, 
codenamed Operation Storm, against the Serb-held Krajina region in Croatia. Serb forces fled 
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largely without a fight, leaving almost 200,000 civilians exposed to one of the worst instances of 
ethnic cleansing of the Balkan wars.
673
  
Once it became clear that Milosevic, the Serb leader, had written off the Kraijna Serbs, 
senior U.S. officials, including from the Pentagon, began to openly endorse the Croatian 
offensive. Secretary of Defense Perry was among the most explicit in welcoming the offensive 
and publicly declared: ―We hope that it is successful.‖674 President Clinton more cautiously and 
somewhat awkwardly expressed the hope on August 7 that the offensive ―will turn out to be 
something that will give us an avenue to a quicker diplomatic solution.‖675 It is was not until 
several weeks later that the Croatian army, again supported by Bosnian Muslim troops, actually 
launched a significant ground offensive into western Bosnia that went much beyond the Bihac 
pocket and reversed most Serb territorial gains from previous years.
676
 Yet when President 
Clinton approved the NSC staff‘s endgame strategy on August 8, 1995, for the first time in years, 
there was widespread hope in the administration that the hitherto recalcitrant Serbs might 
become more amenable to negotiations. Holbrooke confirms that ―the Croatian offensive, while 
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Planning for a NATO-led stabilization force 
The endgame strategy worked out by the NSC staff under Lake foresaw that successful 
negotiations on a peace agreement for Bosnia would result in the deployment of an international 
stabilization force and significant economic assistance for postwar reconstruction.
678
 But it was 
inconceivable to the administration and the Pentagon in particular that the United States should 
have shouldered most of the burden for postwar stabilization and reconstruction in Bosnia, given 
that this was after all a European security problem. The Joint Chiefs were adamant that the 
United States should continue to limit its liability and avoid ―owning‖ the situation, especially 
from a military standpoint.  
During the initial discussions in Washington on postwar stabilization, the JCS insisted 
that a European Union (EU) peace implementation force should be established with American 
assistance; and failing that, following a peace agreement, a NATO force composed largely of 
European troops should be deployed. The military‘s ―view was that this was a European 
situation,‖ remembers Admiral Owens. Therefore, the best solution from their standpoint would 
have been to deploy a ―European peacekeeping force,‖ or at any rate a predominantly ―European 
presence supplemented by the United States on the edges.‖679 The European allies, however, 
insisted on a sizeable American contribution, at least for the initial peace implementation phase. 
The Bosnian Muslims, too, made it clear that they would not sign any peace agreement with the 
Serbs, unless there was a firm U.S. commitment to help implement the agreement and guarantee 
their security.
680
 Hence the focus of U.S. military planners increasingly shifted to a NATO 
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implementation force, in which the Americans would play an initially significant but then rapidly 
diminishing role.  
By late June 1995, Secretary Perry conceded that the Pentagon would be willing to 
envision a deployment of U.S. troops for a limited period of time, in a multilateral context, ―as a 
part of a NATO force to help implement a peace settlement.‖681 The top military brass, too, had 
come to the conclusion that to avoid further tarnishing the image of American leadership, the 
U.S. would have to contribute a sizeable number of troops to help stabilize the situation on the 
ground in Bosnia once a settlement had been achieved. But senior Defense Department officials, 
with the Joint Chiefs at the forefront, made it clear that they would recommend deploying U.S. 
troops only in a peace-implementation role, and only in a multilateral NATO context. The 
military‘s idea was that while a U.S.-led NATO force would be charged with postwar 
stabilization in the short run, that task would then largely be handed off to a European force in 
the near future— possibly after a single year. As one former U.S. defense official explains: 
―There was a general expectation that the United States would go in heavy upfront, and the 
Europeans and other partners would take up more of the burden as the force went down.‖682  
The military leaders had also made it clear that in case the diplomacy failed to produce a 
settlement and the administration chose to move ahead with lift, arm, train, and strike, they 
would have strenuously objected to deploying U.S. ground troops in any combat or other active 
support role on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans, too, would have been unlikely 
to contribute ground troops in the absence of a peace agreement, to support the Bosnian Muslims 
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in the implementation of arm, train, and strike.
683
 Hence the Clinton foreign policy team debated 
for some time the possibility of deploying a more robust successor force to UNPROFOR, 
composed of troops from moderate Muslim states and without U.S. participation, as a possible 
alternative to a NATO deployment. ―We had some discussions with Indonesia and Turkey 
[about] a Muslim peacekeeping force,‖ remembers Owens. ―We could have provided 
intelligence to them, and combined it with limited strikes to force the Serbs into compliance.‖684  
 
The August 1995 NATO air campaign: locking in the European allies 
In the course of August 1995, following the adoption of the endgame strategy, several of 
the administration‘s civilian activists appear to have concluded that more assertive air strikes 
against the Bosnian Serbs, combined with the Muslim-Croat ground offensive, could 
significantly boost the prospects of a negotiated solution to the Bosnian conflict.
685
 The top U.S. 
military brass and Pentagon leaders more generally understood in the aftermath of Srebrenica 
that air power would have to be used more assertively to defend the remaining safe areas. As 
Perry explains, ―we just believed that the consequences of [air strikes to defend the safe areas] 
could not be as serious as the consequences of sending [American] NATO forces to pull out the 
UN forces in disgrace.‖686 However, Shalikashvili and the other members of the JCS remained 
skeptical of moving beyond limited air strikes and initiating a broader strategic air campaign 
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aimed at coercing the Bosnian Serbs into a peace settlement—at least as long as there was no 




As Strobe Talbott, at the time the U.S. deputy secretary of state and a key liaison person 
between the military brass and the administration‘s civilian activists, explains: ―We recognized 
in advance of military action that the United States and its international partners would have to 
maintain a significant presence in Bosnia for a long time.‖688 For that reason, the Pentagon and 
the U.S. military in particular insisted on obtaining an explicit IO endorsement through NATO or 
the UN for any broader air campaign. They advised that a close multilateral consensus should be 
maintained with the European allies until the very end, so secure their support on postwar 
stabilization. That was ―absolutely central‖ to the Pentagon‘s thinking, remembers Slocombe.689 
Already in late July, following the Srebrenica massacre, NATO‘s European partners had 
agreed that airpower should be used more decisively in defense of the remaining UN ―safe 
areas.‖ At a special conference held in London on July 21, 1995, the United States and its 
principal European allies decided to streamline the ―dual key‖ authorization process for air 
strikes. The United States would have preferred a complete elimination of the UN key. Yet in 
view of maintaining a transatlantic consensus, Washington agreed to the Europeans‘ request that 
the UN key should merely be transferred downwards, from UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
and his Special Representative Akashi to the overall UN force commander in the theater, French 
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General Bertrand Janvier (who could then further delegate it to the UNPROFOR commander on 
the ground, British Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith).
690
  
Following the London conference, at a meeting of NATO‘s supreme political body, the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Europeans had also agreed that UN and NATO military 
commanders would now have the authority to call for air strikes not only against specific Serb 
military positions involved in attacking a UN safe area (so-called ―Option One‖ targets), but also 
more generally against weapons in the affected sector of Bosnia not directly involved in an 
attack, as well as command-and-control facilities, radars, and ammunition depots (so-called 
―Option Two‖ targets). However, the French in particular were reluctant to envision any broader 
strategic bombing against Serb troop concentrations or equipment throughout Bosnia, including 
civilian infrastructure like power grids (so-called ―Option Three‖ targets). Paris remained 
adamant that such broader strategic bombing would require a further explicit approval from both 
the NAC and the UN Secretary-General, who would probably defer any related decision to the 
UN Security Council (where the Russians, traditionally aligned with Serbia, could be expected to 
cast their veto).
691
 In short, Washington‘s European allies were willing in the aftermath of 
Srebrenica to put in place a somewhat more credible NATO deterrent against further Serb attacks 
on the remaining ―safe areas,‖ but they were unwilling to follow Washington‘s civilian activists 
down the path toward full-fledged strategic bombing.  
The uneasy compromise that had emerged out of the London conference and subsequent 
NAC meetings was put to a test in late August 1995. In the morning of August 28, 1995 an 
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artillery shell landed on the crowded Sarajevo marketplace, leaving thirty-eight dead and about 
ninety wounded. As soon as UN investigators had determined that the shell was in fact fired 
from a Serb-held area, the UNPROFOR commander on the ground, British Lieutenant General 
Rupert Smith, turned the UN key.
692
 France, Britain, and Germany now joined the United States 
and backed NATO air strikes in response to the shelling. That allowed NATO to launch its 
broadest air campaign up to that point, code-named Operation Deliberate Force, two days 
later.
693
 Because of Russian opposition at the UNSC, Washington and its European allies had not 
been able in previous weeks to obtain an explicit UN mandate for a broader air campaign.
694
 Yet 
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, under the pressure of events and facing a united front 
between the United States and the main troop contributors to UNPROFOR, ultimately agreed 
with NATO‘s standpoint that the bombing was authorized under SCR 836 (on the ―safe areas‖), 
which dated back to 1993.
695
 
President Clinton, after talking to his principal advisers, had reportedly insisted: ―We 
have to hit ‗em hard.‖696 The ostensible objective of the air campaign, as NATO‘s Secretary-
General Willy Claes explained at the time, was merely ―to reduce the threat to Sarajevo and to 
deter further attacks on the safe areas.‖697 But the civilian activists in Washington clearly saw the 
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air strikes as a coercive instrument that could support the diplomatic process of which Holbrooke 
had taken charge two weeks earlier.
698
 At the same time, the U.S. military leaders insisted on 
proceeding in close cooperation with the European allies throughout. For that reason, as one 
former senior U.S. diplomat explains, tight political control was maintained over the conduct of 
the air campaign; NATO‘s bombing was limited to military targets, and dual-use ―Option Three‖ 
targets remained always off-limits.
699
 Indeed, under pressure from the Joint Chiefs, Washington 
decided to end the bombing on September 14, 1995, several days sooner than had initially been 
planned and than the Clinton administration‘s civilian activists would have preferred, after 
―Option Two‖ targets had been exhausted. This was deemed necessary to maintain a full 
multilateral consensus with the European NATO allies, who were growing increasingly jittery 
and were clearly unwilling to move on to ―Option Three.‖700  
The U.S. military leaders actually believed that the air campaign, if managed 
multilaterally, could help lock in the European allies and ensure that they would feel committed 
to protecting the Bosnian Muslims and securing Bosnia‘s long-term stabilization. For this reason, 
the military brass insisted that as many of the European allies as possible should actively 
participate in the bombing with their own aircraft and otherwise be involved in logistical matters, 
although that clearly limited Washington‘s own freedom of action. ―We wanted to get their 
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Seven European NATO members (the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Turkey, Germany, and Italy) ultimately contributed aircraft to Operation Deliberate Force, 
though several of those nations, like Germany and Italy, merely flew support missions and did 
not actively participate in the bombing.
702
 By the time the campaign ended on September 14, a 
total of 3,515 sorties had been flown and NATO aircraft had delivered 1,026 explosive 
ammunitions against Bosnian Serb targets. The United States contributed 45 percent of coalition 
aircraft, flew about 65 percent of all sorties, and delivered the vast majority of precision-guided 
munitions.
703
 What mattered most to the U.S. military leaders, however, was a sense that the 
European allies had now been locked in, and it appeared very likely that they would take a 
leading role on postwar peacekeeping and stabilization. As Admiral Owens explains:  
Even though the United States contributed about 98 percent of the precision bombing, it 
was very important to have the Europeans as a central element of the air campaign. Our 
view was that they should be the ones to take it forward— that any peacekeeping 
activities on the ground would be dependent on the Europeans. So you really needed to 
have them as part of the air campaign, even though they were not adding frankly very 




An EU peace force as the American exit strategy 
By late September 1995, a negotiated agreement appeared increasingly likely. Hence the 
focus of the U.S. military brass had firmly shifted to peace implementation. With the Powell 
doctrine still very much on their minds, the JCS insisted on deploying a large, overwhelming 
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stabilization force with a robust enforcement capability that could rapidly quash any local 
resistance if needed.
705
 The plan that eventually emerged foresaw a NATO-led implementation 
force (IFOR), with additional troop contributions from other (mainly Muslim) countries, such as 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, and Pakistan. The uniformed leaders also insisted that IFOR‘s 
mandate should be circumscribed to strictly military matters and ought to exclude tasks like 
reconstruction, refugee resettlement, and humanitarian relief. The military put down their feet on 
this point, leading to significant friction with State Department officials like Holbrooke, who 
wanted IFOR to also take on some basic reconstruction tasks. SACEUR General George Joulwan 
―felt that NATO was going to win or lose based on how they were going to come out of Bosnia,‖ 
remembers a senior U.S. Army officer who was involved in planning the operation. ―And his 
view was that if NATO stuck to the military part of the operation, they stood a good chance of 
succeeding.‖706 Ultimately the military leaders had it their way: they obtained a narrow mandate 
for IFOR, limited to separating the former warring parties and ensuring a period of stability to 




The Joint Chiefs were fundamentally convinced (and had persuaded the White House) 
that Congress and the American people would not support a U.S. military involvement in Bosnia 
without a clear exit strategy based on a specified timeframe. The top military brass were in 
frequent communication with congressional leaders, especially from the House and Senate 
Armed Services Committees. Based on those interactions, the JCS were genuinely concerned, 
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more than the administration‘s activists, about the willingness of Congress to support any costly 
and protracted deployment of American troops in Bosnia.
708
 Throughout the Bosnian war, there 
had been significant bipartisan backing from congressional leaders for air strikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs.
709
 However, it was equally clear that after the killing of eighteen American 
soldiers in Somalia in the fall of 1993, and following the Republican Party‘s sweeping victory at 
the November 1994 congressional midterm elections, Capitol Hill was extremely wary of any 
renewed commitment of American troops in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement role.
710
  
―We needed to convince Congress that we had an exit strategy,‖ remembers Kross. ―And 
the final element of the exit strategy was: hand it over to the Europeans on the ground.‖711 Hence 
Washington‘s official policy line became that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia for about a 
year as part of IFOR and would then for the most part be withdrawn by the end of 1996. IFOR 
was in fact given only a one-year mandate, which ran from December 1995 to December 1996. 
The U.S. military leaders hoped that a European force would take over thereafter.
712
 The 
Pentagon actually sought to extract a commitment from the European allies that if the United 
States offered a large troop contribution upfront, European forces would then take up most of the 
burden by the end of 1996: ―We were pushing the Europeans as much as we could to get their 
commitment that they would take it from there,‖ remembers Owens.713 From the late summer of 
1995 onward, the JCS developed all their plans for postwar stabilization in close cooperation 
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with allied military representatives at NATO headquarters, to ensure the maximum possible level 
of burden- and risk sharing compatible with an effective operation.
714
  
In short, the military leaders and their civilian allies at the Pentagon were adamant on 
limiting the liability of American troops and of the United States more generally. Towards this 
end, the Joint Chiefs insisted on: (a) narrowly circumscribing IFOR‘s mandate, (b) developing a 
clear exit strategy before American troops were actually deployed, and (c) involving a large 
number of international allies and partners from NATO and non-NATO countries. Throughout, 
the working assumption in Washington and especially at the Pentagon was that while the U.S. 
would make a significant initial contribution to the military aspects of peace-implementation, 
from the get-go all civilian aspects would be managed and largely paid for by the European 
allies.
715
 NATO ultimately assembled 60,000 troops for IFOR, which entered Bosnia between 
December 1995 and January 1996, soon after the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations 
in Dayton, Ohio. Yet by the end of 1996, peace in Bosnia remained exceedingly fragile, in spite 
of significant progress on the ground. The European allies, while willing to step up their own 
contribution, were not yet ready to take over entirely. Given the risk that a precipitous American 
withdrawal might have derailed the entire operation, the JCS reluctantly agreed to an extension 
of the U.S. military deployment in Bosnia and cooperated in securing congressional funding for 
the follow-on NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).
716
 The U.S. contribution to SFOR in 1998 
was 8,500 troops (making up 30 percent of a total NATO force of slightly over 27,000 troops) – 
down from an initial U.S. contribution to IFOR of 20,000 troops (roughly 40 percent of the total 
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 Smaller contingents of U.S. forces remained in Bosnia for nearly a 
decade, until December 2004, when a European Union peacekeeping force of roughly 6,000 




5. Understanding the military’s bureaucratic political influence 
Once it became clear in early August 1995 that the president was strongly committed to 
moving ahead with the endgame strategy developed by the NSC staff, the Joint Chiefs 
grudgingly came on board.
719
 But the military leaders had greatly constrained Washington‘s 
Bosnia policy over the previous two years and continued to do so thereafter, notably on the 
question of using air power for coercive purposes. Crucially, between 1993 and 1995, the 
military‘s skepticism about armed intervention, their outright opposition to any deployment of 
U.S. ground troops in a combat role, and their desire to limit American liability for events on the 
ground, maintained the Clinton administration on a steady multilateral course of action.  
Furthermore, although Operation Deliberate Force, combined with the Croat ground 
offensive, allowed the Bosnian Muslims to recover large swaths of territory previously lost to the 
Bosnian Serbs, the final peace settlement negotiated at Dayton and signed in Paris in December 
1995 recognized the existence of a quasi-independent Serb political entity in Bosnia, the 
Republika Srpska, and it practically ratified the results of ethnic cleansing on the ground—
precisely what the Pentagon had advocated since 1992.
720
 With the endgame strategy developed 
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by the NSC staff under Lake, the Clinton administration had in fact rejected the uncompromising 
stance of Albright and Fuerth, who had continued to resist any concessions to the Bosnian Serbs. 
Thereafter, U.S. policy moved from one-sided support for the Bosnian Muslims to a recognition 
of the need to address the often conflicting interests of all sides.
721
 The question, then, is: How 
did the military leaders manage to influence U.S. policy on Bosnia to such a striking degree? 
 
Persuasion through professional expertise 
The top U.S. military brass had several instruments at their disposal to influence the 
Clinton administration‘s Bosnia policy. In part, as Richard Betts has argued, during the debates 
about intervention in Bosnia the ―military leaders constrained decisions by the substance of their 
intramural arguments.‖722 In other words, the military leaders brought a wealth of professional 
experience and detailed technical knowledge to the internal bureaucratic debates. That led to 
fruitful deliberation among the Clinton administration‘s foreign policy principals and greatly 
affected the civilians‘ understanding of what an effective and domestically sustainable U.S. 
policy on Bosnia might look like. For instance, by the summer of 1995, even some of the most 
hawkish Clinton administration officials, such as Holbrooke, who in previous years had insisted 
on bombing Bosnian Serb strongholds unilaterally, had come to recognize that close multilateral 
coordination with the NATO allies on the use of force would be valuable in terms of ensuring 
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their subsequent support on peace implementation: ―We must never forget that we will need 
them all if there is ever a settlement,‖ Holbrooke wrote in a note to Christopher on August 23. 
―The EU for economic assistance, our NATO allies for the new post-UN peacekeeping force, the 
UN for legitimizing resolutions.‖723   
The generals‘ professional expertise also gave them a more direct type of leverage. If the 
military leaders disagreed with a specific use-of-force option, they could inflate the required 
number of troops and the costs of the operation so as to make it appear politically unfeasible.
724
 
Fuerth, who was clearly constrained in his interventionist impulses on Bosnia by a skeptical 
Pentagon, remembers related conversations with the military commanders as follows:  
Only the military could tell the civilians how much force would be needed, but in order to 
tell them how much force would be needed there had to be a common definition of the 
objective. To achieve a common definition of the objective, the civilians needed some 
idea of the military consequences of the decision to go forward. So you needed to get to 
the point where the military officers, who could tell you what it would take to accomplish 
an objective by force, felt sufficiently confident about how you would use that knowledge 
to give it to you. If they were afraid that the civilians were too prone to go off and use the 




Bureaucratic leverage through political activism 
The military leaders‘ influence on the rest of the administration was not only the result of 
quiet persuasion and effective argumentation in the intramural debates. The U.S. military leaders, 
as discussed in chapter two, can also act as more straightforwardly political actors—and on 
Bosnia they did so frequently and with astonishing effectiveness. General Powell‘s public 
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insistence in 1992 and early 1993 that any U.S. deployment of ground troops in Bosnia might 
result in a costly quagmire greatly undermined popular and especially congressional support for 
American military intervention. It had an extraordinary impact on the administration‘s policy and 
played a key role in forestalling any meaningful U.S. armed intervention in Bosnia until mid-
1995.
726
 Between 1993 and early 1995, U.S. military leaders, and more generally senior 
Pentagon officials who largely reflected the military‘s views, used various congressional 
testimonies and media appearances to publicly express their skepticism about American 
intervention in Bosnia and point out the dangers that a U.S. military engagement (especially if 
uncoordinated with the NATO allies) would entail. The fact that President Clinton himself was 
largely absent from the internal debates on Bosnia and exercised little leadership until mid-1995 
further increased the military‘s influence. But more than the military‘s actual public statements, 
it was the constantly present threat that they might vent their disagreements and concerns in 
public, which gave them extraordinary leverage in the internal bureaucratic debates.
727
  
Furthermore, the relationship between the military brass and Congress on U.S. Bosnia 
policy was a complex and dynamic one throughout. On the one hand, the military leaders‘ active 
cooperation was needed to successfully ―sell‖ any U.S. troop deployment to the American 
Congress. Holbrooke for instance recalls that the military‘s influence over Congress provided 
them with a great deal of leverage over the administration during the debate over IFOR‘s 
mandate: ―The White House was understandably averse to a direct confrontation with the 
military. If the military openly opposed the deployment, our political difficulties would be vastly 
increased. We had to have their backing to get congressional and public support for the mission, 
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which meant that they had the upper hand in the debate over what their mission would be.‖728 On 
the other hand, as I previously discussed, the Joint Chiefs insisted more than other U.S. policy 
leaders on the risk that Congress might refuse to fund any large-scale deployment of American 
troops to pacify and stabilize the Balkans. It may be, as one scholar has argued, that Washington 
leaders anticipated that a NATO mandate for any U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia would limit 
congressional opposition.
729
 However, to the extent that anticipated congressional opposition to 
any large-scale U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia contributed to keeping the Clinton 
administration on a steady multilateral track, the military leaders functioned as a crucial 
transmission belt. The military‘s role in this matter was very similar to that played over Haiti in 
1994: the military brass, more than civilian officials, saw cooperation with international partners 
as an effective means of limiting U.S. liability and, thereby, keeping Capitol Hill on board.  
Finally, by the time a final settlement in Bosnia appeared within reach, the 
administration‘s civilian activists themselves could rely on relevant experience form previous 
U.S. military interventions, and notably from the recent Haiti operation in 1994. One important 
lesson the activists had learned was that proceeding multilaterally through global or regional IOs 
could significantly reduce the military‘s opposition to intervening, and notably to deploying U.S. 
forces in a peacekeeping and stabilization role overseas. In the case of Haiti, as discussed in 
chapter three, an explicit UN endorsement of military intervention ensured international buy-in 
and subsequently made it possible to withdraw the bulk of American troops within a matter of 
months. Fuerth recalls that the administration as a whole had ―learned a lot in the course of 
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figuring out what to do about Haiti,‖ notably about how working with international partners 
could reassure the military leaders, ―and that was reapplied when thinking about what to do 
about Bosnia.‖730  
 
6. Testing alternative explanations for U.S. multilateralism on Bosnia 
In the final part of this chapter I want to again test two prominent alternative 
explanations, derived from the scholarly literature, as to why the United States may have sought 
to channel its Bosnia policy through standing IOs between 1993 and 1995. First, quite apart from 
strategic or political considerations, U.S. policy leaders might have been driven by international 
moral norms requiring that armed interventions be multilaterally endorsed through relevant IOs. 
Another possibility is that U.S. leaders sought to reassure third-party states in other parts of the 
world of Washington‘s motives, in view of preventing potentially costly international 
countermeasures, or ―soft balancing,‖ aimed at thwarting U.S. foreign policy in other issue areas. 
 
Multilateral legitimacy as an end (U.S. leaders have internalized relevant norms) 
Prominent social constructivists and other sociologically oriented scholars of 
international relations claim that over the last two decades or so, foreign policy leaders in the 
western world have internalized new international legitimacy norms and attendant rules of 
appropriate behavior that require multilateral endorsement for the use of force. Hence those 
policy leaders should seek the endorsement of relevant IOs for prospective military interventions 
out of a genuinely felt sense of moral obligation. Thomas Risse-Kappen is perhaps most explicit 
in his argument: in the eyes of the western leaders who were planning international policy on 
                                                 




Bosnia, he claims, it was ―inconceivable‖ that they could ―intervene militarily to pursue 
unilaterally defined strategic interests.‖731  
The norm internalization hypothesis is closely related to the frequently heard assertion 
that senior officials in the Clinton administration were convinced multilateralists who abhorred 
unilateral military action, as opposed to officials in the subsequent administration of President 
George W. Bush, for instance, who were ostensibly more unilateralist in outlook.
732
 Put 
differently, there seems to be a fairly widespread opinion that even if not all post-cold war 
American leaders across political parties have internalized relevant moral norms of multilateral 
behavior, this may well have been the case for self-proclaimed liberal internationalists in the 
Clinton administration. Indeed, the Clinton administration, given its heavy reliance on 
multilateralist rhetoric, is what methods scholars call a ―most likely case‖ for the norm 
internalization hypothesis—it easily ought to confirm it. It follows that if the hypothesis does not 
hold with regard to the Clinton administration, its more general validity is called into question.
733
  
 For the norm internalization hypothesis to be confirmed with specific regard to the 
Bosnia case, one ought to be able to observe the following dynamics. First, U.S. policy leaders 
should have sought the endorsement of relevant IOs as a matter of moral duty—i.e., they should 
have seen such endorsement as an all but necessary condition for the international use of force. 
Unilateral action, in short, should have been unthinkable to them. This should be evident not 
only from their public pronouncements, but also from their private arguments during relevant 
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bureaucratic debates. Second, U.S. leaders should have sought the endorsement of the UN 
Security Council or NATO primarily for intrinsic normative reasons, regardless of its political 
and strategic benefits at the domestic or international levels.  
 Yet a careful review of internal bureaucratic debates among the Clinton administration‘s 
foreign policy leaders suggests that few, if any, of them had internalized relevant norms that 
make unilateral military action unthinkable. It appears that the most prominent liberal 
internationalists within the administration, such as Albright, Lake, and Holbrooke, were no more 
attached to multilateralism as a matter of moral principle than their more skeptical and pragmatic 
colleagues. In fact, the liberal internationalists, because of their overall hawkish attitude on 
Bosnia, were more willing than others to compromise the norm of multilateralism in favor of 
humanitarian principles. 
 Albright, the Clinton administration‘s leading activist on Bosnia, probably thought that a 
multilateral endorsement of military intervention through the UN or NATO would be desirable, 
all things being equal. But she could certainly very much conceive of U.S. unilateral military 
options, and she never thought that channeling the threat or use of force through relevant IOs 
would be a necessary, or near-necessary, condition for American intervention. Indeed, it seems 
that Albright and her fellow humanitarian activists at the State Department had concluded as 
early as April 1993 that obtaining an explicit multilateral endorsement through NATO or the UN 
would be unnecessary.
734
 Albright insisted that Washington ought to be ready to carry out air 
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strikes against the Bosnian Serbs unilaterally, if the NATO allies or the UN were unwilling to 
explicitly endorse them or sought to impose too restrictive conditions for their use.
735
 Albright‘s 
approach to the Balkans, as previously indicated, was highly moralistic and deeply influenced by 
her childhood experience in the region, and the only moral norm she appears to have been intent 
on complying with at virtually any cost was the obligation to ―resist evil‖ as she saw it.736 
 Lake, probably the most influential among the administration‘s activists on Bosnia, 
appears to have been no more attached to the principle of multilateralism as a fundamental 
matter of morality. Undoubtedly Lake was more pragmatic than Albright, as well as somewhat 
less hawkish in his attitude. To some extent, this can be explained by his institutional role as the 
administration‘s chief foreign policy coordinator, which required that he carefully take the views 
of other senior policy officials into account when formulating advice to the president. In line 
with Lake‘s focus on forging a policy consensus within the administration, his overall preference 
for multilateralism on Bosnia appears to have been less the reflection of an inherent normative 
conviction than the result of contingent cost-benefit calculations. Given Lake‘s almost daily 
interactions with the top military brass, he fairly rapidly came to the conclusion that multilateral 
support would generally be desirable for U.S. intervention in civil-war contexts where lengthy 
peacekeeping and military stabilization missions could be anticipated. In short, he came to 
support multilateralism because, in his own words, ―the more you involve others, the more you 
reduce the burden on the United States—and it was certainly necessary to work on this vis-à-vis 
the Pentagon.‖ But he always remained convinced that if the costs of proceeding multilaterally 
became excessive, the United States could and should intervene on its own.
737
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 With specific regard to Bosnia, by the time Lake finalized the administration‘s endgame 
strategy in the summer of 1995, he had precisely concluded that the costs to the United States of 
continued multilateral action were starting to outweigh the benefits. Lake‘s analysis was that 
increasingly, America‘s global leadership and the administration‘s political future were at stake. 
Hence the U.S. should do everything possible to end the war in Bosnia by the end of the year, 
and that included bombing the Bosnian Serbs unilaterally if needed. As Lake remembers, ―it had 
to be made clear to the allies that they had no veto over our approach; we would act with or 
without them.‖738 Senior political advisors to the president were of the same opinion, counseling 
U.S. unilateral military action as a last resort.
739
 
 Finally, among the administration‘s leading activists on Bosnia, Holbrooke appears to 
have been the least attached to multilateralism as a matter of moral principle. As early as 1993, 
Holbrooke had come to the conclusion that bombing ―Serbia proper‖ (i.e., the Republic of 
Serbia, and not just Serb strongholds inside Bosnia) would be a useful tool of coercive 
diplomacy that might allow Washington to ―send the proper message.‖740 Yet such a policy 
would have been utterly unacceptable to the NATO allies and could only have been carried out 
unilaterally by the United States.
741
 Similarly, in May 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs had taken 
hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage, Holbrooke insisted that to reassert American leadership 
and credibility, Washington should issue a forty-eight hour ultimatum for the release of all 
                                                 
738 Lake, Six Nightmares, p. 147.  
739 In July 1995, with opinion polls showing support for bombing, political consultant Richard Morris had started 
agitating for bold military action within the administration, reportedly asking: ―Why can‘t Clinton just bomb Bosnia 
on his own?‖ Quoted in Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, p. 381. 
740 Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 53. By the summer of 1995, Lake, too, had become convinced that threatening and 
potentially carrying out American air strikes against Belgrade would crucially help to make the Serbs more 
cooperative in the negotiations. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, p. 100. 
741 As Robert Hunter, then the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, explains: ―That option never came up at NATO. It would 
have been totally unacceptable to the allies.‖ Author interview with Robert Hunter (March 22, 2010). See also 




hostages and then bomb the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale in case of noncompliance. 
Because ―the Europeans will oppose this,‖ he continued, the U.S. would have to proceed 
unilaterally.
742
 It is only by the summer of 1995, once Holbrooke had been named chief U.S.  
negotiator for the Balkans, and after repeated (and sometimes tense) interactions with the Joint 
Chiefs, that he fully acknowledged the value of maintaining a close multilateral consensus with 
the NATO allies, as a means to ensure the greatest possible amount of burden sharing during the 
subsequent peace-implementation and stabilization phase.
743
 
 In short, the most prominent liberal internationalists in the Clinton administration appear 
to have felt no distinctive attachment to multilateralism as a matter of moral obligation. Instead, 
they saw multilateralism largely as a tool, which could either be beneficial or exceedingly costly 
to the United States, depending on the circumstances. Revealingly, given the activists‘ 
commitment to forcible humanitarian action, with regard to Bosnia they tended to see 
multilateralism as overall less beneficial and useful than other, more skeptical and pragmatic 
leaders, notably from the Department of Defense. 
 
Multilateralism to reduce costly international opposition (Prevent ―soft balancing‖)  
 Another possibility is that Washington leaders value multilateral legitimacy for 
international strategic reasons that go beyond the effective implementation of the actual 
intervention. Prominent international relations scholars argue that unilateral U.S. military 
interventions, carried out without the formal endorsement of global or regional IOs, signal 
revisionist American intentions to the world. That, in turn, might lead third-party states to reduce 
their cooperation with the United States in other issue-areas, such as finance and trade, or, worse, 
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form ―soft balancing‖ coalitions aimed at frustrating and undermining U.S. foreign policy more 
generally.
744
 According to this line of argument, U.S policy leaders typically seek the 
endorsement of relevant global or regional IOs to signal benign intentions vis-à-vis third-party 
states and thereby reduce the likelihood of costly international opposition.
745
  
 In order for the above-outlined ―soft balancing‖ theory of American multilateralism to be  
corroborated, one ought to be able to observe the following implications. First, Washington 
policy leaders should acknowledge that leading up to the use of force they were deeply 
concerned about global opposition to U.S. armed intervention, because of the potential material 
costs to the United States. Second, those same policy leaders should declare that signaling benign 
intentions and thereby reducing third-party state opposition to American behavior was, in fact, 
among the principal reasons for seeking to obtain the endorsement of relevant IOs. Finally, the 
endorsement of U.S. military action through relevant IOs should actually have persuaded initially 
skeptical third-party states that U.S. intentions were benign, and in consequence international 
opposition to the use of force should have visibly diminished.  
 The aforementioned implications of the theory, however, cannot be observed in the 
Bosnia case. American military intervention in Bosnia enjoyed widespread support across the 
globe regardless of UN or NATO endorsement, including from countries that are often highly 
skeptical of U.S. intentions. Muslim public opinion and Islamic states, in particular, were 
strongly supportive of international military action against the Bosnian Serbs from early on. The 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, a grouping of over fifty states mainly from North 
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Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, had been pressing the Clinton 
administration to adopt a tougher stance on Bosnia from 1993 onwards.
746
  
 The only states that were strongly opposed to greater U.S. military action on Bosnia and 
to air strikes in particular were: first, the European NATO members, which had deployed their 
own lightly armed peacekeepers in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR and feared an escalation of the 
conflict; and second, the Russian Federation, which for ethnic, religious, and historical reasons 
was closely aligned with the Serbs. By definition, the European countries were not ―third party 
states,‖ given their nature as NATO allies and their deep involvement in Bosnia. Also, the 
Europeans were extremely unlikely to retaliate against the United States, their main international 
ally, in other issue-areas in case of U.S. unilateral intervention. Thus, the Russian Federation was 
the only genuine third-party state whose opposition to U.S. military action might have been of 
concern to Washington for its potential broader implications beyond the region. 
 Russia had been among the sponsors of SCR 836, adopted in June 1993, which 
authorized the use of air power in Bosnia to protect UNPROFOR and deter attacks against the 
safe areas.
747
 However, Moscow favored a narrow interpretation of the resolution, and over the 
subsequent two years, Russian officials issued numerous public statements strongly denouncing 
the use of air power. A few examples may help clarify the persistent nature of Russian 
opposition. In the spring of 1994, Moscow disputed NATO‘s authority to establish a weapons-
exclusion zone around Sarajevo and threaten air strikes in case of Serb noncompliance, insisting 
that those measures were not authorized under existing UN resolutions.
748
 More than a year later, 
at the London conference held in July 1995, in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre, Russian 
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foreign minister Kozyrev and defense minister Grachev still publicly rejected the use of air 
power against the Bosnian Serbs and refused to sign the final communiqué advocating air strikes 
to defend the remaining safe areas.
749
 Finally, in September 1995, after NATO had launched 
Operation Deliberate Force, the Russians were more assertive than ever and furiously 
denounced the air strikes in various public statements. Moscow even sponsored a SC resolution 




 At the same time, Russia‘s public denunciation never actually stopped the United States 
from carrying out air strikes whenever there was a consensus within NATO. Former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Perry remembers that to most American officials dealing with Bosnia, 
Russia seemed at worst ―like an unnecessary complication‖ with little potential for undermining 
broader U.S. global interests.
751
 In Washington, the tough public statements of Russian officials 
condemning the air strikes were largely seen as reflecting an attempt by the Yeltsin government 
to defuse mounting domestic political pressure from lawmakers and the general public.
752
 
Furthermore, Russian officials were not nearly as vehement in private conversations with 
Washington leaders as they were in public.
753
 Leon Fuerth, who as Vice-President Gore‘s 
national security adviser was much involved in US-Russian relations, remembers that in private 
―the Russians were willing to extend themselves. Maybe they didn‘t feel that they had much 
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choice, given their economics and internal position.‖754 Therefore, while Washington took 
Moscow‘s objections to the air strikes seriously, given in particular Russia‘s ability to undermine 
U.S.-led diplomatic efforts in the region, the Yeltsin government never came close to having a 
veto over U.S. decisions concerning Bosnia.
755
 
 Crucially, in 1994 and 1995, channeling American coercive threats and actual aerial 
attacks through NATO, a regional IO, did nothing to reassure Moscow of Washington‘s 
intentions. NATO, far from legitimizing military intervention in Russian eyes, was viewed in 
Moscow as an instrument of American regional hegemony and thus as inherently threatening to 
Russia‘s security interests. The announcement in late 1994 that NATO would expand eastward 
had created a storm in Moscow. Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky warned at the 
time that he and his parliamentary allies would consider NATO military action against the 
Bosnian Serbs akin to a declaration of war against Russia.
756
 Even mainstream Russian elites 
were suspicious at the time that the Balkans might become ―a staging area for the expansion of 
American power right up to the border of Russia itself.‖757 In view of Moscow‘s deep-seated 
suspicion of NATO, one former senior U.S. official who at the time was coordinating the 
alliance‘s Balkans policy speculates that ―the Russians would probably have been happier if the 
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U.S. had just intervened unilaterally, had worked with them. With the Warsaw Pact gone, the 
first threat to Russia was the expansion of NATO.‖758  
The fact that NATO‘s repeated use of airpower in Bosnia, leading up to and including 
Operation Deliberate Force, was ostensibly authorized under existing SC resolutions (notably 
Res. 836, of which Russia had been a co-sponsor), also seems to have had little or no reassuring 
effect on Moscow. In fact, Russian officials repeatedly insisted, not without some reason, that 
there was no explicit SC authorization for offensive military action; hence in Moscow‘s eyes, the 
U.S. and NATO had stretched Res. 836 on the safe areas beyond recognition, in blatant disregard 
of the Council‘s original intent.759 The SC was one of the few remaining international platforms 
that allowed Russia to interact with the world‘s other major powers on an equal footing; and the 
West‘s ability to largely disregard Russia‘s opposition to the use of air power on the Council 
must have been deeply troubling to Moscow. Indeed, one of Moscow‘s greatest concerns at the 
time was the perception, shared by many Russians, that their nation was being increasingly 
sidelined and excluded from the concert of great powers.
760
 It was not until Russian forces were 
given a visible role in the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR), following protracted 
and difficult negotiations between Secretary Perry and his Russian counterpart Grachev, that 
Moscow developed a somewhat more cooperative attitude toward U.S. policy in Bosnia.
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In conclusion, therefore, the case of Bosnia—similarly to the previous Haiti case—
refutes the hypothesis that channeling U.S. military action through international institutions can 
reassure third-party states who are strongly concerned about American intentions. The only state 
that was greatly concerned about American intentions at the time was Russia. But channeling the 
use of force through NATO, far from reassuring Russia, may actually have further increased 
Moscow‘s concerns about U.S. intentions and Washington‘s long-term strategy toward the 
region. In October 1995, the Russian military commander in charge of operational planning at 
Moscow‘s ministry of defense told his American counterpart, General Wesley Clark: ―We know 
what you Americans are up to. You are coming into Bosnia because it‘s in our part of Europe 
and you want to be there.‖762 This raises serious doubts in particular about the ability of regional 
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Kosovo, 1998-99: Europe’s buy-in through NATO reassures the JCS 
 
 
On March 24, 1999, NATO member states launched a sustained air campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Allied bombers from fourteen countries pounded Yugoslavia 
for 78 consecutive days, in an effort to force President Slobodan Milosevic to stop his systematic 
oppression and mass expulsion of the Kosovar Albanian population. The United States 
contributed the lion‘s share of the military hardware and technological capabilities to the air 
campaign. However, all the most important decisions, including those to threaten airstrikes, 
initiate airstrikes, and approve increasingly more controversial targets, were taken through a fully 
integrated NATO command structure. That made the Kosovo air war, in the words of one 
analyst, ―the most multilateral campaign ever.‖764  
Seeking NATO‘s explicit endorsement of armed intervention and proceeding by means 
of a multilateral consensus with the allies entailed significant costs to the United States. To begin 
with, NATO‘s half-hearted approach leading up to the air campaign greatly weakened 
Washington‘s coercive leverage vis-à-vis Milosevic. Furthermore, once the bombing actually 
began, serious political constraints on the use of air power allowed the Yugoslav leader to 
dramatically escalate his campaign of ethnic cleaning on the ground, and for several weeks he 
was left with a reasonable hope that he might be able to prevail in the contest of wills. Therefore, 
Washington‘s decision to channel its coercive strategy through NATO and stick with the alliance 
in the face of mounting difficulties constitutes a puzzle. The question that needs to be answered, 
                                                 




then, is the following: What were the expected benefits of institutionalized multilateralism in the 
eyes of U.S. policy leaders that presumably outweighed its costs? 
In the spring of 1998, soon after the violence flared up in Kosovo, Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright and her staff emerged as the Clinton administration‘s leading activists. By 
April 1998, Albright and U.S. Balkans envoy Robert Gelbard began to insist that in the face of 
European hesitations about the use of force, Washington should issue a unilateral threat of 
armed intervention against Yugoslavia and then proceed with targeted air strikes if necessary. 
The top U.S. military brass, however, adamantly rejected those arguments. First, the military 
leaders were skeptical that limited air strikes, let alone the mere threat of force, could effectively 
solve the Kosovo problem. The military staunchly opposed the introduction of American ground 
troops in a peace-enforcement role; and they were concerned that even if limited air strikes could 
help achieve a negotiated solution to the crisis, similarly to what had happened in Bosnia, a 
sizable international stabilization force would then have to be deployed for several years. Finally, 
the uniformed leaders insisted that since no significant American interests were at stake in the 
Balkans, the western European allies should be left to take the lead in resolving the problem.  
The central argument of this chapter is that U.S. multilateralism over Kosovo was to a 
significant degree the result of bureaucratic political deliberations and bargaining between the 
skeptical military leaders and their civilian allies at the Pentagon, on the one side, and activist 
policy officials pushing for armed intervention, on the other. The Clinton administration‘s 
activist policy officials needed at least the military‘s acquiescence, in order to form a winning 
bureaucratic coalition in favor of armed intervention and persuade the president to move ahead 
with the use of force. Hence the activists had to be able to reassure the military leaders that 




lead on postwar stabilization, bearing most of the burden. In the course of the bureaucratic 
debate, activist policy officials, led by Albright, concluded that the explicit endorsement of 
armed intervention through NATO and a close involvement of the alliance in military planning 
throughout could reduce the Pentagon‘s opposition, notably by locking in European support for 
Kosovo‘s long-term stabilization.  
The chapter is structured as follows: I first provide more evidence that channeling the 
threat and ultimate use of force through NATO indeed entailed significant costs to the United 
States. Thereafter I seek to show that from early 1998 onward, the military leaders, through their 
reluctance about armed intervention, in fact drove the Washington policy process toward 
institutionalized multilateralism. The military brass came on board only in late January 1999, 
once it was clear that Washington‘s European allies had been locked in through NATO and 
would shoulder most of the burden for Kosovo‘s long-term stabilization. In the final part of the 
chapter, I test two prominent alternative hypotheses derived from the scholarly literature about 
the determinants of U.S. multilateralism for armed intervention. First, U.S. policy leaders may 
have sought the endorsement of relevant IOs simply because they had internalized new post-cold 
war norms of international legitimacy. Second, Washington may have sought IO endorsement in 
order to signal benign intentions to third-party states and thereby avert potentially costly 
international opposition in other issue areas, or ―soft balancing,‖ against the United States.  
 
1. Background to the crisis 
The Serbs have long viewed Kosovo as the historical birthplace of their nation and as the 
site of the most important event in Serb national history, the battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of the 
Blackbirds) of 1389, which resulted in nearly five centuries of Ottoman Muslim rule. At the 




(over two-thirds of total residents in recent decades) that considers the region a natural part of 
greater Albania.
765
 By the time NATO launched its military intervention, Operation Allied 
Force, in the spring of 1999, the province had already been on the international community‘s 
radar screen for roughly a decade. In 1989, Serb president Milosevic, seeking to consolidate his 
power, stripped Kosovo of its regional autonomy. In an effort to change the province‘s 
demographics, he then encouraged unemployed Serbs to move to Kosovo by guaranteeing them 
local jobs. After the outbreak of war in neighboring Bosnia in 1992, Kosovo‘s delicate ethnic 
balance was at risk of breaking down completely.
766
  
In late 1992, the administration of President George H.W. Bush, fearing a broader 
regional destabilization, warned Milosevic that any violent Serb crackdown in Kosovo would 
result in U.S. unilateral military action. The State Department‘s understanding at the time was 
that, given Europe‘s failure to quell the escalating conflict in Bosnia, Milosevic would respect 
only a U.S. unilateral threat.
767
 Thus, on Christmas Eve 1992, U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger sent a classified cable to Belgrade that read as follows: ―In the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against 
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.‖768 After President Clinton and his administration came 
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to office in early 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher repeated the ―Christmas warning‖ 
to Milosevic twice, in February and July of that year.
769
  
However, in 1995, the Kosovo issue was deliberately left out of the Dayton peace talks 
with Milosevic, in order to avoid further complicating the negotiations over Bosnia. Many 
Kosovar Albanians seem to have concluded from this that only violent resistance would beget 
sufficient international attention to advance their national cause. In 1996 a previously unknown 
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), began to engage in sporadic attacks against Serb 
policemen and other central government representatives.
770
 As Hashim Thaci, a key figure in the 
resistance movement, explains, the KLA leadership understood that ―any armed action [the 
organization] undertook would bring retaliation against civilians.‖771 But such tactics were 
deemed necessary, or at any rate expedient, to bring about increased international attention and 
ideally trigger a U.S. military intervention. Following a series of brazen KLA attacks in early 
1998, Serb police and military units launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, which 
deliberately targeted civilians in view of intimidating the local population and withdrawing 
support from the insurgents. The violence reached a critical threshold in early March 1998, when 
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2. The Costs of U.S. Multilateralism over Kosovo 
In the United States, Secretary of State Albright firmly condemned the Serb crackdown. 
She had concluded almost immediately after the first massacres in February 1998 that 
international diplomacy vis-à-vis Milosevic, to be effective, would have to be backed up by a 
credible threat of military intervention.
773
 Washington‘s European allies, however, were 
skeptical of the KLA; they insisted on even-handed mediation and were at first hesitant to 
impose even moderate sanctions on Serbia.
774
  
Given those differences, proceeding by means of a multilateral consensus with the NATO 
allies entailed significant costs for Washington. First, during the months leading up to the 
bombing, Washington‘s strong rhetorical support for the Kosovar Albanians emboldened the 
KLA to step up its guerrilla-type activities; and at the same time, the alliance‘s hesitations about 
military action allowed the Serb authorities to engage in increasingly violent repression.
775
  
Arguably, if instead of pursuing a half-hearted multilateral strategy, Washington had either 
adopted a completely hands-off approach from early on, or had credibly threatened unilateral 
military action in the first part of 1998, a deadly spiral of violence might have been averted.
776
 
Furthermore, even after a NATO air campaign was actually launched in March 1999, 
Washington‘s freedom of action remained greatly constrained; and for several weeks, constant 
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allied bickering over target selection made for a very ineffective use of air power. The alliance‘s 
waging of war by consensus brought its strikingly close to failure and meanwhile allowed the 
Yugoslav leader to dramatically escalate his campaign of ethnic cleansing on the ground. 
 
NATO’s internal divisions lead to a spiral of violence on the ground 
 By late May 1998, Russia had threatened to veto any UNSC resolution explicitly 
authorizing the use of force against Yugoslavia.
777
 Thereafter the Clinton administration, sensing 
that an explicit SC mandate for armed intervention would be exceedingly difficult to obtain, 
chose instead to channel its policy on Kosovo through NATO. Meeting in Luxembourg on May 
28-29, 1998 NATO‘s foreign ministers agreed to initiate planning for preventive military 
deployments into Albania and Macedonia, aimed at avoiding a regional spill-over of the crisis. A 
few weeks later, NATO‘s defense ministers also directed their military authorities to develop a 
full range of options to halt the campaign of violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo.
778
 
However, the alliance was far from a consensus on actually threatening, let alone using, military 
force against Serbia. As a former senior U.S. official explains: ―At the ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg, the U.S. had already started advocating military planning for airstrikes. But a lot of 
allies said, this has to be part of a larger comprehensive effort—so even the planning was 
controversial.‖779 
By June 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the only European head of 
government who wholeheartedly agreed with Albright on the need to back up the diplomacy with 
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a credible threat of force. Most other European allies, including France, Italy, Germany, and 
Denmark, insisted that any threat of force, let alone its actual use, had to be explicitly authorized 
by the UNSC.
780
 The British, too, would have strongly preferred acting under a UN mandate and 
actually tabled a draft resolution at the SC in early June.
781
 The European position was in line 
with Article 53 of the UN Charter, according to which ―no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council.‖ As a consequence of the Europeans‘ insistence on a UN mandate and Russia‘s threat to 
veto a SC resolution, ―NATO was paralyzed…throughout the summer and into the early fall of 
1998,‖ remembers former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.782 
Meanwhile the Kosovo Albanians were greatly emboldened by NATO‘s tough rhetorical 
stance against the Milosevic regime. The KLA in fact exploited Serbia‘s relative restraint in the 
summer of 1998, which was largely the result of Russian pressure on Belgrade, to launch a major 
military offensive.
783
 By mid-July, the KLA had set up numerous checkpoints in the region and 
claimed control of as much as forty percent of Kosovo‘s territory.784 Thereupon even moderate 
ethnic Albanian leaders, aware that the KLA could not defeat the Yugoslav security forces on its 
own, began to openly call for a U.S. or NATO military intervention, in the hope that it would 
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pave the way for Kosovo‘s independence.785 But at the end of July Milosevic, convinced that 
NATO would not act in the absence of a UN resolution, ordered his security forces to crush the 
KLA militarily. Within a month, over 200,000 ethnic Albanians had either fled to neighboring 
countries or ended up as displaced persons inside Kosovo.
786
  
The same pattern repeated itself again later that year. On September 23, 1998 the SC 
adopted Resolution 1199, demanding an end to Serb repression, as well as Serb facilitation of the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The resolution was adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and identified the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo as a ―threat to 
international peace and security,‖ but it contained no ultimatum and no explicit authorization of 
force in case of Serb noncompliance.
787
 By mid-October, following intense negotiations led by 
U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, and under significant pressure from Moscow, Milosevic again 
agreed to cease the violence and consented to the deployment of unarmed international monitors 
inside Kosovo.
788
 The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of October 1998 facilitated the return of 
displaced people inside Kosovo to their villages and may have saved the lives of up to several 
thousands of ethnic Albanians.
789
 However, the October agreement had one crucial flaw: its 
focus was entirely on Serb compliance, and it placed no demands on the Kosovar Albanian side. 
Furthermore, no attempt was made by a divided West to interdict the flow of arms and money to 
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 In subsequent weeks, the KLA once again took advantage of Serb restraint to 
reorganize itself and regain control of parts of Kosovo from which it had been recently expelled. 
By mid-November, the KLA was again engaged in systematic attacks against Serb targets in 
Kosovo. According to the EU‘s special envoy for Kosovo, Wolfgang Petritsch, those attacks 
were clearly intended to bring about increased Serb repression, in view of ultimately triggering a 
U.S. or NATO military intervention.
791
 
The Serb crackdown was particularly harsh this time around, and it again deliberately 
targeted elements of the civilian population. NATO, however, at first appeared more divided 
than ever. Several European nations hinted that the KLA had brought this upon itself, which in 
turn further emboldened Milosevic to step up his offensive.
792
 On January 15, 1999 Serb 
paramilitary forces killed forty-five people, most of them civilians, in the village of Racak in 
southern Kosovo. There had been worse civilian massacres in Kosovo over the previous year; yet 
the events at Racak produced a hitherto unseen sense of outrage in the West, in large part due to 
the vivid scenes of the massacre shown in the media.
793
 Following the Racak killing, the U.S. 
State Department favored immediate military action, in the form of a punitive cruise missile 
strike on Serbia.
794
 But the Europeans were still unwilling in January 1999 to lash out militarily 
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The western European nations insisted on a further round of negotiations. Only on 
January 30, after the United States had agreed to their request, NATO agreed in principle to 
―take whatever measures are necessary in the light of both parties‘ compliance.‖796 
Representatives of Serbia, the Kosovar Albanians, the United States, and its chief European 
allies then met on February 6 in Rambouillet, France, for final negotiations aimed at achieving a 
political settlement. Serbia was asked to withdraw most of its security forces from Kosovo, grant 
substantial autonomy to the province, and accept the presence of armed international 
peacekeepers. The official negotiating position was that Kosovo‘s final status would be decided 
after a three-year transitional period. However, during the negotiations, Secretary Albright 
signed a secret side-agreement with the Kosovar Albanians, which promised that Kosovo could 
hold a referendum on independence after three years.
797
 On March 18, 1999 the Kosovar 
Albanians accepted the comprehensive proposal.
798
 In contrast, political authorities in Belgrade, 
while accepting most elements of the proposal, adamantly rejected the presence of armed 
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On March 24, 1999, with diplomacy having reached a dead end, NATO launched 
Operation Allied Force against Yugoslavia. Milosevic must have known that he had no chance of 
prevailing militarily against the most powerful alliance in history. So why did he choose to stand 
up to NATO, instead of yielding at Rambouillet? In part, the Yugoslav leader‘s choice reflected 
the importance of Kosovo, which stirred so many emotions in all Serbs, to his own political 
survival.
800
 But it also appears that Milosevic, faced with a constantly squabbling Atlantic 
alliance, never took the threat of NATO air strikes very seriously. General Klaus Naumann, who 
chaired NATO‘s military committee at the time, suggests that by the beginning of 1999, NATO‘s 
―stick had been transformed into a rubber baton.‖ The allies ―had threatened too often and hadn‘t 
done anything.‖801 Albright, too, admits that working multilaterally significantly reduced the 
effectiveness of U.S. coercive diplomacy: Milosevic, she explains, possibly ―thought that we 
were bluffing.‖802 
 
The costs of war fighting by coalition 
After the negotiations at Rambouillet had failed, NATO reached a consensus that force 
needed to be used. But in the absence of a direct threat to the allies‘ vital strategic interests 
(nobody among them had been directly attacked), the consensus behind air strikes remained 
exceedingly tenuous. The predominant assumption was that NATO would fight a short, limited 
war. The goal was not to compel the Serbs to leave Kosovo by crushing them militarily, but 
rather to employ moderate amounts of force to persuade Milosevic to move back to the 
negotiating table. Wesley Clark, NATO‘s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) had only 
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developed plans for a short air campaign of no more than two weeks—a far cry from the 78 days, 
or two-and-a-half months, that it ultimately took to break Milosevic‘s will to resist.803  
The NATO coalition used force only in limited and incremental amounts. U.S. military 
commanders would in principle have preferred to hit Milosevic hard from the beginning, 
applying overwhelming force in the pursuit of clearly defined objectives. ―That‘s what air force 
doctrine calls for—figure out where your opponent‘s center of gravity is and knock the hell out 
of it,‖ explains Col. Gregory Kaufmann, a retired U.S. Army aviation officer who headed the 
Pentagon‘s Balkans task force in 1998 and 1999.804 But the political imperative of holding 
together a fractious multinational coalition outweighed immediate considerations of military 
effectiveness. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, asked at the time why NATO did not launch 
a more robust air campaign from the beginning, candidly admitted: ―Acting unilaterally,… that‘s 
precisely the kind of air campaign that you‘d want—hit fast and hard, and cripple Milosevic‘s 
forces as soon as possible. The difference here, of course, is that we‘re acting as an alliance.‖805 
The thirteen non-U.S. allies that actively participated in the air campaign (i.e., twelve 
European nations plus Canada) dropped only twenty percent of all bombs, launched barely ten 
percent of all cruise missiles, and conducted less than ten percent of the crucial electronic 
warfare and reconnaissance missions.
806
 As former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre 
explains, the United States ―had 600 aircraft in the theater that could sustain night-time combat 
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operations, whereas the total contribution of the [other] NATO allies was only twelve aircraft 
that could fly fully at night.‖807 Thus, from a pure capabilities point of view, the U.S. could 
easily have executed the Kosovo air campaign unilaterally and would probably have done so 
more effectively. 
The NATO coalition was also extremely risk-averse. To avoid Yugoslav air defenses, 
alliance aircraft generally flew at an altitude of about 15,000 feet. Consequently the pilots‘ 
ability to reliably identify and hit relevant Serb military targets was significantly curtailed, 
especially in bad weather.
808
 Bombing from 15,000 feet also increased the risk of ―collateral 
damage,‖ such as when NATO hit a passenger train crossing a bridge, or mistook a convoy of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees for an armored column. Based on a report by Human Rights Watch, 
an estimated 500 Serb and ethnic Albanian civilians died as a result of the NATO bombing.
809
  
Furthermore, allied concerns about bombing sensitive facilities resulted in a highly 
cumbersome and micromanaged targeting process, which further undermined the campaign‘s 
strategic effectiveness. Many European NATO members, unlike the United States, had signed 
the 1977 additional protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which bars attacks on ―objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.‖810 Thus, most European allies were 
either reluctant about or outright opposed to striking dual-use infrastructure in Serbia, including 
electrical grids and fuel storage facilities. Some European nations also wanted to have a say in 
the overall selection of targets, making for an exceedingly cumbersome campaign 
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 European sensitivities also were one important reason why at the outset of the 
air campaign, NATO leaders excluded the possibility of a ground invasion of Kosovo or of 
arming the KLA.
812
 As Gregory Schulte, at the time a senior NSC staffer working on the 
Balkans, recalls, ―getting the decision on air strikes was hard for NATO. And there was a real 
concern that if you added to that the possibility of ground troops being introduced, you wouldn‘t 
even get air strikes.‖813  
The fractiousness of the alliance and the limited, incremental way in which NATO fought 
may well have convinced Milosevic that he might be able to ride it out.
814
 ―You want to hold the 
group together,‖ explains one former senior State Department official. ―But it‘s a perverse, or at 
any rate very difficult situation. You had a very savvy interlocutor, who initially thought nothing 
bad was going to happen [to him].‖815 According to a former senior U.S. military official, in all 
likelihood NATO‘s tentative and incremental approach to war fighting ―prolonged the 
problem.‖816 Albright, too, admitted while the war was still ongoing that ―not everything may be 
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moving as rapidly as it would unilaterally‖—thus finding herself vindicated in the skepticism of 




How NATO’s half-hearted approach worsened the plight of ethnic Albanian civilians 
 Finally, the alliance‘s hesitations and its explicit ruling out of a ground combat option at 
the outset of the war probably emboldened Milosevic to step up his own military offensive 
against the Kosovar Albanians. During the first ten days of the air campaign, Serbian security 
forces, largely unimpeded by NATO aircraft, forcibly expelled half a million Kosovars across 
the border into Albania and Macedonia, creating a massive humanitarian emergency that 
overshadowed anything seen over the previous year. By the end of the war, approximately 




NATO‘s intelligence analysts did not fully predict the scale of Milosevic‘s planned ethnic 
cleansing campaign in response to an allied air attack (according to one source, the alliance 
anticipated ―merely‖ 200,000 new Kosovar refugees).819 However, NATO leaders clearly 
anticipated that the Yugoslav president would dramatically step up his assault against the ethnic 
Albanian population. The following dialogue, which took place on March 6, 1999 between 
SACEUR Clark and Secretary Albright, is illustrative in this regard: 
Albright: ―If we commence the strikes, will the Serbs attack the population?‖ 
Clark: ―Almost certainly they will attack the civilian population. This is what they are 
promising to do.‖ 
Albright: ―So what should we do? How can we prevent their striking the civilians?‖ 
Clark: ―We can‘t. … it‘s not going to be pleasant.‖ 
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Albright: ―But you think we should go ahead?‖ 
Clark: ―Yes, we have to.... We have to follow through and make it work.‖ 
Albright: ―Yes, I think so, too.‖820 
 
NATO‘s official line was that there was little the alliance could have done to stop 
Milosevic, anyway. A few days after the launch of the air campaign, German intelligence 
claimed to have found evidence of plans for a Serbian Operation Horseshoe, which Milosevic 
had allegedly approved already in late 1998 to cleanse Kosovo of virtually the entire ethnic 
Albanian population.
821
 But after the war, it emerged that the Horseshoe allegations were based 
on thin evidence and may actually have been fabricated from run-of-the-mill Bulgarian 
intelligence reports.
822
 Undoubtedly the Serbs had been planning for a large-scale expulsion of 
Kosovar Albanians—otherwise they could not have implemented it so quickly after the start of 
NATO bombings. However, one cannot infer from the existence of a plan the firm political 
intention to carry it out. It is in fact unlikely that Milosevic would have given the go-ahead for 
such a massive forced population resettlement, in the face of a credible threat of overwhelming, 
swift retaliation by external powers.  
Furthermore, German intelligence officials had informed NATO authorities of the alleged 
Serb plan for Operation Horseshoe already in late February 1999—that is, several weeks before 
the air campaign was actually launched.
823
 Assuming that Washington considered the 
intelligence to be reliable, the United States could have prevented a major humanitarian disaster, 
by proceeding in either of two ways: Washington could have yielded to European reluctance and 
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called off the bombing altogether; or it could have unilaterally launched a more decisive air 
campaign against Serb strategic targets from early on, which might quickly have forced 
Milosevic to stop the ethnic violence. Instead, Washington chose to proceed by means of a 
multilateral consensus with its European allies through NATO, which greatly constrained the use 
of air power and allowed the ethnic cleansing on the ground to proceed virtually unhampered for 
several weeks. While most of the refugees were later able to return, an estimated 10,000 Kosovar 
Albanians perished at the hands of Serb security forces during the NATO bombings.
824
 It was 
only by late April 1999, as European defense leaders became aware that a failure over Kosovo 
might have called into question NATO‘s future viability and America‘s security commitment to 
the continent, that the alliance as a whole agreed to step up the air campaign by deploying 
additional aircraft and significantly expanding the target set.
825
 That, combined with a Russian 
diplomatic initiative in early June, eventually broke Milosevic‘s will to resist.826 
 
3. The military’s pushback against U.S. unilateral intervention 
My central hypothesis is that the top military brass in Washington contributed more than 
other senior policy officials to keeping the United States on a steady multilateral track. To 
corroborate my bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. multilateralism, the following implications 
ought to be observed. First, there should be evidence of interventionist senior policy officials in 
Washington initially disregarding the need for IO endorsement, or even pushing for U.S. 
unilateral intervention in the face of European reluctance about the use of force. Second, the top 
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U.S. military brass should have been skeptical of armed intervention and outright opposed to 
unilateral intervention, based on the concern that Washington might then have been held 
responsible for Kosovo‘s long-term stabilization. Third, activist civilian leaders intent on 
reassuring the military should gradually have steered the Washington policy process toward 
relevant IOs, in view of locking in the support of foreign allies and partners. If those activists 
retrospectively acknowledged that U.S. multilateralism over Kosovo was in fact largely a result 
of the military‘s concern about limiting American liability, that would constitute strong 
confirmatory evidence for my theory. Finally, the temporal evolution of U.S. policy, and of the 
preferences held by relevant actors, should more generally confirm that the military‘s privately 
and publicly voiced skepticism about the (unilateral) use of force in fact largely drove the 
Clinton administration‘s effort to channel its coercive strategy through NATO. 
 
Albright, the Munich analogy, and the duty to resist evil 
The principal U.S. national security officials shaping Washington‘s Kosovo policy were 
Secretary of State Albright, National Security Adviser Samuel ―Sandy‖ Berger, Secretary of 
Defense William ―Bill‖ Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Henry ―Hugh‖ 
Shelton, and SACEUR Wesley ―Wes‖ Clark. The State Department was the main source of U.S. 
bureaucratic activism over Kosovo, under the leadership of Secretary Albright and her advisers 
Marc Grossman, James Rubin, Robert Gelbard, Christopher Hill, and Richard Holbrooke.
827 
 
As soon as the violence in Kosovo began to flare up in early 1998, Albright emerged as 
the Clinton administration‘s leading hawk. The same moral fervor that had driven Albright on 
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Bosnia now also motivated her over Kosovo. Indeed, the Bosnia experience had convinced her 
that Milosevic was an absolutely evil, ruthless individual who could not be trusted and with 
whom one could not meaningfully negotiate. One of Albright‘s closest aides at the time 
summarizes the secretary‘s views as follows: ―Albright believed very early on that the lessons of 
Bosnia were that Milosevic would respond only to the use of force. And she began to talk about 
that, publicly. In the middle of 1998, the State Department was certainly the only department 
considering the use of force.‖828 For the reluctant Pentagon leaders, who insisted on the risks and 
high potential costs of military action, the dominant reference point was the American quagmire 
in Vietnam. Meanwhile for Albright, the more compelling analogy was Munich: there could be 
no appeasement in the face of aggression and attempted genocide.
829
 
During the previous crisis over Bosnia, Albright‘s influence in Washington had been 
limited, given her junior Cabinet position as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. But in 
President Clinton‘s second term, she had become the administration‘s top foreign policy official. 
Now she used her new bully pulpit and her greatly increased influence to advocate a decisive 
response to Milosevic‘s crackdown in Kosovo. Throughout 1998, President Clinton focused 
much of his energy and attention on deflecting accusations that he had engaged in sexual 
misconduct with Monica Lewinsky, a young White House intern.
830
 Albright quite skillfully took 
advantage of the resulting power vacuum within the administration to advance her cause.
831
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The Secretary of State not only pushed her own views assertively during internal 
administration debates. Albright also publicly went out ahead of her fellow national security 
principals in terms of rhetoric, seeking to increase the administration‘s commitment to doing 
whatever she thought necessary to resolve the crisis in Kosovo. For instance, as early as March 
1998, she put American credibility on the line, by solemnly declaring at a news conference in 
Rome: ―We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they 
can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.‖832 During subsequent months, she behaved as the 
quintessential policy entrepreneur: she sought to change the attitude of her colleagues from other 
government agencies, and she gradually forged an interagency consensus on the need to threaten 
and potentially use military force. Ronald Asmus, at the time a senior State Department official 
responsible for European affairs, assesses the secretary‘s influence as follows:  
The intervention never would have happened without Albright. When those pictures 
showed up on CNN about the internment camps [of Kosovar Albanians], she said, ‗it 
reminds me of the Holocaust. This is unacceptable.‘ Almost everyone in the U.S. 
government opposed her in the beginning. She had to first convince Berger, than Clinton. 
She convinced them through her tenacity. But she had made up her mind when she 




The other leading American activist among senior government officials was SACEUR 
Clark. He had been a member of Holbrooke‘s negotiating team in 1995 that ended the Bosnian 
war, and like Albright, he had been profoundly shaped by his first-hand experience of dealing 
with Milosevic over Bosnia. As early as March 1998, Clark became certain that Milosevic could 
only be stopped through either the use or the credible threat of force.
834
 As the senior U.S. 
military commander in Europe, Clark wielded considerable influence in Washington and other 
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allied capitals. Yet Clark‘s activism over Kosovo resulted in serious tensions between him and 
the top military brass in Washington, notably the Joint Chiefs, who were highly skeptical of a 
renewed armed intervention in the Balkans and tried to cut off Clark‘s access to the 
administration‘s civilian leaders. Secretary of Defense Cohen, himself highly risk-averse, sided 
with the JCS and was suspicious of Clark‘s push for military action.835 From the spring of 1998 
onwards, Clark‘s chief bureaucratic ally in the administration was Secretary Albright. Together, 
Albright and Clark sought to outmaneuver their opponents, in view of persuading the president 
to authorize armed intervention. Asmus, who accompanied Albright on several trips to Europe, 
recalls that:  
Wes [Clark] and Madeleine [Albright] were, I don‘t want to say they were conspiring 
together, but they saw eye-to-eye. We would often fly to [NATO HQ in] Brussels and 
they would go off in the corner one-on-one, and talk for a very long time with no note 
takers and no one present. We all suspected that they were talking about how to 
outmaneuver various opponents in the bureaucratic process who were opposed to what 




April – May 1998: debating a U.S. unilateral intervention 
During the first half of 1998, senior State Department officials insisted that given the 
reluctance of major European allies to envision the use of force, the United States might have to 
bomb Serbia unilaterally, to stop Milosevic‘s crackdown on the Kosovar Albanians. The 
administration‘s Balkans envoy, Robert Gelbard, and U.S. Ambassador to Macedonia 
Christopher Hill, an influential voice on American policy towards the region, insisted from early 
1998 onward that Washington ought to publicly re-emphasize the ―Christmas warning‖ vis-à-vis 
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Milosevic—i.e., the threat of U.S. unilateral military action first issued in late 1992.837 SACEUR 
Clark, though well aware of the Pentagon‘s determination to resist a further U.S. military 
engagement in the Balkans, largely agreed with the State Department‘s hawks. Indeed, by mid-
April 1998, Clark, acting in coordination with Gelbard, had quietly developed a list of Yugoslav 
targets that the U.S. could hit unilaterally from the air. Strikingly, therefore, NATO‘s supreme 
commander was willing to bypass the alliance for the sake of issuing a more credible threat, to be 
followed by a unilateral U.S. military strike if necessary.
838
  
Towards April 20, Gelbard outlined a new policy proposal to Secretary Albright that 
explicitly foresaw the possibility of a U.S. unilateral strike. Gelbard‘s specific recommendation 
was that that a high-level emissary, ideally the secretary of state or her deputy, be dispatched to 
Belgrade with a letter from President Clinton threatening military action. Milosevic should be 
given an ultimatum of between three and five days to remove most of his security forces from 
Kosovo, and in case of noncompliance the United States should then ―use Tomahawk missiles, 
and in the middle of one night, destroy the [Yugoslav] ministry of defense and the ministry of 
interior.‖839 Thereafter, U.S. diplomats would go back to resume negotiations with Milosevic. 
Asked about the role of NATO and the European allies, Gelbard emphasizes: ―I am not even sure 
we ever thought about the other allies at the time.‖840 
Albright herself was frustrated by the slow pace of multilateral diplomacy in the Contact 
Group, the diplomatic forum on the Balkans including the U.S. and its European partners. ―I am 
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sick and tired of going to meeting after meeting. Now I can see how Bosnia happened,‖ she 
privately vented her frustration with the multilateral diplomacy as early as March 1998.
841
 By 
late April, the secretary of state appears to have concluded that a U.S. unilateral intervention 
might in fact be necessary. The Contact Group, she recalls, ―agreed on essentially nothing… I 
felt it urgent that we again raise the possibility of bombing.‖842 A former senior State Department 
official further explains Albright‘s views at the time:  
Because of where Secretary Albright was coming from, she thought there are some times 
when you need to do it [i.e., threaten and potentially use military force] regardless of 
multilateral support. And partially because of her own personal background, she had very 





Albright was sympathetic to Gelbard‘s proposal of a U.S. ultimatum and potential 
unilateral air strike, and she suggested that they discuss the idea with Berger at the White House. 
On April 23, 1998, Gelbard, backed by Albright, laid out his proposal to Clinton‘s national 
security advisor. But Berger, having listened to Gelbard, summarily rejected the idea of bombing 
Serb infrastructure or administrative facilities. As the discussion progressed, with Gelbard and 
Albright insisting, the national security advisor eventually lost his temper: ―So you want to bomb 
some goddamn bridge?‖ Berger reportedly shouted. ―Well, what if that doesn‘t work? Do you 
bomb another goddamn bridge?‖844 Berger was wary about threatening force and absolutely 
opposed to doing so unilaterally. Once issued, the threat might well have to be executed. Then, 
assuming that a limited cruise missile strike would not break Milosevic‘s resolve, the 
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administration would have to escalate further, with the risk of getting dragged into an intractable 
civil conflict. Berger also wanted to protect the president, in view of the impeachment scandal 
that had just exploded on the national political scene.
845
  
Berger‘s own skepticism about armed intervention appears to have been shaped to a 
significant degree during his frequent interactions with the military brass in Washington. Prior to 
the aforementioned meeting at the White House on April 23, U.S. defense planners at the Joint 
Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), aware of Gelbard‘s and Clark‘s planning 
behind the scenes, had made it clear that they strongly opposed unilateral U.S. military action in 
the Balkans. ―We used to talk to Sandy [Berger] a lot,‖ remembers Lieutenant General David 
Weisman, at the time the deputy head of strategic planning on the Joint Staff. ―Bob Gelbard had 
no idea about how to deploy military force.‖846 The military leaders in Washington doubted that 
air power alone would lead Milosevic to acquiesce; and they had strong reservations about the 
feasibility of another large-scale U.S. troop commitment to the Balkans.
847
 During subsequent 
discussions with the State Department, Berger reportedly expressed concerns that were strikingly 
similar to those voiced by the military leadership: ―This will be our Vietnam,‖ Berger reportedly 
said. ―This will destroy the Clinton administration, and we will not let you do that.‖848 
Over the following weeks the Clinton administration‘s hawks realized that to achieve a 
bureaucratic consensus in Washington on the use of force, the European allies first had to be 
brought on board. Berger himself had hinted as much during the April 23 meeting: the 
administration should ―avoid empty rhetoric,‖ he had counseled, while it ―tried to multilateralize 
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the threat of force.‖849 Albright and her fellow activists needed to be able to offer reasonable 
guarantees to their skeptical colleagues in Washington that following the success of coercive 
diplomacy, the European allies would in fact shoulder most of the burden for long-term 
peacekeeping and stabilization in Kosovo. The best way of achieving this was to maximize the 
European allies‘ political buy-in from early on, by working through NATO—the multilateral 
institution where America‘s leverage has traditionally been greatest. In many regards, therefore, 
for the administration‘s activists, cooperating with the Europeans on the diplomacy through 
NATO and the Contact Group was a means to an end: the goal was ―to nurse European 
willingness to make this a high priority, until the point where the Europeans realized, this [i.e. 
the diplomacy] is not going to work, and then we would be able to lead, exercise American 
leadership, with European support.‖850  
 
The Pentagon’s concerns about another protracted entanglement in the Balkans 
 The military leaders and their civilian allies at the Pentagon believed there were no major 
U.S. strategic interests at stake in Kosovo that warranted the likely risks and high costs of armed 
intervention. Secretary Cohen himself thought that Kosovo was an obscure place, and he didn‘t 
see it as the American military‘s responsibility to stop violent repression in faraway places. 
Cohen always believed that the pure humanitarian argument proves too much: it would quickly 
lead the United States to overextend itself militarily.
851
 Furthermore, having grown up in the 
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Vietnam era, Cohen was inherently suspicious of military intervention as a means to achieve 
domestic political change in foreign countries.
852
 
 Hence the Pentagon leadership was extremely reluctant about the prospect of 
humanitarian military intervention over Kosovo. ―We weren‘t totally opposed, but we were very 
reluctant,‖ recalls a former Joint Staff official. He then adds that undoubtedly, there was 
opposition ―to a ground combat role to force the Serbs out of Kosovo.‖853 The Joint Chiefs for 
the most part saw pitfalls, things that could go wrong, and Secretary Cohen reflected their views. 
To begin with, the military cautioned that the mere threat of force was unlikely to succeed, and 
once American credibility was put on the line, Washington would then have to follow through 
with actual air strikes, and ultimately U.S. ground troops might be drawn into the conflict.
854
 The 
military brass and the civilian policy leaders at OSD challenged the view that, since limited 
airstrikes had succeeded in Bosnia, one could now expect the same pattern to repeat itself over 
Kosovo. First, they pointed out, in the case of Bosnia the joint Croat-Muslim ground offensive of 
August and September 1995 had played a crucial role in persuading the Serbs to negotiate. But in 
the case of Kosovo, the ragtag KLA army was not even close to posing a comparable challenge 
to Milosevic. Furthermore, most Serbs considered Kosovo to be an inalienable part of their 
national homeland, which would make it significantly more difficult for Milosevic to 
compromise this time around.
855
 Joseph Ralston, at the time the vice-chairman of the JCS, recalls 
the bureaucratic debates between skeptical military leaders and civilian hawks in Washington as 
follows: 
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People would say, OK just the threat of air strikes will work. Well, then we‘d ask, what if 
it doesn‘t? OK, they replied, then, if you drop one or two bombs, it will solve the 
problem. Well, we continued, what if it doesn‘t? Then you‘d have to go to the next step. 





If the United States ended up deploying ground combat troops to Kosovo, in what the 
Pentagon viewed as a civil war, they might quickly get caught up in a Vietnam-style quagmire. 
Failure over Kosovo would not only be exceedingly costly in terms of human and material 
resources; it might also sap the nation‘s morale and support for the armed services more 
generally, thereby making it more difficult to intervene militarily in the future where significant 
U.S. national interests might actually be at stake.
857
 Hence U.S. defense leaders were adamant 
that force should be used only as a last resort, after all other possible avenues of resolving the 
problem peacefully had been exhausted; and the introduction of American ground troops in a 




The need to devise an exit strategy before going in 
Senior Pentagon officials and the military brass in particular also insisted much sooner 
and more emphatically than other policy leaders in Washington that the Clinton administration 
needed to devise a viable exit strategy for American troops before explicitly threatening, let 
alone actually using, force against Yugoslavia. The U.S. military at the time were still very much 
influenced by the Powell doctrine, which among other things prescribes that force should be used 
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only in the pursuit of clear and attainable objectives and in the presence of a plausible exit 
strategy to avoid endless entanglement abroad.
859
  
The uniformed leaders were fundamentally skeptical about using force in the pursuit of a 
goal, regional autonomy for Kosovo, that appeared to be eminently political in nature and could 
not be linked to precise military objectives. As a former senior Pentagon official explains, ―the 
warfighters want clear military objectives: capture this hill, occupy this city. But with regard to 
Kosovo, they were asking: What is my mission?‖860 In other words, the top brass worried that 
because the military objectives were vague, the exit strategy, too, could not be clearly defined. 
The question they asked over and over again was: ―How do we define success here?‖861 The 
military leaders worried that ultimately, the United States might be supporting Kosovar 
independence, which would require a long-term armed international presence on the ground.
862
 
The Pentagon leadership also more generally feared that even if air power persuaded 
Milosevic to accede to Washington‘s demands, and Kosovo was granted significant autonomy 
within Yugoslavia, ultimate success would require the deployment of a sizeable foreign military 
presence on the ground for several years—if only because the Kosovar Albanians themselves 
would want a credible outside security guarantee. Senior defense officials, who naturally focused 
on the feasibility and likely implications of various military options, had come to this conclusion 
as early as the spring of 1998, when the possibility of U.S. intervention was first seriously 
discussed. As Gregory Kaufmann, who at the time headed the OSD Balkans task force, explains: 
We very much looking at SFOR [i.e., the NATO-led stabilization force in Bosnia]. Our 
thought was that we would have to deploy a similar kind of force in Kosovo. Certainly 
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that was the first way that people at OSD were looking at this—that any eventual mission 





The military leaders in particular worried that there would not be sufficient U.S. 
congressional support for another protracted deployment in the Balkans after Bosnia, and they 
expressed this concern repeatedly in the interagency debate. As Ralston recalls, ―the military 
didn‘t want to find themselves in a situation where we get started in this and then suddenly the 
Congress says: ‗well, wait a minute, we‘re not going to support that.‘ Because then you don‘t 
have a way to succeed.‖864 The military commanders had learned from Vietnam and the more 
recent sobering experience of Somalia that maintaining domestic political support for the entire 
duration of a foreign military engagement is critical to its success.
865
 Former senior State 
Department officials confirm that, compared to their Pentagon colleagues, during the lead-up to 
the Kosovo intervention, they focused less on the need to secure congressional support for any 
protracted military deployment.
866
   
In part, the different sensitivities between the State Department and the Department of 
Defense on this matter are a reflection of each agency‘s different congressional constituencies. 
The State Department largely deals with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
who are typically quite internationalist in outlook. Meanwhile the Pentagon interacts primarily 
with members of the House and Senate armed services committees, who play a key role in the 
defense appropriations and authorization process and are traditionally more reluctant to commit 
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U.S. troops. (Secretary Cohen himself had long been a member of the armed services committee 
in the Senate and thus understood the concerns of its members particularly well).
867
  
Another crucial difference was that Senior State Department officials, especially the most 
hawkish ones like Albright and Gelbard, tended to be much more optimistic than their Pentagon 
colleagues about the prospects that the coercive diplomacy might succeed. The administration‘s 
chief diplomats initially believed that if the right incentives were brought to the table, Milosevic 
would become more cooperative, and a largely self-sustaining autonomy arrangement for 
Kosovo might be achieved. In short, the prevailing view at State throughout the first part of 1998 
was that while some international presence might well be necessary to stabilize the situation after 
a political settlement was accepted by the parties, that presence would mainly consist of aid 
workers, observers, and maybe a police force—but once Milosevic withdrew his own troops 
from the province, there would be no need for a large international military contingent.
868
  
Not until late August 1998 did the first senior State Department official, U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow, make the case in an influential cable to Washington 
that the ―only way‖ of keeping any peace would be ―by putting an armed NATO peacekeeping 
force on the ground, as we did in Bosnia.‖869 In contrast, the uniformed leaders insisted from 
early on that the political goals of sustainable peace and autonomy for Kosovo could not be 
achieved within a short time frame and without an open-ended international military presence on 
the ground. Hence, from the military‘s standpoint, there was only one viable exit strategy for the 
United States that would also secure long-term congressional support: the burden of 
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implementing and policing any political settlement on the ground had to be shifted as much as 
possible to the European allies. Walter Slocombe, the undersecretary of defense for policy at the 
time, remembers the Pentagon‘s standpoint in the internal bureaucratic deliberations as follows: 
―The only way you could have a deal which would be real was if there was, effectively, an 
occupation. So there had to be an international force, and the U.S. military was very anxious that 
we not have the main burden—in fact, we wanted to have as little of the burden as we could 
possibly have.‖870  
As Milosevic stepped up his campaign of violent repression in the fall of 1998 and U.S. 
military action became increasingly likely, the Pentagon continued to insist that the European 
allies would have to bear primary responsibility for postwar stabilization. Secretary Cohen 
declared in early October: ―It is my recommendation and my—I would almost say insistence— 
that it be largely, if not wholly, European in nature, given [that U.S. forces] will be carrying the 
bulk of the load‖ in any air campaign.871 Thus, the Clinton administration‘s senior defense 
officials made it clear that the European allies would have to be involved, and reassurances 
would have to be obtained that the allies, rather than Washington, were going to bear primary 




4. How bureaucratic bargaining drove Washington’s policy toward NATO 
Between the spring of 1998 and late March 1999 (when NATO launched Operation 
Allied Force), the primary goal of Secretary Albright and her fellow activists was to convince 
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President Clinton to ―make the right decision‖ by authorizing military action.873 However, to 
persuade the president, the administration‘s civilian hawks first needed to be able to reassure the 
military brass and forge a large bureaucratic coalition in favor of armed intervention. Rubin, at 
the time a close aide to Secretary Albright, acknowledges that ―we could never have issued 
threats [of military action] in 1998, if the Pentagon had been opposed to it.‖874  
 
The military’s political leverage 
The president understood that public opposition from the uniformed leaders could have 
potentially disastrous implications in terms of public and congressional support for the policy. 
Furthermore, with the impeachment process in 1998, Clinton‘s vulnerability in other areas went 
up immediately, and that made him particularly keen to avoid a public confrontation with the 
military.
875
 Undoubtedly, with specific regard to Kosovo, the military‘s political leverage was 
somewhat reduced by the fact that General Clark, the U.S. regional commander for Europe and 
NATO‘s chief military official, was himself an avowed hawk. ―That made a huge difference in 
terms of how the internal debate unfolded,‖ explains Rubin, at the time a close aide to Secretary 
Albright.
876
 Yet Clark was fairly isolated within the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs actively 
sought to undermine his influence. 
On Kosovo, the military brass largely voiced their disagreements privately in the 
intramural bureaucratic debates, but they clearly signaled to the administration that there would 
be a political fight unless their concerns were taken seriously. In other words, more than on 
previous occasions, it was the military‘s threat of voicing their opposition in public that gave 
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them significant leverage inside the administration.
877
 The military could also establish informal 
coalitions with members of Congress, particularly from the armed services committees, to 
advance their bureaucratic interests or oppose a particular policy. For instance, during the early 
fall of 1998, Congress initially pressed the administration to take stronger action on Kosovo, but 
after being briefed by skeptical military leaders, previously hawkish members of the legislature 
became much more reluctant to call for military action against Serbia.
878
  ―Do the military have 
backchannels to the Congress? Of course they do,‖ explains a former senior OSD official. On 
Kosovo, like for previous humanitarian interventions, those backchannels greatly increased the 
military‘s leverage: ―That‘s why there was a lot of emphasis on making sure that the European 
allies came along on this thing, the uniformed pounded on it‖—and they explicitly linked 
burden-sharing on Kosovo‘s stabilization to the issue of congressional support.879 
 
Involving NATO to reassure the military brass 
The military leaders forced their more hawkish colleagues from the State Department to 
more systematically consider the potential downsides of armed intervention, including the 
possibility that limited air strikes might fail to achieve Washington‘s desired objective. Rubin 
acknowledges that most advocates of forceful action at the State Department at first ―didn‘t want 
to spend a lot of time thinking about what would happen if it didn‘t work—that‘s true.‖880 This is 
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consistent with the evidence from the other cases discussed in this dissertation, where civilian 
activists rarely focused on issues of feasibility leading up to the use of force.
881
  
But regardless of whether the administration‘s activists fully agreed with the military 
leaders‘ analysis, they had to be able to answer the military‘s criticisms in view of persuading 
other skeptics and forging a winning bureaucratic coalition in favor of intervention. By late April 
1998, as recounted above, Berger had come to share most of the Pentagon‘s concerns about a 
potentially open-ended U.S. military commitment. Berger, in turn, was reflecting but also 
influenced President Clinton‘s own political caution: ―To know what Clinton felt,‖ as one analyst 
explains, ―you only needed to know what Berger felt.‖882 Hence the administration‘s activists 
had to be able to persuade the Pentagon, as well as Berger and ultimately the president, that any 
prospective U.S. contribution of ground troops to a long-term stabilization force for Kosovo 
could be kept to a minimum. Officials at the State Department understood that would be 
necessary ―in order to win the policy argument internally.‖883 As long as the Pentagon remained 
very skeptical or outright opposed, the president himself would remain reluctant and possibly 
altogether unwilling to authorize military intervention. As one former senior adviser to Secretary 
Albright explains, ―our assumption was that we had to find ways to minimize the percentage of 
American troops… if there was any hope of getting the Pentagon... to buy it.‖884  
Senior military planners on the Joint Staff insisted from early on that if force was going 
to be used, the main challenge would not be winning the war, but ―winning the peace 
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afterwards.‖885 Some of the military planners also explicitly suggested that it would be helpful to 
obtain a NATO endorsement of armed intervention, and to consistently coordinate the policy on 
Kosovo with the European allies, in order to maximize their buy-in. As Lieutenant-General 
Weisman recalls: ―If there was going to be a military solution, we wanted to make sure that the 
allies were on board. We needed the NATO endorsement. NATO had to take the lead, so that 
everybody would be involved, not only with the operation, but also with the peace afterwards—
in fact, that‘s the most important part.‖886 
 Policy officials at the State Department, for their part, especially those with significant 
experience in the field of transatlantic relations, clearly understood that involving the alliance 
and working through NATO‘s institutional structure would maximize Washington‘s leverage 
over its European allies. After all, the Europeans had historically benefited most from a thriving 
NATO, which embodied America‘s commitment to transatlantic security.887 The expectation 
among activist policy officials at the State Department was that involving the alliance over 
Kosovo and obtaining its explicit endorsement of the use of force would maximize the likelihood 
―that NATO forces were going to go in later;‖ and that, in turn, would in turn make it 
significantly ―easier to sell the policy to the U.S. government and particularly to the Joint 
Chiefs.‖888 Furthermore, the administration was working to provide NATO with a new strategic 
purpose, and the admission of several new members was planned for early 1999, which made an 
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Initially, Washington also considered the possibility of seeking to obtain a UNSC 
mandate as a complement or alternative to NATO endorsement. State Department officials were 
fully aware that a UN authorization of military action would make it much easier for other 
countries and especially for the European partners to follow Washington‘s lead. As Morton 
Halperin, at the time the State Department‘s head of policy planning, explains, ―from our point 
of view, if we had had a UN Security Council resolution to do it, getting the Europeans involved 
would have been much easier.‖890 However, by the fall of 1998, U.S. policy leaders understood 
that it would be exceedingly difficult to persuade Russia to abstain at the SC on any use-of-force 
resolution. Hence the Clinton administration focused its diplomatic efforts on the Atlantic 
alliance and sought to obtain an endorsement of military action from NATO‘s supreme political 
organ, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). But it appears that some senior officials at the State 
Department, crucially including Secretary Albright, may actually have wanted to bypass the 





An integrated NATO coalition 
 By the fall of 1998, senior State Department officials, possibly after consultations with 
Clark and military planners on the Joint Staff, had also come to the conclusion that to effectively 
lock in the European allies, the NAC should not merely endorse U.S. air strikes politically, as the 
                                                 
889 Author interview with Marc Grossman (January 13, 2011). 
890 Halperin interview. 
891 ―If a UN resolution passed,‖ Albright explains, ―we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security 
Council authorization before it could act. This would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto over NATO. Cf. 




UNSC had endorsed previous U.S. interventions in Somalia or Haiti. Instead, air strikes against 
Serbia should be carried out by a fully integrated NATO coalition, with a unified command and 
the largest possible multinational participation from the outset.
892
 The military planners, for their 
part, strongly believed that it would be helpful to have as many NATO members as possible 
directly participate in the air campaign, to maximize the allies‘ buy-in and ensure that they would 
have ―a stake in the outcome,‖ although it was understood that their combat contribution would 
be ―negligible, with the exception of France and Great Britain.‖893 
The expectation was that having the non-U.S. allies directly participate in the air campaign 
would effectively lock them into NATO‘s formal decision-making structure, where the United 
States traditionally enjoys great political leverage. That, in turn, would maximize the likelihood 
of the European allies subsequently taking the lead on postwar peacekeeping and stabilization. 
The strategic pull of NATO solidarity would also presumably make it much easier for European 
political leaders to justify significant contributions of peacekeeping troops before their own 
skeptical domestic audiences.
894
 Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who in many 
regards functioned as a liaison person between the president and the military leaders, confirms 
that the Clinton administration came to see a clear link between the allies‘ participation in the air 
campaign and their subsequent contribution to peacekeeping and reconstruction: the goal, he 
argues, was to enlist ―as much participation in the war as possible from allies and ad hoc partners 
in order to ensure their participation in the reconstruction.‖895 
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Some former State Department officials involved in decision making over Kosovo 
downplay the impact of Washington bureaucratic politics in steering U.S. policy toward a 
multilateral track. Given that NATO had been successfully involved in Bosnia, they argue, there 
was simply a presumption that any coercive strategy over Kosovo should also be channeled 
through the Atlantic alliance.
896
 The argument however does not hold up to detailed scrutiny: as 
previously shown, in the spring of 1998 Albright and Gelbard were pushing for a U.S. unilateral 
military option with no involvement of NATO whatsoever, before being rebuffed by the 
Pentagon and the White House. Another potential criticism of my argument is that some fairly 
significant European participation in long-term peacekeeping and stabilization might well have 
been secured regardless of the allies‘ active participation in the air campaign. However, the U.S. 
military leaders and the Pentagon more generally would not have been happy with just some 
European participation—they wanted the European allies to contribute a very large majority of 
troops and material resources for long-term stabilization. General Clark remembers that 
throughout the early fall of 1998, ―there had been continuing questions from the Pentagon 
about… whether there could be a NATO ground force without United States participation.‖897 
Asmus, the former senior State Department official, concedes that the real question was: How 
much were the Europeans ultimately going to contribute to peace implementation?
898
   
Finally, if the goal had been simply to boost U.S. public support for military action, the 
NAC could simply have endorsed the use of force politically. The air campaign could then have 
been conducted by a loose coalition of the major allies—e.g. the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Canada, which carried out the vast majority of airstrikes anyway—but crucially 
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without relying on a cumbersome and very inflexible integrated command structure. Slocombe 
confirms that for the purpose of increasing U.S. public support ―it was important to have, not UN 
support and not NATO qua NATO, but to have other countries participate in the operation.‖899  
At the Pentagon, nobody ever seriously considered the possibility of having an ad-hoc 
coalition of states carry out the air strikes, with the NAC‘s political endorsement but without a 
unified command.
900
 The option was briefly considered at the State Department during the early 
summer of 1998, when officials there—while desirous of involving the alliance at some level, in 
view of its ongoing strategic transformation—feared that an integrated NATO command 
structure would be exceedingly constraining.
901
 But even at the State Department, the option was 
subsequently dismissed, as it became clear to everyone in the administration that an open-ended 
international stabilization mission in Kosovo would probably be necessary. By the fall of 1998, 
policy leaders at the State Department understood that Washington ―needed a long-term 
European coalition,‖ explains Asmus, echoing the military leaders, because ―it wasn‘t just about 
winning the war—it was about winning the peace.‖902  
 
January 1999: The military leaders reluctantly come on board 
The Joint Chiefs and the OSD gradually reduced their opposition to the use of force 
between late 1998 and early 1999, as a consensus emerged within NATO on the need to threaten 
and potentially carry out air strikes. But before giving their final go-ahead, the Pentagon leaders 
first wanted to be reasonably sure that the other NATO allies would in fact carry most of the 
postwar burden.  
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The U.S. military leaders first reluctantly agreed to issue an explicit threat of air strikes 
in October 1998—though at that point they were fairly confident that the use of force was not 
imminent.
903
 By then, the NATO allies had reached a consensus on threatening air strikes against 
Yugoslavia, to buttress the diplomatic effort led by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke on the 
ground. On October 13, 1998 the NAC issued an Activation Order (ACTORD) for air strikes. 
But there was no transatlantic consensus at the time on actually carrying out air strikes in case of 
Serb noncompliance with Holbrooke‘s demands. Javier Solana, at the time NATO‘s secretary-
general, recalls that the first ACTORD was primarily aimed at generating consensus within the 
alliance, but it was still ―very far away from action.‖904 In fact, NATO adopted the activation 
order one day after Milosevic had agreed to comply with Holbrooke‘s demands; hence the 
alliance‘s goal was primarily to keep the threat of air strikes alive in the Yugoslav leader‘s 
mind.
905
 But the first ACTORD can also be seen as part of an ongoing effort on the part of 
activist U.S. policy officials to gradually develop a consensus at the NAC (and by implication, in 
Washington) on military intervention.
906
 
The bureaucratic balance of power began to more clearly shift away from the Pentagon in 
early 1999. On January 15, Serb security forces killed forty-five people at the village of Racak in 
southern Kosovo. With the violence on the ground flaring up again, the failure of Holbrooke‘s 
October agreement became apparent. The Atlantic alliance, which had committed itself to 
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enforcing the agreement, now needed to defend its credibility. ―It wasn‘t until Racak in 1999 that 
the use of force became real,‖ recalls a former senior State Department official. ―Before that it 
was very notional, it was the beginning of the discussions and the different positions were being 
laid out.‖907 During the days immediately following the Racak massacre, Albright and her staff 
developed a new comprehensive policy proposal. The strategy, which Albright presented to her 
colleagues at the NSC on January 19, foresaw that the conflicting parties (the authorities in 
Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians) should be given an ultimatum to accept an interim 
settlement by a date certain. If both parties agreed to the settlement, NATO would then deploy 
peacekeepers to implement it on the ground. If Belgrade agreed and the Kosovars didn‘t, the 
international community would stop supporting the latter and withdraw. But if only the Kosovars 
agreed, NATO would launch a phased air campaign to force Milosevic into compliance.
908
  
After Albright had laid out the new strategy proposal, Secretary Cohen and JCS 
Chairman Shelton vigorously argued against any U.S. participation in a peacekeeping force for 
Kosovo. They said they were concerned about getting caught in the middle of a civil war and 
doubted that Congress would support the deployment.
909
 But the political tide had clearly shifted 
in favor of the activists, and nobody could come up with a better alternative to Albright‘s 
proposal, given that the administration‘s and NATO‘s credibility were increasingly perceived to 
be on the line. ―We were sitting at the table,‖ remembers a former senior OSD official, ―and at 
some point we realized, well we‘re going to lose this argument, we need to start thinking about 
the next step. And change occurred because of that process.‖910  
                                                 
907 Author interview with James Rubin (April 9, 2010). 
908 Daalder and O‘Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 71-2. 
909 Albright, Madam Secretary, pp. 394-95. 




With Berger and the president signaling support for the new policy proposal, the 
Pentagon leaders, unwilling to force a public showdown with the rest of the administration, 
reluctantly came on board. By January 23, the Pentagon leaders, too, supported the strategy of 
direct negotiations backed by the threat of air strikes, and they endorsed a NATO-led 
peacekeeping force with U.S. participation ―possible.‖911 However, as one analyst points out, the 
interagency ―consensus was, at best, extremely flimsy,‖ and leaving the issue of U.S. 
participation in a peacekeeping force open for the time being appears to have been necessary to 
obtain the Pentagon‘s approval of the overall strategy.912 Undoubtedly, the perception after 
Racak and the blatant failure of the October 1998 agreement that NATO‘s credibility and 
America‘s leadership role within the alliance were on the line helped bring the Pentagon on 
board.
913 
Former State Department activists recall insisting a lot in the interagency debates on 
NATO‘s credibility being at stake, based on the belief that such arguments certainly ―favored 
those who wanted to see military intervention.‖914 The perception that NATO‘s credibility was at 
stake also helped mobilize support for Albright‘s strategy among key Republican leaders on 
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Crucially, however, what ultimately led the Pentagon and especially the military to agree 
to Albright‘s proposal was the understanding by late January 1999 that the European allies were 
in fact willing to fully support the strategy and to generate the vast majority of troops for 
Kosovo‘s long-term stabilization. Washington policy officials had to privately assure the other 
allies that the United States would contribute at least a limited troop contingent to a NATO 
stabilization force.
916
 But as David Weisman, at the time the U.S. representative to NATO‘s 
military committee, explains, by the time the Clinton administration endorsed Albright‘s strategy 
on January 23, a transatlantic consensus had already been reached that if force was going to be 
used, there would be an implicit division of tasks: the United States would contribute most of the 
military capabilities for the air strikes; meanwhile the European allies would shoulder most of 
the burden for long-term peacekeeping and reconstruction.
917
 On January 29, at a Contact Group 
meeting in London, the principal European allies formally endorsed Albright‘s new policy 
proposal. One day later, the NAC backed up the negotiating strategy by explicitly endorsing 
military action as a last resort.
918
 The Clinton administration‘s formal approval of the strategy on 
January 23, in advance of the final vote at NATO, simply helped to lock in the transatlantic 
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Further Pentagon efforts to limit U.S. participation 
 Even after an agreement of principle had been reached between the allies, the Pentagon 
leadership continued to seek to minimize U.S. participation in a NATO stabilization force. More 
in-depth transatlantic discussions on the tasks, size, and shape of such a stabilization force began 
soon after the new comprehensive strategy had been approved. On February 1, Secretary Cohen 
once again emphasized that the ―European allies must bear a substantial burden in terms of 
dealing with Kosovo and that any participation by the United States should be as small as it 
could be.‖920 General Shelton, meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 
3, pointed out that the Joint Chiefs aimed at a U.S. contribution of between 2,000 and 4,000 
troops, out of an anticipated peacekeeping force of roughly 30,000.
921
 Furthermore, following the 
Bosnia experience, the military leaders wanted to keep KFOR‘s mandate narrowly focused on 
security and deterrence. Policing, law enforcement, and reconstruction should be left to civilian 
agencies, so as to narrowly circumscribe the liability of the armed services and their troops.
922
 
On February 13, 1999 President Clinton finally announced in public that once a political 
settlement was reached, the United States would contribute ―a little less than 4,000‖ troops to a 
NATO stabilization force for Kosovo (KFOR).
923
  
Throughout February and most of March 1999, while U.S. and European diplomats 
scrambled to find a negotiated solution to the crisis, the military leaders in Washington also 
relied on their close ties to key congressional leaders in order to gain additional leverage over 
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both the administration and the NATO allies. General Ralston, the vice chairman of the JCS, 
negotiated an agreement with congressional leaders, based on which the United States would not 
provide more than fifteen percent of the total troops for KFOR. In part, Ralston explains, the 
agreement aimed to ensure that there would be sufficient congressional support for any 
deployment of U.S. troops:  
The Congress of the United States didn‘t like the fact that when we went into Bosnia, out 
of the initial 60,000 troops, 20,000 were American. So we cut that down by more than 
half, to the fifteen percent level, and that was OK. If we had gone above that threshold, I 




 But Ralston‘s agreement with Congress was also a convenient way of increasing the 
military‘s own bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the rest of the administration. As a former senior 
defense official candidly points out, skeptical leaders ―at the Pentagon, including Ralston, 
Shelton, and Cohen, could use it to say: look we can‘t go further, this is the end of our political 
rope.‖925 Furthermore, the agreement became an effective tool that U.S. diplomats could 
subsequently deploy in a classical two-level game to extract the maximum possible contribution 
from the European NATO allies: given that Washington‘s domestic win-set was limited and that 
both sides had an interest in the alliance‘s future viability, the Europeans had little choice but to 
accept the Pentagon‘s stance.926 In the long run, Washington‘s effort to proceed by means of a 
close multilateral consensus with the European allies from mid-1998 onward and channel the use 
of force through an integrated NATO coalition bore the intended fruits. Almost immediately 
after the successful completion of the air campaign, the European allies took the lead in post-war 
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 KFOR reached its full strength of roughly 50,000 troops by 
late 1999, with the U.S. contributing a mere 7,000 soldiers.
928
 The total U.S. contribution of 
troops and funding for peacekeeping and reconstruction never exceeded sixteen percent of the 
total—as foreseen by the military‘s agreement with Congress.929 By June 2011, more than a 
decade after the completion of Operation Allied Force, KFOR was still on the ground, but the 
U.S. contribution had shrunk to 800 soldiers, or slightly more than ten percent of a total 




5. June 1999: A U.S.-led ground invasion without NATO endorsement? 
 On March 24, 1999 President Clinton announced the imminent start of the NATO 
bombing campaign in a televised address to the nation. He crucially declared on that occasion 
that he did ―not intend to put our [i.e., American] troops into Kosovo to fight a war.‖931 Over the 
preceding two months, as previously shown, defense leaders at the Pentagon had adamantly 
opposed the idea of a ground invasion.
932
 ―The Joint Chiefs had put this as a condition of their 
support,‖ explains Halperin, before adding: ―It was clear to us that the president had met with the 
Chiefs and had made a political deal with them.‖933 However, Clinton‘s public ruling out of a 
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ground invasion at the start of the war seriously undermined NATO‘s coercive leverage. As a 
former senior NATO official explains, it ―allowed Milosevic to… speculate that there might be a 
chance for him‖ to ride it out.934 
 
April 1999: Secret planning for a ground invasion without NAC endorsement 
 By mid-April, after several weeks of bombing, U.S. officials began to worry that air 
strikes alone might not be sufficient to coerce Milosevic into submission. Hence the 
administration‘s leading activists, General Clark and Secretary Albright, as well as 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering and special Balkans adviser 
James Dobbins, began to push for a reconsideration of the ground option. At first, they were 
rebuffed in the internal bureaucratic debates by their Pentagon colleagues, who anticipated that a 
ground invasion would be extremely dangerous and costly.
935
 But in subsequent weeks the 
possibility of a U.S.-led ground invasion became increasingly real, as Albright and Clark were 




 At a long-planned summit of NATO heads of government on April 23-25, the subject of a 
possible ground invasion was not formally broached, to avoid a potentially divisive debate 
among the allies. However, on Blair‘s prodding, a few days before the summit, Berger had 
persuaded NATO Secretary-General Solana to authorize secret planning for a possible ground 
invasion by American and British officials at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in 
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Europe (SHAPE)—the central command of NATO military forces.937 Crucially, the planning had 
not been authorized by the NAC, reflecting a lack of consensus within the alliance.
938
 But the 
effect of the secret U.S.-British decision was to give SACEUR Clark a virtual carte blanche to 
plan for the eventuality of a ground invasion. Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs remained extremely 
skeptical, and the planning greatly increased tensions between Clark and the top U.S. military 
brass in Washington, contributing to the SACEUR‘s premature dismissal soon after the war.939  
 By mid-May, Clark had finalized plans for a 175,000-strong invasion force that would 
enter Kosovo mainly from the south through Albania, with the purpose of driving Serb security 
forces out and establishing an international protectorate.
940
 Taking into account that ground 
operations would have had to be completed before the winter and that the military planners and 
logistics experts needed at least ninety days of preparation time, it was widely anticipated that 




NATO endorsement unlikely (but European support for KFOR had already been secured) 
 It is unlikely that there would have been any NAC approval for a ground invasion, and 
few European allies would probably have participated in the operations. The British were strong 
supporters, and a significant participation on their part could virtually be taken for granted. In 
Washington, the administration increasingly recognized that U.S. credibility was on the line and 
a ground invasion might be necessary to avoid a humiliating defeat. ―By late May,…I was ready 
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to send troops in if necessary,‖ former President Clinton remembers.942 The Pentagon remained 
extremely reluctant, but Secretary Cohen and the top military brass understood what was at 
stake. Also, the Joint Chiefs understood that regardless of whether NATO was going to explicitly 
endorse a potential final ground phase of the war, the European allies were already locked in and 
their leadership within KFOR and on postwar reconstruction more generally had been secured.
943
  
 However, the other NATO allies were much less sanguine about the prospect of a ground 
invasion.
944
 Germany had always been the most reluctant among the major allies, with almost 80 
percent of the German public opposed to a ground war.
945
 Former German foreign minister 
Joschka Fischer, personally a declared activist on Kosovo, acknowledges that for his country any 
―participation in the ground war was completely out of the question, given unequivocal 
opposition in parliament and among the general public.‖946 The German national parliament, the 
Bundestag, opposed even the possibility of German political support for a ground invasion at the 
NAC. Chancellor Schroeder publicly suggested that Germany would in fact block a NAC 
authorization.
947
 The political leadership in Paris and Rome, too, remained highly skeptical, with 
                                                 
942 Clinton, My Life, p. 855. See also John F. Harris, ―Clinton Says He Might Send Ground Troops,‖ Washington 
Post, May 19, 1999. 
943 Author interviews with Walter B. Slocombe (March 11, 2010) and Gen. Joseph Ralston (March 17, 2010). 
944 At a secret meeting of NATO defense ministers held in Bonn on May 27, 1999, the British pledged some 50,000 
troops, and Germany, Italy, and France appeared more cooperative than in previous discussions. France and Italy 
even made a preliminary offer of at least 10,000 troops each. But the discussions in late May among NATO defense 
leaders appear to have been out of step with the predominant political sentiment in allied capitals. Cordesman, 
Lessons and Non-Lessons, p. 245; Scognamiglio, La Guerra del Kosovo, p. 158; Daalder and O‘Hanlon, Winning 
Ugly, pp. 157-58. 
945 Simon Duke, Hans-Geor Ehrhart, and Matthias Karadi, ―The major European allies,‖ in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
2000), pp. 134, 138. 
946 Joschka Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre: Deutsche Aussenpolitik – vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September (Cologne: 
Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), p. 206. 
947 Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, pp. 196-97; Daalder and O‘Hanlon, Winning Ugly, p. 163; John F. Harris, 




the latter constrained by an exceedingly fragile domestic coalition.
948
 Albright summarizes the 
positions of the principal allies as follows: ―The British favored the ground option, Germany and 
Italy were against, and the French would support it only in the unlikely event that it was 
authorized by the [UN] Security Council.‖949  
 In view of those fundamental divisions within the alliance, it appears almost unthinkable 
that a ground invasion of Kosovo could have been carried out as an integrated NATO coalition 
operation. Indeed, given staunch opposition by Germany and other minor allies, the NAC would 
probably not even have been able to politically endorse a ground invasion. As former U.S. 
Defense Secretary Cohen recalls, ―it was never a close call in getting a consensus to put land 
forces in… Out of the 19 total [alliance members], I doubt very much whether we could have 
gotten the consensus. I‘m convinced we could not have.‖950 Therefore, had there actually been a 
ground invasion, it would almost certainly have been carried out by an informal coalition of the 
willing, without any explicit IO endorsement.  
 By late May, Washington appeared increasingly determined to move ahead with the 
ground invasion if needed, even on a U.S—UK bilateral basis. ―It was perfectly clear to me that 
we were going to send in ground troops,‖ explains Slocombe, suggesting that the Pentagon, too, 
was gradually coming on board.
951
 Once the United States had staked its prestige as the world‘s 
leading military power on a successful outcome of the war, there was no turning back. From the 
perspective of senior U.S. policy officials and President Clinton himself, major strategic interests 
were now at stake. That made the administration as a whole more risk-acceptant and willing to 
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move ahead with a potentially costly ground invasion as a last resort. The prospect that NATO 
would not formally endorse the participation was a secondary concern, given that the alliance‘s 
support on postwar stabilization had already been secured. As Berger recalls, ―the president,… 
had made clear to me in principle that we could not lose.‖952 Therefore, victory would be secured 
―in or outside NATO,‖ Berger told a group of U.S. national security experts on June 2, before 
adding: ―A consensus in NATO is valuable. But it is not a sine qua non. We want to move with 
NATO, but it can‘t prevent us from moving.‖953  
 President Clinton was scheduled to meet with the Joint Chiefs on June 3, in view of 
taking a preliminary decision on a U.S.-led ground invasion.
954
 However, earlier that day, 
Milosevic finally yielded to NATO‘s demands as presented by the European and Russian 
envoys, Martti Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin. Milosevic‘s decision, as a former senior 
State Department official persuasively puts it, saved the Clinton administration from ―having to 
roll over‖ the dissent of several NATO allies.955  There are indications that Milosevic, kept 
abreast of internal NATO deliberations by Russian intelligence, was in fact quite aware of the 





6. Testing alternative explanations of U.S. multilateralism 
In the final part of this chapter I again briefly examine two prominent alternative 
explanations, derived from the scholarly literature, of why the United States might have sought 
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to channel the threat and use of force over Kosovo through NATO. First, U.S. policy leaders 
might have internalized international legal or moral norms requiring that cross-border military 
intervention be multilaterally endorsed through relevant IOs. Another possibility is that 
Washington sought to reassure third-party states of American motives, in order to prevent 
potentially costly international countermeasures in other issue areas, or ―soft balancing‖ against 
the United States. 
 
Multilateral legitimacy as a matter of duty (U.S. leaders have internalized new norms) 
Prominent IR scholars in the social constructivist tradition claim that leaders in the 
western world have internalized new international norms and attendant rules that require 
multilateral endorsement for the use of force as a matter of moral duty.
957
 For this theory to be 
supported with specific regard to the Kosovo case, one ought to be able to observe several 
implications. First, in 1998 and 1999, U.S. policy leaders should have sought the endorsement of 
relevant IOs as an all but necessary condition for military intervention—that is, they should have 
been unwilling to take the prospect of U.S. unilateral intervention seriously. Second, American 
leaders should have sought the endorsement of the UNSC or NATO primarily for intrinsic 
normative reasons, regardless of its political and strategic benefits at the domestic or 
international levels.  
Given that the norm of multilateralism is frequently associated with liberal 
internationalism as a political doctrine, and that senior Clinton administration officials are often 
portrayed as staunch liberal internationalists, the Kosovo case ought to offer strong support for 
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the norm internalization hypothesis.
958
 However, there is little evidence that the most activist 
U.S. officials on Kosovo saw formal multilateral endorsement as a sine qua non condition for the 
use of force. Nor is there much evidence that they sought to channel the threat and potential use 
of force through standing IOs primarily due to intrinsic normative considerations.  
To begin with, the Clinton administration‘s leading activists on Kosovo were not greatly 
concerned about compliance with international legal norms for military intervention in the 
Balkans. Only an explicit UN authorization could have made a U.S.-led military intervention 
internationally legal, given that no plausible argument could be made for individual or collective 
self-defense.
959
 Secretary Albright displayed a lack of concern for international law bordering on 
contempt. When British foreign secretary Robin Cook cited ―problems with our lawyers‖ over 
using force in the absence of UN authorization, Albright bluntly told him: ―Get new lawyers.‖960 
Furthermore, Albright believed at the time that a UN mandate, had it actually been available, 
would have been exceedingly constraining and was therefore undesirable: ―If a UN resolution 
passed,‖ she explains, ―we would have set a precedent that NATO required Security Council 
authorization before it could act. This would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto over 
NATO.‖961  
To General Clark, probably the second most influential U.S. activist on Kosovo, 
international law appears to have mattered only insofar as it was of concern to the European 
leaders with whom he had to interact on a frequent basis. Beyond that, Clark displays a striking 
degree of ignorance concerning the international legal regulation of the use of force. In his 
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memoir, he writes that SCR 1199, adopted on September 23, 1998, effectively authorized 
NATO‘s use of force over Kosovo.962 However, the resolution, while adopted under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, did not ipso facto authorize military intervention and in fact nowhere 
endorsed the ―use of all necessary means.‖ Indeed, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian ambassador to 
the UN, emphasized shortly before voting in support of the resolution that ―no use of force and 
no sanctions are being imposed by the Council at the present stage.‖963  
The State Department‘s own lawyers, following instructions by Albright, agreed to 
abandon any suggestion that military intervention absent UN authorization would be illegal, 
although they never went so far as to suggest that it would actually be legal.
964
 Most other senior 
officials at the State Department and beyond were not particularly concerned about international 
legality, either on intrinsic normative or on political and strategic grounds. ―The American public 
doesn‘t care much about international legality,‖ explains James O‘Brien, a former senior adviser 
to Secretary Albright. ―The American public wants to see Americans fight a good fight. 
Certainly self-defense is one of the best fights. Beating down a bully is another great fight. The 
legal is merely a proxy for the first two.‖965 According to one former senior White House 
official, the only legal matter that seriously concerned the administration‘s lawyers during the 
lead-up to the use of force was whether President Clinton had the domestic constitutional 
authority to initiate military action in the absence of formal congressional support: ―When the 
White House, DOD, and State lawyers got together, they weren‘t focused on whether or not there 
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was a Security Council resolution. That didn‘t matter to them. They were focused on whether the 
U.S. president had the authority to order U.S. troops into combat under the U.S. constitution.‖966 
But even if the Clinton administration‘s leading activists did not care much about 
international legal rules, they might still have internalized relevant moral principles requiring 
that military intervention be endorsed by relevant IOs in order to be legitimate. Again, the 
available evidence does not support this hypothesis. Albright, a declared liberal internationalist, 
never thought that multilateral endorsement through NATO (or the UN) would be necessary to 
legitimize the use of force over Kosovo. In her eyes, the humanitarian purpose of military action 
appears to have been a sufficient source of normative legitimacy. Put differently, she seems to 
have thought that human rights norms and the putative duty to prevent genocide trump 
international norms requiring multilateral approval of military action. According to the former 
secretary of state, multilateralism—far from being a matter of duty—actually has no intrinsic 
value whatsoever. While sometimes useful, multilateralism is merely a ―tool‖ of foreign policy 
in Albright‘s eyes. The term ―multilateralism‖ itself, she writes, is ultimately ―without 
appeal.‖967 That is in line with Albright‘s argument in the spring of 1998 that in the face of 
European reluctance to consider the use of force, the United States should have intervened 
unilaterally.  
As previously discussed, in the spring of 1998 several other senior State Department 
officials, notably U.S. Balkans envoy Robert Gelbard and the chief negotiator for Kosovo, 
Christopher Hill, also advocated threatening and if necessary implementing U.S. unilateral air 
strikes. The State Department‘s hawks changed course only after they were rebuffed by their 
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colleagues from the Pentagon and it became clear that President Clinton would not authorize a 
U.S. unilateral intervention.  
 
Multilateralism to reduce costly international opposition (Prevent ―soft balancing‖)  
 Another possible explanation of U.S. multilateralism over Kosovo is that Washington 
policy leaders valued IO endorsement for international strategic reasons that go beyond the 
effective implementation of the intervention itself. Prominent international relations scholars 
argue that U.S policy leaders seek the endorsement of standing IOs in order to signal benign 
intentions to third-party states, thereby reducing the likelihood of costly international opposition, 
or ―soft balancing‖ against the United States.968 Katharina Coleman applies this argument 
specifically to the U.S.-led Kosovo intervention: ―At a minimum,‖ she argues, ―US power had to 
be seen as non-threatening by other states… [But] NATO also provided an excellent base for 
lobbying non-NATO members for their endorsement of Operation Allied Force.‖969 
 For the ―soft balancing‖ theory of U.S. multilateralism to be supported in the Kosovo 
case, one ought to be able to observe the following implications. First, Washington policy 
leaders should indicate that leading up to the use of force they were in fact deeply concerned 
about global opposition to U.S. military intervention, because of the potential reputational and 
ultimately material costs to the United States. Second, those same policy leaders should 
acknowledge that signaling benign intentions and thereby reducing third-party state opposition to 
American behavior was in fact among the principal reasons for seeking to obtain the 
endorsement of relevant IOs. Finally, IO endorsement of military action should actually have 
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persuaded initially skeptical third-party states that U.S. intentions were benign, and consequently 
international opposition should have visibly diminished.  
The broader international community of non-NATO member states was divided about the 
Kosovo intervention. On the one side there were major global and regional powers such as 
Russia, China, India, and South Africa, which strongly opposed what they perceived as an 
instance of blatant and unjustified aggression against a sovereign state.
970
 On March 24, 1999— 
the day the air campaign began— President Boris Yeltsin declared from Moscow that ―Russia is 
profoundly outraged by NATO‘s military action against sovereign Yugoslavia, which is nothing 
less than an act of open aggression.‖971 The Chinese UN ambassador similarly condemned 
NATO‘s intervention as ―a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the accepted 
norms of international law.‖972 Russia and China had their own unresolved ethnic conflicts in 
places like Chechnya, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and they were greatly concerned that the world‘s 
most powerful military alliance was intervening on behalf of oppressed minorities abroad. As 
Talbott explains, ―the Chinese did not like the idea of NATO bombing a capital of a country on 
behalf of a Muslim minority, and the Russians could not have been more explicit about analogies 
to Chechnya.‖973  
Leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), such as India and South 
Africa, opposed the very idea of ―humanitarian‖ military intervention, which they viewed as a 
dangerous encroachment on state sovereignty, especially in the absence of explicit SC 
authorization. But the NAM was internally divided, with several of its 114 members unwilling to 
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explicitly condemn the use of force over Kosovo. The reason was not that NATO‘s endorsement 
reassured developing-country leaders about Washington‘s motives and legitimized the 
intervention in their eyes. NATO‘s self-proclaimed right to intervene militarily abroad without 
SC authorization—far from legitimizing U.S. power—raised significant concerns throughout the 
developing world.
974
 However, most Arab and Islamic countries were simply unwilling to 
condemn the intervention, given its ostensible purpose of protecting an oppressed Muslim 
population.
975
 Thus, to the extent that several developing country leaders remained ambivalent 
about Operation Allied Force, it was because they saw this specific intervention as substantively, 
if not procedurally, legitimate to some degree.
976
 Contrary to Coleman‘s assertion, NATO 
endorsement as such did not provide a particularly helpful base for reassuring non-NATO 
members about U.S. intentions. 
Senior State Department officials anticipated during the lead-up to the intervention that 
most Muslim countries would be unwilling to condemn the use of force. Also, it soon became 
clear that apart from Russia, most former Soviet republics—such as Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan—would welcome an assertion of American power in Moscow‘s traditional sphere of 
influence. NATO candidate countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic, were likewise expected to support the intervention.
977
 However, it was equally 
clear to Washington that regardless of whether NATO endorsed the use of force or not, it would 
be impossible to get a majority of the world‘s countries to explicitly support the Kosovo 
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intervention. For this reason, the U.S. declined to seek a formal vote on the use of force at the 
UN General Assembly. Such a vote, if successful, could have fully legitimized the intervention 
in the eyes of world public opinion, under a procedure first used in 1950 and known as the 
―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution.978 Halperin, who at the time of the Kosovo intervention was the 
State Department‘s head of policy planning, explains that ―Uniting for Peace was a very good 
idea when [the U.S.] had an automatic majority in the General Assembly. But we now have an 
automatic majority against us in the General Assembly. [Hence] there is no interest in it today in 
the U.S. government.‖979  
Overall, however, during the lead-up to the Kosovo intervention, U.S. policy leaders 
were not particularly concerned about international opposition from developing countries. 
Dobbins, the State Department‘s special Balkans adviser at the time, offers a particularly candid 
and matter-of-fact assessment: ―The only state outside NATO that was of serious concern was 
Russia. The assumption was that the Chinese would go along with whatever the Russians would 
go along with. So the pivotal state was Russia. As to the NAM, there wasn‘t anything they could 
do to help Serbia or harm us.‖980 Halperin essentially concurs, suggesting that in all the State 
Department and interagency meetings in which he participated, third-party state opposition 
beyond Russia ―was not on the screen at all.‖981 Thus, it appears that Washington leaders worried 
little about potential negative consequences to America‘s international reputation and standing 
and were entirely unconcerned about soft balancing from the developing world. 
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How much of a concern, then, was Russian opposition to the use of force? Furthermore, 
was there an expectation in Washington that NATO‘s endorsement would reassure Russian 
authorities about American motives? Moscow had long had a fairly close political relationship 
with Belgrade, based on strong ties of ethnic and religious kinship.
982
 Therefore, Russian 
authorities made it clear already in the summer of 1998 that they would be unable to support a 
SC resolution authorizing the use of force against Yugoslavia.
983
 When NATO subsequently 
launched its air campaign in March 1999, Russian leaders vehemently condemned the bombings, 
seeking to placate their own angry public.
984
  
However, in private Russian authorities proved remarkably cooperative with the West 
during the lead-up to the use of force. On October 8, 1998 foreign ministers of the Balkans 
Contact Group (which included Russia) met at the VIP lounge of Heathrow Airport in London to 
discuss the Kosovo issue. Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov repeated on that occasion that his 
government could not publicly endorse the use of force at the SC. But Ivanov also indicated that 
Moscow was privately willing to acquiesce in NATO‘s decision to threaten air strikes. 
According to Holbrooke, who was present at the meeting, Ivanov said: ―If you take it to the UN, 
we‘ll veto it. If you don‘t we‘ll just denounce you.‖985  
By January 1999, the use of force over Kosovo was becoming an increasingly realistic 
possibility. On January 27, Secretary Albright, accompanied by a few close advisors, joined 
Russian foreign minister Ivanov at the Bolshoi opera house in Moscow for a performance of 
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Verdi‘s La Traviata. During the intermission, the American delegation made NATO‘s intentions 
with regard to Kosovo unmistakably clear to the Russians. The alliance was going to threaten 
force to support a last-ditch negotiating effort at Rambouillet. There was going to be a short 
deadline, and in the absence of an agreement, the alliance would start bombing Yugoslavia and 
continue until Serb troops withdrew from Kosovo and an international peacekeeping force was 
let in. ―We were very explicit,‖ remembers Halperin, who was part of the U.S. delegation at the 
Bolshoi. ―The Russians‘ response was, we can‘t endorse this. But there was not any hint of a 
threat that they would be on the other side. They knew what we were doing. They accepted that it 
was the only way to stop Milosevic.‖986  
Russia at the time was recovering from a serious financial crisis, and Moscow‘s political 
leaders were keenly aware of their nation‘s dependence on western economic aid. Hence the 
Russian government under Yeltsin was trying to walk a fine line, opposing the use of force in 
public to keep the domestic nationalist opposition in check, while for the most part acquiescing 
to NATO‘s strategy in private. The United States had offered $5.4 billion in bilateral economic 
support to Russia between 1992 and 1998, without counting significant U.S. contributions to 
multilateral economic assistance totaling more than $100 billion.
987
 In late 1998 and early 1999, 
precisely as the Kosovo crisis was reaching its climax, Russia was engaged in delicate 
negotiations with the IMF over a major economic loan.
988
 Given Washington‘s preponderant 
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influence on IMF loan disbursements, Moscow political authorities had strong incentives to be 
cooperative with the U.S. in private.
989
 
 In sum, during the lead-up to the use of force, senior Clinton administration officials saw 
Russian public opposition to the use of force as a problem, but one that could be managed with 
skillful diplomacy. ―Nobody in the U.S. government argued against intervention out of concern 
for Russia‘s reaction,‖ remembers Stephen Sestanovich, at the time the secretary of state‘s 
special adviser for the former Soviet Union. Sestanovich further explains:  
During the lead-up to the use of force, the Russians were difficult. They did not like the 
way in which the U.S. and the West had established a kind of hegemony in the Balkans. 
Everybody expected them to be difficult, and maybe even more so over Kosovo [than 
over Bosnia], because of their emotional ties with Serbia. But that just meant, we have a 





 Senior American officials were quite aware that channeling the threat and potential use of 
force through NATO would not at all reassure the Russians—in fact quite the opposite. 
Moscow‘s national security leaders at the time still saw NATO as very much antagonistic to their 
own interests. As a former senior State Department official explains, ―NATO was expanding at 
the time into their former sphere of influence. They would certainly have liked NATO to fail in 
its effort over Kosovo.‖991 In Russian defense and intelligence circles, most of the senior staff 
members were former cold warriors, who throughout their careers had been taught to oppose 
NATO and fight NATO. It was hard to imagine that suddenly, those same individuals could 
perceive NATO as signaling ―benign‖ American intentions. Senior Clinton administration 
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officials in fact understood that to many Russians at the time, NATO appeared as a catalyst for 
Washington‘s hegemonic aspirations—a means for empowering rather than constraining the 
United States.
992
 Therefore, if the goal was to placate Russian concerns about U.S.-led military 
action in Moscow‘s traditional sphere of influence, channeling the use of force through NATO 
was hardly part of the solution. Most senior policy officials in Washington understood that well. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, then, it appears that neither norm internalization by U.S. policy leaders, 
nor concerns about soft balancing in other issue areas, can explain Washington‘s efforts to seek a 
NATO endorsement for military action over Kosovo and proceed by means of a close 
multilateral consensus with the European allies. As I have sought to demonstrate in this chapter, 
American multilateralism over Kosovo was primarily the result of bureaucratic political 
deliberations and bargaining in Washington between the military leaders and their governmental 
allies, on the one side, who were highly skeptical of armed intervention, and civilian hawks at 
the State Department, on the other, who sought to reassure the military brass and forge a winning 
bureaucratic coalition in favor of the use of force.  
The Clinton administration‘s activist policy officials, led by Secretary Albright, needed to 
be able to convince their colleagues at the Pentagon and the White House that American liability 
would be limited and that the western European partners would in fact shoulder most of the 
burden for Kosovo‘s long-term stabilization. In the course of 1998, the activists concluded that 
involving the Atlantic alliance, by obtaining its explicit endorsement of armed intervention and 
channeling the use of force through an integrated NATO coalition, would be helpful in view of 
reassuring skeptical policy officials in Washington and gradually shifting the bureaucratic 
                                                 




balance of power in favor of armed intervention. Therefore, the Kosovo case offers strong 








Iraq, 1998-2003: The policy is regime change (on the cheap) 
 
 
OSD believed strongly that it was going to be a cakewalk. 
We had proven it in Afghanistan, we were the superpower. 
It was going to be simple and it wasn‘t going to cost very 
much. The Iraqis were all going to stand up and cheer. 




On March 19, 2003, American and British forces crossed into Iraq and launched 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invasion aimed at changing the political regime in Baghdad.
994
 For 
over a decade, the United States had sought to weaken Saddam Hussein‘s grip on power, relying 
on a combination of economic sanctions, occasional bombing, and financing of various Iraqi 
opposition movements, hoping that the regime would eventually collapse from within. However, 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush concluded that Saddam‘s 
regime, believed to hold weapons of mass destruction (WMD), constituted a vital threat to the 
United States. Furthermore, hawkish U.S. officials, led by Vice President Richard Cheney, 
believed that removing the Iraqi dictator from power would send a powerful signal of American 
resolve to other actual and potential proliferators around the world.  
Nevertheless, as an invasion of Iraq appeared increasingly likely, in the fall of 2002 the 
administration at first sought to obtain an endorsement of military action from the UN Security 
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Council. Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as senior military planners at the Joint Staff in 
Washington, advised that a UN-based approach would be helpful to lock in international support 
for the war and especially for its aftermath. In the short run, President Bush heeded Powell‘s 
advice and the administration decided to engage the United Nations. But the president also seems 
to have agreed with Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the 
UN process would be valuable only insofar as it could quickly grant an international stamp of 
legitimacy to what Washington was going to do anyway—namely forcibly remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. In November 2002, the SC unanimously approved Resolution 1441, which 
established a UN new weapons inspections regime and threatened ―serious consequences‖ in 
case of Iraqi noncompliance. SCR 1441 did not explicitly authorize military action, as U.S. 
authorities acknowledged at the time of its adoption. But as I show in this chapter, after SCR 
1441 was approved, President Bush and his team never made a serious effort to obtain a second 
UN resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force.  
What explains this half-hearted U.S. effort vis-à-vis the United Nations leading up to the 
2003 Iraq war? The Bush administration‘s most influential national security officials, I argue, 
shared a high threat perception in the aftermath of 9/11 that shortened their time horizon and 
greatly increased their risk acceptance in foreign affairs. Furthermore, those same officials—
Rumsfeld, Cheney, and their respective subordinates—believed that the Iraqi regime could be 
toppled ―on the cheap;‖ i.e., at a limited cost to the United States. Therefore, the hard-liners felt 
little incentive to seek to obtain an explicit UN approval of military action and indeed thought 
that the costs of multilateralism would be unacceptably high.  
Among the American military, there was a widespread belief in 2002-03 that regime 




much costlier and more protracted than the civilian hard-liners anticipated. Therefore, senior 
military planners on the Joint Staff in Washington and at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, 
recommended among other things that the administration seek an explicit UN endorsement 
before the launch of hostilities, to maximize international buy-in. However, Secretary Rumsfeld 
generally disregarded the uniformed leaders‘ advice, and rather than magnifying the military‘s 
own concerns vis-à-vis the president—as previous secretaries of defense had done—he tended to 
impose his own views on the military brass. Furthermore, the nation‘s top military leaders, 
Generals Myers and Pace, the chairman and vice-chairman of the JCS, as well as CENTCOM 
commander Tommy Franks, were for various reasons closely aligned with the administration‘s 
civilian hard-liners. In particular, Myers, Franks, and Pace never openly challenged the 
administration‘s optimistic assumptions about the war and its aftermath. Therefore, the 
administration‘s civilian hawks did not have to reassure the JCS, and the bureaucratic political 
dynamics that had decisively pushed the Washington policy process toward IO-based 
multilateralism on other occasions were not activated leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I first briefly discuss U.S. decision 
making leading up to the 1998 ―Desert Fox‖ airstrikes. That allows me to show that the Bush 
administration‘s attitude vis-à-vis the UN in 2002 and 2003 represented less of a break with 
previous American policy than is often believed. Thereafter I focus in more detail on interagency 
debates leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. In the final part of the chapter, I engage in a 
counterfactual thought experiment: I argue that Washington might well have obtained an explicit 
UN endorsement for military action, provided that U.S. authorities had been willing to seriously 







1.  Prologue: the 1998 “Desert Fox” airstrikes 
In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States and its partners 
embarked on an ambitious policy of containment vis-à-vis Iraq. The policy consisted of stringent 
international sanctions, a UN inspections regime aimed at identifying and destroying Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), two no-fly zones imposed over the north and south of the 
country, and a stepped-up U.S. military aid program to build up the defensive capabilities of 
Iraq‘s neighbors in the Gulf. From the outset, this approach had a twofold objective: first, 
reducing the Iraqi threat to regional stability; and second, weakening and frustrating Saddam 
Hussein‘s domestic regime to foment internal political change. The assumption in Washington 
was that the Iraqi dictator, weakened domestically by his crushing military defeat, would not be 
able to survive politically for much longer. But the goal of regime change enjoyed little 




Disarmament vs. regime change – the origins of the transatlantic divide on Iraq  
To effectively disarm Iraq of its presumed chemical and biological weapons, the UN 
Security Council set up a special organ, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). 
Meanwhile responsibility for Iraqi nuclear capabilities fell to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). As an incentive for Iraq to cooperate with the weapons inspectors and conform 
to its broader disarmament obligations, SCR 687, adopted at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, 
envisaged that economic sanctions would be lifted in return for ―Iraq‘s compliance… and 
                                                 
995 Author interview with Bruce Riedel, Deputy Chief, CIA Persian Gulf Task Force, 1990-1991; NSC Director for 
Gulf and South Asia Affairs, 1991-1993; NSC Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs, 1997-2002 
(December 15, 2010). See also Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 272; and Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of 




general progress toward the control of armaments in the region.‖996 In subsequent years Iraqi 
authorities never cooperated fully, and on numerous occasions they prevented the inspectors 
from accessing suspected weapons sites. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, Iraq had been 
effectively disarmed of most of its nuclear and chemical capabilities. After General Hussein 
Kamel Hassan, the Iraqi dictator‘s son-in-law, defected to Jordan on August 20, 1995 and 
revealed extensive details of proscribed Iraqi weapons programs, Iraq‘s remaining biological 
capabilities were also for the most part destroyed.
997
  
At the same time, by the middle of the decade, growing international opposition had 
materialized to the economic sanctions, which were widely perceived as indiscriminately 
punishing Iraqi civilians, while reinforcing Saddam‘s grip on power. France, Russia, and several 
other European countries began to advocate a change of policy: they insisted that Iraq no longer 
posed a serious military threat; sanctions would never achieve Saddam‘s full compliance with 
the UN resolutions—let alone his overthrow; and the only viable long-term solution was to 
gradually reintegrate Iraq into the community of nations through trade, investment, and a 
normalization of diplomatic relations.
998
 French and Russian oil companies also had significant 
economic interests in seeing sanctions permanently lifted.
999
 But UN Secretary-General Kofi 
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The political mood in Washington, meanwhile, pointed in the opposite direction. Since 
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, U.S. policy leaders had publicly demonized Saddam Hussein 
and his regime to such a degree that Iraq‘s straightforward reintegration into the international 
community was now a non-starter politically in Washington—especially in view of Iraq‘s at best 
lukewarm cooperation with UNSCOM.
1001
 In 1996, the Clinton administration supported a 
reform of the UN sanctions regime to reduce their adverse humanitarian impact; and the resulting 
Oil-for-Food program, in spite of serious problems of corruption, reportedly helped reduce 
malnutrition among Iraqi children by fifty percent in subsequent years.
1002
 Several months later, 
however, American leaders publicly emphasized for the first time that regime change, rather than 
mere disarmament, was in fact Washington‘s principal policy objective vis-à-vis Iraq. On March 
26, 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright defied existing UN resolutions, by declaring: 
―We do not agree with the nations who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations 
concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanctions should be lifted.‖1003 Lest there be any doubts 
about U.S. intentions, later that year, President Clinton insisted that ―the sanctions will be 
there…as long as he lasts.‖1004 This explicit embrace of regime change as a policy goal put the 
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United States on an increasing path of collision with its international partners. It apparently also 
removed from Saddam Hussein whatever limited incentives he may previously have felt to 
cooperate with the UN inspectors, and Iraqi obstructionism grew significantly in subsequent 
months.  
 
The U.S. and the UN playing cat-and-mouse with Iraqi authorities 
On November 3, 1997, Iraq blocked UNSCOM inspection of a suspicious missile site, 
claiming that the international team contained too many Americans who were allegedly working 
as undercover U.S. intelligence agents. Soon thereafter the Iraqi government expelled six 
inspectors of U.S. nationality.
1005
 In response, President Clinton dispatched an aircraft carrier to 
the region, and Washington explicitly threatened military action. A further escalation was 
avoided on that occasion, thanks to an agreement brokered by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov that allowed all UNSCOM inspectors to return.
1006
 Another similar crisis ensued in 
January 1998, when Iraq blocked several UN inspections teams, again on the pretext that they 
included too many Americans. This time, following a renewed U.S. military buildup in the 
Persian Gulf, UN Secretary-General Annan stepped in; and he, too, was able to secure Iraq‘s 
agreement to comply with existing SC resolutions and cooperate with UNSCOM.
1007
 On March 
2, 1998, the SC adopted Resolution 1154, which threatened that Iraq would face the ―severest 
consequences‖ if it did not comply with its international obligations. Although Resolution 1154 
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did not explicitly authorize military action, the Clinton administration publicly declared that it 
had obtained UN authority to use force if Iraq opposed further inspections.
1008
 
Several months later, on September 19, the administration— under pressure from 
Congress—adopted the Iraq Liberation Act, which elevated regime change into an official U.S. 
policy objective and authorized $97 million to provide military support to the Iraqi 
opposition.
1009
 Thereafter, Iraq‘s relationship with the inspectors rapidly collapsed, and on 
October 31, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM.
1010
 President Clinton, now faced with 
complete Iraqi noncooperation, ordered a substantial bombing campaign on November 14. Yet 
once again, virtually at the last minute (U.S. and British warplanes were already in the air) Iraqi 
authorities pledged in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that they would resume cooperation 
with UNSCOM.
1011
 Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Albright were adamant that the 
bombing proceed anyway.
1012
 However, British authorities made it clear that they would no 
longer participate in the air strikes, which in their view were no longer justified, and thus 
President Clinton chose to call off the bombing. Clinton was plainly willing to order military 
action without an explicit UN endorsement, but like President Bush several years later, he was 
reluctant to use significant force without at least British participation.
1013
 
Yet by mid-December 1998, the time for diplomatic compromise had definitively run out. 
On December 15, chief UN weapons inspector Richard Butler reported to the Security Council 
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that in previous days Iraq had once again not fully cooperated with UNSCOM: the Iraqi 
authorities had obstructed one further inspection and failed to turn over documents pertaining to 
their chemical and biological weapons programs.
1014
 President Clinton had approved the revised 
plans for a massive U.S.-UK attack already in early December; and several days before the 
Butler report was issued, Clinton‘s national security team unanimously recommended that 
Washington move ahead with the air campaign. The decision to wait until after the publication of 
Butler‘s report was taken in consultation with British authorities.1015 As a former senior British 
diplomat recalls, ―although the Americans were cutting corners, we were trying to show that the 
action was justified under the resolutions, which President Clinton hadn‘t been particularly 
concerned about in November or earlier.‖1016 The joint U.S.-UK air campaign, code-named 
Operation Desert Fox, began on the day following Butler‘s report to the Council. The bombing 
lasted barely four days, until December 19, but it was the most robust military action against Iraq 
since the 1991 Gulf War: over 400 cruise missiles and 600 bombs hit a total of 97 Iraqi sites, 




Appearing tough while moving on: the goals of Operation Desert Fox 
 The goals of the bombing campaign were threefold. First, degrade Iraqi military 
capabilities; second, reassert American credibility and presidential leadership; and finally, allow 
                                                 
1014 Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, p. 160; see also Albright, Madam Secretary, p. 286. 
1015 On Clinton‘s approval of the military plans, see Hugh Shelton, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American 
Warrior (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2010), p. 366. On the timing of the national security team‘s 
recommendation, see Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), p. 833. 
1016 Author interview with Jeremy Greenstock (March 30, 2011).  
1017 The U.S. and UK did not attack suspected chemical and biological weapons sites, out of fears of provoking a 
major humanitarian emergency. Gordon, p. 123. On the number of bombs and missiles employed, see also Thomas 




the United States to end the inspections regime, which by then had become ineffective and a 
nuisance, while shifting the blame to Baghdad.  
The U.S. had credible intelligence in the fall of 1998 that Iraq, with assistance from North 
Korea and Iran, was developing intermediate-range missiles in violation of SCR 687. Stopping 
Iraq‘s active missile program, a potential threat to American allies and U.S. troops in the region, 
was the air campaign‘s principal military objective.1018 Furthermore, administration officials 
publicly emphasized the threat from Iraq‘s putative WMD capabilities. Secretary Cohen, for 
instance, declared in front of the news media that the goal was ―to degrade Saddam Hussein‘s 
ability to make and use weapons of mass destruction [and] wage war against his neighbors.‖1019 
However, former Clinton administration officials privately acknowledge that by the late 1990s, 
Iraqi WMD capabilities were in fact no longer considered a strategic threat.
1020
 
 Second, the air strikes‘ primary strategic (as opposed to narrowly military) objective was 
to reassert America‘s international credibility, which in the eyes of senior administration officials 
had been tarnished by the prolonged cat-and-mouse game with Iraq. Secretary Cohen, a key 
advocate of the bombing, told the president in early December that following repeated threats of 
military action over the preceding year, U.S. credibility was now on the line.
1021
 The president, 
for his part, was politically weakened by the impeachment proceedings against him in the 
Monica Lewinsky affair. Public criticism of the air strikes focused on the possibility that Clinton 
had ordered military action as a diversionary maneuver, to postpone or frustrate the impeachment 
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 But in fact, failure to act on Clinton‘s part would have raised serious questions 
about his continued ability to lead, given the circumstances; and it was this sense of the 
president‘s vulnerability that allowed his hard-line advisers to prevail.1023  
 Finally, the 1998 air strikes were aimed at quietly ending the UN inspections regime, 
which by then was yielding few results and had become a constant irritant in Washington‘s eyes. 
NS adviser Berger declared in concomitance with the attack that ―UNSCOM has been inefficient 
for some time‖ and continuing with the inspections under existing circumstances ―doesn‘t make 
much sense.‖1024 President Clinton and his team understood leading up to the bombing campaign 
that the air strikes would probably mean the end of UNSCOM‘s work, since the Iraqi regime 
would permanently withdraw its cooperation. But far from deterring the administration, the 
prospect of terminating the inspections without having to openly take responsibility appears to 
have been one of Washington‘s principal motives. Bruce Riedel, at the time a senior national 
security official working on the Middle East, explains the administration‘s calculus as follows:  
I would describe the Desert Fox air strikes as providing a pivot point for the 
administration to put an end to the endless cat-and-mouse game with the Iraqis. Because 
it was draining American foreign policy, it was a constant irritant, which frequently made 
the administration look weak. [The goal was] to find a way to end inspections and just let 
sanctions stay in place. Close that chapter, and move on. After 1998, there was a yearlong 





 There was of course no illusion in Washington that a limited, four-day air campaign 
would bring the Iraqi regime to its knees or otherwise produce fundamental political change on 
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the ground. Yet the air strikes would open a new chapter: they might embolden oppositional 
forces inside Iraq, and ideally they would force a deeper re-thinking of international policy. Most 
fundamentally, the attack and the subsequent removal of UNSCOM resolved the inherent 
contradiction of calling for Saddam to comply with international demands (which implied the 
promise of lifting sanctions if he did so), while at the same time calling for his ouster (which 




The U.S. military brass, though reluctant, endorse limited air strikes 
 The top U.S. military brass expressed some reluctance leading up to the Desert Fox air 
campaign, but there was never the kind of fundamental opposition from the uniformed leaders 
that had been voiced prior to earlier American interventions in Haiti or the Balkans. General 
Anthony Zinni, at the time the commander of CENTCOM, the responsible regional command,  
expressed some concern that the air strikes might antagonize the Iraqi regular army, which the 
U.S. was planning to rely upon to maintain stability in case of an internal uprising and overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein.
1027
 Furthermore, JCS Chairman Henry ―Hugh‖ Shelton had reservations 
about the timing of the bombing campaign, given the president‘s political vulnerability. 
Secretary of Defense Cohen, however, adamantly supported the planned air strikes, as well as 
their timing just before the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. He insisted that reasserting 
American credibility was a ―vital‖ national interest. Ultimately, in the course of a thirty-minute 
private meeting in early December, Cohen brought Chairman Shelton fully on board.
1028
  
The uniformed leaders never voiced more fundamental opposition and ended up 
supporting the bombing, because the campaign‘s military objectives were quite narrowly defined 
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as ―disrupting and degrading Iraq‘s missile capability for some period of time.‖1029 In other 
words, the military brass understood that the armed services‘ liability would be limited and there 
was no risk of a costly, open-ended ground campaign.
1030
 Furthermore, the military were 
reassured by indications of solid domestic political support for armed intervention in Congress 
and among the American public.
1031
 For several weeks, leaders in the Republican-dominated 
Congress had been calling for a tougher U.S. response against Iraqi interference with the 
weapons inspections.
1032
 Public opinion polls in November also showed that over sixty percent 
of the American public supported U.S. military action against Iraq.
1033
  
 The uniformed leaders and senior Pentagon officials more generally, however, strongly 
opposed any move beyond limited air strikes. The available CENTCOM plan for invading Iraq at 
the time, OPLAN 1003, developed under General Zinni, called for a force of half a million 
American troops.
1034
 There are indications that the required troop numbers were artificially 
inflated to some degree, in order to make it practically impossible for President Clinton or the 
more activist members of his administration to sell such a policy domestically in the United 
States.
1035
 Thus, in the late 1990s, the military leaders effectively removed the possibility of a 
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full-scale invasion of Iraq from the political agenda in Washington. Even Albright, the Clinton 
administration‘s chief interventionist, acknowledges that ―no serious consideration was given to 
actually invading Iraq.‖1036  
The military leaders also strongly opposed the idea of deploying smaller contingents of 
American ground troops to support Iraqi opposition forces. One influential plan, developed by 
Iraqi expatriates under Ahmed Chalabi and their neoconservative U.S. ally Paul Wolfowitz, 
foresaw the introduction of American ground forces to create a secure enclave in southern Iraq, 
similar to the semi-free Kurdish zone in the north, aimed at allowing the Iraqi opposition to form 
a provisional government and mobilize to overthrow Saddam‘s regime.1037 President Clinton was 
initially not altogether opposed to the idea, although it would inevitably have been implemented 
unilaterally by the United States. But the military leaders quickly disabused Clinton of any 
notion that the project could be carried out. The Iraqi opposition forces would probably be 
attacked and massacred by Saddam‘s army, which in turn might draw the United States into an 
all-out unilateral ground war, with an attendant massive military burden.
1038
 As former 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe recalls, the military and the Pentagon 
more generally ―had no use for such fantasies.‖1039  
 
Why the U.S. never sought an explicit UN endorsement for the air strikes  
Leading up to the Desert Fox air campaign, neither the JCS nor any other policy leader in 
Washington pushed for an explicit multilateral endorsement through the UN or NATO. The chief 
underlying reason appears to have been that no senior administration official expected an open-
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ended military engagement, let alone a costly stabilization effort, which made it unnecessary to 
lock in international support by seeking the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs. Secretary 
Cohen‘s insistence on preserving U.S. credibility as a ―vital‖ national interest also appears to 
have convinced the uniformed leadership that quick military action was in fact required. Finally, 
senior administration officials, including the military leaders, were quite confident that as long as 
the mission was going to be seen as successful, it would generate its own legitimacy and 
support—especially among the American people.1040  
In terms of international support, military commanders at CENTCOM felt that all they 
needed was the private backing, or at least the acquiescence, of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
monarchies.
1041
 Most of the Gulf region‘s political leaders made it clear that they could not 
openly support the bombing campaign and indeed would publicly oppose it.
1042
 But they 
privately reassured the administration that U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf would not be 
negatively affected, regardless of whether the air strikes were going to be explicitly endorsed by 
the UN Security Council.
1043
 Once the joint U.S.-UK bombings began, they were in fact 
vehemently condemned as a blatant violation of international law in public statements by leaders 
throughout the Middle East, as well as by Russia, China, and the 113-member Non-Aligned 
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 Broader U.S. economic and diplomatic interests in the Gulf region, 
however, remained largely unharmed.
1045
  
The argument made by policy analysts close to the Clinton administration, according to 
whom ―in 1997 and 1998, the United States was unwilling to use force in Iraq without broad 
international support‖ is therefore not substantiated by the evidence.1046 Washington and London 
never explored the possibility of seeking an explicit UNSC mandate for the use of force against 
Iraq in the fall of 1998. Given the absence of serious concerns about a protracted military 
engagement and strong U.S. domestic support for military action, Washington was simply 
unwilling to engage in lengthy negotiations and offer significant side-payments to other IO 
member states in order to obtain an explicit SC endorsement. The administration wanted to act 
quickly, seizing the window of opportunity between the publication of Butler‘s report on 




Obtaining an explicit SC authorization of ―all necessary means‖ would undoubtedly have 
been difficult, and it would probably have required significant side-payments to Moscow aimed 
at preventing a Russian veto.
1048
 French support, too, could not be taken for granted, although 
Paris was not necessarily opposed to military action in private and might well have abstained at 
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 Greenstock, the British UN ambassador at the time, confirms that Washington 
and London never even thought about circulating a draft resolution aimed at authorizing the use 
of force at the SC. Moscow, he thinks, would have been unlikely to go along with such a 
resolution in November or December 1998. But he leaves open the possibility that a Russian 
abstention could have been obtained at a subsequent stage, after ―a comprehensive review by the 
Security Council of Iraq‘s performance against the benchmarks set in the resolutions to-date.‖1050 
Such a review had in fact been prescribed by the Council earlier on in 1998, and it could have 
been completed within a matter of months.
1051
 However, Greenstock laconically concludes, ―the 
Americans cut through that with the bombing in December.‖1052 
Stephen Sestanovich, at the time the top U.S. diplomat dealing with Russian affairs, 
agrees that the Russians might have been persuaded to abstain on the authorization of ―all 
necessary means‖ at the Security Council. However, he adds, Washington ―never explored the 
question of what the Russians‘ price might be.‖1053 No American official ever offered a serious 
quid pro quo for Russian support; or warned of the consequences of not cooperating. ―The most 
obvious economic inducements that Russia sought were those associated with an end to 
sanctions.‖1054 In short, it appears that if Washington had sufficiently valued an explicit SC 
endorsement for the air campaign, it could have obtained it through an intense diplomatic effort 
and the willingness to enter into a grand bargain: full multilateral endorsement for military action 
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aimed at punishing Iraq for its immediate noncooperation, in exchange for a subsequent gradual 
lifting of economic sanctions. The lifting of sanctions, however, was clearly too high a price for 
the United States to pay. Sanctions symbolized Washington‘s tough policy vis-à-vis Iraq; they 
enjoyed widespread U.S. domestic support; and their removal would have been a politically 
near-impossible feat for an already embattled President Clinton.
1055
  
  The Clinton administration‘s approach on the 1998 air strikes, whereby Washington did 
not seek an explicit Security Council authorization but claimed that military action was justified 
under existing UN resolutions threatening ―severe consequences,‖ set a precedent that would be 
seized four years later by President George W. Bush and his administration. Following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush became willing to more wholeheartedly 
embrace the U.S. policy of regime change, which President Clinton before him had somewhat 
tentatively approved as a matter of principle. But the U.S. modus operandi on Iraq vis-à-vis the 
Security Council had clearly been set by the Clinton administration in the late 1990s. With the 
benefit of hindsight, James O‘Brien, a senior State Department official responsible for policy 
planning in the Clinton administration, considers that the decision in 1998 to ―move ahead to use 
force without the explicit endorsement of the Security Council was a mistake, because it made it 
easier for something like the invasion of Iraq to happen a few years later.‖1056 
 
2. The Bush administration, 2001-2003: Iraq as a vital threat  
 President George W. Bush took up office in early 2001, after having promised during his 
election campaign that he would pursue a ―humble‖ foreign policy that would eschew ambitious 
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interventions and nation building projects abroad.
1057
 Until September 2001, the Bush 
administration‘s Iraq policy focused primarily on reviving the international sanctions regime. 
The sense in Washington was that France and Russia were working behind the scenes to pull the 
sanctions regime apart, while Iraq‘s immediate neighbors, including Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, 
were increasingly ignoring the economic embargo altogether.
1058
 ―That‘s why [Secretary of 
State] Colin Powell tried smart sanctions,‖ recalls Stephen J. Hadley, at the time the deputy U.S. 
national security adviser. ―Narrow the sanctions, easing the pressure on the civilian population, 
and thereby save the sanctions regime.‖1059 President Bush eventually signed off on this new 
policy initiative developed at the State Department, yet persuading him was far from easy. ―The 




The new administration‘s leading hard-liners on Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, and Lewis ―Scooter‖ Libby, the 
national security adviser to Vice President Cheney, had been insisting from the spring of 2001 
onward on the need to put Washington‘s goal of regime change into practice.1061 Before 9/11, the 
hard-liners were unable to convince the administration as a whole that Iraq warranted urgent 
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military action. Yet the bureaucratic debate over smart sanctions in many regards prefigured 
future, increasingly acrimonious differences over Iraq policy between the State Department, on 
the one side, and civilian leaders at the Pentagon and the office of the vice president, on the 
other. In the remainder of this section I first describe how 9/11 radically changed the Washington 
policy debate on Iraq. Then I show how the heightened threat perception of U.S. leaders 
shortened their time horizons, making them more risk-acceptant and allergic to multilateral 
constraints. 
 
9/11 changes everything 
 Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 
11, 2001, the administration‘s hard-liners found themselves suddenly empowered. During an 
emergency meeting of the administration‘s national security principals on September 12, 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, reflecting a widespread feeling among his civilian subordinates 
at the Pentagon, asked whether the terrorist attacks did not represent an ―opportunity‖ to launch 
military action against Iraq.
1062
 Three days later, debating U.S. policy options with the president 
at Camp David, Wolfowitz and Libby more vigorously asserted that the administration should in 
fact confront Iraq and forcefully topple Saddam Hussein during the first round of the 
administration‘s war on terror.1063  
Secretary of State Powell and JCS Chairman Shelton strongly pushed back against 
attacking Iraq as a response to September 11. The evidence available to the CIA and briefed to 
the NSC by its director, George Tenet, clearly pointed to al-Quaeda, an Islamic terrorist 
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organization that had no relationship with the secular Iraqi regime.
1064
 In view of that, Powell 
and Shelton insisted that the administration‘s primary focus should be on Afghanistan, a country 
known to harbor terrorist training camps and Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda. The rapidly 
forming international coalition supporting the United States, they argued, would all but unravel if 
the administration were to attack Iraq—and Washington would have to carry the entire burden of 
its new war against terror on its own.
1065
 With CIA director Tenet also recommending that 
Afghanistan should be the initial target, President Bush agreed to postpone the question of going 
after Iraq. ―We‘re going to get that guy [Saddam Hussein], but we‘re going to get him at a time 
and place of our own choosing,‖ the president reportedly said.1066 As one former military adviser 
to Secretary Rumsfeld recalls the discussions during those crucial days after September 11:  
It was clear that we had to do first things first, and the first thing to do was go after Al 
Qaeda. We knew they were in Afghanistan, not in Iraq. And even though Dr. Wolfowitz 
made a very forceful case that we should take this opportunity to get rid of Saddam, the 
decision was made by the president, with the support of Secretary Powell, that no, this is 




 The president, however, had merely postponed the question of toppling Saddam 
Hussein‘s regime. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Bush quickly concluded that 
―keeping Saddam in a box looked less and less feasible.‖1068 According to Riedel, a Clinton 
appointee who continued to serve as a senior national security official in the new administration 
for roughly a year, ―the Bush-Cheney decision to invade Iraq was made shortly after 9-11; and 
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the goal was to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein, not to disarm Iraq.‖1069 In fact, during 
the aforementioned Camp David meeting on September 15, President Bush told General Shelton, 
his senior military adviser until late 2001, that he intended to take out Saddam Hussein before 
the end of his first term in office.
1070
 Therefore, by the end of 2001, it was largely a question of 
timing—not whether, but when to invade Iraq. 
Meanwhile, from early October 2001 onwards, the administration had launched a military 
operation in Afghanistan, aimed at killing or capturing suspected terrorists and defeating the 
Taliban regime. But already on November 21, barely a week after the U.S.-backed Northern 
Alliance had driven the Taliban from Kabul, President Bush instructed Secretary Rumsfeld to 
secretly start working on an updated invasion plan for Iraq.
1071
 The other national security 
principals (including Powell and Tenet) were not brought into the loop until late December 2001, 
when CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks updated the NSC on the latest military 
plans.
1072
 In subsequent months President Bush, while denying that any decision had been taken 
on military action, began to prepare the nation for war. His State of the Union address on January 
29, 2002, was read by many as an effort to gradually shift the public‘s attention from 
Afghanistan towards Iraq. In his speech, the president identified an ―axis of evil‖ composed of 
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, hostile regimes pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and their 
putative terrorist allies. The president also made it understood that the administration, facing a 
heightened threat environment, would act fairly soon: ―Time is not on our side,‖ Bush explained. 
―I will not wait on events, while dangers gather… The United States of America will not permit 
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the world‘s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world‘s most dangerous 
weapons.‖1073  
 
Heightened threat perception and shorter time horizons  
 There was a genuine belief across the Bush administration that since the UN weapons 
inspectors had left Iraq in 1998, Saddam had reconstituted his WMD program. The almost 
unanimous view was that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and was 
working to reconstitute its nuclear program.
1074
 ―The intelligence indicated that there were WMD 
and that the Iraqis were willing to use them, if not themselves, then by handing them over to 
other people,‖ explains Stephen P. Bucci, a former Pentagon official who used to brief Secretary 
Rumsfeld about related reports almost on a daily basis.
1075
 The information on which the CIA 
was relying implied a significant degree of inference, given that no anthrax or chemical weapons 
samples had recently been discovered in Iraq.
1076
 Yet the October 2002 National Intelligence 
Estimate, which has since been partially declassified, dryly assessed that ―Baghdad has chemical 
and biological weapons; [and] if left unchecked, it will probably have a nuclear weapon during 
this decade.‖1077 In December 2002, CIA director George Tenet eliminated any remaining doubts 
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among the administration‘s top national security officials, when he reassuringly told President 
Bush, ―it‘s a slam dunk‖—meaning there was absolute certainty.1078  
Iraq‘s putative WMD programs were first of all considered a serious threat to regional 
security. The administration‘s hard-liners, like Feith, argued that the administration could not 
afford to wait for much longer, because ―if Saddam were to invade Kuwait again—or attack 
Saudi Arabia or Jordan, for example—Iraq‘s WMD would become an argument for not opposing 
that aggression.‖1079 Senior Pentagon officials were further concerned that in the face of a 
growing Iraqi threat, the United States would have to keep large troop contingents in Saudi 
Arabia, which might further fuel Al Qaeda‘s terrorist propaganda.1080 But what worried the 
administration‘s activists most was the possibility of more direct, operational ties between the 
terrorist network and Iraq. The most vital threat to the United States, Feith believed, stemmed 
from the danger that ―Saddam might soon provide terrorists with WMD—biological weapons, 
for example.‖1081 As a former senior aide to Feith recalls: ―Feith was a conspiratist. He believed 
people were against us and out to get us.‖1082 Vice President Cheney and Wolfowitz were also 
extremely concerned by the idea of a potential ―nexus‖ between terrorist groups, WMD, and 
Iraq. In the aftermath of 9/11, the vice president developed ―a real fever,‖ as Secretary Powell 
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and White House strategist Karl Rove put it.
1083
 President Bush himself recalls that he genuinely 
came to fear ―the destruction possible if an enemy dictator passed his WMD to terrorists.‖1084  
By the end of 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld, who had initially been sitting on the fence, 
appears to have decided to back Wolfowitz and Feith wholeheartedly on the need for a quick 
military confrontation with Iraq. Rumsfeld and his fellow OSD hard-liners, with support from 
the vice president‘s office, came to dominate the interagency process leading up to the Iraq war: 
they essentially took over the agenda-setting role from National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice and her staff.
1085
 Perhaps the most influential advocate of toppling the Iraqi regime through 
military force, however, was the vice president himself. Cheney had no statutory policy 
responsibilities, and he could thus focus all his energies and attention on a few issues of his 
choosing, so long as President Bush did not object. The vice president‘s personal staff had grown 
considerably since the 1990s, and Cheney could now draw on a dozen national security aides, 
who ensured that his views would be represented in most relevant meetings at various levels.
1086
  
The vice president and his staff held significant sway over the administration with their 
argument that decisive U.S. military action against Iraq could have a significant ―demonstration 
effect.‖ Of course, they insisted, there were other hostile states developing WMD, like North 
Korea, Libya, or Iran. Yet effectively dealing with one of them would help reestablish 
deterrence, by sending a powerful message to other actual or potential proliferators about 
Washington‘s determination and the likely consequences of openly challenging vital American 
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 Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, too, agreed that U.S. deterrence had been seriously 
weakened as a consequence of the timid responses to terrorism and WMD proliferation under the 
previous Democratic administration, and therefore a bold new initiative was called for to 
enhance U.S. national security.
1088
   
In short, the Bush administration‘s leading hard-liners on Iraq—Cheney, Wolfowitz, 
Feith, and several of their subordinates—perceived a very high threat to U.S. national security in 
the aftermath of 9/11 and believed that the danger of WMD proliferation had to be tackled 
swiftly and decisively. Undoubtedly the vice president, like several of the administration‘s other 
senior officials, was prepared to somewhat bend the truth when making his case to the public; yet 
it appears that Cheney was in fact deeply convinced that the risks to U.S. national security were 
mortal and real.
1089
 This heightened threat perception clearly shortened the hard-liners‘ time 
horizon: ―time is not on our side,‖ Cheney declared in late August 2002, and ―the risks of 
inaction are far greater than the risks of action.‖1090 Furthermore, in their almost missionary zeal, 
senior officials like Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Feith, as well as Rumsfeld, became unusually risk 
acceptant and willing to experiment with broad policies of revolutionary political transformation 
in the Middle East. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who loyally followed the Bush 
administration in its headlong march to war, recalls from his interactions with senior 
administration officials following 9/11 that ―the U.S. attitude to risk had been turned upside 
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down‖—a usually risk-averse nation was now clearly willing to sacrifice its blood and treasure to 
tackle a perceived vital security threat.
1091
 
The prevailing view among the Bush administration‘s hard-liners was that the threat 
stemming from Iraqi WMD proliferation had to be dealt with sooner rather than later, through a 
policy of preventive war that left little room for consensus building with foreign partners through 
relevant IOs, such as the UN or NATO. Senior Pentagon officials had been publicly talking 
about preventive war since the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
1092
 By early June 2002, President 
Bush himself articulated the new doctrine of ―preemption‖ in a speech at West Point, where he 
emphasized that containment was no longer a feasible strategy in the face of hostile regimes with 
WMD that could secretly provide those weapons to terrorists.
1093
 The doctrine‘s implications 
were more fully fleshed out in the summer of 2002 by Feith and his team, in a secret memo titled 
―Sovereignty and Anticipatory Self-Defense.‖1094 The document claims that in a world where 
hostile states might covertly use terrorist groups to deliver WMD ―in an unattributable, and 
hence undeterrable, manner,‖ the United States should no longer have to wait until it is actually 
attacked before being able to launch military action in self-defense.
1095
 These insights, Faith and 
his colleagues conclude, ―lead inevitably to a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense,‖ whereby the 
cross-border use of U.S. military force can be checked exclusively by the American constitution, 
and not ―by a requirement for international approval of some kind (e.g., from the UN).‖1096 
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  Finally, in their short-term focus on tackling a perceived imminent threat, the Bush 
administration‘s hard-liners did not adequately consider the longer-term feasibility of the policy 
of forcible regime change, which they derived from the new doctrine of anticipatory self-
defense. As one former NSC staffer in the Bush administration recalls, due to the pressure to act 
quickly to neutralize the putative Iraqi danger, ―everyone was so focused on the initial phases of 
the plan that people weren‘t pressing to see what would happen several weeks into the 
invasion.‖1097 In fact, the administration‘s hard-liners appear to have fallen prey to a type of 
short-sighted, wishful thinking that is typical of the most zealous policy activists: while focusing 
on the immediate payoffs of the policy they advocated, they tended to systematically develop 
best-case scenarios as far as the policy‘s (longer-term) feasibility was concerned, thereby 
radically underestimating potential pitfalls along the path they were advocating.
1098
 As former 
Secretary of State Powell, who went along with the policy only reluctantly and half-heartedly, 
recalls, his civilian colleagues at the Pentagon and the office of the vice president proceeded on 
the basis of ―wishful thinking and dreamy, dreamy assumptions that had no basis in reality.‖1099 
 
3. The hard-liners’ rosy expectations and aversion to multilateralism 
 The administration‘s civilian hard-liners from the Pentagon and the office of the vice 
president believed that a relatively small number of American combat troops could quickly and 
successfully topple Saddam Hussein‘s regime. But it is with regard to the post-combat phase that 
the activists‘ predictions were most exceedingly optimistic. Their expectation of a short and 
relatively painless occupation rested on a number best-case assumptions: invading American 
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troops would be welcomed as liberators by a friendly Iraqi populace; a new democratic Iraqi 
government composed of former expatriates would quickly take over; the Iraqi administrative 
structure and security apparatus would remain largely intact; and finally, with international 
sanctions lifted, postwar reconstruction could largely be financed through sales of Iraqi oil. 
These optimistic assumptions about the postwar transition added to the activists‘ aversion to 
paying significant costs in view of obtaining the endorsement of relevant IOs. As a senior NSC 
staffer who was responsible for international coalition management on Iraq explains, the 
administration‘s hard-liners ―didn‘t have an extended stabilization period in mind. So they didn‘t 
make the argument, we need a UN resolution because that‘s the only way to durably hold the 
allies three years from now—because they didn‘t envision it three years from now.‖1100 
 
A running start with 20,000 troops – or proving the Powell Doctrine wrong 
 Secretary Rumsfeld and his staff at OSD were adamant that significantly fewer troops 
would be needed to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein‘s regime than the existing U.S. war 
plans foresaw. The off-the-shelf war plan, OPLAN 1003-98 developed by General Zinni in the 
late 1990s, envisioned a lengthy seven-month buildup of nearly 400,000 troops in the Middle 
East before offensive operations could be launched.
1101
 But from late 2001 onward, Rumsfeld 
pushed the new CENTCOM commander, General Franks, to repeatedly slash the required troop 
numbers. By mid-2002, CENTCOM‘s ―running start‖ plan foresaw a possible launch of 
offensive operations against Iraq without a lengthy buildup, and using only one heavy division, 
or less than 20,000 troops, combined with massive air support.
1102
 Rumsfeld‘s goal was to 
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substitute speed, surprise, and advanced technological capabilities for the U.S. military‘s 
traditional emphasis on sheer mass. As Col. Michael Trahan, at the time a senior military planner 
at CENTCOM, recalls: ―There was very clear pressure from OSD. Traditional military planning 
requires overwhelming force—the typical ratio of combat forces in an offense is between seven 
to one and four to one. But we were told that we wouldn‘t need that, because technology could 
serve as a force multiplier.‖1103 
 The civilians‘ optimism was partially justified by the fact that Iraq‘s army in 2002 was 
only about a third of the size it had been during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and its combat 
effectiveness had been seriously degraded by a decade of international sanctions.
1104
 As Walter 
Slocombe, a former senior defense official who had dealt with Iraq for eight years during the 
Clinton administration and who subsequently advised the Bush administration on postwar 
reconstruction in Iraq, recalls: ―Rumsfeld had this initial fantasy of invading Iraq with 20,000 
troops—and it might have been enough for the initial combat phase of the war, given that 
Saddam had probably decided, sensibly, that he was not going to fight the American army this 
time.‖1105 But Rumsfeld and his staff also had a broader, more ideological agenda. Conservative 
hard-liners in Washington had long viewed the ―Powell doctrine‖ of overwhelming force as an 
impediment to deploying American power. The civilians at OSD now wanted to show that the 
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Iraq will be a bastion of democracy in the region 
 But it was on the war‘s aftermath that the hard-liners were willing to take the greatest 
risks. Their planning for the postwar transition was driven by almost outlandishly optimistic 
assumptions, which led them to disregard anything but the rosiest scenarios. To begin with, 
serious postwar planning did not begin until November 2002, after CENTCOM and OSD had 
been finessing the main invasion plan for almost a year. Franklin C. Miller, a senior defense 
official in the Bush administration, recalls that the administration ―had concentrated very heavily 
on phases 1, 2, and 3 [i.e., the force deployment and combat phases] of the war from August 
until November 2002, because there were things that had to be done, under a presumed time 
pressure.‖1107 As to the postwar planning that was subsequently carried out before the launch of 
the invasion in March 2003, for the most part it focused on short-term humanitarian issues, like 
preventing starvation among the Iraqi civilian population and assisting potential refugees.
1108
 
There was only very limited, last-minute planning for administering postwar Iraq, and the 
possibility that American troops might have to assume primary responsibility for maintaining (let 
alone re-establishing) political order was hardly considered at all.
1109
 As former President Bush 
                                                 
1106 Author interview with Marc Grossman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 2001-2005 (January 13, 
2011). See also Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, pp. 53f; and Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, p. 199.  
1107 Author interview with Franklin C. Miller, Senior NSC Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 2001-
2005 (February 23, 2011). 
1108 Bush, Decision Points, p. 248. 
1109 Nora Bensahel, ―Mission not accomplished,‖ in Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney, eds., War in Iraq: 
Planning and Execution (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 130ff; and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Iraq Without a Plan,‖ 




now admits, the possibility that Iraq might descend into a state of anarchy following the invasion 
―was one important contingency for which [the administration] had not adequately prepared.‖1110 
 The administration‘s chief activists, led in this matter by Wolfowitz and Feith, had long 
expected that it might be possible to entirely skip the intermediate step of a transitional U.S. 
administration after the war, by almost immediately handing off power and responsibility to a 
new interim government formed of former Iraqi expatriates.
1111
 American forces, Wolfowitz 
insisted, would be welcomed as liberators by a friendly Shi‘a populace. Hence the Americans‘ 
task would be limited to enabling the Iraqis to help themselves; and for this purpose, a small 
number of stabilization forces, deployed for a short period of time, would be sufficient.
1112
 The 
deputy secretary of defense did not just make this argument in public, but during private NSC 
meetings, too, ―he portrayed a very welcoming Iraqi populace made up of Shias who would 
throw palm fronds and flowers in front of the tanks as they rolled into Baghdad. And he had a 
wealth of Iraqi expatriates who supported that view.‖1113 The leading influence in this context 
was Ahmed Chalabi, an ambitious Iraqi expatriate who had built up a close relationship to 
Wolfowitz and Feith going back to the 1990s, and who headed the Iraqi National Congress 
(INC), an umbrella Iraqi opposition group. Senior officials at OSD and the vice president‘s office 
―listened to Ahmed Chalabi very closely,‖ explains Armitage. ―And Chalabi‘s siren tune was: 
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the people of Iraq are hungry for democracy; Iraq will be the bastion of democracy in the Middle 
East.‖1114 
 
The country’s administrative structure and security apparatus will remain intact 
 Furthermore, leading up to the war, the administration‘s chief activists effectively made 
the case that once U.S. occupation forces had removed the top layer of Baath party officials, 
Iraq‘s administrative structure would continue to function. The nation‘s army and police 
apparatus, too, would remain largely intact and could be used to stabilize the country. As Hadley 
explains, ―we assumed that we would have about 135,000 Iraqi army forces available to help us 
maintain post-conflict order, and that we would use them to help us with post-conflict 
reconstruction.‖1115 Therefore, the expectation was that no large-scale U.S. peacekeeping and 
reconstruction effort would be necessary. This conclusion further strengthened the conviction 
that U.S. forces would merely need to assist Iraqi authorities for a short period of time.
1116
  
These highly optimistic assumptions were largely developed by civilian policy officials at 
OSD.
1117
 Leading up to the war, senior OSD officials asserted that by August 2003—that is, less 
than half a year after the invasion—the number of American troops in Iraq would be scaled back 
to about thirty-four thousand. CENTCOM‘s war plan, developed under strict guidelines from 
OSD, foresaw that three years later, only a small U.S. assistance force of about 5,000 troops 
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would remain in the country.
1118
 The administration had similarly planned to send only about 
1,500 police advisers to train Iraqi officers for a short transitional period.
1119
 Following the 
invasion, of course, Iraq‘s administrative structure and security apparatus largely collapsed, and 
the country rapidly descended into chaos. These problems were significantly compounded by the 
decision of Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator, to entirely disband the Iraqi army and 




Iraqi oil will pay for it all 
 Finally, the administration‘s leading activists expected that the limited reconstruction 
work that might be necessary would largely be paid for through Iraq‘s own oil reserves. 
Wolfowitz publicly insisted that once international sanctions were going to be lifted, Iraq could 
rely on annual oil exports worth $15 billion to $20 billion. ―To assume we‘re going to pay for 
this is just wrong,‖ he passionately asserted during a congressional hearing.1121 In the 
administration‘s internal policy meetings, too, ―Wolfowitz was very compelling in his argument 
that the Iraqi oil was going to pay for this, and he said it over and over.‖1122 The deputy secretary 
of defense even commissioned a small group of people to work through the oil issues and project 
Iraq‘s future oil production in barrels per day, of course assuming the absence of major internal 
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instability. ―He built a very convincing argument that the cost to [the United States] was going to 
be major combat operations and then it would be paid for.‖1123  
 To some extent, these best-case assumptions about postwar Iraq appear to have reflected 
an effort on the part of the administration‘s hard-liners to square an ardent desire to topple 
Saddam Hussein‘s regime, on the one side, with a staunch ideological opposition to nation-
building, on the other. ―It was an ideological bend of the administration,‖ recalls a former 
military officer seconded to Rumsfeld‘s office.1124 According to the administration‘s 
conservative leaders, crucially including the president, the purpose of the American military was 
to fight and win the nation‘s wars, and not to preserve stability or promote reconstruction in their 
aftermath.
1125
 During the 2002 election campaign, future National Security Adviser Condoleezza 
Rice had famously declared, ―We don‘t need to have the 82nd airborne escorting kids to the 
kindergarten.‖1126 This ideological aversion to stability operations and nation-building might also 
partially explain why few of the administration‘s top officials, with the exception of Secretary 
Powell, ever questioned the hard-liners‘ rosy assumptions leading up to the war.  
 
International buy-in for postwar reconstruction won’t be needed 
The Bush administration‘s hard-liners, anticipating a small U.S. invasion force, no costly 
reconstruction effort, and no need for an open-ended stabilization mission, saw little incentive to 
seek the cooperation of foreign allies and partners, let alone to lock them in by obtaining the 
endorsement of relevant IOs from the outset. As one former Pentagon aide candidly concludes:  
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We probably misunderstood the length of the commitment that we were getting into and 
the difficulties that would occur, which would then have required that kind of long-term 
support and participation from our allies. We had no idea how brittle the Iraqi 
infrastructure was both physically and intellectually. We thought we could go in there, 
get rid of Saddam and his buddies, put nicer people in place, and have a functioning 
country.
1127
   
 
Furthermore, the administration‘s activists were confident that insofar as outside help 
from allies and partners might be advantageous in the invasion‘s aftermath, it would be 
forthcoming, anyway: other nations would follow in the ―slipstream‖ of American leadership, as 
President Bush himself liked to put it, and provide relevant assistance as needed.
1128
 This was the 
lesson that Rumsfeld and his OSD staff, in particular, had taken away from the recent 
Afghanistan experience, where the NATO allies had indeed jumped on the American 
bandwagon, providing troops and funding for long-term stabilization after U.S. forces had 
successfully defeated the Taliban regime.
1129
 The administration‘s hardliners, however, did not 
adequately consider that on Afghanistan (unlike Iraq) the NATO allies had unanimously 
supported U.S. objectives from the outset, with the North Atlantic Council endorsing U.S. 








                                                 
1127 Author interview with Col. Stephen P. Bucci (January 19, 2011). 
1128 Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 377; Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, p. 198; Gordon and Trainor, 
Cobra II, p. 162. 
1129 Author interview with Col. Stephen P. Bucci (January 19, 2011). See also Gordon and Shapiro, Allies At War, p. 
65. 
1130 SC Res. 1368, adopted unanimously on September 12, 2001, did not explicitly endorse U.S. military action, but 
it recognized for the first time that terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security and that military 




4. Powell’s push for a UN-based approach and the silence of the JCS 
 Not all of the Bush administration‘s national security leaders shared the hard-liners‘ 
optimistic assumptions regarding the war and its aftermath, or the aforementioned sense of 
urgency about the threat stemming from Iraq. Senior State Department officials and military 
planners, in particular, opposed the administration‘s rush to war and repeatedly expressed major 
concerns about: the limited troop numbers foreseen for the invasion; the view that the Iraqi 
externals could quickly form a viable government; and finally the assumption that no large-scale 
U.S. stabilization force would be needed after the war. Consequently, they believed that a UN 
endorsement, obtained before the launch of offensive operations, would be valuable to lock in 
the support of foreign allies and partners. In this section I first describe the State Department‘s 
concerns and related policy suggestions, before discussing more specifically the military 
planners‘ attitude. Finally, I show how hard-liners at OSD were able to minimize opposition 
from the uniformed leadership, by either co-opting or intimidating senior military officials in key 
positions. The result was a half-hearted and ultimately unsuccessful U.S. policy vis-à-vis the UN.  
 
The State Department’s concerns about the postwar transition 
Senior policy officials at the Department of State were not fundamentally opposed to the 
idea of military action against Iraq. The administration‘s leading diplomats, with Powell and 
Armitage at the forefront, saw the Iraqi regime as a growing threat that would have to be dealt 
with effectively at some point down the road. However, senior State Department officials 
questioned the existence of operational ties between Saddam Hussein and Al Quaeda. Hence 
they also disputed that military action would have to happen quickly, leaving no time to engage 
key allies and partners through the UN. ―My objection had to do with timing, not with the fact of 




better served waiting until after President Bush was reelected in the fall of 2004.‖1131 Marc 
Grossman, the Bush administration‘s undersecretary of state for policy, shared a similar view: ―I 
wasn‘t for not fighting,‖ he explains. ―I just wasn‘t for fighting him [Saddam Hussein] off the 
top of the list.
1132
 In short, Senior State Department officials wanted to slow down the hard-
liners‘ rush to military action; but they weren‘t opposed to war—there was no fundamental 
matter of principle involved. Powell himself, while reluctant, never explicitly recommended 
against the war, either in public or privately to the president.
1133
  
The senior diplomats‘ insistence that a rush to war should be avoided reflected their 
understanding that Iraq, though a threat, was not an imminent threat to the United States; and 
there were other, more urgent issues that should be dealt with first. Furthermore, several months 
would be needed to build up broad international support for military action. Grossman‘s view in 
mid-2002 was that Saddam should have been contained for at least another year, so that ―in the 
fall of 2003, if you had to use force, you could do so as the leader of a UN-backed coalition like 
we had done in 1991.‖1134 The State Department‘s leaders anticipated a much more complex and 
burdensome reconstruction effort, compared to their colleagues at OSD. They questioned that 
regime change in Iraq could be implemented ―on the cheap.‖1135 Consequently, they insisted, it 
could not be done unilaterally: the United States should make significant efforts to obtain an 
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explicit UN endorsement before the launch of offensive operations, in view of locking in the 
assistance of foreign allies and partners. 
 The State Department was skeptical that Iraqi expatriates, led by Chalabi, could quickly 
form a transitional government, thereby obviating the need for a multi-year period of U.S.-led 
trusteeship. Powell and his staff felt that a government formed largely of expatriates would 
hardly be representative; hence it would not be perceived as legitimate by the local population, 
and it would be unhelpful in terms of stabilizing Iraq. As Grossman explains, the State 
Department‘s ―view was that the future of Iraq needed to be decided by Iraqis and not just by 
Iraqi exiles. Therefore you needed to find a way, even if it took a little extra time, to enfranchise 
Iraqis living in Iraq to participate in this conversation as well.‖1136 President Bush, lobbied by 
OSD, initially disregarded the State Department‘s proposal of a transitional international 
authority, or trusteeship structure, for postwar Iraq. It was not until after the 2003 invasion, when 
it became clear that Chalabi‘s ―externals‖ were nowhere ready to take over and Iraq‘s 
administrative structure began to implode, that Washington scrambled to quickly establish a 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Ambassador Bremer, which incorporated several 
elements of the trusteeship proposals developed at the State Department several months 
earlier.
1137
 As one self-critical former OSD official recalls, ―we thought those expatriates were 
going to ride in on white horses right behind our tanks, they would be welcomed with open arms, 
and they would take over. I think the State Department understood a little better that that was not 
necessarily a good assumption.‖1138 
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Powell tells Bush, ―We are going to own it, so let’s involve the UN‖ 
In the summer of 2002, the administration‘s hard-liners stepped up their rhetorical and 
bureaucratic push to war. By then, it was clear even to mid-ranking officials at the State 
Department that President Bush had decided to move ahead with regime change in Iraq, making 
a military showdown increasingly likely.
1139
 On August 5, 2002, Powell met with the president 
for a private conversation at the White House, which the Secretary of State had requested to 
express his concerns. As Powell himself recalls: ―I took it to the president on the fifth of August 
and told him that when we break this we‘re going to own it. And when the government falls [in 
Iraq] we‘re going to be the government. And you may not want to be the government of this 
country. So let‘s try to get the UN resolution.‖1140 Involving the United Nations, Powell 
elaborated further, might provide an alternative to war, if Saddam cooperated. But it would also 
be crucial in case there was going to be a military confrontation, to maximize support from 
international allies and partners for both combat and postwar stabilization.
1141
 Former President 
Bush recalls that during the conversation, Powell ―was more passionate than I had seen him at 
any NSC meeting. He told me…the military strike would be the easy part. Then America would 
‗own‘ Iraq… [and] a UN resolution was the only way to get any support from the rest of the 
world.‖1142 
In previous weeks, State Department officials had already begun to argue in various 
interagency meetings that Washington should make a serious effort to return the UN weapons 
inspectors to Iraq and obtain a SC endorsement for military action. According to Armitage, most 
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senior officials at the State Department agreed with Powell, and the reasons why they wanted to 
involve the UN were: ―first, avoid the war if possible; and second, get international support 
should [the U.S.] have to go to war.‖ Crucially, policy officials at the State Department 
increasingly ―worried about what would happen after the war,‖ given that OSD had done very 
little planning for postwar stabilization; and they believed that obtaining a UN endorsement from 
the outset would be important ―to get friends and allies on board, to help with the burden.‖1143  
UN endorsement was considered less relevant in terms of generating concrete operational 
support for major combat from international partners, and notably to obtain access to bases, air 
corridors, and port facilities in the Persian Gulf. The expectation was that such support would be 
available regardless of IO involvement. General Franks had in fact confirmed to President Bush 
in the early afternoon of August 5 (with Powell present, and before Powell made his pitch to the 
president for seeking UN endorsement later that day) that CENTCOM had already successfully 
concluded preliminary access, basing, and overflight agreements with relevant partners in the 
Persian Gulf.
1144
 Nor did domestic political concerns play a major role: ―The United Nations is 
not a domestic political factor here,‖ explains Grossman.1145 The administration understood that 
political backing from allies and partners would be valuable in terms of strengthening U.S. 
public support; yet senior State Department officials expected that such backing from an ad-hoc 
―coalition of the willing‖ would be available even without an explicit UN endorsement.1146 
Furthermore, the issue of domestic support became practically moot after Congress adopted a 
joint resolution authorizing the use of force in early October 2002—that is, almost an entire 
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month before the first UN resolution was approved.
1147
 Finally, it appears that concerns about 
reduced overall international cooperation with Washington, or soft balancing against the United 
States, did not motivate the State Department leadership to seek to engage the UN. ―I did not 
expand the problem out to cooperation on counterterrorism and Afghanistan and things like 
that—I didn‘t think through all of that,‖ Powell explains.1148 Nor did other senior administration 
officials worry about soft balancing as a potential consequence of a U.S. invasion without UN 
endorsement. ―I don‘t remember anybody making the argument that we needed international 
sanction on Iraq to keep people cooperating with the U.S. in other areas,‖ explains Hadley.1149  
 
Military planners worry about the rush to war and challenge OSD’s optimistic assumptions 
What role, if any, did senior military officers play in multilateralizing U.S. policy leading 
up to the 2003 Iraq war? Over the following pages, I show that the traditional military 
establishment was in fact highly skeptical of invading Iraq in 2002-03, based on the belief that 
no vital U.S. national interests were at stake that might have warranted the high costs of an open-
ended occupation. Senior military planners on the Joint Staff (JS) and at CENTCOM, who were 
responsible for developing the relevant war plans, recommended a multilateral approach, in view 
of limiting U.S. liability. But the Pentagon‘s civilian leaders were staunchly opposed to 
involving the United Nations, and the chairman and vice-chairman of the JCS, Generals Myers 
and Pace, as well as CENTCOM commander Franks, were for various reasons closely aligned 
with their civilian masters. Therefore, the military planners‘ impact on Washington policy 
debates was limited.  
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 To begin with, several retired general officers, especially former Army and Marine Corps 
leaders, opposed the administration‘s push for war in 2002 and doubted that Iraq constituted an 
imminent, vital threat to the United States. Zinni, a retired Marine Corps general and former 
CENTCOM commander, had retired in the summer of 2000 believing that the international 
sanctions, combined with the enforcement of the no-fly zones and occasional bombing, had 
reduced Saddam Hussein‘s regime to a secondary threat. Under Zinni‘s tenure at CENTCOM, 
the Iraqi army had not only visibly shrunk in size—by the late 1990s, the general recalls, it was 
also ―dealing with obsolete equipment, ill-trained troops, dissatisfaction in the ranks, a lot of 
absenteeism.‖1150 As the momentum towards military action was building up in the fall of 2002, 
Zinni expressed his doubts in public, insisting that Washington should continue to contain Iraq 
and there were other priorities in U.S. national security policy.
1151
 Similarly, General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, another former CENTCOM leader who had commanded coalition forces in the 
1991 Gulf War, spoke out against attacking Iraq in early 2003. Schwartzkopf openly worried 
about the costs of postwar stabilization and insisted that continued containment would be the best 
course to follow.
1152
 But it appears that the retired military brass were merely giving a public 
voice to the concerns that many active-duty officers, some of them closely involved in Iraq war 
planning, harbored in private. In late July 2002, the Washington Post carried a front-page story 
based on off-the-record interviews, saying that many senior military officers favored 
containment and did not consider Iraq an imminent threat.
1153
 By January 2003, TIME Magazine 
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reported that ―as many as 1 in 3 senior officers questions the wisdom of a preemptive war with 
Iraq.‖1154  
Senior military planners on the Joint Staff, who had closely reviewed the war plans, were 
particularly concerned. General John Abizaid, director of the JS until late 2002, and subsequently 
deputy commander at CENTCOM leading up to the war, held a view similar to that of senior 
State Department officials: Iraq constituted a problem that would have to be dealt with at some 
point down the road, but it posed no imminent, vital threat to the United States. The view among 
senior planners on the JS, Abizaid recalls, ―was that even if the Iraqis was moving towards 
weapons of mass destruction, it would be a while before they would really constitute a big 
enough threat. So there seemed to be plenty of time.‖1155 Similarly, planners at CENTCOM and 
active-duty U.S. Army leaders believed that Iraq constituted no imminent threat. Therefore, 
containment remained a viable strategy for the time being, although given that the international 




 The military planners‘ first concern was that a war against Iraq in 2002 or 2003 would 
divert the nation‘s attention and scarce resources away from the strategic threat of transnational 
terrorism. Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, head of operations on the Joint Staff until late 
2002, and one of the few senior officers on active duty who staunchly opposed the war (which 
eventually contributed to his early retirement), recalls related debates among the military brass as 
follows: 
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After 9/11 occurred, the focus was on Al-Qaeda and the Taleban and Afghanistan, and 
that‘s where all the effort and mental focus of the military naturally began to concentrate. 
But very quickly people in OSD, Secretary Rumsfeld and others, began talking about 
Iraq. And the military‘s reaction—as you can imagine, I had extensive contacts with other 
senior American officers around the world, as well as in Washington—the reaction was 
confusion. Why Iraq? Although nobody had any affection or regard for Saddam Hussein, 




Furthermore, as the administration‘s march to war appeared increasingly unstoppable 
from mid-2002 onwards, the military planners, as well as a number of troop commanders, were 
concerned that the invasion would be much costlier than civilian hard-liners anticipated. 
Rumsfeld‘s insistence on repeatedly cutting the troop numbers for both combat operations and 
postwar stabilization was viewed as a dangerous gamble, which would needlessly expose the 




Army leaders were particularly concerned, given that their service would bear the 
heaviest burden and they would largely ―own‖ postwar stability operations in Iraq. ―It was clear 
to everybody that not only did we have the wrong capability on the front end, but certainly the 
wrong capability on the back end,‖ remembers one former troop commander.1159 In the fall of 
2002, General Eric Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, privately expressed his concerns 
about the lack of sufficient troops for both combat and post-combat stabilization to Secretary 
Rumsfeld.
1160
 Furthermore, finding that OSD was all but deaf to his pleas, Shinseki also 
repeatedly voiced his concerns to senior staffers on the NSC, who relayed those views to Rice 
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 In early 2003, shortly before the invasion, General Shinseki, who had previously 
commanded U.S. stabilization forces in Bosnia, openly challenged the hard-liners‘ optimistic 
assumptions about postwar Iraq. During a congressional hearing, the Army chief insisted that 
―several hundred thousand soldiers‖ would be required for post-combat stabilization.1162  
Senior military planners on the JS and at CENTCOM for the most part shared the Army 
leaders‘ concerns. CENTCOM planners worried about the ―hybrid‖ war plan, towards which 
Rumsfeld had pushed them by early August 2002. The plan foresaw only a very short buildup of 
roughly two weeks before the launch of offensive operations, which would leave the United 
States with less than 50,000 troops available to secure all of Iraq ten days into the ground 
war.
1163
 As Col. John Agoglia, CENTCOM‘s deputy head of plans leading up to the war, recalls:  
We as planners talked about how best to maintain control of the civilian population after 
the invasion. We believed that the Iraqi army could potentially surrender en masse, or 
desert. The answer was, quite frankly, more force. We were constantly fighting for those 
additional forces. We told General Franks that we had some real concerns with the hybrid 





By the fall of 2002, senior members of the JS in Washington, who regularly reviewed the 
war plans developed at CENTCOM based on guidelines from OSD, were seriously concerned 
about the low troop numbers and more generally the lack of detailed planning for postwar 
stabilization.
1165
 Under directions from Abizaid, in late September the JS conducted a classified 
                                                 
1161 Author interview with Kori Schake (January 21, 2011). 
1162 Statement by Eric Shinseki, ―Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004,‖ 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Cong., 1 sess. (Washington: February 25, 2003). 
For more background, see also Ricks, Fiasco, 96f. 
1163 United States Central Command, ―Operational Timeline/Force Flow,‖ Declassified Power Point Briefing Slide, 
August 2002 (Available online at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/Tab%20K.pdf). See also 
Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, p. 87; Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 287; Franks, American Soldier, pp. 389f. 
1164 Author interview with Col. John F. Agoglia (February 1, 2003). 




war game, code-named ―Prominent Hammer II,‖ which highlighted significant shortages in war 
planning and force allocation. This computer-based simulation eventually persuaded the 
Pentagon‘s civilian leadership to increase the troop numbers and gradually move away from the 




The Joint Staff and CENTCOM planners counsel multilateralism 
The military planners, anticipating that the invasion would be followed by an open-ended 
and costly stabilization phase, recommended that the administration obtain reassurances about 
postwar burden sharing from international allies and partners before the launch of offensive 
operations. To this end, they explicitly counseled on several occasions that a UN endorsement of 
the war might be helpful. The planners‘ hope was that international troops might at least partially 
substitute for low U.S. force levels during the postwar occupation phase and thus help avert a 
major strategic disaster. Senior JS officials like Abizaid, General George Casey, the director for 
strategic plans and policy, and Newbold, the director for operations, shared a ―strong feeling that 
the UN had to be part of the decision-making process, endorsing what action [the U.S.] would 
take.‖1167  
General Abizaid recalls that the JS leaders saw a UN-backed coalition as particularly 
valuable for ―burden sharing on postwar stabilization, because none of us thought that the 
postwar planning assumptions [dictated by OSD] were very robust.‖1168 The senior military 
planners were pragmatists who did not have a strong doctrinal preference for UN endorsement 
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over support from ad-hoc coalitions: how to bind in the allies was seen as a political issue, not a 
military one. Nevertheless, the JS leaders clearly understood that a UN mandate could be very 
helpful in terms of locking in foreign allies and partners for the long run.
1169
 From the early 
summer of 2002 onwards, those senior military planners insisted on the desirability of 
multilateralizing the policy with Generals Myers and Pace, the chairman and vice chairman of 
the JCS, as well as in meetings of the administration‘s NSC Deputies Committee, the highest 




The planners at CENTCOM shared similar concerns leading up to the war and formulated 
comparable recommendations. Agoglia remembers that he and his colleagues counseled from 
late 2001 onward—that is, beginning with the earliest iterations of the war plan—that a UN 
endorsement might be helpful in terms of obtaining greater support from foreign partners. But it 
was in June of 2002, when Rumsfeld had pushed the war planning towards a ―running start‖ 
concept that significantly shortened the deployment phase while slashing the troop numbers, that 
the discussion at CENTCOM more specifically focused on the desirability of a UN mandate.
1171
 
―We knew that the greater level of international support we had, the better it would be for the 
post-conflict side of the equation,‖ explains Agoglia. ―We got more into the UN discussion in the 
summer of 2002, in late June and July, as we started doing the running start.  We would go in 
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faster, we would have less force there, so additional allies would be helpful.‖1172 The military 
planners expressed their sentiment on the desirability of a UN mandate, aimed at achieving 
greater international buy-in, to OSD representatives at CENTCOM, who further relayed those 
views to Feith, the Pentagon‘s undersecretary for policy. Feith, however, was notoriously hostile 
to the United Nations and to multilateralism more generally.
1173
 Agoglia and his colleagues also 
expressed the same recommendations to General Franks, but it is unclear whether the 
CENTCOM commander then conveyed those concerns to Rumsfeld or the president.
1174
  
 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the military planners on the JS and at 
CENTCOM, as well as the armed services more generally, had at least some impact on the 
administration‘s subsequent decision to involve the United Nations. First, senior JS officials 
expressed their concerns in the NSC Deputies Committee, which crucially contributed to 
formulating the administration‘s policy on Iraq. Furthermore, the military brass maintained 
various informal channels of communication with Secretary Powell and his deputy, Armitage.
1175
  
It may not be a coincidence that Powell made his case to President Bush for involving the UNSC 
in the evening of August 5, only a few hours after Franks had briefed the latest ―hybrid‖ war plan 
to the president—a plan worked out in previous weeks under pressure from OSD, and which 
further increased the already significant worries among military planners about the ability of 
American forces to maintain public order following the invasion.
1176
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Armitage acknowledges that senior military officers often called him to express their 
concerns about troop numbers, the administration‘s perceived rush to war, the lack of 
multilateral involvement, and more generally the inadequate planning for postwar occupation: 
―You usually get through to the deputy,‖ he explains, ―that leaves less fingerprints.‖1177 Powell 
himself was very much concerned leading up to the war that the Pentagon‘s civilian leaders were 
taking unnecessary risks by forcing a cut-down in the number of combat and occupation troops 
that went beyond what most of the military commanders felt comfortable with.
1178
 As a former 
JCS Chairman who was now serving as Secretary of State, Powell was in a delicate position: he 
could not admit to be formally speaking on behalf of the armed services in cabinet-level 
meetings—it would have been improper, and Rumsfeld in particular was highly sensitive about 
the State Department‘s known contacts to the military.1179 Directly questioned about it, Powell 
denies that he was speaking for the military during the August 5 meeting, when he made his case 
to the president for involving the UN: ―it was my concern,‖ he insists, though it was certainly 
influenced by his ―own personal experience as a soldier of thirty-five years.‖1180 
 
Yes-men at the top: understanding the military’s limited influence on Iraq policy  
Under normal circumstances, the military planners should not have had to rely on the 
Secretary of State or on various NSC staffers to convey their concerns to the president. Since the 
1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the chairman and vice-chairman of the JCS are supposed to 
speak for the military and represent the military‘s interests and concerns vis-à-vis the president 
and the NSC. However, civil-military relations during the administration of President G.W. Bush 
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did not follow this pattern. Generals Myers and Pace, the chairman and vice-chairman of the 
JCS, lacked the personal fortitude of previous JCS chairmen. It appears that Rumsfeld had in fact 
chosen them for the top military posts largely because of their known malleability.
1181
 They were 
closely aligned with the Pentagon‘s civilian leadership on most policy issues, and they never 
dared to challenge or contradict Rumsfeld in front of either the president or the cabinet.
1182
 
Rumsfeld was convinced that the military had gained too much authority in matters of policy in 
previous years, and he took up his post as defense secretary in 2001 determined to quash the 
authority of the Joint Chiefs.
1183
 As one former senior military officer with direct experience at 
OSD recalls: ―Secretary Rumsfeld wanted yes-men around him, and that‘s what he got.‖1184  
Reportedly, Powell and Armitage had in fact asked Generals Myers and Pace to back 
them at the NSC on troop numbers and the need for multilateral involvement: ―But there wasn‘t 
any support from the Chairman or Vice-Chairman, and that was extremely irritating to Secretary 
Powell and Armitage. In fact, Secretary Powell challenged General Myers to be more assertive—
that was a point of real friction between them.‖1185 The unwillingness of Myers and Pace to 
forcefully convey the concerns of military planners and troop commanders to the president (and 
to the NSC more generally) made it extremely difficult for the military to have any independent 
impact on Washington policy debates leading up to the Iraq war.
1186
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The only other senior military official who regularly talked to the president leading up to 
the war was General Franks, the CENTCOM commander. Certainly Franks did not lack the 
opportunity to convey the concerns of his own military planners to the commander-in-chief. 
However, in his eagerness to please his civilian superiors, Franks seems to have followed OSD‘s 
guidance with little questioning and largely brushed aside his own planners‘ concerns, especially 
on post-combat stabilization. As one former senior CENTCOM official recalls: ―we knew there 
had to be additional forces for nation building; and we said all along there would be more forces 
required. But Rumsfeld didn‘t want the forces there, and Franks followed his boss.‖1187 It also 
appears that Rumsfeld exploited Franks‘s somewhat cocky personality, by encouraging the 
CENTCOM commander to disregard criticism or advice from the Joint Staff. ―This was going 
direct OSD to CENTCOM and it was bypassing the Joint Staff,‖ recalls Abizaid. ―This was 
highly compartmentalized activity that was outside the norm.‖1188  
Furthermore, Franks had little personal interest in planning for postwar stabilization. ―As 
he saw it, CENTCOM was going to fight the war and then go home,‖ recalls a former senior 
military planner.
1189
 Panning for postwar stabilization (so-called ―Phase IV‖) is supposed to be 
doctrinally part of any war plan; yet the Joint Staff was never briefed on a complete Phase IV 
plan by CENTCOM leading up to the war.
1190
 Franks knew from December 2001 onward that he 
was going to retire from CENTCOM by the summer of 2003.
1191
 The war was unlikely to start 
before February 2003. In fact, CENTCOM plans briefed to the president in August 2002 already 
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foresaw a start of the invasion by February or early March of the subsequent year.
1192
 Therefore, 
Franks focused almost exclusively on the combat phase of the war, which he knew was going to 
be executed under his watch and where victory appeared almost certain, and he seems to have 
accepted OSD‘s rosy assumptions about the post-combat transition without much questioning. 
―That‘s why the whole Phase IV planning received so little attention,‖ explains Col. Michael 
Trahan, who worked for Franks at CENTCOM. ―He wasn‘t going to be the one responsible for 
executing it, and so he didn‘t have to take ownership.‖1193 Following the invasion of Iraq, Franks 
in fact left CENTCOM in July 2003 and retired from the Army in August.
1194
 
With little or no support from the JCS chairman and vice-chairman or from General 
Franks, and with the Pentagon‘s civilian leadership agitating for war, it was exceedingly difficult 
for other general officers, including the service chiefs and senior JS officials, to convey their 
views to the president and the NSC. In principle, the chief of staff of the Army and the Marine 
Corps, Generals Shinseki and James Jones (who both harbored serious concerns about the war 
plans), could have requested a personal meeting with the president to directly convey their views. 
However, that would have been an extreme measure for the service chiefs to take. Their role is 
that of force providers, and they don‘t usually advise the president on matters of policy.1195 ―The 
individual and collective character of the JCS,‖ explains one former senior Joint Staff official, 
―was such that they would not take their concerns to the president. With different people, it 
might have been a different story.‖1196 Shinseki in particular was a low-key general officer who 
preferred to defer to the political leadership on matters of policy, and he publicly spoke out on 
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Finally, two factors explain why skeptical general officers below the JCS level never 
spoke out more assertively, either privately inside the administration, or in public by leaking 
their views to the press. First, Secretary Rumsfeld and his civilian staffers at OSD made it very 
clear that loyalty on the part of the top military brass would be rewarded and there would be a 
price to pay for opposition. In a striking departure from previous practice, Rumsfeld interfered 
with military promotions and personally decided on all the assignments for three- and four-star 
general officers.
1198
 Franklin Miller, a former senior defense official on the NSC, is scathing in 
his assessment: ―Rumsfeld was a tyrant. He suppressed any form of dissent in the building. By 
personally interviewing any nominee for flag rank, Rumsfeld made it clear that he was going to 
be the one deciding who was going to be promoted and who wasn‘t. He was politicizing the 
promotion system and making it very clear [to the senior officers] that if they crossed the line, 
their career was over.‖1199  
In addition, there never was a high-level policy debate inside the administration about 
whether the U.S. should in fact invade Iraq, which would have allowed the military to express 
their views more assertively, including through public leaks. President Bush, as previously 
argued, appears to have decided soon after September 11, 2001 that Saddam had to be forcibly 
removed from power. Throughout the first part of 2002, the military planning was kept secret, 
but among senior officials involved, ―there seemed to have been an assumption there would be 
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war.‖1200 By June 2002, the president told General Franks and his CENTCOM planners that the 
policy debate was essentially over.
1201
 ―There wasn‘t open opposition [from the military] 
because there wasn‘t a decision,‖ explains Newbold.1202 In previous years, leading up to other 
armed interventions, the military brass had usually leaked their concerns to the press or conveyed 
their skepticism to Congress before a decision was taken. But once the president decides, the 
military usually fall in line, so as not to undercut government policy. If individual officers 
remain fundamentally opposed, their only alternative is to resign.
1203
 The military brass had also 
been genuinely shocked by the events of 9/11, 2001, which added to their reluctance to publicly 
oppose a policy that the civilian leadership was presenting as part and parcel of the 
administration‘s war against terrorism.1204  
Summing up, senior military planners and force commanders at CENTCOM, the Joint 
Staff, and at the Army staff were very much concerned about the lack of Phase IV planning 
leading up to the Iraq war, and there was a widespread view that the administration should have 
made a greater effort to lock in the support of foreign allies and partners for postwar 
reconstruction. However, the nation‘s top military leaders, Myers and Pace, as well as 
CENTCOM commander Franks—who were the only uniformed officials to enjoy regular access 
to the president—were closely aligned with the Pentagon‘s civilian leadership and loyally echoed 
Secretary Rumsfeld‘s views in front of the president and the cabinet. Other general officers who 
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were concerned about the war plans lacked either the personal fortitude or the opportunity to 
convey their views to the president and the NSC.  
In the absence of vigorous military opposition or publicly expressed skepticism about the 
policy and the war plans, the bureaucratic political dynamics that had decisively pushed the 
Washington policy process toward IO-based multilateralism on other occasions were not 
activated leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. The administration‘s civilian hard-liners lacked strong 
incentives to seek the endorsement of relevant IOs, in view of locking in the support of foreign 
allies and partners and thereby reassuring the JCS about postwar stabilization, because the JCS 
were either fully on board with the policy to begin with or never made it clear that they weren‘t.  
 
5. The outcome: A half-hearted attempt at the United Nations 
 The Bush administration‘s limited efforts to engage the United Nations in the fall of 2002 
were largely the result of Secretary Powell‘s personal insistence (though the Secretary of State, 
as previously argued, was undoubtedly aware of the military‘s preferences and concerns). 
Following Powell‘s meeting with the president on August 5, 2002, the administration‘s chief 
diplomat repeated his arguments for involving the UN in front of the entire NSC on August 16, 
and then again on September 7.
1205
 Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney pushed back 
on both occasions: working through the UN would mean bringing the international weapons 
inspectors back into Iraq, and as a result, they argued, the U.S. would be tied down in a never-
ending diplomatic process.
1206
 Furthermore, given the hard-liners‘ optimistic assumptions about 
the war and its aftermath, they believed that the invasion would generate its own legitimacy and 
an explicit endorsement from the UN Security Council would be unnecessary. Hence a UN 
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mandate should not be sought—unless the SC could be persuaded to swiftly approve military 
action on the administration‘s terms and at little cost to the United States.1207 ―They fought us 





Towards Resolution 1441 
 President Bush shared the hard-liners‘ aforementioned skepticism about the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, Secretary Powell persuaded him that the administration should not appear 
to be completely sidelining the UN leading up to the war. At the NSC meeting on September 7, 
the president declared that he would work with the UN and seek a SC resolution to bring back 
the weapons inspectors and obtain an expression of support for military intervention as a last 
resort.
1209
 In previous weeks and months, Tony Blair, the British prime minister, had also 
repeatedly urged President Bush to seek UN authority for the use of force. The British leader—




However, the Bush administration‘s commitment to and patience with the UN process 
was always limited. John Negroponte, at the time the U.S. permanent representative to the 
United Nations in New York, thinks that ―the effort to get an inspections resolution was half-
hearted at best from the point of view of the president of the United States in the fall of 2002. 
The administration didn‘t really focus much on diplomacy with the other Security Council 
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members leading up to the Iraq war.‖1211 The president heeded Powell‘s advice to involve the 
United Nations, but he also seems to have agreed with the hard-liners that the UN process would 
be valuable only insofar as it could quickly grant an international stamp of legitimacy to what 
Washington wanted to do anyway—namely forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power. 




 The negotiations on a SC resolution began in mid-September, after President Bush had 
committed in a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 12 that he would work 
with the United Nations.
1213
 By the end of the month, the U.S. delegation in New York circulated 
a first draft resolution. But the text was very harsh and seemed to be aimed at little more than 
quickly providing a pretext for war. Cheney and Rumsfeld had successfully lobbied for 
draconian requirements that foresaw: the creation of no-fly and even no-drive zones along the 
UN inspection routes; the deployment of American inspection teams and armed guards to 
accompany the UN inspectors; and the right to take Iraqi scientists who might have worked on 
WMD programs abroad for interrogation. Iraq‘s failure to comply in full would have 
automatically authorized ―all necessary means.‖1214 It quickly became evident, however, that 
such a draconian draft had virtually no support at the SC beyond the United States, with France 
and Russia vehemently opposed and even the British quite skeptical.
1215
 Greenstock, the British 
UN ambassador, recalls that ―the Russians were very opposed to that for the first few weeks of 
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negotiations, and then the French took over from the first or second week of October.‖1216 The 
French government‘s view, shared by several of the Council‘s non-permanent members, was that 
a tough UN resolution ought to be adopted to disarm Iraq of whatever WMD it still possessed. 
But the resolution should not include an explicit, automatic authorization of force in case of Iraqi 
noncompliance. Only the UN weapons inspectors themselves, and not individual member states, 
should be able to determine Iraqi ―material breach,‖ or noncompliance with its disarmament 
obligations; and before using force, a second resolution would be necessary with an explicit 
authorization of military action.
1217
 
 By late October, the Bush administration finally agreed to drop any reference to ―all 
necessary means‖ in the initial UN resolution.1218 That did not happen, however, until after 
another vigorous debate between Powell and Wolfowitz (who was replacing Rumsfeld on that 
occasion) during an NSC meeting on October 15, where the OSD representative insisted that 
Washington should force a vote on the initial draft and then move ahead with using force 
unilaterally if needed, since ―there are worse things than having our…draft defeated or vetoed by 
France.‖1219 But President Bush and Rice agreed with Powell that it was too early to completely 
abandon the UN track, given the president‘s public pledge to work with the UN and Iraq‘s recent 
declaration that the weapons inspectors could return without preconditions.
1220
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On November 8, 2002, after almost seven weeks of intense negotiations, the SC 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1441.
1221
 The resolution offered Iraq a ―final opportunity‖ to 
comply with its disarmament obligations, established a new UN inspections regime to verify 
Baghdad‘s compliance, and threatened ―serious consequences‖ in case of Iraqi noncooperation. 
Furthermore, the resolution explicitly foresaw—in an apparent concession to France—that any 
failure by Iraq to comply with its obligations would be immediately reported to the Council by 
the inspectors, after which the Council would decide on further measures to be taken.
1222
 As 
Negroponte declared at the time, ―this resolution contains no ‗hidden triggers‘ and no 
‗automaticity‘ with respect to the use of force.‖1223 With hindsight, even the administration‘s 
hard-liners concede that ―Resolution 1441 was not an authorization for war.‖1224 
 The administration however felt that it had achieved what it needed in terms of 
legitimacy for military action. ―We didn‘t feel as though an additional resolution would be 
necessary for a military operation,‖ recalls William Wood, who as a senior State Department 
official had been heavily involved in negotiating the resolution.
1225
 Powell and his staff reckoned 
that the world‘s headlines would focus on the fact that an international consensus on Iraq had 
been achieved and the SC had unanimously threatened ―serious consequences.‖ The general 
public would not read the resolution‘s technical details or understand its fairly complicated 
language.
1226
 Furthermore, senior administration officials understood that SCR 1441 would help 
make the case that President Bush was not hell-bent on military action, and war would be a ―last 
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resort.‖1227 Finally, in view of Iraq‘s record over the previous decade, nobody in the 
administration expected that Iraq would fully cooperate; and Powell had made it clear to the 
other SC members during the negotiations that for Washington, ―nonperformance means 
war.‖1228 
 
The UN inspections regime—pretext for war? 
 The UN weapons inspectors re-entered Iraq in late November 2002, for the first time 
since 1998, and they immediately began their work.
1229
 On December 7, as required by SCR 
1441, Iraq provided a lengthy declaration (11,807 pages of mostly old and incomplete data) on 
its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, which it said proved that it had no illicit 
weapons.
1230
 Thereupon Vice President Cheney, who had insisted on the requirement for such a 
declaration in the first place, claimed that since the Iraqi statements were blatantly false, the 
administration should simply declare ―material breach‖ and move ahead with military action in 
short order.
1231
 Negroponte recalls that the administration‘s hard-liners had indeed been ―waiting 
for the declaration with bated breath,‖ and it was clear to him that ―anything that was wrong with 
it, they were going to use as a pretext for material breach.‖1232 Yet nobody among the other SC 
members—crucially including the British—agreed with this interpretation.1233 Chief weapons 
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inspector Hans Blix asked for seven weeks, until January 27, 2003, to study the voluminous Iraqi 
declaration. Since General Franks was not yet ready to launch military operations anyway, the 
administration concluded that the UN process should not be precipitously abandoned.
1234
 
Throughout December 2002 and until mid-January 2003, most foreign leaders, including 
senior British and French officials, believed that Iraqi cooperation with the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNSCOM), the tough new inspections 
regime headed by Blix, might still avoid a military confrontation.
1235
 The inspections, backed by 
the threat of force, were in fact off to a reasonably good start: UNSCOM teams were conducting 
some 300 inspections a month, many of them unannounced, including on suspicious sites pointed 
out by U.S. and allied intelligence.
1236
 No illicit weapons material was discovered, but in the 
course of the inspections process about seventy Iraqi ―Al-Samoud‖ missiles, which exceeded the 
allowed range, were destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision.
1237
 Blix‘s first report to the SC, on 
January 27, 2003, had pointed out some shortcomings in Iraq‘s cooperation, although there were 
no concrete instances of violation. By February 14, Blix was able to report that ―the situation has 
improved,‖ and although many prohibited weapons remained unaccounted for, the chief weapons 
inspector insisted that with full Iraqi cooperation, the period of disarmament could be short.
1238
 
 However, in Washington the administration‘s patience was clearly limited. By December 
2002, given the pace of military preparations and the large U.S. force buildup in the Persian 
Gulf, war had become a virtual necessity. Withdrawing American forces without first having 
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removed Saddam Hussein from power would have been politically extremely difficult for 
President Bush.
1239
 In late November, General Franks had set in motion the deployment of a full 
invasion force of almost 130,000 American troops.
1240
 That came on top of the tens of thousands 
of troops that had already been silently deployed to the Persian Gulf under orders from Rumsfeld 
since August 2002, under the guise of training exercises and increasing the theater capacity for 
Afghanistan.
1241
 Rumsfeld, in short, had set the nation on a default path towards military action; 
and he eventually warned that the president couldn‘t ―leave 150,000 troops sitting on Iraq‘s 
border forever.‖1242  
On December 18, 2002, shortly after the Iraqi weapons declaration, President Bush said 
during an NSC meeting: ―I think war is inevitable.‖1243 Secretary Powell himself, understanding 
where the administration was headed, suggested during that same NSC meeting (i.e., less than 
three weeks after the UN inspectors had moved back into Iraq) that soon after Blix‘s report to the 
Security Council on January 27, 2003, the United States should declare Saddam Hussein to be in 
material breach and quickly drive the UN process to a conclusion.
1244
 Blix subsequently sought 
to reassure Powell that if Iraq cooperated further, the remaining weapons questions could be 
resolved by April 15, 2003. Powell, however, told him that would be too late.
1245
 From the point 
of view of an administration that was determined to go to war, further inspections were 
becoming a political liability: reports of increasing Iraqi disarmament and cooperation risked 
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destroying the administration‘s ostensible casus belli and might undermine public support for the 
war. Hadley candidly explains that a continuation of the UN inspections, ―rather than being the 
basis for a resolution to go to war, would basically have prevented us from going to war.‖1246 
From Washington‘s standpoint, the UN inspections regime was thus never more than a 
side-show, to be tolerated until the point in early March 2003 when General Franks would be 
ready to launch the invasion.
1247
 The Bush administration was ―never interested in the 
inspections, really,‖ concludes Greenstock, the British ambassador in New York. ―They were 
just looking for a degree of legitimacy that they could milk out of the system.‖1248 Negroponte, 
his former American colleague, develops the analysis further:  
The president had probably already made up his mind to go to war even before we got the 
resolution. So he wasn‘t really prepared to give the inspections regime much of a chance. 
If you set up a UN institution to carry out a regime of inspections and you are serious 





6. Could a second UN resolution have been obtained?  
Pundits close to the Bush administration have claimed that Washington made a serious 
effort to get a second UN resolution authorizing military action in February and early March 
2003, but obtaining such a resolution was in fact impossible due to French and Russian 
obstructionism at the SC.
1250
 I argue that this conclusion relies on a revisionist interpretation of 
history that is not supported by the evidence. A reasonable counterfactual argument can be made 
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that the Bush administration could in fact have obtained a second resolution authorizing military 
action, provided there had been no rush to war and U.S. authorities had been willing to devote 
more time and resources to the diplomatic effort. 
  In the course of January 2003, Washington‘s international partners realized that the Bush 
administration‘s march to war was in fact unstoppable. On January 13, 2003, French President 
Chirac dispatched his diplomatic adviser, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, to Washington for 
consultations with senior Bush administration officials. The French envoy suggested that the UN 
inspectors be given more time to complete their work, and he left open the possibility of French 
support for military action down the road. But National Security Advisor Rice straightforwardly 
told him that U.S. credibility was now at stake and the administration could not wait for much 
longer.
1251
 ―After Gourdault-Monagne‘s visit to Washington,‖ recalls a French diplomat who 
personally attended the meetings, ―it became very clear to people in Paris that the U.S. 
administration was going to go to war no matter what happened.
1252
 During the visit, Gourdault-
Montagne had suggested that if military action was deemed necessary in Washington, the United 
States should simply move ahead on the basis of SCR 1441, without coming back to the Council 
for a second resolution, and Paris would acquiesce in the decision.
1253
 Subsequently Jean-David 
Levitte, the French ambassador to Washington, repeated the same point to Hadley: in view of 
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Tony Blair needs a second UN resolution 
 As previously argued, following the adoption of SCR 1441, the Bush administration had 
at first not intended to come back to the Council for a second resolution, which it deemed 
unnecessary.
1255
 It was Blair, the British leader, who in late January 2003 insisted that 
Washington and London should come back to the SC and seek a second resolution, and he 
persuaded President Bush, against the explicit recommendation of most of the latter‘s senior 
policy advisers, including Rice and Powell.
1256
 Blair had promised a skeptical British public in 
December 2002 that he would only support military action against Iraq with a UN mandate or if 
―the spirit of the UN resolution was broken because an unreasonable veto was put down.‖1257 In 
other words, British authorities needed to be able to persuade their domestic public that they had 




 From late January to early March 2003, London scrambled to obtain a second UN 
resolution authorizing the use of force, but Washington‘s support for the effort was lukewarm, at 
best. In Greenstock‘s words, the United States for the most part simply ―condoned a certain 
amount of time for the British to make the effort.‖1259 In early 2003, the American president 
hardly ever spoke to either Chirac or the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, thus never putting 
his full personal weight behind seeking to obtain their abstention at the Council.
1260
 Secretary 
Powell, too, largely focused on the domestic political front once SCR 1441 was adopted, and 
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(contrary to his French counterpart, Dominique de Villepin) he did not personally travel to the 
capitals of undecided Council members, leaving the job to lower-ranking State Department 
officials.
1261
 ―Contrast the way that the Bush administration handled the second resolution in 
2003 with Jim Baker‘s effort on the first Gulf War,‖ suggests Ambassador Negroponte, and it 
becomes clear that in 2002-03, the administration ―didn‘t really focus much on diplomacy with 
the other Security Council members leading up to the Iraq war.‖1262 In 1990-91, President 
G.H.W. Bush had been personally deeply involved in diplomacy with key international partners, 
and Secretary of State James Baker had visited forty-one countries on five continents (frequently 
offering significant financial side-payments and diplomatic incentives), in view of building up 




Seeking a numerical majority on the Council  
 French foreign minister de Villepin had already hinted in an interview on January 20, 
2003 that under the existing circumstances, his country would oppose a second resolution 
explicitly authorizing military action.
1264
 Policy officials in London and Washington, however, 
expected that if at least nine out of the Council‘s fifteen members could be persuaded to vote for 
a second resolution, Paris would have abstained instead of vetoing the resolution.
1265
 France had 
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But by early February 2003, the Bush administration could count only on itself and 
Britain among the Council‘s five permanent members, plus Spain and Bulgaria among the 
current ten nonpermanent members. Among the P5, France, Russia, and China were opposed to 
an immediate authorization of military action, believing that the UNSCOM inspections were 
making progress. That put all the weight on the remaining six nonpermament members, who for 
the time being remained undecided: namely, Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, Angola, Cameroon, and 
Guinea. If Washington and London could persuade five out of the six undecided nations to 
support military action, then France, as well as Russia and China, would probably have 
abstained, and a second resolution authorizing military action could in all likelihood have been 
adopted at the Council.
1267
  
 On February 24, the British, with acquiescence from Washington, circulated a draft 
resolution in New York, which stated that Iraq had not complied with its international 
obligations and therefore ―failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441.‖1268 
The draft was clearly interpreted by everyone on the Council as an attempt to authorize the 
―serious consequences‖ that had merely been threatened in resolution 1441.1269 In previous 
weeks, British and American diplomats had put significant pressure on the six undecided Council 
members, in view of obtaining their affirmative vote. Walter Kansteiner, at the time the assistant 
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secretary of state for Africa, and his British counterpart, Valerie Amos, had personally met with 
the leaders of Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon, and by mid-February, all three of them had 
promised to support the British-American draft.
1270
  
By the end of February, Chile and Mexico, too, were shifting towards an affirmative vote. 
At that point, a personal visit by President Bush nor Secretary Powell, combined with significant 
financial incentives (or not-so-veiled threats) from the United States, might well have locked in 
their support. Instead, as a favor to Blair, President Bush merely called Vincente Fox, the 
Mexican president, on the telephone, and there is no evidence of explicit side-payments having 
been offered.
1271
 The Pakistani government was expected to support the United States, given its 
financial dependence on Washington.
1272
 While neither Mexico, nor Chile, or Pakistan had 
formally assured their affirmative vote, American diplomats involved in the UN negotiations are 
confident that if the United States government had put its full diplomatic weight behind the 
February 24 draft resolution and forced a vote, a nine-member majority could indeed have been 




Chirac says ―non‖ 
 The window of opportunity that had emerged by late February, however, closed again in 
early March, as Iraq‘s cooperation with the weapons inspectors further improved and world 
public opinion increasingly turned against the war. Millions of people participated in public 
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marches against the war in several European capitals, including London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, 
and Madrid.
1274
 By then, President Chirac, an instinctive politician, had also become more vocal 
in his public opposition to the war.
1275
 On March 5, the foreign ministers of France, Russia, and 
Germany met in Paris and issued a joint declaration stating that they would ―not allow a 
proposed resolution to pass that authorizes the resort to force.‖1276 A few days later, on March 
10, Chirac went one step further, declaring in a televised interview that France would veto any 
explicit authorization of military action ―whatever the circumstances‖—by which he meant, 
regardless of how many nonpermanent members were going to vote for the resolution.
1277
  
For Chirac, the veto threat was both a matter of principle (the Council should not rubber-
stamp what he believed would be an illegitimate war) and of political expediency (the war was 
deeply unpopular among European publics and among French Muslims in particular).But there 
was also a tactical dimension involved. French political authorities had concluded that by making 
the veto threat explicit, they could take the political pressure off the nonpermament members, 
offering them political cover, and thereby prevent Washington and London from obtaining a 
nine-member majority on the Council. Jean-Marc de La Sablière, the French UN ambassador at 
the time, remembers that at the end of February 2003, the UN representatives of Chile and 
Mexico came to see him and mentioned: ―the Americans are saying that you will abstain.‖ When 
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de La Sablière sought to reassure them that France would in fact veto any explicit authorization 
of force at this stage, they asked: ―well, could you make it public?‖1278 
  By early March—that is, before Chirac issued his explicit veto threat on March 10—the 
six undecided nations had again become much more uncertain about whether to support a second 
resolution authorizing force. Their view was that the inspectors should be allowed more time to 
complete their work and the SC should establish specific benchmarks, against which Iraq‘s 
compliance could then more clearly be measured. Most of them believed that another thirty to 
sixty days should be allowed for that purpose. ―The fact was that they [the undecided six] felt 
that the Americans were rushing it beyond the logic of the situation,‖ explains Greenstock. ―So 
in the end, they started to march backwards and moved away from what they were being asked to 
do. The Africans, too, fell away. And that movement was accentuated when the French said they 
were going to veto.‖1279 
 
The last-minute benchmarks proposal  
Between March 8 and March 12, 2003, Greenstock launched a last-minute effort to find a 
compromise agreement with the six uncommitted nations, by working out a list of five 
benchmarks that Iraq would have had to meet within a short time frame. Specific requirements 
included cooperation with the UN inspectors on taking Iraqi scientists and their families abroad 
for interviews, as well as accounting for anthrax, alleged stores of VX nerve gas, ballistic 
missiles, and remotely piloted aircraft.
1280
 Washington reluctantly allowed the British to move 
ahead with the proposal but was unwilling to allow more than a single week for Iraq‘s full 
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compliance—hence the final deadline had to be March 17.1281 The six uncommitted members, 
for their part, were open to finding a compromise solution but felt that the benchmarks should 
not be a mere pretext for war. ―The six liked the idea, but they had requirements on which 
Greenstock was never able to deliver,‖ explains de La Sablière.1282 The six uncommitted nations 
insisted on a longer deadline and asked that there be no ultimatum or ―automaticity‖—that is, the 
Council would have to assess the implementation of the benchmarks after the deadline, based on 
a report from the inspectors.
1283
 Greenstock himself explains the ultimate failure of the 
benchmarks proposal as follows:  
The middle ground six, the Africans, the Pakistanis, and the Latin Americans, went along 
tentatively with the idea of setting benchmarks. But they wanted to stipulate a much 
greater length of time for Saddam to meet those benchmarks than the Americans were 
prepared to concede. They [the six] stipulated forty-five days to me, and we couldn‘t 




France and Russia, for their part, would most likely have gone along with the benchmarks 
proposal, so long as the SC retained the ultimate authority to decide on military action.
1285
 As 
one senior French diplomat explains: ―Whether we were going to accept it sincerely or because 
we had no other choice, that‘s another question. But I think we would have accepted it.‖1286 
Assuming that Washington had consented to a 45-day deadline, a benchmarks resolution could 
have been adopted around March 12 or 13, 2003. The Council would then have decided by the 
end of April, based on reports from the inspectors, whether Iraq had complied, or whether the 
use of force was instead warranted. With hindsight, it would have been exceedingly difficult for 
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the Iraqi government to comply with the benchmarks. Baghdad could hardly have accounted for 
its outstanding anthrax and of VX nerve gas stores, given that the relevant documentation had 
probably been destroyed years earlier. Furthermore, Iraqi scientists interviewed abroad might 
have told indicting stories of Saddam‘s attempts to deceive the international community about 
his WMD programs. Would that have been sufficient to achieve a consensus behind authorizing 
force on the Council? Javier Solana, at the time the EU‘s high representative for foreign policy, 
believes that France in particular would have come on board if a longer timeline had been 
offered: ―The French were willing to get out of the mess. There‘s no doubt about that. But the 
impression was that the Americans were very decided.‖1287  
In short, what prevented an agreement on a new benchmarks resolution at the SC was not 
principled opposition from either France, Russia, or any of the nonpermanent members, but 
rather Washington‘s unwillingness to consider a longer timeline for Iraqi compliance. 
Negroponte remembers that by the time the benchmarks proposal was being discussed, ―it was 
obvious to me that Washington had decided to move on.‖1288 With Greenstock unable to offer the 
six nonpermanent members any compromise agreement regarding the deadline, the benchmarks 
negotiations had collapsed by Friday, March 14.
1289
 On Monday, March 17, Washington and 
London formally declared Security Council negotiations to be over. Three days later, on March 
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19, President Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom, and soon thereafter the 




Conclusion: What could have been done differently? 
Implicit in the aforementioned paragraphs is the argument that Washington and London 
could probably have obtained a further UN resolution authorizing military action, if the Bush 
administration had been willing to allow for more time and make a greater diplomatic effort. 
General Abizaid, who by early 2003 was deputy commander at CENTCOM, rejects the 
argument sometimes made by civilian Bush administration officials that U.S. military leaders 
pushed Washington to go to war by March 2003, because American forces would have been 
incapable of fighting in the Iraqi summer heat. Even in the summer, U.S. forces equipped with 
advanced technological capabilities could have avoided the heat by fighting at night (as they had 
already partially done during the 1991 Gulf War):  
It would have been a problem, but it was not an insurmountable problem. I believe it was 
not a military decision, it was a political decision, and then some of the political 
leadership came up with this idea that it couldn‘t be done later. Of course it could be 
done. It could be done anytime. I didn‘t feel any great pressure from our military 




Armitage, a former Navy officer who had served three combat tours in Vietnam, 
remembers explicitly telling the president not to feel pressured by rising temperatures in Iraq. ―I 
said, Mr. President, don‘t be rushed in your decision by rising daytime temperatures, because we 
own the night—and it‘s a lot cooler then.‖1292  
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It appears that the decision to go to war in March 2003, as opposed to waiting another 
two months to try to forge a diplomatic consensus at the Security Council, was based on a fairly 
clear cost-benefit assessment in Washington. From a U.S. domestic political standpoint, support 
for military action was highest in February 2003, following a public presentation by Secretary 
Powell at the Security Council on February 5.
1293
 By waiting for much longer, the president 
risked appearing indecisive vis-à-vis an opponent that he and his administration had increasingly 
portrayed as a vital, imminent threat to the United States. ―We were so leaning forward,‖ 
explains Armitage. ―The momentum that had built in the administration didn‘t favor waiting at 
all.‖1294 With strong domestic political support for military action, and most members of the 
administration expecting that toppling Saddam Hussein and stabilizing Iraq thereafter would be 
easy, the president and his advisers saw little reason to engage in further costly diplomacy, with 
the additional disincentive that the final outcome at the Security Council would still have been 
less than certain. By early March, furthermore, Washington‘s chief ally, Tony Blair, was 
overcoming his own domestic political problems, as British Attorney General Peter Goldsmith, 
reversing his own earlier opinion, declared on March 7 that military action would be legal based 
on existing UN resolutions.
1295
 With Britain‘s support for the war no longer in doubt, the 
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administration in Washington appears to have lost any interest in the UN process whatsoever. By 
early March, Negroponte recalls, ―our minds were on other things.‖1296 
Apart from the aforementioned missed opportunity to force a vote in late February, and 
the subsequent last-minute scramble over benchmarks, an explicit UN mandate for military 
action might well have been obtained if a different strategy had been followed from the outset. 
To begin with, President Bush could have instructed his administration and senior OSD officials 
in particular to adopt a less abrasive diplomatic style, by seriously engaging and consulting with 
major international partners from early on, instead of treating them in a patronizing manner that 
frequently bordered on outright contempt. As one former member of the administration recalls, 
even in private discussions, senior policy officials like ―Douglas Feith and Secretary Rumsfeld 
were just destructively reckless in how they talked about the allies.‖1297 These officials, as 
previously shown, genuinely believed that forging an international consensus leading up to the 
war would be unnecessary. Their harsh public rhetoric vis-à-vis major international partners—
such as Rumsfeld‘s dismissal of French and German concerns about a rush to war as the views of 
―old Europe‖—increased diplomatic frictions and significantly narrowed whatever space there 
might have been to achieve a UN consensus in the short run.
1298
  
Finally, a better functioning interagency process, with NS adviser Rice promoting a frank 
debate among the president‘s senior advisors leading up to the war, could have made a 
significant difference. Several former administration officials interviewed for this dissertation 
agree that Rice took a backseat in NSC discussions leading up to the war. She generally sought 
to resolve debates by blending the views of different senior policy officials, instead of clarifying 
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divergent positions for the president.
1299
 That allowed the most committed and hard-line 
officials, with Rumsfeld and Cheney at the forefront, to dominate the interagency process and 
largely set the agenda on Iraq.
1300
 The dysfunctional NSC process also made it easier for the 
hard-liners to initiate covert force deployments as early as mid-2002, without any cabinet-level 
decision about whether there should be a war in the first place. Rumsfeld and his staff were thus 
able to lead the nation along a default path toward military action, which eventually made it 
politically unfeasible to postpone the war beyond early 2003.  
A frank NSC debate about war strategy during the first half of 2002, for instance, might 
have persuaded the president to follow the suggestion of senior officials from the State 
Department and the Joint Staff, such as Armitage, Grossman, and Abizaid, according to whom 
the administration should not have aimed for military action before the fall of 2003. Such an 
alternative approach might have allowed the administration to forge a consensus at the UN 
Security Council and bring key international partners on board behind military action, before a 
U.S. invasion appeared all but inevitable in foreign capitals. Like Grossman, Abizaid believes 
that if the Bush administration had taken the time, the United States could have put together a 
UN-backed coalition, similar to the one forged in 1991, ―both for combat operations and for 
activities afterwards.‖ Alas, he concludes, ―there was this rush to move quickly and that rush 
didn‘t come from the military, it came from the civilian government.‖1301  
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The foregoing empirical chapters corroborate my bureaucratic politics theory of U.S. 
multilateralism for armed interventions. In the cases of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the military 
leaders by-and-large acted as politically independent professionals. The chairman and vice-
chairman of the JCS were initially opposed to or highly skeptical about using force for the 
purpose of changing the domestic politics of foreign countries. The military‘s principal concerns 
were that U.S. objectives were either unclear or exceedingly ambitious; hence armed intervention 
would most likely result in costly, open-ended troop deployments; and in the absence of 
perceived vital threats to American interests, U.S. public and congressional support could not be 
taken for granted. Civilian advocates of intervention, confronted with great initial reluctance or 
opposition from the military brass, needed to reassure the military leaders, or at least be able to 
show that the military‘s concerns had been adequately addressed, in order to forge a broad 
bureaucratic coalition in favor of intervention and persuade the president to move ahead with the 
use of force. The ensuing bureaucratic bargaining and deliberations in Washington increasingly 
drove the U.S. policy process toward relevant IOs—the UN in the case of Haiti, and NATO in 
the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo.  
These bureaucratic political dynamics were not exclusive to the Clinton administration: 
as briefly discussed in chapter two, the military leaders and their governmental allies also pushed 
the Washington policy process toward multilateralism leading up to U.S. interventions in 
Somalia in 1992, Liberia in 2003, and Libya in 2011. In all those cases, activist policy officials 
sought to obtain the advance endorsement of relevant IOs as part of a broader strategy aimed at 




Hence the military leaders, through their concern about open-ended troop commitments 
overseas, have fundamentally steered the Washington policy process toward multilateralism 
leading up to humanitarian and other idealist interventions. 
 The 2003 Iraq case is more complex. As I showed in chapter six, leading up to the Iraq 
war, several high-ranking military officials, notably on the Joint Staff and in the services, 
doubted that Saddam Hussein‘s regime constituted an imminent, vital threat to the United States; 
and they perceived the Bush administration‘s drive to war as largely reflecting political and 
ideological motives. The military planners also expected that a long-term U.S. troop commitment 
would be needed for postwar stabilization, which in turn made broad international support highly 
desirable in their eyes. This analysis was also shared by Secretary of State Powell, the Bush 
administration‘s leading war veteran, who explicitly recommended that the president seek to 
obtain a UN endorsement for military action.  
On Iraq, however, the nation‘s top military authorities, Generals Myers and Pace, 
respectively the chairman and vice chairman of the JCS, as well as CENTCOM commander 
Tommy Franks, were closely aligned with the administration‘s civilian hawks and never openly 
challenged the hard-liners‘ exceedingly optimistic assumptions about postwar Iraq. With little or 
no support from the JCS chairman and vice-chairman or from General Franks, and with the 
Pentagon‘s civilian leadership agitating for war, it was exceedingly difficult for other U.S. 
general officers to convey their views to the president and the NSC. Furthermore, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld deliberately sought to limit the military‘s political influence, by appointing 
loyalists to top positions, silencing dissenters, and frequently brushing aside unwelcome military 
advice on matters of policy and operations. In the absence of vigorous military opposition or 




dynamics that had decisively pushed the Washington policy process toward IO-based 
multilateralism on other occasions were not activated leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. Hence the 
American effort to seek a UN endorsement for the use of force against Iraq was always half-
hearted, and it was completely abandoned in early 2003, as it became clear that the SC was 
unwilling to hastily rubber stamp a U.S. invasion aimed at regime change. In consequence, with 
little international buy-in, the United States has had to shoulder a very large proportion of the 
postwar stabilization and reconstruction burden in Iraq on its own, at an estimated cost of well 




The future of U.S. multilateralism for military interventions 
Based on the theory and overall analysis presented in this dissertation, several cautious 
predictions can be made about the future of U.S. military intervention and multilateralism. First, 
after the disastrous interlude of near-complete military subservience to civilian interests during 
the administration of President George W. Bush, the U.S. military brass can be expected to 
reassert their professional independence, offering their own vigorous contribution to Washington 
policy debates about armed intervention. The military‘s professional viewpoint, for instance, 
already appears to have had a significant impact on the Obama administration‘s policies on 
armed intervention in Afghanistan and Libya, preventing a precipitous troop withdrawal that 
might have harmed U.S. credibility in the first case, and persuading the administration to 
minimize its own involvement in the latter. The military‘s staunch opposition to further 
interventions aimed at changing the domestic politics of foreign countries also appears to have 
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Moreover, given the high long-term costs of the unilateral Iraq invasion, civilian leaders 
in Washington are likely to more readily follow the military‘s advice in the foreseeable future, 
seeking to limit American liability, by either keeping U.S. ground troops entirely out of foreign 
political conflicts, or intervening only after having obtained the endorsement of relevant IOs. As 
political scientist John Mueller has written, in U.S. national security circles, the injunction ―no 
more Vietnams‖ is already being replaced, or updated, by ―no more Iraqs.‖1304 Hence for the 
foreseeable future, the United States is unlikely to intervene unilaterally to promote domestic 
political change abroad, in the absence of direct threats to American citizens or key allies.  
 At the same time, it might become increasingly difficult for the United States to obtain 
the explicit endorsement of relevant IOs, and notably of the UNSC, for military interventions in 
the future. Paradoxically, the diffusion of democratic political regimes, which the United States 
generally supports, will make it more difficult for the United States to garner IO endorsement for 
armed interventions overseas. In the past, it used to be fairly easy for the United States to obtain 
affirmative votes on the SC from foreign autocrats who depended on Washington for military, 
diplomatic, and financial assistance. As foreign countries increasingly democratize, however, 
their leaders must take into account the preferences of their people to a greater degree, if they are 
to survive politically—and U.S. military interventions are often extremely unpopular among 
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domestic audiences in Latin America, Asia, and even Western Europe. John Ruggie, for instance, 
cogently reminds us that ―in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War the United States had the most 
trouble not with authoritarian states or kleptocracies but with other democracies—and not only in 
‗old Europe‘ France and Germany, but also in Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey.‖1305 In line 
with this argument, one recent study has found that the preference gap between the United States 
and the rest of the world, as measured by voting patterns at the UN General Assembly, has 
widened at a constant rate since the end of the cold war.
1306
 
 Furthermore, the diffusion of global power away from the United States is likely to 
increase the cost to Washington of persuading states like China, Russia, India, or Brazil to either 
vote in favor of prospective U.S. military interventions at the SC or at least to not explicitly 
oppose them. Rising powers like China, India, and Brazil—also known as leaders of the ―Non-
Aligned Movement‖ (NAM)— all espouse a fairly traditionalist conception of state sovereignty, 
which does not fit easily with notions of humanitarian military intervention and more generally 
armed interference in the domestic politics of foreign countries. Following the U.S.-led Kosovo 
intervention in 1999, for instance, the 100-odd members of the NAM unanimously adopted a 
declaration stating: ―We reject the so-called ‗right‘ of humanitarian intervention, which has no 
legal basis in the UN Charter or in the general principles of international law.‖1307  
 What are the most likely implications of the aforementioned international political 
changes for U.S. decision making on military intervention? According to some analysts, given 
that explicit approval from the SC will be increasingly difficult to obtain, the United States can 
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Journal of Politics, 66 (3), 2004, pp. 729-54. 
1307 See Non-Aligned Movement, ―Final Document: XIII Ministerial Conference,‖ Cartagena, 8 - 9 April, 2000. 




be expected to rely more on ad-hoc coalitions of the willing or seek the endorsement of regional 
IOs in the future.
1308
 Support from ad-hoc coalitions may be helpful for the purpose of boosting 
U.S. domestic political approval of military action. Yet by definition, ad-hoc coalitions lack an 
institutionalized mechanism to lock in international support; and thus the endorsement of ad-hoc 
coalitions cannot reassure skeptical policy officials in Washington about longer-term burden 
sharing. Put differently, when the military leaders and their bureaucratic allies strongly oppose a 
prospective intervention, due to the expectation of a costly entanglement and open-ended troop 
commitment, merely the support of ad-hoc coalitions is unlikely to reassure them and reduce 
their opposition.  
In principle, the United States could rely on regional IOs, first and foremost NATO, as a 
viable substitute to SC endorsement. However, barring a direct external attack on a NATO 
member state, Washington‘s European allies are highly unlikely to endorse, let alone actively 
support, a U.S.-led military intervention overseas, in the absence of a prior authorization from 
the SC. The Kosovo experience of 1999, where NATO reluctantly endorsed a U.S.-led military 
intervention without UN cover, after months of pushing and prodding from Washington, will 
probably remain the exception. Major European states such as Germany, Italy, and France 
arguably had important national interests at stake in the Balkans; but the Balkans are being 
gradually stabilized, with the prospect of EU membership down the road offering a powerful 
incentive for peaceful conflict management in the region. Given how difficult it was to achieve a 
NATO consensus over Kosovo, and taking into account the growing ―intervention fatigue‖ 
among European publics following a decade-long military engagement in Afghanistan, it is hard 
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to imagine that the alliance could endorse any future ―out of area‖ interventions in Central Asia, 
Africa, or the Middle East, without a prior SC mandate. Other regional IOs, such as the OAS, the 
African Union, or the Arab League, are even less likely to endorse U.S.-led military 
interventions targeting any of their own members in the absence of prior UN authorization, given 
persistent sensitivities in most of the developing world to western interference. In short, in the 
foreseeable future, endorsement from regional organizations might usefully supplement UNSC 
approval of U.S. interventions and help further lock in international support for post-combat 
peacekeeping and reconstruction, but it is unlikely to become a viable substitute to SC approval.  
 If the military leaders and their bureaucratic allies in Washington oppose a prospective 
intervention based on the expectation of high long-term costs, there are few alternatives for those 
wishing to forge an interagency consensus on the use of force to obtaining the explicit approval 
of the UN Security Council. However, given that SC approval is likely to become more difficult 
to obtain, in the future we are probably going to see more vote-trading initiated and side-
payments offered by the United States, as Washington seeks to persuade skeptical member states 
to vote in favor of military action. Put differently, in the face of a resurgent Russia and rising 
China, the SC will function even more than has hitherto been the case like a classical great-
power concert or security regime, based on reciprocity, logrolling, and mutual accommodation 
among its principal members.
1309
 At the same time, given the growing costs of UN endorsement, 
hawkish policy officials in Washington will more frequently than in the past be unable to muster 
the necessary resources to obtain an explicit SC mandate. That, in turn, can be expected to make 
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it more difficult for activist U.S. leaders to reassure the skeptical military and forge winning 
bureaucratic coalitions in favor of armed intervention.  
The shift of global power away from the U.S. and its allies also implies that other 
powerful states might be able to react more forcefully in the future to American interventions 
they fundamentally oppose. For instance, twenty years from now, in the aftermath of U.S. 
interventions widely perceived as internationally illegitimate, rising democracies like India or 
Brazil might choose to cooperate less with the United States on issues of concern to Washington. 
Put differently, ―soft balancing‖ against the United States, while not a concern to American 
leaders at present, might further constrain Washington policy making in the future. Presumably, 
even mere threats of international retaliation, or reduced cooperation with the United States, as a 
consequence of unilateral military action, would add further ammunition to those policy officials 
in Washington who are skeptical about a prospective intervention to begin with. In short, then, 
over the next few decades the United States is likely to become more multilateralist in outlook on 
matters pertaining to the use of force, but given the growing costs of obtaining explicit IO 
approval, U.S. humanitarian and other idealist interventions aimed at changing the domestic 
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